Letters and Memoranda

A Blueprint for Peace.pdf

This is the third installment in a series of open letters to President Obama spelling out a practical roadmap to end the crisis in Sudan.

On March 30, key activists met with President Obama and his Special Envoy for Sudan, Major General Scott Gration, in the West Wing of the White House. President Obama made it clear that his administration would work vigorously to bring an end to the war in Darfur and help implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South.  After extensive consultations with members of President Obama’s team, UN officials, diplomats from other key countries, and Sudanese actors, this paper is an attempt to put forward a blueprint to achieve President Obama’s objective of a comprehensive peace for all of Sudan. The good news is that this is a goal shared widely throughout the international community. The key missing ingredient for its achievement is strategic leadership from the United States.

In this paper we lay out the structures we think are necessary to achieve peace in Darfur and implement it in the South, East, and transitional zones between the North and South, all areas of active or potential conflict. We also lay out a set of focused and meaningful sticks and carrots necessary to leverage the various parties to find a peaceful solution to the interlocking conflicts within Sudan and regionally.   

In Darfur, the expulsion of key humanitarian aid groups and closure of Sudanese aid organizations have created increasingly precarious conditions for the 2.7 million internally displaced camp dwellers, although some arrangement to expedite the resumption of some aid operations appears to be pending. Brutal harassment of Sudanese human rights defenders has silenced internal voices of dissent.  President Omar el-Bashir’s use of starvation as a weapon of war is an attempt to distract the world from the real issues of accountability in Darfur, the elections in Sudan early next year and the implementation of the CPA. The Government of Sudan should face clear costs from the international community for so blatantly abrogating its responsibility to protect its own population. 

In the South, there is a mere one year and nine months left before the scheduled date for an independence referendum, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, is grinding to a halt on key benchmarks. Meanwhile, localized violence demonstrates both the South’s institutional fragility and vulnerability to traditional divide-and-conquer strategies directed from Khartoum. If left unchallenged, Bashir will continue to view efforts to foment violence, instability, and displacement in the South and Darfur as his most effective instruments of control. Bashir’s use of proxy militias (the Janjaweed in Darfur, the Murahaliin in North-South border areas, and other militias throughout the South) has served as an effective means for him to maintain power in Khartoum, but it has also unleashed the centrifugal forces that could violently rip Sudan apart.

President Obama must be firm in responding to the impending humanitarian crisis, promoting protection of civilians and accountability, and working toward a viable long-term peace that includes both Darfur and a reinvigorated CPA. If the expulsion of key groups from Darfur and elsewhere was suddenly lifted by Khartoum, the situation on the ground would improve greatly. But the essential dynamics of the situation would remain unacceptable — with no clear peace process for Darfur, the CPA fraying, UNAMID ineffective, civilians desperately vulnerable, and President Bashir still a wanted fugitive from international justice.

FORGING A MULTILATERAL PEACE STRATEGY

Here’s the opportunity: a global consensus exists for peace in Sudan, even if there is not agreement on the best path to achieve this goal. China, the Arab League, the African Union, the European Union, and the United States all want peace, but little has been done to build the necessary infrastructure to help bring it about. What has long been missing in Sudan is America’s strategic leadership. The rebels, the ruling party, Sudan’s neighbors, and other key actors have all been waiting for President Obama and his team to engage.

The CPA itself was reached after a sustained investment in diplomacy, led in part by the United States, supported by relevant regional and international powers, and backed by significant incentives and pressures. That hard-won agreement would not now be in jeopardy if the investment in diplomacy had been maintained and the international community had continued its pressure to ensure that the agreement was implemented. It is not too late for the United States to re-invest in ensuring that the outstanding issues preventing full implementation of the CPA are addressed, and the Obama administration must take these steps or watch the possible violent disintegration of Sudan and destabilization of the broader region over the next several years.

The Obama administration must lead in constructing a multilateral strategy for peace by establishing an inclusive peace process for Darfur, re-vitalizing implementation of the CPA and the dangerously neglected Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, and ending Sudan’s proxy war with Chad. Toward that end, General Gration should focus on building a multilateral coalition of countries with significant leverage. At the same time as the processes are being constructed, the United States should work assiduously to create the necessary unilateral and multilateral carrots and sticks to press the parties in the direction of a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of Sudan’s multiple, interlocking conflicts. It is vital that the administration work closely with other key governments in dealing with Sudan; a reliance on bilateral diplomacy will provide Khartoum the opportunity to play one party off against the other, as it has historically done with great success.

• Darfur peace process: The structure should be similar to the Naivasha talks that produced the CPA, and some of the ingredients are already in place. As did Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo with the Naivasha process, AU/UN mediator Djibril Bassolé should lead the Darfur process, which can be based in Doha, Qatar (although Qatar’s recent diplomatic support for Bashir in the wake of the ICC indictment has impaired its credibility as a facilitator of negotiations). He must be supported by a strong team of diplomats and regional experts and backed by a small group of countries with leverage, high-level support, and full-time representation at the talks. We believe that this inner circle should consist at a minimum of the US, UK, France, China, and Egypt. An outer circle group of countries and multilateral organizations (UN, AU, Arab League) should also be engaged in a formal manner to discourage spoilers, and other key nations such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa would need to be thoroughly consulted.
• CPA implementation: The Assessment and Evaluation Commission established by the CPA is clearly insufficient to monitor and press the parties to implement the deal (largely because it lacks sufficiently senior representation and clear reporting guidelines). As a matter of international peace and security, CPA implementation should be at the forefront of the U.N. Security Council’s agenda and the Council should back a new ad-hoc mechanism to guide implementation. The Obama administration should quickly work with other Security Council members, relevant U.N. agencies, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, to establish core benchmarks for the parties, a clear timeline, and genuine penalties for failure to meet deadlines. An international meeting on CPA implementation could provide a vehicle for reenergizing efforts around the CPA and provide the launching pad for the creation of the ad-hoc implementation mechanism.
• Chad/Sudan peace process: The Sudanese government continues to seek a military solution for Darfur through regime change in Chad, and Chad continues to back the JEM in response. The Obama administration should work with France and China to support high-level negotiations in Libya aimed at reducing state support for foreign armed groups and eventual normalization of relations.
• Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement monitoring: Eastern Sudan remains volatile. The Obama administration should work with its international partners (particularly the UK and Norway) and with the Eritrean and Saudi governments to establish a monitoring group for the agreement that will report on implementation and make recommendations for improvements.

