Bad things have a tendency to happen in faraway parts of the world during the holiday season, when policymakers head home and the 24hour news cycle momentarily slows down. Last year the LRAkilled nearly a thousand people during the Christmas massacres following the botched Operation Lightning Thunder. At the same time on the other side of the continent, the military junta commanded by Moussa Dadis Camara took power in Guinea, precipitating the crisis that has pushed that country to the brink. In 2007, violence ripped through Kenya following elections that were held on December 27, with some 1,500 people killed. And back in 2006 there was the disastrous Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, which took place on Christmas Eve.
This is no coincidence. Rebels and politicians alike know that they can get away with a lot when no one is paying attention. This is why Enough sounded the alarm about new threats by the LRA in northeast Congo, and we hope that the reinforcements deployed by the UN to that region can help protect civilians. Wouldn’t it be nice to have a quiet holiday this year?
A powerful statement issued a couple of weeks ago (while I was further in the field) by the Episcopal Church of Sudan is worth highlighting for the palpable frustration it conveys. Although the North and South have reached some consensus on the referendum law, the situation on the ground in southern Sudan remains tenuous, where patience with the implementation of the 2005 North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (or lack thereof) is waning among church leaders and their constituents. A clip from the statement:
We express our sadness at the missed opportunity for making the unity of the Sudan attractive since the signing of the CPA: the lack a reconciliation process, the lack of transparency over the National Census and oil revenues, the failure to repeal or alter laws which are contrary to the spirit of the CPA which guarantees equality and freedom for all, the stalling implementation of the July 2009 Abyei ruling, and the current deadlock over the legislation governing the referendum in Southern Sudan and the popular consultations in Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. Unity has not been made attractive.
The Episcopal Church of Sudan also sounded the alarm about the challenges of the coming year:
The peace process in Sudan has reached a critical point. With less than five months before National Elections and just over one year to the referendum on southern self-determination, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is on the brink of collapse due to contentions over the referendum law, the demarcation of the 1st January 1956 borders, and violence recently perpetrated by other armed groups.
Increasingly, southerners are speaking out and voicing their grievances with the stalled implementation of the CPA. Simply put, comprehensive peace is not a reality today in southern Sudan. Many voices – from people I have met in villages in Jonglei state, to the southern President Salva Kiir, who has made his opinion known publicly and repeatedly in the past several weeks – are trying to get the word out: “Unity has not been made attractive.”
MAKPANDU REFUGEE CAMP, Southern Sudan -- Mama Francoise was impeccably dressed. She ducked under the dense straw canopy just moments after the “village” chief here in Makpandu refugee camp sent someone to fetch her, so it was clear that the vibrant green and blue fabric wrapped around her waist, bright yellow lacy top, gold chain, and dainty gold earrings were part of Mama Francoise’s daily attire; she wasn’t dressing up for the visitors.
From the bright Congolese fabric, her command of French, and her dissatisfaction with the type of food she was receiving in the camp, it was clear that Francoise was not at home. “These people don’t know maize flour; they know rice,” our interpreter explained. And despite the lingering threat of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Francoise’s hometown, she says she has no intention of staying here in a refugee camp in southern Sudan.
“As soon as I harvest my groundnuts, I’m going to go home,” she said.
Situated just over an hour’s drive from the border with Congo, the U.N. refugee agency opened Makpandu to accommodate some of the thousands of Congolese refugees that flooded over the border into Sudan when the LRA moved its campaign of terror into the dense jungle of northeastern Congo. The camp is currently home to over 2,700 people.
“I had heard that a Ugandan militia had attacked in Garamba National Park [in northeastern Congo] and killed some of the park rangers,” Francoise explained. “But I had never seen the LRA or heard much about them until they came to my village.”
In fact, the day the LRA struck, Francoise wasn’t in her village. She and her daughter had traveled to Duru, a larger town about 22 kilometers from her home, to go to the market. In broad daylight, the LRA appeared and began attacking, some armed with rudimentary weapons like machetes and clubs, others with guns.
People from around the area fled, as the LRA attacked multiple villages. As she ran toward Sudan, Francoise learned that her own village was targeted too. The militia had corralled her husband and some of the other older people into a house and burned it down. Her son was captured by the LRA.
Mama Francoise recently got word that her son had escaped after five months with the LRA. Francoise thinks he has returned home now, though she has little news of him, and she’s not sure he knows that she is in Sudan.
Thinking that her son’s escape would be the bright spot in this tragic story, we started to ask follow up questions about how they might be reunited, but Mama Francoise’s sudden tears deterred us. “We cannot talk of him,” she said quietly, after a long pause. Perhaps the future feels too uncertain to hypothesize about what may come next.
When our conversation shifted to life before the LRA threat, Francoise brightened. She spoke lovingly of her husband, a high school teacher who taught geography and French. The pair had met when Francoise was 15 years old, and they married soon after. Francoise was also a teacher; she taught in a nursery school in their town.
The calm in her voice as she described her previous life gave the impression that Francoise was reminiscing about a long-lost childhood, a time when she took for granted the relative privilege her family enjoyed. In reality, the dramatic turn of events that landed Francoise in the refugee camp began unfolding around this time last year. January will mark one year of living at Makpandu camp.
When we inquired after her daughter, Francoise shook her head. “She is not well,” she said, though it was unclear whether her daughter is ill or suffers from the challenges that pain all the residents in this temporary refuge. “We’re not happy here. There is no good treatment, no food, no one to hear our complaints. No one cares,” she added.
We asked when the groundnuts would be ready for harvest. The end of December, Francoise said. She will only be here a couple more weeks.
The U.N. refugee agency will transport people back to their homes once the U.N. deems an area secure. For now, Francoise’s hometown is still at risk of attack by the LRA, so she will make the journey alone with her daughter. Mama Francoise says she doesn’t know what to expect at home, but even the unknown is preferable to the life in this camp that she knows too well.
Please see this post to hear the story of Clementine, another woman we interviewed for this series about Makpandu refugee camp.
We’ve come a long way. Just over a year ago, we were brainstorming on the basics – interviewing in Congo and Washington on how much money the armed groups were making from the minerals trade, consulting geologists on which minerals we were talking about, researching with supply chain experts the potential paths that conflict minerals might take to end up in any consumer products. We debated what to call the campaign – blood metals, war electronics, conflict minerals?
And yet just a year on, things are moving at a breakneck speed. Yesterday the New York Times published its list of Buzzwords of the Year, and conflict minerals was one of them. This is the Times’ list of terms that have captivated America’s attention over the past year - “what resonated, what stuck, what the year revealed about the sensibility of the nation, whether you’re a wise Latina woman, a mini-Madoff, a teabagger or Balloon Boy.” Nested between Cash for Clunkers and Dracula Sneeze, conflict minerals is defined by the Times almost precisely how we have campaigned on it: “Gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum, widely used in electronic devices and commonly mined in politically unstable countries or regions. Related to conflict diamonds.”
There are clearly important hurdles to overcome in the coming year, but this issue has generated incredible momentum in 2009 on so many fronts - from a powerful 60 Minutes episode to far-reaching House and Senate bills to celebrity blogs and videos to the NYTimes list. Companies are telling us that this is now one of the top two issues on their corporate governance agendas.
The truth is powerful. The life and death urgency for people, particularly women, in eastern Congo is the real drive behind why this issue is so captivating for people. But campaigning on conflict minerals has also been something new and innovative over the past year; the campaign helps explain a complex war and a key part of its solution to millions of people across the U.S. and Europe in a way that people can understand and work to help end. Awareness is spreading, thanks to your collective work as activists, consumers, constituents, and interested policymakers.
Our goal in 2009 was to generate real attention on this issue, and we are getting there. Now, time to mobilize to bring about real change on the ground in Congo in the year to come.
Photo: A 16-year-old mines for gold in eastern Congo. (Grassroots Reconciliation Group/Sasha Lezhnev)
Sudan’s national elections scheduled for April 2010 will be neither free nor fair absent significant international pressure on the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, to change the electoral landscape. The Enough Project's latest strategy paper, "Stealing an election in Slow Motion: Time for Real Consequences," argues that the Obama administration must immediately impose consequences on the NCP and be prepared not to recognize the outcome if elections are held in the current climate of violence and political intimidation.
