A Peace Process Play-by-Play

Enough experts lay out the preliminary deal between the Sudanese Government and the Darfuri rebel group JEM.

As the ink still dries on a preliminary deal between the Government of Sudan and Darfur’s largest rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, the situation at the Darfur peace talks in Doha, Qatar is changing rapidly. Here’s an update capturing what we are hearing from various sources in Doha or close to the talks, recognizing that the situation remains highly fluid.

The Justice and Equality Movement - Government of Sudan Framework Agreement

Following up on a draft framework agreement signed in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena last weekend, the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leadership met in Doha on February 23, 2010, to sign a final version of a deal that sets out the terms of their forthcoming negotiations over peace in Darfur. (AlJazeera captured footage from the signing ceremony.)

In large part, the agreement is a pledge to have further negotiations, but it does include some important immediate steps. Key provisions include a two-month ceasefire, release of JEM prisoners in Khartoum (this notably includes JEM leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim’s half-brother), and recognition of JEM as political party. The framework agreement also identified some of the key topics to address during formal talks, including power and wealth sharing and compensation for Darfuri victims, and stipulates that negotiations should conclude by March 15. This rapid timetable is obviously somewhat unrealistic given the complexity of issues such as the demobilization of forces, a fact which even some of the mediators quietly acknowledge.

There is also talk of postponing the state and gubernatorial elections in Darfur until a later date (perhaps November) Contrary to some press reports, our source was confident that the presidential election in Darfur will proceed as planned in April. This formulation on elections has appeal to both JEM and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Bashir would get to claim ‘legitimacy’ with an April presidential victory that included Darfur, and JEM would be given more time to establish itself as a political party before parliamentary and gubernatorial elections take place in Darfur.

JEM’s Khalil Ibrahim insisted in a press conference that no one from his group would stand in the upcoming elections. This declaration would seem to be at odds with his desire to establish JEM as a viable political party. And the insistence perhaps unwittingly acknowledges an unwritten understanding that the Sudanese government would grant political posts to JEM before the rebels would even need to run for office.

We understand that there is also tacit agreement between JEM and the Government of Sudan that a vice presidential position would go to a Darfuri, but not a JEM leader. Ibrahim might receive a governorship.

^{AP Images / Alfred De Montesquiou}

The Liberation and Justice Movement

Making the situation even more murky, the process of negotiations between JEM and the Sudanese government has been accompanied by a parallel effort to unite other Darfuri rebel groups, a number of whom are now negotiating as a block called the Liberation and Justice Movement. Tensions clearly remain between JEM and these other groups, and the ability to reconcile these tensions will likely determine if the agreements of the last several days are a genuine breakthrough or yet one more series of broken promises.

The African Union-United Nations mediators, the Qatari hosts, and U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration are pushing for the Liberation and Justice Movement to negotiate with the Government of Sudan on a parallel track to JEM, with a plan to bring the two tracks together toward the end of talks. The Liberation and Justice Movement, the Government of Sudan, and the mediators are reportedly putting finishing touches on a framework agreement, which is expected to be made public shortly. The Liberation and Justice Movement framework agreement reportedly closely resembles JEM’s (minus the prisoner release provision).

The Liberation and Justice Movement consists of 10 separate groups, five of which reportedly receive backing from Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi. The groups have more or less rallied around a leader, former governor of Darfur Tijani Seise, though there are already reports of some displeasure among the ranks because he is a civil society leader and not a rebel. There is an understanding that he could be named vice president at the end of negotiations.

One rebel faction still not bought in to this coalition is the group with ties to prominent Darfuri leader Abdel Wahid, who lives in Paris and has refused to join the talks in Doha. This group, known as the Wahid Commanders, issued a statement declaring a commitment to peace, but refusing to join the Liberation and Justice Movement or to accept Tijani Seise as the leader because of his presumed links to the Libyans. Wahid himself was dismissive of the agreement with JEM, calling it a “ceremonial peace.”  International negotiators have long been frustrated by Wahid’s reluctance to join unified talks, but it is also clear that he maintains an important base of support among Darfuris.

Dual Track Negotiations

The mediation team is charging ahead with its dual track approach to negotiations, despite the protestations of JEM leader Ibrahim, who appears to feel that smaller rebel groups and civil society do not deserve a prominent place at the negotiating table. The African Union-United Nations mediators, the Qataris, and the U.S. special envoy all seem to support the parallel negotiation track, not necessarily because they see it as ideal, but because they think it is the best they can do at this moment. This may be an accurate assessment on their part, but there are obvious pitfalls to such an approach.

Perhaps most dangerous to the prospects for peace, JEM appears to be quite cool to the idea of other Darfuri players being given a seat at the table. While JEM may be the most important military force, it is far from representative of all Darfuris. In a press conference, Dr. Khalil suggested that it would be a waste of time to negotiate with the other groups because they do not represent movements. To paraphrase from Dr. Khalil’s statement at a press availability (an exact transcript was not available):

Some of these so-called leaders are taxi drivers in N’Djamena and street sweepers in the Netherlands. They will not negotiate with the Government of Sudan while we are also negotiating. It is up to this forum to choose whether to let us negotiate alone or have the others negotiate. People in Darfur and Kordofan will not accept that movements will be made in the lobby of hotels.

One interpretation of Dr. Khalil’s remarks was that JEM is trying to intimidate the mediators into giving JEM the greatest possible leadership role even while recognizing that the mediation team won’t back down from the parallel track approach and that other groups will have to have their voices heard over time. Ultimately JEM also likely recognizes that this brinkmanship has its dangers, and they could well be blamed if talks collapse – leaving them in a vulnerable position both politically and militarily. Diplomats remain optimistic that the two-track negotiations would proceed and hope that an agreement on the terms of the formal talks can be made public next week.