BUILDING THE NECESSARY LEVERAGE

A serious peace process with credible mediation putting forward fair proposals will secure a deal for Darfur. A competent and higher level oversight mechanism with the involvement of countries with influence will ensure the implementation of the CPA. Having the right balance of meaningful pressures and incentives will ensure that prospects for success are much greater.

In broad strokes, the U.S. should present the Sudanese regime with a choice: 

Behind Door One: if the Sudanese government permits unimpeded humanitarian access, removes the indicted president, and secures peace in Darfur and the South, a clear process toward normalization will be mapped out. Almost all of the incentives for Sudan come in the form of more normal relations with much of the world, the lifting of sanctions, a return to more normal patterns of trade and diplomacy, and the other benefits that would naturally flow from Sudan achieving stability as a result of more equitable power and wealth sharing.

Behind Door Two: if President Bashir and his party remain defiant by continuing to undermine efforts at peace for the country, a series of escalating costs will ensue, including diplomatic isolation, targeted economic sanctions, an effective and expanded arms embargo, and, if necessary to stop massive loss of civilian life, eventual targeted military action.
 
If the benefits of Door One and the consequences of Door Two are meaningful, the chance for peace in Sudan increases dramatically.  The missing ingredients in efforts to date for Darfur and CPA implementation have been adequate leverage and lack of strategic vision for resolving comprehensively the country’s conflicts. Without real sticks and carrots, the warring parties in Sudan will remain focused on military confrontation. The international community needs to help change the incentive structure in Sudan from war to peace. 

On the incentive side, phased cooperation with and—ultimately—normalization with the United States is the largest carrot the Obama administration has to offer. Removal of certain unilateral sanctions and penalties could be undertaken in response to verifiable changes on the ground in Darfur and the South. Full normalization should only occur once the Sudanese government adheres to its obligations under various peace agreements. Any negotiating process must be guided by the reality that Khartoum has a long history of grabbing carrots, then failing to follow through on commitments.

On the pressures side, there seems to be an erroneous belief that there are no meaningful pressures left to use. We have spelled out a number of points of leverage that are available. That reflects our view that the Sudanese government responds much more directly to pressures than they do to incentives. Until now, most sticks have been unilateral and have had limited effect on the regime’s calculations. Substantial and focused multilateral pressures have not been tried and should form the basis of the new administration’s strategy. Clearly, equally robust pressures and incentives should be developed and applied impartially to the rebel factions and SPLM to the degree to which their actions may warrant these measures.

We believe leverage for peace in Sudan can best come from the following actions. Some of these initiatives should occur immediately to build leverage for negotiations, while others should be utilized only if the situation in Darfur deteriorates as a result of ruling party actions or intransigence.

IMMEDIATE POINTS OF LEVERAGE

• Isolate Bashir: Although Bashir is experiencing a short-term surge in support from Arab and African governments in the aftermath of the arrest warrant, this will erode quickly in the face of longer term trends that include his use of starvation as a weapon, continuing support for Hamas, and Khartoum’s warmongering, which puts Chinese and Arab investments at risk. Private diplomacy can explore ending Bashir’s tenure and finally addressing the impunity that has reigned throughout his two decades in power. There are already telling signs that support for Bashir in key Arab and African states is more rhetorical than practical, with a number of senior leaders increasingly seeing him as a distinct liability. Bashir’s actions are making Sudan’s fragmentation more likely, not less, and that is an outcome that key players in the region should hope to avoid. Personal and direct diplomacy by President Obama will be crucial in shaping regional attitudes toward Bashir. 
• Reinforce the Government of Southern Sudan: The main deterrent to the resumption of war between the ruling party and the South is a strong GOSS. That requires investing in good governance, anti-corruption measures, agricultural production, and the modernization of the South’s army (the SPLA). This includes providing the air defense system that President Bush promised to the GOSS well over a year ago in order to neutralize the ruling party’s one military advantage: air superiority.
• Support the elections and referendum: The national elections recently re-scheduled for 2010 and the 2011 referendum could trigger a return to war in the South if they are unilaterally undermined by the ruling National Congress Party. International support should be directed to holding fair and transparent processes that allow the Sudanese people to choose their leaders and decide their fate. Sudan’s multiple crises all stem from a failure to establish reasonable power-sharing mechanisms in this large and incredibly diverse country, and a great deal of attention needs to be put into ensuring that elections can be conducted in an environment of safety and security.
• End simmering regional conflicts: Conflicts and rivalries throughout the broader region of East and Central Africa make it much harder to resolve Sudan’s internal wars. Multilateral efforts should focus chiefly on the simmering conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, on ending the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, and on ending Chad’s destabilizing civil war.
• Re-contextualize counter-terrorism cooperation: Khartoum has for years used its cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism to deflect serious pressure over human rights and implementation of the CPA. Consistent with its stated policy, the Obama administration must make clear to the Sudanese government that cooperation on counter-terrorism is not a chit it can trade for U.S. compromises on human rights and peace efforts. 
• Secure the support of key diplomatic players: As stated above, some of Bashir’s staunchest supporters have new reasons to back away slowly from their despotic ally. If the CPA collapses and the North-South war resumes, China and Egypt would be among the biggest losers. Former southern rebel commanders indicate that if they are forced to go back to war, the first targets they will hit will be Chinese oil installations. And if they go back to war, some of the southerners will fight for independence this time, rather than their previous vision of unity, and previous divisions within southern communities would likely be stoked in a violent fashion by Khartoum. Egypt’s worst fears of a potentially hostile new state in the Nile Basin could be realized. These two countries, along with key African countries, Saudi Arabia and other Arab League states, should be engaged to become part of the solution in Darfur and the South.  President Obama should also make clear to relevant nations that ending blind support for Bashir to the detriment of the peace process is a priority for his Administration and has the potential to affect bilateral relations with the U.S. if not addressed.
• Military planning: Military planning should begin to develop ways to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid if the regime continues to deny aid as a weapon of war. It would be irresponsible not to prepare for worst case scenarios.