"The first step in ramping up meaningful pressure would be for the U.S. to suspend its support for anything but the local election monitors who will help determine the credibility--or lack thereof--of the process ," said John Prendergast, Enough's founder and the report's author. "Business as usual has to end. There should be no veneer of legitimacy for a process that lacks any credibility."
The recent crackdown by the NCP on senior opposition politicians and the use of tear-gas on pro-democracy protesters demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the basic requirements of credible elections have not been met. “The U.S. and other donors to the electoral process need to stand up and conclude that the Emperor is as naked as he ever was, and blow the whistle now on this deadly charade,” says Prendergast.
Credible elections in Darfur are impossible given rampant insecurity and attacks on civilians and the displacement of the majority of Darfur’s population, and elections in the South could intensify inter-communal and political tensions. “A stolen election would be the beginning of the end for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement," argues Prendergast. "The NCP will almost certainly exploit what it would quickly claim was newfound 'democratic legitimacy' to prevent southern Sudanese from holding the self-determination referendum scheduled for 2011. If that happens, it would be fanciful to think that anything short of full-scale national war would result.”
"If nothing changes before April, U.S. taxpayers will have spent nearly $100 million to support the election of an indicted war-criminal and legitimize the iron-fisted rule of one of the world’s most oppressive regimes," says Enough Executive Director John Norris. "In this context, it is time to alter course in bold and specific ways in order to avert what could be the deadliest conflagration in Sudan’s war-torn post-colonial history."
Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on crises in Sudan, Chad, eastern Congo, northern Uganda, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. Enough’s strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a “3P” crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. Enough works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises. The RAISE Hope for Congo campaign aims to build a permanent and diverse constituency of activists advocating for effective change in eastern Congo, including an end to the long-running conflict and the resulting sexual violence against women and girls, and reforms to reduce trade by rebel groups in conflict minerals. To schedule an interview, please contact Eileen White Read at eread@enoughproject.org; phone 202 641 0779.
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An Enough Project strategy paper released today, "Stealing an Election in Slow Motion: Time for Real Consequences" says that Sudan’s national elections scheduled for April 2010 will be neither free nor fair absent significant international pressure on the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, to dramatically change the electoral landscape. The crackdown by the NCP on December 7 and 14 2009, involving the arrests of senior opposition politicians and the use of tear-gas on protestors, is yet another demonstration that the basic requirements of credible elections, including freedom of expression and assembly, have yet to be met. Credible elections in Darfur are impossible given rampant insecurity and attacks on civilians, the absence of a credible peace process, a disputed census, and the displacement of the majority of Darfur’s population; in the South, elections may fan the flames of simmering inter-communal and political tensions.
If nothing changes before April, U.S. taxpayers will have spent nearly $100 million to support the election of an indicted war-criminal and legitimize the iron-fisted rule of one of the world’s most oppressive regimes. In this context, it is time to alter course in bold and specific ways in order to avert what could be the deadliest conflagration in Sudan’s war-torn post-colonial history.
“The U.S. and other donors to the electoral process need to stand up and conclude that the Emperor is as naked as he ever was, and blow the whistle now on this deadly charade,” said John Prendergast, author of the report and Co-Founder of Enough. “A stolen election would be the beginning of the CPA’s end, as the NCP would almost certainly exploit what it would quickly claim was newfound “democratic legitimacy” to prevent southern Sudanese from holding the self-determination referendum scheduled for 2011. If that happens, it would be fanciful to think that anything short of full-scale national war would result.”
During Sudan's half-century of independence, few spots on Earth have witnessed as much death and destruction, with 2 1/2 million war-related fatalities during the past two decades alone. Although the Darfur genocide that began in 2003 is only one of the conflicts raging in the country, they all stem from the same cause: the abuse of power. The ruling party represses independent voices and supports militias that have used genocide, child soldiers and rape as weapons of war.
Sudan faces a critical new year, with an unfree election coming in April and a referendum on the independence of the south the following January -- tripwires that could provoke a return to full-scale war. In Washington, meanwhile, few challenges have produced a greater chasm between words and deeds. A first step toward closing that gap is debunking the myths about Sudan that persist among policymakers, diplomats and the public.
"During Sudan's half-century of independence, few spots on Earth have witnessed as much death and destruction, with 2 1/2 million war-related fatalities during the past two decades alone. Although the Darfur genocide that began in 2003 is only one of the conflicts raging in the country, they all stem from the same cause: the abuse of power. The ruling party represses independent voices and supports militias that have used genocide, child soldiers and rape as weapons of war. "
- Writes Enough Co-founder John Prendergast in this weekend's Outlook section of the Washington Post. Click to keep reading "Five Myths About Sudan"
Here at Enough, we often swap emails with interesting articles and feature stories that we come across in our favorite publications and on our favorite websites. We wanted to share some of these stories with you as part of our effort to keep you up to date on what you need to know in the world of anti-genocide and crimes against humanity work.
Congo analyst Jason Stearns blogs on what he heard through the grapevine regarding the U.N. Security Council’s next move for the Congo peacekeeping mission, MONUC. According to him, the U.N. body is considering Human Rights Watch’s recommendation of creating a civilian protection expert group—what would certainly be a right step in efforts to make civilian protection in eastern Congo more effective.
Take a look at this interesting On The Mediainterview with Nicholas Kristof on the psychology behind what makes people want to respond and take action for humanitarian causes, such as Darfur.
A press release from Carter Center today commended the broad participation of Sudanese citizens in the voter registration that ended last week. The organization reports that at least 75.8 percent of eligible Sudanese registered, or 15.7 million out of 20.7 million people. In the period leading up to elections, the center called on expanding civic education and making the preliminary voters’ list available so that national and international observers, political parties, and citizens can take a look.
On Wednesday, Credit Suisse agreed to pay $536 million to settle claims brought against it by the U.S. government for helping countries, including Sudan and Iran, violate financial sanctions. Apparently, the bank made more than $1.6 billion in illegal transactions involving Iran, Sudan, Burma, Cuba and Libya from the mid-1990s to 2006. Thanks to Bec Hamilton for the catch.
Submitted by Tsegaye Hidru on December 18, 2009 - 1:11pm.
George Clooney (Ocean's Eleven, Syriana, ER)—Academy award-nominated actor, producer and screenwriter—has been active in African aid and development efforts for years. He co-authored a Wall Street Journal article titled "Obama's Opportunity to Help Africa," in November 2008 with David Pressman and John Prendergast. George, Don Cheadle and John Prendergast have worked and strategized on ways to advance the issue of Darfur. George also narrated the HBO documentary on Darfur Sand and Sorrow.
Sudan’s national elections scheduled for April 2010 will be neither free nor fair absent significant international pressure to dramatically change the electoral landscape.
Enough Co-founder John Prendergast explores the many challenges facing the 2010 Sudan election season.
The deputy police commissioner of Duk Padiet, left, and a police describe an attack on their village. (Photo / Maggie Fick)
Sudan’s national elections scheduled for April 2010 will be neither free nor fair absent significant international pressure on the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, to dramatically change the electoral landscape. The crackdown by the NCP on December 7 and 14 2009, involving the arrests of senior opposition politicians and the use of tear-gas on protestors, is yet another demonstration that the basic requirements of credible elections, including freedom of expression and assembly, have yet to be met. Despite recent progress over key components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, little has been done to change the electoral environment, and many of the national-level reforms included in the CPA have been ignored by the NCP with little outcry from the international community.
Explore our interactive timeline of the elections in Sudan.
In the wake of this crackdown, and in the face of what the Obama administration calls “ongoing genocide,” the United States has yet to impose genuine consequences on NCP officials and others who are obstructing peace in Sudan. If nothing changes before April, U.S. taxpayers will have spent nearly $100 million to support the election of an indicted war-criminal and legitimize the iron-fisted rule of one of the world’s most oppressive regimes.
