A Peace Process for Darfur?

The latest proposition for a Darfur peace process met a tough crowd on Friday, a day after it was publicly released, with criticism ranging from simply ‘it won’t work’ to accusing its authors of “protecting corrupt and merciless leaders."

A “panel of the wise,” led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, unveiled its 148-page proposal for a renewed Darfur peace process this week, opening it up for debate and sign-off by African Union leaders assembled in the capital of Nigeria.

Attention centered on the proposal that a Hybrid Criminal Court be formed to hear the cases of “individuals who appear to bear particular responsibility for the gravest crimes” in Darfur. Sudanese judges would work side-by-side with judges of other nationalities to try cases dealing with crimes in Darfur. Mbeki explained the rationale behind this proposal in his address to the African leaders:

“Exceptional measures must be put in place to assure the people of Darfur that justice will be done, taking into account the objective reality that a number of them have little confidence in the independence and impartiality of their national criminal justice system.”

The proposal doesn’t get into much detail about the AU stance on the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for President Bashir, providing instead more of a review of the AU’s actions toward the ICC to-date (most notably, an appeal to the U.N. Security Council to have the warrant deferred, a request the UNSC turned down). But it does note that the ICC’s mandate is limited and must therefore be supplemented by national judicial systems. (Human Rights Watch clearly interpreted this proposal as a way to potentially sideline the ICC. HRW’s Richard Dicker issued a call for the hybrid court and national law reforms to “not delay the ICC cases for one minute.”)

While reactions to the hybrid court dominated most of the reporting about the Abuja meeting, the AU proposal highlights some essential elements of a political process for bringing peace to Darfur. Some quick thoughts after reading a synopsis of the plan (a useful 18-pager boiled down from the original 148):

-- The panel rightly looks at the conflict in Darfur as a manifestation of a countrywide, decades-old problem: deep inequality in the country, with political power and development opportunities centered in Khartoum. The panel doesn’t provide much detail about how this situation came to be – through ruthless government policies and military campaigns aimed at quashing any opposition – but instead diplomatically attributes the status quo to “the neglect of the Sudanese peripheries by the centre of power and wealth in Khartoum, a legacy that predates independence and has continued to date.” While this explanation is not surprising, it’s also not difficult to see why opposition groups, who have long been on the receiving end of this so-called “neglect,” could accuse the AU of taking an inappropriately conciliatory stance toward the ruling regime.

-- The panel also addresses the importance of making a concerted effort to include a wide array of voices in the peace process, including the Sudanese government, rebels, refugees and displaced people, political parties, civil society including women, the native administration, nomads, Sudan’s neighbors, and “the rest of the international community.” It may seem like a no-brainer to call for “inclusive negotiations,” but Darfur peace processes have fatally overlooked this concept in the past.

Photo: Thabo Mbeki, former South African president and head of the African Union Peace and Security Council. (AP/Mike Hutchings)

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