   

FUTURE STICKS IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES

• Strengthen multilateral, targeted economic pressures: President Obama should work through the U.N. Security Council to bring on board a larger collection of nations with targeted sanctions against those individuals and parties most responsible for violence in Sudan, whether they are government or rebel actors. If the Security Council fails to pass these broader sanctions, then the U.S. should build an international coalition to bring this pressure, working particularly with the European Union, individual European countries and Japan. Along with the ICC, these instruments can create much higher legal, financial, and political costs to those who are responsible for violence against civilians and preventing progress toward peace.
• Expand the arms embargo: Given the Sudanese government’s continued attacks against civilians in Darfur and compelling evidence that weapons from other nations, including China, are finding their way to the frontlines, a comprehensive arms embargo on offensive weapons against the Bashir regime should be imposed by the U.N. Security Council. The embargo should include a robust international monitoring mechanism to ensure its effectiveness.
• Protect civilians: UNAMID is failing to achieve its central goal of protecting the civilian population in the region, but the question of how to bolster UNAMID’s ability to protect civilians seems to have fallen off the international community’s radar screen in recent months. Much of this failure can be traced directly to the practice of giving the Sudanese government—the prime perpetrator of the genocide—a de facto veto over the mission’s composition and operations. This has to change. A robust force on the ground in Darfur with a competent lead nation, an experienced division-level  headquarters staff, and a clear command-and-control structure is essential for saving lives, creating an environment amenable to the peace surge, and establishing the international credibility required to ensure that a broader peace strategy succeeds. Galvanizing the political will necessary to build this capacity could finally give UNAMID a chance to succeed in protecting civilians. The effort to fully staff the U.N. force in Darfur at 26,000 should be accompanied by a shift in the U.N. force’s mandate that would allow it to protect civilians who want to go home to their villages of origin, which should be the ultimate goal of our Darfur policy.
• Effectively end offensive military flights: President Obama and other key members of the administration have taken a robust position in the past regarding the need to counter Sudan’s aerial attacks on civilians in Darfur, and have voiced support for enforcing a no-fly zone. Continued Sudanese aerial attacks in Darfur—there were over 40 last year—have rightly generated considerable attention, as has the expulsion of key relief agencies. The U.N. Security Council has demanded an end to offensive military flights several times, most recently in Resolution 1769, which authorized UNAMID. UNAMID has not enforced that demand. It is clear that the administration and the U.N. Security Council need to consider how best to counter these continuing aerial attacks. 

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: BUILDING THE COALITION FOR PEACE

President Obama and members of his administration have spoken passionately about their intention to act boldly to end the crisis in Darfur and promote international efforts toward a peaceful future in Sudan. Now they have the chance to do so at a crucial juncture in Sudan’s history.

But the United States can’t do it alone, and the Obama administration’s engagement and close coordination with other key governments is essential. Special Envoy Gration can lead U.S. efforts toward peace in Sudan, but he must recognize the need to work closely both with U.S. allies and with those leaders who continue to back Bashir following the ICC arrest warrant issuance. 

President Obama should now begin stronger and more sustained efforts to build a coalition for peace. But this effort will only be successful if the President himself treats the situation in Sudan as a strategic priority, sets objectives for U.S. policy, builds the necessary leverage, and invests in the diplomacy necessary to achieve an equitable and lasting solution.

Sir John Holmes
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
New York, New York

Goma, February 6, 2009

Dear Sir,

On behalf of the Congo Advocacy Coalition, a group of 100 aid and human rights organizations, we urge you to insist to the parties to the conflict in North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo that the protection of civilians during military operations be a top priority, and for the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo (MONUC) to have a central role in the planning of all military operations, as mandated by the UN Security Council, in order to effectively protect civilians and ensure humanitarian access.

Even before the main thrust of military action has begun, the joint operations have already sparked significant displacement in North and South Kivu. While estimates of numbers remain tentative, people have fled in response to warnings of imminent combat, actual outbreaks of fighting, and just plain fear, adding to the 1.2 million already displaced in earlier waves of fighting. This includes 4,500 refugees who fled to Uganda, and more who have fled from their homes in Lubero and Masisi territories in North Kivu. Some of those displaced have since returned, but the situation remains volatile and further displacement is expected.

Villagers have reported FDLR reprisal killings and rape of civilians in the Katoyi area of Masisi territory, and there are also reports that civilians are being blocked from fleeing in some areas in western Masisi, effectively being used as human shields. In eastern Rutshuru territory, Congolese and Rwandan coalition forces, as well as other armed groups, are reportedly responsible for rape and pillaging over the past two weeks.

It is crucial that the Rwandan and Congolese armies, together with MONUC, take steps immediately to ensure that civilians are protected throughout the military operations, by rigorously applying international humanitarian law, limiting further displacement, promoting humanitarian access and systematically mitigating against known threats to civilians and non-combatants. We hope that you will use your trip to eastern Congo this week, and follow-up meetings in New York, to ensure that MONUC and other relevant actors have the resources needed to protect civilians effectively.

Lessons must be learned from the unimaginable brutality suffered by Congolese civilians in northeastern Congo following the launch of a joint Ugandan and Congolese military operation to disarm the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group that has been based in Congo’s Garamba National Park since 2005. More than 700 people were massacred by the LRA in less than one month during a series of coordinated, simultaneous attacks over the Christmas period last year. In each place, protection measures were reactive and Congolese soldiers arrived, if at all, at least a day or more after horrific, organized killing raids. Over 130,000 civilians have been forced from their homes in Haut Uélé district, and the attacks continue.

The FDLR has a hauntingly similar history of avoiding military confrontation and instead launching devastating reprisal attacks on civilians. It is clear that further human rights abuses against civilians in North and South Kivu in particular remain a real threat.