The current efforts of the United States and the broader international community to end the atrocities in Darfur and prevent all-out war in Sudan are failing. Despite clear signs that the CPA is in jeopardy and continued atrocities against civilians in Darfur and southern Sudan, the Obama administration has yet to impose consequences on those behind the violence.
No consequences for commission or orchestration of crimes against humanity.
No consequences for the brutalization of political opposition and silencing of independent voices.
No consequences for the failure to establish conditions for a free and fair national election.
No consequences for the non-implementation of existing agreements, including the CPA.
A stolen election would be the beginning of the CPA’s end, as the NCP would almost certainly exploit what it would quickly claim was newfound “democratic legitimacy” to prevent southern Sudanese from holding the self-determination referendum scheduled for 2011. If that happens, it would be fanciful to think that anything short of full-scale national war would result. In this context, it is time to alter course in bold and specific ways in order to avert what could be the deadliest conflagration in Sudan’s war-torn post-colonial history.
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Credible elections in Sudan? Not even close
The April 2010 national elections are a central pillar of the CPA, the peace deal that ended the North-South war. But in order for elections to truly achieve the democratic transformation that was intended in the CPA, conditions for holding credible elections must be in place. These conditions include a new security law to reduce the government’s broad powers of arbitrary arrest and detention, an independent electoral commission, clear steps to allow independent media coverage, and unrestricted access for international observation teams. Not one of these preconditions has been met to date. These are the basic freedoms that must be in place for any election to meaningfully reflect the will of the people and for opposition politics to have a chance of challenging the status quo. If they are not there, elections can further inflame the crisis, rather than ameliorate it, and to date the international community has been overwhelmingly focused on technical support for the elections without recognizing that the underlying conditions for a free and fair election are not in place.
Until the NCP agrees to conditions that will allow for credible elections, the United States and other donors should suspend all electoral assistance. Un-free and unfair elections should not be financed and legitimized by American taxpayers. If the Sudanese parties decide to continue with elections without the establishment of these basic standards, the U.S. and the broader international community should not certify its outcome as a credible one.
However, efforts to put in place the conditions for the January 2011 referendum should continue. Not holding the referendum on time is the most certain trigger for all-out war.
The risks of ignoring electoral prerequisites and holding non-credible elections are enormous, with consequences ranging from the humanitarian to the political. Non-credible elections will:
Fuel violence and divisions, particularly in the South and Darfur;
Undermine the CPA’s aim of democratically transforming the country;
Disenfranchise millions of Darfuris;
Provide false legitimacy to an indicted war criminal, Omer al-Bashir, and to his ruling NCP;
Badly discredit international electoral assistance programs;
Reinforce to the NCP that it can ignore key provisions of the CPA such as national political reforms; and,
Waste nearly a hundred million dollars of American taxpayers’ money.
Darfur is particularly vulnerable to flawed elections at this time. Rampant insecurity and attacks on civilians, the absence of a credible peace process, a disputed census, and the displacement of the majority of Darfur’s population are key obstacles to holding truly democratic elections. The displacement of Darfur’s population alone could conceivably lead to myriad problems. Many displaced Darfuris lack proper identification papers or cards, which not only complicates the voting and registration process but also creates ripe opportunities for electoral rigging. Elections in Darfur could formalize displacement; i.e., by registering Darfuris to vote in displaced camps, the NCP may well argue that the individuals who registered in camps have forsaken their legal claims to the lands from which they were driven. The NCP has also routinely encouraged the immigration of non-Darfuris into areas cleared out by the violence, raising questions of whether an election would truly be representative of the region’s people. Elections on these terms will only create new opportunities for the NCP to further exploit the population and hand the ruling party an easy, illegitimate victory. In short, it is almost impossible to imagine a fair election in Darfur in four months, and any national election that does not include Darfur will sorely lack legitimacy.
In the South, piecemeal and ad hoc attempts by the international community and the southern government to address significant security concerns related to the elections are a cause for concern even if the NCP does agree to pre-election reforms. If the elections occur in the current climate, where legitimate elections are impossible, they will fan the flames of simmering inter-communal and political tensions in the South. Elections in the South represent risks that will be all the more threatening if reforms by the NCP do not occur now.
The urgent need for consequences
The U.S. and other donors to the electoral process need to stand up and conclude that the Emperor is as naked as he ever was, and blow the whistle now on this deadly charade.
To be clear, we are not calling for a postponement of the elections, per se, but rather for the creation of conditions for free and fair elections as envisioned in the CPA. The CPA was built upon a clear sequence: national reforms first, to be followed by nation-wide elections and a referendum. If the international community does not condition its continued financial and logistical assistance on substantial reform of the electoral environment, the results will be predictably unfortunate. If the international community lets the NCP gloss over the provisions that would allow for fair elections, without consequences, this will demonstrate once again the lack of international will to enforce crucial CPA components, and will signal to the NCP that it can wriggle out of additional CPA requirements, thus further imperiling the fragile peace in the South. We are calling for full implementation of the CPA. Rushing toward elections without the proper conditions in place will end badly for all involved, and further embolden the NCP to undermine the next major CPA process: the referendum.
Un-free and unfair elections in Sudan and its potentially violent aftermath will continue to undermine efforts toward democratic reforms throughout Africa as a continent. With several countries -- including Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Chad -- holding elections next year and all undermining the underpinnings of democracy in varying degrees, the conduct of credible elections in Sudan is pivotal to countering this negative regional trend. The U.S. rarely pulls the plug on its support for an electoral process, no matter how non-credible it is. Doing so in Sudan would set a positive precedent that the substance of democratic transitions matter to the United States.
There is a reason Sudan is facing this make-or-break scenario. Until now, the parties – particularly the NCP – continue to trample the agreement because there has been no cost for not implementing key parts of the CPA. It is time for President Obama to implement his administration’s own benchmark-based policy. Flouting the establishment of conditions for a credible election and referendum should trigger immediate consequences. The U.S. should work within and outside the U.N. Security Council to develop a coalition of countries willing to impose consequences on the NCP for its obstruction of basic conditions for peace. Consequences should include ratcheting up targeted multilateral sanctions, enforcement of the arms embargo, denial of debt relief, and greater support for further International Criminal Court investigations and indictments. Similar consequences should await senior SPLM officials and Darfur rebel leaders if they are found to be undermining peace as well.
These consequences that allegedly reside in the Obama administration’s confidential annex to its policy are the only instruments that can prevent an all-out national war in Sudan. Consequences, or the meaningful threat thereof, have altered the calculations and behavior of the NCP in the past. They led to the expulsion of Osama bin Laden, the end to slave raiding and aerial bombing in the South, the acceleration of intelligence cooperation after 9/11, and the CPA itself.
There is a path to peace for the parties in Sudan. The United States has a major role to play. But to contribute to peace, the U.S. needs to stand for peace with principle, and back principle with real leverage in the form of credible multilateral consequences in support of genuine democratic processes and verifiable commitment to peace. The first step surely is to suspend U.S. taxpayer support for the unacceptably flawed electoral process, signaling the beginning of a strategy in which fundamental human rights and civil rights violations have real and escalating costs.
A significant majority of weapons in Sudan—two million to be precise—are outside of government control and in the hands of civilians, mostly in the South, says Small Arms Survey in a report released yesterday. This proliferation is a result of a spike in arms acquisition by both North and South ruling parties, in what the organization say is increasingly looking like an “arms race” in the lead up to elections in April.
Arms imports to the Khartoum-based ruling National Congress Party, in particular, have jumped, from 1 million in 2001 to more than 23 million in 2008. According to customs data supplied to the U.N., 90 percent of these imports were supplied by China and Iran.
The southern ruling party’s, or SPLM’s, arms capabilities remain “dwarfed” by those of the NCP and its military. The report said: “More than just the quantitative advantage, the quality, sophistication, and condition of the weapons held by Khartoum are considerably better overall than those held by the SPLA.”
The NCP’s official security forces possess an estimated 470,000 small arms and light weapons, as compared to the SPLM’s 200,000.