We fear that if the following urgent steps are not taken immediately by the parties to the conflict, MONUC and other internal actors, there could, once again, be disastrous consequences for the people of eastern DRC:

• The Rwanda-DRC command center for the joint military operation should ensure that protection of civilians is a critical component of impending operations and adequate measures are taken to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and to prevent civilian casualties. The two governments should immediately present their plans for ensuring civilian protection and agree with MONUC on any additional safeguards required and how these are to be implemented. 
• MONUC should continue its deployment of joint protection teams, comprising human rights, child protection, civil affairs and demobilization specialists near military contingents of all parties to the conflict, including field bases close to where the FDLR are located, and should extend such deployments to other areas as required. MONUC command should ensure that guidance on practical implementation of the protection mandate is fully understood and adhered to by all members of the mission. UN member states should urgently deploy the additional peacekeepers and equipment authorized in November 2008 to assist in protecting civilians.
• A special adviser on human rights for eastern Congo should be appointed to help ensure that respect for human rights and protection of civilians is a critical component of military operations and the political process.
• The parties to the conflict should ensure that humanitarian access is kept open so that life-saving assistance can be delivered to all in need. To promote that, a senior civilian official should be appointed to liaise between humanitarian actors and military contingents in the joint operation to allow the sharing of information necessary for humanitarian planning.
• DDRRR bases should be situated close to FDLR locations to help ensure that anyone wanting to surrender is able to do so in safety, security and dignity. As military operations continue against the FDLR leadership, efforts by the two governments and MONUC to encourage voluntary repatriation of FDLR combatants and their dependants should be strengthened and properly resourced, not sidelined.

The continued presence of the FDLR in eastern Congo reflects the underlying problems contributing to the persistent violence. FDLR combatants need to be disarmed and demobilized and those responsible for serious violations of international law, including genocide, must be held to account. But dealing with the FDLR problem does not tackle the other issues that have contributed to conflict in eastern Congo such as land tenure, representation of minorities, the culture of impunity, and the illegal exploitation of Congo’s mineral wealth. Military operations will not resolve these matters and there will not be lasting peace unless there is a political process to find solutions to such issues.

We therefore also urge you, and the UN Secretariat and Security Council, to encourage all parties to the conflict to abide by their previous commitments under the Nairobi and Goma Accords and re-engage in a political process to tackle the underlying issues that feed conflict in eastern Congo and bring about a lasting peace that the people of eastern Congo so desperately seek.

Yours sincerely,

The Congo Advocacy Coalition
 

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The Congo Advocacy Coalition, made up of local and international nongovernmental organizations, was established in July 2008 to advocate for greater protection of civilians and respect for human rights in eastern Congo. Members of the coalition’s steering committee include: ActionAid, Enough Project, Human Rights Watch, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oxfam, Conseil Régional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Développement (CRONGD) - North Kivu, Promotion et Appui aux Initiatives Féminines (PAIF) – North Kivu, Institut Congolaise pour la Justice et la Paix (ICJP) – South Kivu, and Association des Femmes Juristes du Congo (AFEJUCO) – South Kivu.

Other Signatories:

International NGOs:
Action Against Hunger/ Action Contre la Faim (ACF) – USA, American Bar Association (ABA) Rule of Law Initiative in DRC, Beati i costruttori di pace/ Blessed are the Peacemakers , CAFOD, CARE International, Centre Lokole/ Search for Common Ground, Global Witness, International Emergency and Development Aid (IEDA) Relief, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Great Lakes, Refugees International, Tearfund, Trocaire, War Child Holland

Congolese NGOs:
ACAEFAD, Action by Christians Against Torture (ACAT)/Sud Kivu, ACPS, Action des Chrétiens Activistes des Droits de l'Homme a Shabunda (ACADHOSHA), ADECOF/Sud Kivu, AFCD, AFCDI, AFECEF, AJERF, Africa Justice Peace and Development (AJPD), ALCM, AMALDEFEA, AMI-KIVU, ANAMEDAPED, APIBA, APRODEPED, ASADHO (Association africaine de défense des droits de l'homme) - Sud Kivu, ASALAK, Action Sociale pour la Paix et le Développement (ASPD), Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes (ASSODIP), AYINET/DRC, BDENA, Blessed Aid, CADRE, Collectif des Associations des Femmes Pour le Développement (CAFED), Campagne Pour la Paix (CPP), CCJT, CEDAC, CELPA/SK, Centre d’Appui pour le Développement Rural Communautaire (CADERCO), Centre de Recherche sur l'Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme (CREDDHO), Centre de promotion socio-sanitaire (CEPROSSAN), Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche en Education de Base pour le Développement Integré (CEREBA), Coalition RDC pour la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI), Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes Solidaires du Congo (COJESKI)/Sud Kivu, Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes Solidaires du Congo (COJESKI)/ Nord Kivu, COPARE, CUBAKA, DYJESKI, EFD, Encadrement des femmes indigènes et des ménages vulnérables (EFIM), Entraide des Femmes pour les Déshérités (EFD) - Uvira Sud -Kivu, Foyer Social de Mogo (FSM/Kabare), GAIDER, GAMAC, GRAM-Kivu, Group d'Etudes et d'Actions Pour un Développement Bien Défini (GEAD) /Nord-Kivu, Groupe de Voix de Sans Voix (GVSV), Groupe Féminine, HEAL Africa, Héritiers de la Justice, Humanitas, IGE/CCD, La Synergie des femmes pour les victimes des violences sexuelles (SFVS), Mamans Umoja, Martin Luther King Non-Violence Group, OCET, PAL, PAMI, Perspectives "Monde Juste", PIDP-Kivu, PRENAO, PRODES, Promotion de la Démocratie et Protection des Droits Humains (PDH), RADHOSKI-Sud Kivu, Réseau Provincial des ONG de Droits de l'Homme (REPRODHOC)/Nord-Kivu, RFDP, SAMS, SARCAF, SILDE, SJPR/EST, Solidarité pour la Promotion Sociale et la Paix (SOPROP), SYNECAT, UCODE, UPADERI, VOVOLIB (Voix de Sans Voix ni Libertés)

President Obama's Immediate Sudan Challenge.pdf

This is the second installment in a series of letters to President Obama spelling out a practical roadmap to end the crisis in Sudan.

During his first month in office, President Obama will face a number of foreign policy tests, challenges, and dilemmas from a variety of hot spots around the world. All are grave, but given the increasing probability that the International Criminal Court, or ICC, will issue an arrest warrant for the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, the situation in Sudan will very quickly demand his attention.

Omar al-Bashir has threatened serious consequences if a warrant is issued, including the potential shutdown of humanitarian aid agencies and of UNAMID, the hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur.  Much of this is bluster by Bashir, hoping to avoid a potential warrant, and is similar to threats made by other leaders—such as former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic and Liberian President Charles Taylor—when they were hoping to avoid justice. How the United States responds to Bashir’s threats will factor greatly into what the Sudanese regime actually does in response to the ICC action and will also help shape what the international community is prepared to do.  President Obama’s response must be firm in addressing this immediate threat, but should not lose sight of the larger strategic goals that ought to be at the center of a new administration’s policy: an unyielding focus on brokering a peace deal for Darfur and the implementation of the existing Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, the 2005 agreement to end the 22-year war between northern and southern Sudan.

THE IMMEDIATE IMPERATIVE

It is likely that the ICC judges will issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir during President Obama’s first month in office.  The Obama administration should make it clear from the beginning that it fully supports justice and accountability for Darfur’s genocide, and will not tolerate any obstruction of the aid effort, deployment of the UNAMID civilian protection force, or implementation of the CPA.  Clear messages from the Obama administration that there will be consequences for such actions should be delivered to the leadership of the Sudan regime.  Multilateral diplomatic efforts should be launched by the new administration to help build international solidarity for specific consequences to be imposed on Sudan if it targets either UNAMID or humanitarian relief operations. Consequences could include: an arms embargo, rapid escalation of targeted sanctions against key regime officials, a plan to apprehend Bashir and support for further ICC indictments of culpable officials, targeted air strikes against air assets of the regime used for offensive military operations, and other measures.

If an arrest warrant is issued, ruling party officials in Sudan will have a choice: retain Bashir as president and face increased isolation from the international community, or arrange for his resignation and departure from the scene, thus allowing for more pragmatic policies to emerge.

We don’t know what the regime ultimately will do, but we urge the Obama administration to work behind the scenes with countries with influence in Sudan to press for the latter possibility. Ambassador Susan Rice, President Obama’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, spent the beginning of her career as an Africanist. Her expertise will increase U.S. credibility in negotiations at the United Nations with key international actors, but the window of opportunity to exact coordinated pressure on Khartoum will not remain open for very long.  The chance to take advantage of it will be largely determined in the first few weeks of President Obama’s tenure by the leadership his administration is willing and able to exercise on this.

President Obama should move quickly to name the high level envoy who will have ownership of Sudan policy and responsibility for ending the genocide.  It is essential that this official have the authority to coordinate all relevant parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy and have requisite familiarity with the issues to hit the ground running.  The envoy’s role, mandate and authority needs to be clearly spelled out in advance and at the senior-most levels of the U.S. government.

THE LONGER-TERM SUDAN POLICY FOCUS

Even while immediate challenge posed by the expected arrest warrant commands attention, President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Ambassador Rice would be well served to quickly establish clear policy objectives focused on a real and lasting all-Sudan solution for Darfur, the South, and the rest of this embattled country.  While both Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice pledged strong action on Darfur during their Senate confirmation hearings last week, the need for a holistic approach to Sudan’s crises could not be greater as deadlines for Sudan’s national elections and other crucial elements of the CPA’s implementation (such as North-South border demarcation) loom large.  The Obama administration must make the crucial leap to “connect the dots,” and invest in holistic strategies that will offer long-term solutions to Sudan’s violence.

In her confirmation hearing, Ambassador Rice correctly identified the “root of the problems in Darfur and throughout Sudan” as “the lack of an underlying peace.” Her diagnosis supports the notion that the Obama administration must put peacemaking at the center not only of their Sudan policy agenda, but of a broader effort to reframe the overall approach to U.S relations throughout the Africa. Ensuring that such an approach is implemented and maintained will be key in the weeks and months ahead.

As we said in our first letter to President Obama, the message of Sudan activists all over the United States is clear:

• Don’t try to contain the damage from the war in Darfur—END the war.
• Don’t just declare that genocide is taking place—END the genocide.
• Don’t just manage the consequences of crisis after crisis in Sudan—END these crises.

President Obama must lead a concerted international peace surge for Sudan, and diplomacy must be backed by well-conceived and consistently escalating pressure on Khartoum and other combatants to create the proper conditions for a lasting peace. More effective protection of civilians and continued steps toward accountability for crimes against humanity, which are vital in their own right, will help advance this peace surge.
Secretary Clinton recently highlighted the need to reassess options to ensure better civilian protection in Darfur and neighboring Chad, but these efforts are just one part of what must be a new comprehensive strategy for Sudan.

More than five-and-a-half years into Darfur’s crisis, and four years after the signing of the CPA, there is no prospect of a peace deal for Darfur and no coherent effort to ensure that the CPA gets implemented; in fact, progress on the CPA is progressing at an alarmingly slow rate. This is a damning indictment of U.S. and international efforts in Sudan to date. Despite an abundance of rhetoric, it is clear to all parties, including the Sudanese government, that the United States government and its international partners have thus far been content simply to manage the consequences of the crisis in Sudan, rather than resolve the situation.