When tracing the arms supply chain of major non-state armed groups, three out of five identified patterns originated from the NCP, “whether through deliberate supply, negligence, or via armed engagement,” the group said.
These sobering figures are a reiteration of what will happen if coordinated international efforts to prod Sudanese parties forward in the peace process do not begin immediately—a return to all-out war.
NAIROBI (AlertNet) - Increased attacks on relief workers, ethnic violence and simmering political tensions ahead of elections next year are hampering efforts to deliver aid to millions of Sudanese, putting more lives at risk, aid agencies said.
This year has been the most violent period since the war ended in Sudan in 2005 and hundreds of thousands of people in the south of the country are trapped in a worsening crisis, medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) said.
A surge in ethnic violence in the south, which has killed some 2,000 and displaced a quarter of a million people, is creating a humanitarian disaster, aid workers said.
Be sure to check out Nicholas Kristof’s editorial in the New York Times today, profiling Sudanese refugee Valentino Achak Deng and his efforts to build a high school in his hometown in South Sudan.
Kristof describes Deng as an inspiring figure, rising from a childhood occupied with fleeing the perils of the Sudanese civil war, to become a leader for change in his community.
Kristof says, rightly so:
“Valentino had earned the right to take it easy for the next 600 years; instead, he sets an astonishing example of resilience, compassion and charity.”
Deng’s high school in the town of Marial Bai has enrolled 100 students so far, but his sights are set higher, hoping to increase the number of students to 450 and to have over half of those enrollees be girls.
Though the high school is operational, much remains to be done. You can support Deng’s work through a donation, or, if you’re a teacher, volunteer to train teachers and work with students at the high school.
To learn more, go to the website for the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, here.
Photo: Valentino Achak Deng. (The Valentino Achak Deng Foundation)
Lord’s Resistance Army’s Sends Chilling Threatto Congolese Civilians: ‘We Will Celebrate Christmas With You’
WASHINGTON, D.C– Enough, the anti-genocide project at the Center for American Progress, released the following statement today regarding incursions by the Lord's Resistance Army rebel group against civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Enough calls on the United Nations Security Council and member states, including the United States as the greatest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping, to put immediate pressure on the Congolese government and the U.N. peacekeepers to improve civilian protection in the north-eastern reaches of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Recent interviews conducted by Enough Project researchers traveling in Haut Uele and Bas Uele in Province Orientale, in northern Congo, suggest that the Lord's Resistance Army--a transnational terrorist group with a 20-year record of atrocities--is threatening to repeat the massacres it committed during Christmas 2008, in which over 800 Congolese civilians were brutally murdered.Meanwhile, Congolese army units deployed to protect local populations from the LRA continue to commit grave abuses against Congolese civilians.
The LRA have killed nearly 1,500 Congolese civilians and abducted 3,000 more (including at least 700 children) since the Ugandan army launched an offensive against the LRA in December 2008. The presence of 6,000 Congolese soldiers in Province Orientale--many of them integrated brigades of former rebels and local militia from the troubled Kivu provinces in eastern Congo--has actually made matters worse. The U.N. Mission in the Congo, or MONUC, has deployed to the affected region, but peacekeepers conduct only limited patrols in some LRA-affected area that provide little deterrent against LRA attacks and Congolese army abuses. A battalion of Tunisian reinforcements that was supposed to deploy in June 2009 has yet to arrive.
"Civilians in Haut Uele and Bas Uele not only face the threat of LRA attack, but are also subject to the predations of the Congolese soldiers sent to protect them," said Enough policy advisor Colin Thomas-Jensen. "The international community must press the Congolese government and the United Nations peacekeepers to better protect civilians from attacks."
During a research mission in Haut Uele last week, an Enough field researcher spoke to Congolese civilians who had received direct warnings from the LRA of fresh attacks against the villages of Ngilima, Bangadi and Niangara."Residents of Bangadi and Niangara, as well as local and international relief organizations, also reported having seen letters from the rebels threatening mass killings during the upcoming holiday period," recounted Enough field researcher Ledio Cakaj. "We spoke to former captives of the LRA who recently escaped. They frequently heard the rebels talk about 'celebrating' Christmas with the people of Ngilima, a clear reference to LRA attacks of last Christmas."
The LRA might be planning fresh Christmas attacks as a response to recent claims by the Congolese and Ugandan governments that the rebels are finished. Recent LRA attacks against Ngilima, Bangadi and Niangarademonstrate that the insurgency is far from over, and that the LRA is as brutal as ever. On November 26, a family of eight was burned alive by the LRA in their hut close to Bangadi. Similar attacks reported in the villages of Ngilima and Niangara have left more many dead. On December 2, LRA rebels captured and cut off the ears and lips of a man near Bangadi.On December 12, two men and a woman were mutilated by LRA rebels in Ngulu, 25 km southeast of Bangadi.
Although Congolese soldiers are stationed in a few LRA-affected areas, these forces are raping, killing, and looting the very population they are supposed to protect. “Living with the Congolese army is like living with a viper,” a local resident told Enough. “I have never seen worse behaving people throughout my life.”
U.N. peacekeepers are absent in the villages where the threat of LRA attacks is most acute. Humanitarian organizations have called for increased U.N. troops to provide civilian protection for the last two years. A new battalion of Tunisian peacekeepers was approved by the U.N. Security Council in November 2008, butthese badly needed reinforcements will not arrive in Orientale until at least February 2010.
The recurrent violence and inadequate U.N. protection have forced humanitarian organizations to suspend distribution of food in the hardest hit areas. Unable to cultivate their lands or access humanitarian aid, the residents of Bangadi, Ngilima and Niangara have grown desperate. "We are being exterminated by the LRA and from hunger," a resident of Bangadi told Enough.
"The status quo in northeastern Congo and other LRA affected areas is a miserable failure with an appalling human cost." said Enough Co-Founder John Prendergast. "As a matter of urgency, the United Nations Security Council must work with regional governments and other concerned nations to put in place a more effective counter-insurgency strategy to end the LRA threat once and for all."
Visit theEnough Project’s blog, Enough Said, for updates on this issue.
Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on crises in Sudan, Chad, eastern Congo, northern Uganda, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. Enough’s strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a “3P” crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. Enough works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises. The RAISE Hope for Congo campaign aims to build a permanent and diverse constituency of activists advocating for effective change in eastern Congo, including an end to the long-running conflict and the resulting sexual violence against women and girls, and reforms to reduce trade by rebel groups in conflict minerals. To schedule an interview, please contact Eileen White Read at eread@enoughproject.org; phone 202 641 0779.
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It's the biggest adventure in the aid world—and by far the toughest. JOSHUA HAMMER takes a hard look at the relief effort in the war-torn nation of Chad, where rebels stage their raids on neighboring Darfur and the humanitarian fallout has become the worst show on earth.
The road to hell begins in N'djamena, a Third World backwater that seems to cram all of Africa's problems—corruption, neglect, war, stagnation, tribal rivalry, disease—into a few dusty, desperate square miles. The temperature pushed 120 on a June afternoon as photographer Marco Di Lauro and I weaved through the streets of Chad's capital, following Idriss, a jellabiya-clad rebel from the Justice and Equality Movement, the biggest of at least half a dozen factions waging war with government forces across the border in the Sudanese province of Darfur.
We were on our way to an interview with JEM's head of intelligence, who happened to be in town that week. After leaving the Pekin Hotel, our Chinese-run bed-and-breakfast, we skirted the Chari River, a murky stream populated by hippopotami and by smugglers who wade across the shallow water from neighboring Cameroon, delivering electronics and other goods to far more impoverished Chad. Blocks from the river,
Newly arrived refugees wait outside the UN's Oure Cassoni camp, near Bahai, Chad (Photograph by Marco Di Lauro)
red-bereted members of the Presidential Guard patrolled grim-faced in front of the concrete Palais Rose, the official residence of unofficial president-for-life Idriss Déby Itno. Next to the palace stood Chad's national museum, scarred by a February 2008 rebel attack that left gaping holes in the roof and the bones of an elephant visible through a perforated wall. Vendors loitered on sidewalks in front of pastel-painted, arched colonial buildings, hawking Viagra, fake Swiss Army knives, and Celtel mobile-phone cards. This forlorn center of N'Djamena's commercial life consisted of two banks, a French bakery, the Air France and Ethiopian Airlines ticket offices, and a handful of expat-friendly restaurants. Read more ...