The costs of this approach have already been immensely painful for Darfuris, who continue to be killed and driven from their homes in large numbers by government attacks, and are without a U.N. force capable of protecting them. Equally important, without a substantial investment in peacemaking in Darfur and peace implementation for all Sudan, the facts on the ground have the potential to become much, much worse: Darfur’s war likely will continue to escalate, the CPA may collapse and reopen a direct North-South conflict, many more people may die, rebel groups will become larger and even more lawless, and Sudan will potentially disintegrate as a state. Sudan’s potential fracturing in particular has a range of serious international security implications, ranging from disruptions in oil supplies to an increased ability of terrorist groups to operate within such chaos. The possibility of southern Sudan seceding following its self-referendum in 2011 has never been more real; the repercussions of such an outcome, given the current trajectory in Sudan, would likely be severe for both the northern and southern populations.

Certainly, protecting civilians is an important goal that will require significant energy and resources for the foreseeable future. But it is not sufficient. Protection efforts must be buttressed by a broader approach to end Sudan’s multiple conflicts. Pursuing the goal of civilian protection during the conflict should not obscure or divert energy from the larger and ultimate objective: bringing peace to Sudan by securing a credible deal for Darfur and implementing the terms of the CPA.

The CPA itself was reached after a sustained investment in diplomacy, led in part by the United States and backed by significant incentives and pressures. That hard-won agreement would not now be in jeopardy if the investment in diplomacy had been maintained and the international community had continued its pressure to ensure that the agreement was implemented. It is not too late for the United States to re-invest in ensuring that the outstanding issues preventing full implementation of the CPA are addressed, and the Obama administration must take these steps or accept the possible disintegration of Sudan in the next several years.

A U.S.-LED PEACE STRATEGY

The advent of a new administration has opened a window of opportunity for the United States to use its tremendous experience in peacemaking. Moreover, given that President Obama will face enormous challenges—ranging from a full-blown financial crisis to active wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan—a significant investment in peacemaking in Sudan is both cost-effective and has the greatest chance of ending Sudan’s suffering.

Leverage for peace in Sudan can best come from the following actions.

Continue the International Criminal Court investigation

Accountability for crimes against humanity in Darfur remains an essential element of a lasting peace in Sudan, and evidence to date suggests that the recent ICC actions have generated genuine pressure on the Sudanese government, as well as the rebel leadership.  As discussed above, the Obama administration should support the arrest warrants for President Bashir and rebel officials as they are issued. 

It now appears that the Security Council will not make the mistake of prematurely deferring the cases against government or rebel officials, which would have set back the cause of peace.^[1] Nothing less than a peace deal in Darfur that includes alternative accountability mechanisms broadly acceptable to Darfuri civilians and real evidence of implementation of the CPA could be sufficient to justify deferring the ICC cases. Short of this, the United States should make clear that it will veto any deferral resolution.  The Obama administration also should provide the ICC with any evidence it has regarding the prosecutor’s accusations. The bottom line: don’t trade accountability for war crimes for empty promises from Khartoum.
 
Enhance multilateral, non-military coercion

President Obama should work through or with selected members of the U.N. Security Council to bring a larger collection of nations on board with targeted sanctions against those most responsible for violence in Sudan, whether they are government or rebel actors. If the Security Council fails to pass these broader sanctions, then the new administration should build an international coalition to bring this pressure. Along with the ICC, these instruments can create much higher legal, financial, and political costs to those who are responsible for violence against civilians. If efforts to pass targeted sanctions through the Security Council fall short, a concerted effort should be made to work with the European Union to apply joint sanctions. In addition, the possibility of capital market sanctions for oil companies contracting with the Sudanese government should be explored.

Expand the arms embargo

Given the government of Sudan’s continued attacks against civilians in Darfur and compelling evidence that weapons from other nations, including China, are finding their way to the frontlines, a comprehensive arms embargo against the government should be imposed by the Security Council. The embargo should include a robust international monitoring mechanism to ensure its effectiveness.

Make UNAMID effective

UNAMID is failing to achieve its central goal of protecting the civilian population in the region. Much of this failure can be traced directly to the practice of giving the Sudanese government—the prime perpetrator of the genocide—a de facto veto over the mission’s composition and operations. This is simply unacceptable. Given the ICC prosecutor’s accusations against Bashir and his loyalists, the United States and United Nations must not allow Khartoum to decide the mission’s force size, national composition, the extent of AU versus international participation, timeframe for deployment, or civilian protection mandate.

A robust force on the ground in Darfur with a competent lead nation and a clear command-and-control structure is essential for saving lives, creating an environment amenable to the peace surge, and establishing the international credibility required to ensure that a broader peace strategy succeeds. Ambassador Rice has already indicated her desire to bolster what she called “global peacekeeping capacity.” Galvanizing the political will necessary to build this capacity could finally give UNAMID a chance to succeed in protecting civilians.

Ban offensive military flights

President Obama and other key members of his administration have taken a robust position in the past regarding the need to counter Sudan’s aerial attacks on civilians in Darfur, and have voiced support for enforcing a no-fly zone. Continued Sudanese aerial attacks in Darfur— there were over 40 last year and the Sudanese government launched a new aerial campaign last week —have rightly generated considerable attention. The U.N. Security Council has demanded an end to offensive military flights several times, most recently in Resolution 1769, which authorized UNAMID.^[2]  UNAMID has not enforced that demand. It is clear that the next administration and the U.N. Security Council need to consider how best to counter these continuing aerial flights and provocations.

A CHECKLIST FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

As soon as possible, the new administration should undertake the following:
 

• Appoint the President’s Special Envoy who will own this issue so that individual can begin working as rapidly as possible, and clearly establish the mandate, role and authority of this envoy within the administration. Providing sufficient authority and support will be vital.
•  Identify two senior diplomats experienced in peacemaking to be the deputies to the President’s Special Envoy, one for Darfur and the other for the CPA.
• Engage with key international actors to develop a practical and escalating menu of options for exerting leverage on the government of Sudan and rebel movements to create an environment conducive to credible negotiations.
• Task relevant agencies, including the Pentagon and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations, to explore direct ways to make ongoing civilian protection efforts more effective, including steps to make UNAMID more robust and capable and to enforce a ban on offensive military flights.
• Identify U.S. Foreign Service officers to staff a diplomatic cell that will be deployed to embassies in the region to work on these issues around the clock in the manner they deserve.
• Work closely with interested parties with leverage in Sudan and the region, especially China, the United Kingdom, France, and key African countries, to coordinate efforts on the peace surge, protection of civilians, and accountability.