The cross-border nature of the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA—currently active in northeastern Congo, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan—is a clear threat to international peace and security.
Enough experts expose the ongoing violence and turmoil caused by the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa.
Source: Enough / Ledio Cakaj
Arrow Boys are local militia that have organized to defend communities against the LRA.
The cross-border nature of the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA—currently active in northeastern Congo, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan—is a clear threat to international peace and security, but the United Nations Security Council has yet to take seriously its responsibility to protect civilians from the LRA and marshal the will and the resources to put in place an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
In Western Equatoria State in Southern Sudan, where LRA attacks in recent months have killed at least 135 people and driven 67,000 from their homes, the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, have been unable and in some cases unwilling to protect southern Sudanese civilians. Unfortunately, U.N. peacekeepers deployed to support implementation of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement have not risen to the direct challenge to peace posed by the LRA. The Government of Southern Sudan and the United Nations must do better, but improved civilian protection is only one element of a comprehensive strategy to address the LRA threat. Civilians in the affected region will not be safe so long as the LRA continues to operate as a transnational terrorist group.
The U.N. Security Council must authorize and member states must resource a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians in LRA-affected areas, identify and sever external lines of support, increase opportunities for rank-and-file fighters to defect, and end the insurgency once and for all through more effective military pressure on LRA leader Joseph Kony and his high command.
_______________________________________
John Prendergast speaks to activists about the LRA at the How It Ends lobby days event, organized by the Enough Project, Invisible Children, and Resolve Uganda.
Introduction
A spate of brutal attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, in southern Sudan is further evidence of the urgent need for a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians and end the LRA crisis once and for all through an internationally backed counterinsurgency effort. LRA leader Joseph Kony and two of his deputies are wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity, yet his 22-year-old campaign of violence against civilians continues in northeastern Congo, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan. With mounting anecdotal evidence that Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party is again backing proxy militias—including the LRA—to destabilize southern Sudan in the run up to elections next year and a self-determination referendum in 2011, the regional threat to innocent civilians from the LRA is escalating. The international community must respond accordingly.
The cross-border nature of the LRA is a clear threat to international peace and security, but the international response thus far has been woefully inadequate. The situation in Western Equatoria State in Sudan’s southwest corner is but one example among many of the unique challenges that this insurgent group poses to the international community’s responsibility to protect. Recent attacks have caused death, displacement, and made an already difficult humanitarian situation much worse. Farmers have stopped cultivating their land for fear of being abducted and killed, while much of the food surplus they have accumulated has been looted by the LRA.
The status quo response to the LRA in Western Equatoria—and other LRA-affected areas in northeastern Congo and the Central African Republic—is failing. Although the responsibility to protect civilians in Western Equatoria rests first and foremost with the Government of Southern Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, the SPLA’s limited capacity and strained relationship with local populations has made protecting civilians daunting. The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, has also struggled to fulfil its mandate to “protect civilians under threat of imminent violence” from the LRA.
However, a significantly improved effort by the SPLA and UNMIS to protect civilians in Western Equatoria is only one element of what is needed: a comprehensive approach to the LRA threat that protects civilians in these areas and pursues LRA leadership through a properly resourced counterinsurgency effort. Marshalling the will and the resources to put such an approach in place is the responsibility of the U.N. Security Council and U.N. member states. Until the Security Council, working in coordination with the Government of Southern Sudan and other regional actors, takes seriously its responsibility to protect civilians from the LRA and to execute international arrest warrants against LRA leadership, LRA atrocities will continue.
Failing to Protect:
The case of southern Sudan
In the aftermath of Operation Lightning Thunder—a U.S.-backed joint offensive against the LRA in northeastern Congo by Ugandan, Congolese, and southern Sudanese forces in December 2008—the LRA stepped up a campaign of extreme violence, targeting civilians in northeastern Congo, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic.[1]
While these so-called “Christmas massacres” in Congo received international attention, the suffering of southern Sudanese at the hands of the LRA occurs largely under the radar.[2] A U.N. report from October noted that the LRA has already killed 205 people in Western Equatoria in 2009 and abducted another 135 people. Over 67,700 southern Sudanese have been driven from their homes.[3] However, this is potentially the tip of the iceberg. Given the thin international presence in the area, the real numbers for deaths and abductions are likely higher.
The international responsibility to respond to this cross-border threat to international peace and security rests with the U.N. Security Council, but the Security Council has failed thus far to articulate a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians and end the LRA insurgency. In the absence of strong leadership from New York, the Government of Southern Sudan, U.N. Peacekeepers, and local militias have faltered in their efforts to protect civilians in Western Equatoria.
The Government of Southern Sudan:
A perceived lack of will
Enough conducted a series of interviews in and around the towns of Yambio and Nzara during recent field research in Western Equatoria. Most of the people interviewed felt that the SPLA in Western Equatoria cannot protect them because of inadequate troop numbers and limited capacity. A significant number also claimed that the SPLA was unwilling—sometimes refusing outright—to protect them from the LRA. Other witnesses say that SPLA officers have accused local informants of being collaborators, even accusing some villagers of being responsible for the attacks.[4]
Witnesses to LRA attacks said that the SPLA often deployed too late to provide meaningful protection and in some cases failed to act even when they were nearby. One person from the village of Birisi, which is a mile from Yambio, said that in three separate LRA attacks in July and August 2009, SPLA soldiers did not deploy to confront the LRA despite being based in close proximity. According to the same witness, SPLA soldiers told the villagers in Birisi that they did not have the authority to fight the LRA.
Interviewees instead expressed greater confidence in local defence forces called Arrow Boys and the Ugandan army, or UPDF, which has deployed forces to pursue the LRA in southern Sudan. “The UPDF fights the LRA, even the Arrow Boys fight the LRA, but not the SPLA,” said a local chief. The UPDF has made a continuing effort to reach out to the local population for information regarding the LRA. As a religious worker said, “From the level of communications and cooperation it seems as if the UPDF is the local army and the SPLA the foreign one.”[5] One Nzara resident told Enough that in cases of LRA attacks, people inform the UPDF first, then the SPLA: “Had it not been for the UPDF, we would be displaced or killed by now.”[6]
After attacks on the villages of Ukcuo in August 2009 and Bomu in September 2009, there was allegedly no response from the SPLA. At least 16 people were killed in Bomu and many were abducted in both villages. During three separate LRA attacks in August and September 2009 in the villages of Bureangure, Sakure, and Baikpara, SPLA soldiers turned up many hours after the attacks had taken place. According to testimony from displaced persons from Bureangure, SPLA soldiers arrived on the scene at least eight hours after the attack. Many people were killed and abducted but only the Arrow Boys responded, eventually pursuing the LRA into the bush. The bodies of six people killed in Sakure were collected on August 30 by the local population with the help of Ugandan soldiers.
There have been cases when the SPLA engaged the LRA, but these were mostly instances in which the SPLA was directly attacked. And when the SPLA has been given LRA positions, it often fails to seize the initiative. People driven from the village of Karika told Enough that after the LRA attacked their village in August 2009, they informed a nearby SPLA unit. The SPLA commander told the villagers to follow the LRA fighters and inform him when and where the LRA fighters went to sleep. On October 2, 2009, the village of Karika was attacked again even though the exact location of the LRA fighters was purportedly disclosed to the SPLA.
Community and religious leaders held the same views as the majority of the people interviewed, maintaining that the SPLA was incapable of protecting civilians in Western Equatoria. “It is common practice for the SPLA to turn up five hours after the attacks happen,” said a local pastor.[7] U.N. staff and local and international aid workers reflected similar concerns about poor responses from the SPLA to LRA attacks.
While the SPLA is still transforming itself from a guerrilla force to a conventional army, the SPLA’s failure to protect civilians in Western Equatoria cannot be solely attributed to a lack of capacity.[8] According to the SPLA spokesperson, Gen. Kuol Diem Kuol, there are at least 3,000 SPLA soldiers in Western Equatoria, compared to a few hundred LRA fighters.[9]
In almost all of the interviews Enough conducted in the field, there was a consistent view that intercommunal tensions between the SPLA and the local population have undermined the SPLA’s ability and willingness to serve as a protector. The SPLA force in Western Equatoria is composed mostly of soldiers from the Dinka tribe while the local population is Zande. Intercommunal conflict in 2005 and 2006 between the Zande and the Dinka created a climate of lingering suspicion between the two groups. A local journalist said, “The mistrust has never gone away and this is why the Dinka soldiers refuse to protect people they see as their enemies.”[10] A displaced person from Ezo added: “It is very simple: The Dinka does not want to protect the Zande. For the Dinka, the Zande and the Acholi are the same.”[11] The majority of the LRA fighters are Acholi.
After repeated attempts, Enough was unable to meet with the SPLA force commander or any other official SPLA representatives in Western Equatoria to discuss the crisis of civilian protection. The inability to communicate concerns directly to the SPLA is a constant frustration for local residents as well. A journalist told Enough, “The SPLA still thinks of itself as a guerrilla force. There are no official lines of communications, be it for international journalists who want to report on the situation in Sudan or for the simple peasants who want to report LRA attacks.”[12]
U.N. Peacekeepers: Simply inadequate
The United Nations appears dangerously behind the curve in dealing with the LRA. As currently deployed in Western Equatoria, the United Nations does not play a significant role in civilian protection. Some 200 Bangladeshi peacekeepers are based in Yambio, the capital of Western Equatoria, but this is far too small a deployment to take the aggressive measures to carry out the United Nations’ civilian protection mandate.
Moreover, the local population in Western Equatoria has very little trust in the U.N. presence. “They are not even able to protect themselves,” said a local politician, referring to the Bangladeshi battalion.[13] “The LRA attacked them in 2007 and they did not even respond,” he added. Worryingly, the lack of trust has evolved into outright contempt in some cases. “Why are they here in their trucks with their guns if not to protect us” said a community leader referring to the Bangladeshi blue helmets, “to taunt us?”[14]
U.N. humanitarian workers are similarly frustrated with U.N. peacekeepers. “If the LRA attacked us, the peacekeepers will be the first to run,” a U.N. source told Enough.[15] The peacekeepers spoke very little English and have limited interaction with the local population or even humanitarians. “How can they work in a place where they can’t communicate?” asked an international relief worker.[16]
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1870 requests that the U.N. Mission in Sudan make full use of its mandate to provide security to civilian population under imminent threat of violence, and as early as 2006 the council urged the U.N. mission to make full use of its mandate against the LRA.[17] U.N. officials in Western Equatoria, on the other hand, argue that their mandate does not allow them to “go after the LRA.”[18] Yet protecting civilians from imminent attack and hunting an insurgent group are two very different things.
The reality is that protecting civilians from LRA attacks is simply not a priority for U.N. peacekeepers right now. A U.N. worker put it bluntly, “Unfortunately, in terms of numbers of deaths, the LRA in Western Equatoria ranks low when compared to casualties from conflicts in Jonglei and Unity states. The United Nations can only respond to so many conflicts and Western Equatoria is not a priority for it at the moment.”[19] This is dangerously naïve. Few armed groups in the world can match the LRA’s ability to cause maximum chaos with a minimal number of fighters. The death and destruction will only accelerate if Khartoum accelerates support for LRA operations in southern Sudan.
Signs are increasing that the LRA could be used to disrupt the elections and the self-determination referendum. A recent LRA attack in the town of Nzara in Western Equatoria killed four people at an electoral registration centre. As a Zande paramount chief put it to Enough, “How can you talk about supporting peace when people are being killed?”[20]
Local Militias: Filling the void
The security vacuum left by the SPLA and U.N. peacekeepers has given rise to local defence forces known as Arrow Boys. Though occasionally effective in protecting communities from LRA attacks, these armed groups, like the Mayi Mayi in neighbouring Congo, could themselves become a serious threat to civilians.
Currently, there are at least 10 Arrow Boy groups in Western Equatoria, each with 70 to 80 fighters and operating under a loose umbrella command. The fighters possess rudimentary arms—bows and arrows and locally made guns—and most have little to no military experience. Nonetheless, the Arrow Boys have had some successes against the LRA. Arrow Boys conduct night patrols around their communities and occasionally set up ambushes in areas where the LRA is known to operate. Leaders of groups in Yambio and Nzara stated in interviews that they captured at least 12 LRA fighters in the past few months. A recent U.N. report states that four LRA fighters were killed and one captured by Arrow Boys in one week in October.[21]
Local residents interviewed by Enough stated that the Arrow Boys were indispensable to providing protection in Western Equatoria. “This is not a perfect solution,” said a local official, “but the Arrow Boys are providing at least the appearance of safety which is making people not panic.”[22] A religious leader added, “The Arrow Boys are our only hope. You cannot argue with what they are doing which is essentially protecting their families and communities. No one else is doing it.”[23]
The emergence of irregular armed groups in Western Equatoria is, however, cause for concern. Not only is their sustainability questionable—given their disadvantage in weaponry and military training relative to the LRA—the Arrow Boys also have the potential to turn against the very population they claim to protect. The increasing power of the Arrow Boys is evident in the groups’ expanding involvement in administering local justice. Some of these activities border dangerously on vigilante justice. One Arrow Boy leader said, “We are also helping with solving community problems such as apprehending criminals or people who cause trouble.”[24]
On October 28, a reported clash took place between Arrow Boys in Nzara and a group of Ambororo pastoralists. One Arrow Boy was badly injured and at least one Ambororo was killed.[25] There have also been cases where Arrow Boys are reported to have captured and lynched alleged LRA rebels. At least in one case, a person who was caught and badly beaten by Arrow Boys was not a LRA rebel.[26]
Leaders of the Arrow Boys maintained that they are not soldiers, are uninterested in fighting for money, and fight out of necessity. “We got fed up with being killed, raped, and looted,” said Richard Tambua, the leader of the Nzara section of the Arrow Boys.[27] Yet the Arrow Boys have begun to demand ammunition and other supplies from the SPLA to sustain themselves.[28] “We are in constant touch with our state leaders as well as the SPLA so that they know what we do,” he added. One of the local priests told Enough that religious leaders were advising the Arrow Boys against being used as private militias by powerful individuals in the region.[29] This danger will only increase in the absence of more robust efforts by the SPLA and United Nations to protect civilians.
Protecting Civilians in Western Equatoria
and Beyond
The situation in Western Equatoria is dire and poised to get much worse in the months ahead. The region is on the brink of a major humanitarian crisis, and the Government of Southern Sudan, the United Nations, and international donors must take urgent steps to protect civilians there from the LRA. A successful approach in Western Equatoria has two key prerequisites:
Improved SPLA relationship with the local population:LRA attacks have highlighted the SPLA’s inability to protect civilians and general discontent felt by Western Equatorians toward their national army. The SPLA must urgently gain the trust of the local population and build lines of communication with community leaders to determine civilian protection needs and priorities. Improving cooperation and communication between the SPLA and local communities will require a change in perception between the two ethnically divided groups. Military experts and regional analysts also underscored the importance of communications between the army and the local population. “Gathering information from the local population is of utmost importance in counterinsurgency theory,” said a military analyst. “It is something that the U.S. army has been pursuing vigorously in Iraq and Afghanistan with success.”[30]
When Enough inquired among the local population about how to improve civilian protection, most of the answers involved integrating Zande and other Equatorian soldiers into the SPLA unit at Western Equatoria. “They should bring our Zande boys here,” said a local chief. “But if that is not possible, we want other Equatorians here, soldiers from the Rotuka tribe for instance.”[31] Other suggestions included changing the leadership of the SPLA troops. “We need more active leaders in the SPLA here,” said a local journalist. “It might be good to have a Zande force commander here, someone who knows the problems of the community.”[32]
Increased troop presence:The SPLA and United Nations urgently need to deploy more forces to Western Equatoria, especially in the towns of Ezo and Nzara, which have been regular targets of LRA attacks. The SPLA and UNMIS can be more effective by increasing patrols, identifying and surveying known LRA incoming routes, and collecting and using intelligence from the local population. With an increased military presence, the United Nations should assume a coordinating role in civilian protection, cooperating and exchanging information with U.N. peacekeepers in Congo as well as the SPLA and the Ugandan army.