By taking these practical steps, President Obama will be well positioned to launch a credible peace surge for Sudan, and work with key countries and the U.N. Security Council to build momentum for the one end-state with which no external country disagrees: peace.

A HISTORIC CHOICE

The government of Sudan has tried to frame the options for the international community as either full military engagement (an option it knows is unrealistic), or limited humanitarian efforts. In fact, there is a world of opportunity in between as long as there is the necessary political will to see an end to the killing in Sudan. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Ambassador Rice must assume international leadership in highlighting these options, rallying the world—including many countries that have been content to stand on the sidelines— to respond in unity, and deploying the best and brightest in America’s diplomatic corps to end the slaughter. Our future in Africa will be directly shaped by whether we succeed or fail in Sudan.

As aerial attacks on Darfur by the Sudanese government continue over five years into the crisis and the CPA shows dangerous signs of weakness that could lead to outright collapse, the Obama administration must engage immediately in leading an international peace surge for Sudan. This engagement will clearly demonstrate that the new U.S. administration will exact real consequences on the Sudanese government if its unacceptable policies and behavior continue.

Members of the Obama administration have spoken passionately about their intention to act boldly to end the crisis in Darfur and promote international efforts toward a peaceful future in Sudan. Now they will have the chance to do so at a crucial juncture in Sudan’s history.

John Prendergast is co-chair and John Norris is executive director of Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity at the Center for American Progress. Jerry Fowler is president of the Save Darfur Coalition.

Endnotes

^[1] Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” The Sudanese government so far has failed in getting Security Council support for a 12-month suspension of the investigation, in large part because of the dismal situation on the ground in Darfur and the government’s lack of seriousness in addressing the peace process.

^[2] The U.N. Security Council banned offensive military flights over Darfur in March 2005 (UNSC Resolution 1591).  In July 2007, Resolution 1769 demanded that “that there should be no aerial bombings and the use of United Nations markings on aircraft used in such attacks.”  The Sudanese government has violated this ban consistently and without consequence.

Memorandum to Djibril Bassolé

We congratulate you and welcome your appointment as mediator for the Darfur peace process. Your work is as vital as it will be challenging, and we believe that with leadership,and credible support from the international community, peace is within reach for Darfur. Equally clear without an effective peace process, Darfur’s violence will continue, and Sudan’s ultimate fragmentation will only become more likely.
Your role is one side of a triangle: Ending the catastrophe in Darfur requires not only support for a peace
process, but also international protection for civilians through rapid deployment of UNAMID and accountability for the many human rights abuses that have taken place to date.
The Security Council, previous mediators, and the parties themselves have failed to articulate a clear path to peace, and the people of Darfur have paid a terrible price for this lack of vision. It is tragic that for five years the international community has not mounted an effective peace process, despite the fact that a successful
model already exists for peacemaking in Sudan—the process that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). That agreement was realized in large part because the international community demonstrated strong leadership, invested heavily in diplomacy, and applied coordinated leverage on the parties.
As the mediator, you must ensure that you are fully empowered to drive the process and be supported by a full-time team with expertise in all of the relevant issues under negotiation. The efforts of such a single, empowered mediator were crucial to the success of the negotiations that resulted in the CPA. Equally important to achieving that agreement was the support of the international community, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway (the ‘troika’). As you press forward on a deal for Darfur, you should demand similar backing from the core group of countries with the most leverage over the parties. These include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The UN Security Council should be prepared to back your efforts with focused incentives and pressures. If those basic conditions for your success are not in place, you should duly inform the world.

LISTENING TO VOICES FROM DARFUR

Since the conflict began in early 2003, we have among us made 10 research trips to the war zone. In our travels, we have found only one group of people who have consistently articulated workable solutions to the challenges facing Darfur: the internally displaced and refugee populations. The voice of the Darfurian diaspora is also emerging. The people of Darfur have strong views about what issues need to be addressed, and how. However, Darfurians have been conspicuously absent from peace efforts, helping explain why we have seen such limited progress. You will only succeed in your endeavors if you listen to them, and it is their voices that will ultimately make any peace process sustainable.
As you undertake consultations with Darfurians, you will find that several persistent themes emerge:

•The need to share power and wealth more equitably in order to end historic marginalization, including direct efforts to increase representation of traditionally marginalized groups in government
• The need to decentralize political and fiscal decision making
• The need for victims of violence to receive adequate individual compensation and restitution
of stolen property
• The need for those driven from their homes to be able to return to their land safely and in dignity, with
the establishment of practical land ownership and rights policies that will encourage such returns
• The need to dismantle the structures of violence—in particular the Janjaweed militias—that have torn
Darfur to pieces
• The need to establish practical mechanisms for promoting reconstruction that will include local representatives,the government, and the international community

The issues on the table in Darfur are complex, with deep disparities between the positions of the government
and the rebel groups. Rather than relying solely on the warring parties to come up with their own proposals, you and your team should author a draft agreement that begins to bridge the gaps by consulting with and incorporating the perspectives of a much broader array of stakeholders, particularly the civilian victims of the conflict.
A draft agreement that lays out a clearly defined vision for an end state that resonates with Darfur’s civilian population would break the pattern of previous rounds of negotiations, in which the government and rebel groups exploited the lack of vision and stuck to intransigent positions. The people of Darfur continue to pay the price for this failure, and, for their sake, you must seize the opportunity to chart a new course.
The bottom line is this: There are solutions to the crisis in Darfur, and Darfurians should be at the center of those solutions.

China has again assumed the Presidency of the U.N. Security Council, a position that it last held in July 2007 when it led the authorization of a U.N. peacekeeping force for Darfur. At that time, Beijing appeared to be responding to a global campaign by activists, in advance of the Olympics, to shame China into using its influence to address human rights crises in locales in which it has significant economic investments. But China's actions have belied its rhetoric, and it has continued to protect its favorite deadly dictators in places like Darfur, Burma, and Zimbabwe. A revised strategy must put greater focus on China's wallet.