Further thought should also be given to helping the SPLA with logistics such as transport and intelligence sharing. Increasing troop presence on the Congolese and Central African Republic borders is also important. A regional military analyst told Enough that because of the cross-border activities of the LRA “a strategy of adequate civilian protection would involve a simple stationing of troops in strategic areas who would actively engage any incoming forces.”[33]
However, improved civilian protection is only one element of a comprehensive strategy to address the LRA threat. Civilians in the region will not be safe so long as the LRA continues to operate as a transnational terrorist group. As Enough has argued, the U.N. Security Council must authorize and member states must resource a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians in LRA-affected areas, identify and sever external lines of support, increase opportunities for rank-and-file fighters to defect, and end the insurgency once and for all through more effective military pressure on Joseph Kony and the LRA high command.
[3] U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gap analysis for LRA response, October 1, 2009. On file with Enough.
[4] Villagers of Bomu, for instance, who reported an LRA attack to the SPLA in September 2009, were accused of being LRA collaborators. SPLA soldiers did not go after the LRA, despite 16 people being killed and many abducted. When the Arrow Boys decided to pursue the LRA, SPLA soldiers reportedly stopped them and beat up one badly. On September 5, 2009, the village of Uze was attacked by the LRA. One man was killed and another was cut with machetes. The villagers informed the SPLA of the exact house where the LRA were hiding. According to one witness, the SPLA refused to go near the house arresting instead one of the villagers.
[5] Interview with religious worker, Nzara, October 9, 2009.
[6] Interview with Nzara resident, October 9, 2009.
[7] Interview with local pastor, Yambio, October 8, 2009.
[8] One local politician told Enough, ‘The SPLA fought for 22 years during the struggle [with the Sudanese Army] unpaid and unfed. Why can’t they protect their own people now that they have won?”
In recent months, Duk County and other neighboring, largely Dinka counties in western Jonglei state, have been afflicted by several violent attacks by armed, organized, and well-trained militia.
Author:
Maggie Fick
Dec 16, 2009
Photo / Enough
By Maggie Fick
Duk Padiet, Jonglei state, Southern Sudan -- Nyamun Dit Luol Kuai saw her husband shot dead when her hometown of Duk Padiet was attacked on Sunday, September 20. Nyamun’s husband was shot in the forehead when he raised his head out of the grass to look for the attackers who were advancing on his home. Duk Padiet—a town of roughly 35,000 people according to the 2008 census—is about 250 kilometers North of Bor, the capital of Jonglei state. Duk Padiet is the administrative center of Duk county, which is largely populated by the Dinka, one of the major ethnic groups in southern Sudan.
The United Nations estimates that at least 70 people from Duk Padiet were killed and nearly 40 wounded in the attack, including 11 Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army, or SPLA, soldiers, four southern Sudanese policemen and an estimated 60 people from the Lou Nuer militia. Tukuls, or mud huts, in the market and in residential areas of the town were burned to the ground. Administrative structures such as the police station were also razed and the hospital and a World Food Program warehouse were ransacked. An estimated 570 people were displaced from Duk Padiet following the attack, adding to the total of nearly 360,000 people who have been displaced by violence in southern Sudan this year.
Jonglei state: Epicenter of Insecurity
In recent months, Duk County and other neighboring, largely Dinka counties in western Jonglei state, have been afflicted by several violent attacks by armed, organized, and well-trained militia from the Lou clan of a significant rival ethnic group in the South, the Nuer. These attacks come in the context of an upsurge in violence throughout Jonglei state that has pitted all of the main ethnic groups of the state against each other in patterns that often mirror the historic dynamics of intra-South conflict during the North-South civil war: violence between the Nuer and Dinka, the Murle and Nuer, and between Nuer clans are some of the central trends of the conflict reemerging in Jonglei today.
Although Jonglei has been the deadly epicenter of inter-communal violence this year in southern Sudan, armed attacks are occurring in several other states. In Upper Nile state, near Jonglei state’s northern border, Dinka raiders have attacked several Shilluk settlements near the junction of the White Nile and Sobat rivers in the past month, displacing Shilluk populations north towards the already tense town of Malakal.
Jonglei is geographically the largest of the ten states in southern Sudan. According to the recent census, it is also the most populous state, with 1.3 million people counted. The rampant insecurity in Jonglei is exacerbated by a profound lack of civilian protection throughout the state, which stems from the failure of the Government of Southern Sudan and its security forces to intervene when violent clashes occur and from a United Nations Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, presence that has proven to be much less proactive and preventive than its current civilian protection mandate allows. These issues have been well documented this year by Human Rights Watch.
The presence of small arms among the majority of the local population, who seek to protect themselves in the absence of a reliable and responsible state authority at the local level, is another enduring problem in Jonglei state, where at least three unsuccessful and violent civilian disarmament campaigns have been attempted since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, was signed in 2005. Last month, the Government of Southern Sudan directed the southern army, or SPLA, to initiate another disarmament campaign in Jonglei. Given that the government’s approach to disarmament remains coercive and flawed, this new campaign is likely to be an impetus for further violence and instability in the run-up to the April 2010 elections. Figures from the National Electoral Commission as voter registration for the elections were ongoing indicate that Jonglei state had seen the lowest voter registration turnout, with below 20% of the population registering.
The persistent and destabilizing internal security dynamics in Jonglei state must not be ignored, as they will continue to shape the security situation in southern Sudan regardless of the outcome of the South’s self-determination referendum in 2011. However, the marked increase in 2009 of well-organized militia attacks, such as the attack in Duk Padiet, begs broader questions related to the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the two Sudanese parties to the CPA— the National Congress Party in Khartoum, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which heads the semi-autonomous southern government in Juba.
The North’s Upper Hand
The most politically charged question related to this year’s violence stems from the allegations by senior members of the SPLM-led southern government that the National Congress Party, or NCP, is supporting the violence in the South by supplying proxy militias with weapons. Although no source—including the southern government, UNMIS, or any external actor—has produced a “smoking gun” to prove the involvement of Khartoum is once again sponsoring violence throughout the South, this does not mean that the possibility of northern involvement should be discounted.
This conjecture is not lacking in historical basis. During the North-South war, NCP used a similar divide-and-destroy policy to great effect across southern Sudan, skillfully manipulating internal divisions within the South and supplying weapons to local groups, with the aim of weakening the SPLA movement led by the late John Garang. Given the history of northern involvement with numerous proxy militias, and the porous borders on all side of southern Sudan—including its contested and not yet demarcated border with the North—it is naïve to think that there are not broader political power dynamics at play in the violence that has sparked throughout the South this year.
Some groups accuse southern SPLM politicians of purposefully masking internal southern problems by blaming the North for insecurity and point to an unresponsive southern government that has so far failed to deliver “peace dividends” to its largely rural population. While this critique is justified, from the perspective of the CPA’s international “guarantors”—nations such as the United States who committed to help the Sudanese parties implement the peace agreement—the possibility that the North is arming militias to destabilize the South is a cause for increasing concern as Sudan hurtles toward elections that could further ignite both North-South and South-South tensions. Likewise, additional external pressure is needed on the Government of Southern Sudan to improve its response to local violence, ramp up its measures to protect civilians, and increase the presence of the southern Sudan police and security forces in tense areas of Jonglei and other states.
Historic Tensions, Current Crisis
In the area of Jonglei state where the recent Nuer-Dinka attacks occurred, the history of hostile relations between the Dinka and Nuer run deep. This was “ground zero” of the most serious split within the southern army, or SPLA, during the civil war, which occurred in 1991 between the leader of the SPLA, John Garang, a Dinka from Bor county, in Jonglei, and several of his senior commanders, including, Riek Machar, a powerful Nuer military leader who is the current vice president of southern Sudan.
The recent violence in this area, the presence of well-armed Lou Nuer militias, and the all-too recent violent past have given some members of the SPLM ruling party in Juba reason to accuse the NCP of resorting to its old tactics of proxy militia armament. Suspicions abound in the South of the reactivation of “marriages of convenience” that formed during the North-South civil war between southern leaders from minority groups such as the Nuer, militias such as the “White Army,” and former SPLA factions with former northern allies.
The tensions in Nuer-Dinka relations continue into today. The Nuer populations in the counties bordering Duk to the East harbor grievances against the Juba and Jonglei state governments, which they perceive as Dinka-dominated and unresponsive to the needs of the non-Dinka southern groups. For example, the Lou populations in the large towns of Ayod and Waat, to the East of Duk Padiet, are cut off from trading routes and access to health and other services because the road from Dinka population centers, in Duk and Twic East counties, is entirely impassable. Like the Dinka, the Nuer peoples’ livelihoods revolve around cattle. Access to water sources for cattle during the dry season has been a recurrent flashpoint of conflict when broader political dynamics have soured relations between neighboring Dinka and Nuer populations. Armed youth living in cattle camps are understandably susceptible to manipulation by outside actors, especially when these youth do not trust the local or central government who they perceive as unresponsive to their needs. These politicized tensions are not new, and attempts to defuse tensions through prior coercive disarmament campaigns in Jonglei state have arguably worsened relations between local groups.
All Eyes on the South
The violence in Duk Padiet and the story of Nuer-Dinka tensions in the surrounding region is only a microcosm of some of the daunting challenges facing southern Sudan today. This reality should not lend credence to the recent claims of some diplomats and members of the international community that southern Sudan is “ungovernable” or that a unified Sudan will be more stable than an independent South. The role of the CPA’s guarantors is to promote and protect the fundamental tenets of the peace agreement, one of which is the right of southerners to vote in a self-determination referendum. Given that all anecdotal evident and every public opinion survey indicate that southern Sudan will vote for independence in January 2011, now is the time to harness international efforts in support of a more stable and peaceful southern Sudan in the final remaining year of the CPA’s interim period.
The international community must work with the Government of Southern Sudan to improve security in particularly threatening areas of southern Sudan, such as Jonglei and Upper Nile states, to closely monitor further attacks in the South to better understand the dynamics behind the violence, and to apply pressure on the United Nations Mission in Sudan—a $1 billion per year international mission— to take more proactive and targeted measures to protect civilians in areas where there is a strong likelihood of violence breaking out in the coming months. The North’s historic role in fueling this instability should also inform the international community’s approach. Absent sustained support and focused attention from the international community to the root causes of conflict in the South, the growing tensions within the South are unlikely to subside in the current volatile political climate in Sudan.
Yesterday, the Congolese ambassador threatened to expel the leadership of the peacekeeping force, known as MONUC, in response to the possibility that the Security Council may demand the Congolese army to take immediate measures to protect civilians. Some of the measures discussed were enhanced training, enforcement of military discipline, and preventing the promotion of individuals involved with abuses.
In an interview quoted in Bloomberg, Ambassador Atoki Ileka said, “The Security Council has no right to do this. This is totally unacceptable. We will reject this resolution and we will have a crisis. We can expel the leadership [of MONUC].”
Ileka also said the Security Council could not demand the Congolese army to stop recruiting and using children as it would be a violation of Congo’s status-of-forces agreement with the U.N.
Objections were also raised by the Congolese government over a Human Rights Watch report that documents the Congolese army committing severe abuses against civilians. "We condemn this as disproportionate and an attempt to delegitimize the Congolese state," a Congolese government minister said to AFP. "[It is] an attempt to distort the truth".
Offering condemnations of his own, U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions Phillip Alston today called on MONUC to end support for operations commanded by known war criminals. He said in a press release, “It is a contradiction of basic UN principles for UN peacekeepers to cooperate with a military operation led by individuals who stand accused of war crimes and grave human rights abuses.”
Alston noted, in particular, that the U.N. still has not implemented a conditionality policy that would prevent it from supporting operations led by war criminals Innocent Zimurinda and Bosco Ntaganda.
According to the special rapporteur, civilian protection must be the top priority:
“Civilian protection must be at the centre of both the planning and carrying out of military operations in the Kivus. Strong conditionality, especially with respect to the removal of war criminal commanders from Congolese army leadership positions, must underpin MONUC support for military operations."
This Monday, the two main parties in Sudan arrived at a breakthrough in negotiations necessary for moving forward on key components of the North-South peace agreement signed in 2005. The ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, and its southern counterpart, the Southern People’s Liberation Movement, agreed on legislation whose provisions will govern how three crucial votes—a referendum for South Sudan’s independence set for 2011, popular consultations for areas in the North-South border region, as well as a vote in Abyei to determine whether it will join the North or the South—will be carried out.
This agreement is an essential step in the push for peace in Sudan, but is only one step out of many more to come. Following a parliamentary vote on these agreements set to occur this week, the two parties will have to continue to cooperate on actual implementation of what they have (only) on paper and in words, promised. Very few details (besides the agreement that a 51% majority and a 60% turnout will validate the South’s referendum) on the deal have emerged, but some actions will quickly have to take place, including appointments to the Southern and Abyei Referendum Commissions.
However, Sudanese history shows that the two parties’ agreement on paper may mean very little in practice, and that backsliding from either party may quickly occur. Given the eleventh-hour nature of the compromise, the agreement may simply be an act of brinksmanship on the part of the NCP—of waiting just before a conflagration breaks out to concede, then quickly going back on its word.
A case in point: the NCP's show of good will Sunday night was quickly followed by a crackdown of political opposition Monday morning. The regime’s use of tear-gas and arrest of almost 50 protestors demonstrate that the environment of political intimidation will not be going away any time soon. Notably, the NCP is still not budging on reforms to the National Security Law, which in its current form allows for arbitrary arrests and detention. As long as the central government retains these and other extraordinary powers, the center v. periphery dynamic at the root of so much conflict in Sudan will undoubtedly remain. If the NCP is allowed to steal the elections next April, as looks more and more likely, this dynamic will become even more firmly entrenched.
But, there is also room for optimism and action. The international community can and should seize this opportunity to hold the two parties to what they have promised, enacting consequences at the first sign of equivocation. As Sudan inches closer to fulfilling these hallmarks of the peace process, the full weight of international pressures and vigilance is more crucial than ever.
Photo: South Sudanese President Salva Kiir with officials from the Government of South Sudan.
California Senator Dianne Feinstein signed on to the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (S.891) this Monday, making her the eleventh cosponsor of this important bill that seeks to ensure U.S. involvement in the mineral trade does not contribute to human rights violations and crimes against humanity in eastern Congo. Introduced by Senators Brownback (R-KS), Durbin (D-IL), and Feingold (D-WI), the bill would require all companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, including major electronics companies, to disclose the origin of their mineral supply to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. For minerals coming from Congo or neighboring countries, companies would have to disclose the precise mine of origin, thus lessening the chance that U.S. companies, and by extension, we the consumers, are financing violence in the area.
Click here to see the other co-sponsors of S.891. If your Senator isn't already a cosponsor call the Capitol Switchboard at 202 224 -3121 and urge them to support this legislation..
On yesterday's NPR program All Things Considered, Michele Kelemen highlights the growing anger on Capitol Hill over President Obama's handling of the situation in Sudan. We've been covering these developments closely. Here's the Kelemen's report:
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Sudan’s national elections scheduled for April 2010 will be neither free nor fair absent significant international pressure to dramatically change the electoral landscape.
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The cross-border nature of the Lord’s Resistance Army, or 
In recent months, Duk County and other neighboring, largely Dinka counties in western Jonglei state, have been afflicted by several violent attacks by armed, organized, and well-trained militia.