China's rapid emergence as a global economic powerhouse has come about in part due to its willingness to do business with despotic regimes. This bad behavior is often considered good business, but China's current policy towards these ticking political time bombs poses a major threat to its longer-term economic interests.

China backs its dictator allies with new investments, weapons sales, and diplomatic cover. Illustratively, with more than $8 billion invested, Chinese companies dominate Sudan's oil sector, and Chinese military assets keep turning up in Darfur. When Zimbabwe's dictator Robert Mugabe decided to retain power through rigged elections and state violence, China sent him arms, donated midnight blue tiles for the roof of his palace, and vetoed targeted U.N. sanctions against his cronies. And when Burma cracked down on the peaceful protests of the Saffron Revolution, China steadfastly supported the junta, shipping artillery cannons and running interference for the regime in the Security Council.

To change this pattern, a new administration in Washington and activists around the world need to focus on Beijing's investment strategy, demonstrating how its economic interests are undermined by its present foreign policy and offering China real alternatives. A more sober examination is required in order to ascertain how the Chinese government might be motivated to become a more constructive actor in support of peace and human rights. There are two points of leverage: one positive and one negative.

On the positive side, as China increasingly integrates into the global economy, Beijing must play by the rules if it wants others to do so. China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 was based on the calculation that the economic benefits of globalization outweighed the cost of abiding by international norms. But today an emboldened China skirts the rules on everything from underage gymnasts to product safety and intellectual property rights. The U.S. should remind China that defying basic human rights, environmental and labor standards will rebound negatively on its commercial interests, particularly by using multilateral mechanisms like the W.T.O. to impose a cost on China's errant practices.

On the negative side lurks the greatest threat to China's long-term growth potential. By allying itself with some of the world's worst dictators for the spoils of today's resource grab, the bill will be paid tomorrow by rebels and opposition officials who will remember who kept their enemies in power.

The blowback in Sudan could be explosive. A return to full-scale civil war would directly threaten Chinese oil interests, as rebels there would make their first target the China National Petroleum Company. No less worrisome is the future of Zimbabwe and Burma. Mugabe cannot cling to power indefinitely, and Zimbabwe's economic meltdown provides a preview of Burma's future under the junta. China's support to these regimes has eviscerated the infrastructure, necessary for a healthy business environment, from educational opportunities to property rights. Putting the human suffering aside, none of these countries will remain profitable for long on their present trajectories.

Therein lies the opening. China ultimately has an economic interest in peace in Sudan, and in stable transitions in Zimbabwe and Burma. If China can positively support these outcomes, some of its most egregious sins will be forgiven. The Beijing government should launch such an effort this month, as China literally sets the agenda for the Security Council, by focusing on a peace deal for Darfur that will end the suffering there. Bringing China into a more direct role in peacemaking will require deft diplomacy from Washington and intelligent advocacy from activists, who can help affect Beijing's calculations further by ramping up stock divestment campaigns and calls for arms embargo enforcement and targeted sanctions.

The Chinese government is not entirely a lost human rights cause. We just need to revise the roadmap.

A Peace Surge for Sudan.pdf

This is the first in a series of letters to the next president spelling out a practical roadmap to end the crisis in Sudan.

John Prendergast is co-chair and John Norris is executive director of Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity at the Center for American Progress. Jerry Fowler is president of the Save Darfur Coalition.

The message of Sudan activists all over the United States is clear:

• Don’t try to contain the damage from the war in Darfur—END the war.
• Don’t just declare that genocide is taking place—END the genocide.
• Don’t just manage the consequences of crisis after crisis in Sudan—END these crises.

In short, President-Elect Obama must lead a concerted international peace surge for Sudan, and diplomacy must be backed by well-conceived and consistently escalating pressure on Khartoum and other combatants to create the proper conditions for a lasting peace. More effective protection of civilians and continued steps toward accountability for crimes against humanity, which are vital in their own right, will help advance this peace surge.

Five-and-a-half years into Darfur’s crisis, and three and-a-half years after the signing of a peace deal for southern Sudan (the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA), there is no prospect of a peace deal for Darfur and no coherent effort to ensure that the CPA gets implemented. This is a damning indictment of U.S. and international efforts in Sudan to date. Despite an abundance of rhetoric, it is clear to all parties, including the Sudanese government, that the United States government and its international partners are content simply to manage the consequences of the crisis in Sudan, rather than resolve the situation.

The costs of this approach have already been immensely painful for the Darfuris, who continue to be killed and driven from their homes in large numbers by government and rebel attacks as a U.N. force is incapable of protecting them. Equally important, without a substantial investment in peacemaking in Darfur and peace implementation for all Sudan, the facts on the ground have the potential to become much worse: Darfur’s war likely will continue to escalate, the CPA may collapse and reopen a direct north-south conflict, many more people may die, rebel groups will become larger and even more lawless, and Sudan will potentially disintegrate as a state. In addition, a wider war could also open up fronts in eastern and northern Sudan; continued war in Darfur will further fuel proxy war in Chad and the Central African Republic; and north-south tensions in Sudan could lead to the Lord’s Resistance Army becoming more active in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. Sudan’s potential fracturing in particular has a range of serious international security implications ranging from disruptions in oil supplies to the increased ability of terrorist groups to operate within such chaotic settings.

Certainly, protecting civilians is an important goal that will require significant energy and resources for the foreseeable future. But it is not sufficient. Protection efforts must be buttressed by a broader approach to end Sudan’s multiple conflicts. Pursuing the goal of civilian protection during the conflict should not obscure or divert energy from the larger and ultimate objective: bringing peace to Sudan by securing a credible deal for Darfur and implementing the terms of the CPA. As the two most influential countries with Sudan and two countries with the most to lose if the CPA collapses, the United States and China have compelling reasons to work jointly for lasting peace.

The CPA itself—the agreement to end the 22-year war in southern Sudan and establish a framework for democratic transformation of the country—was reached in 2005 after a sustained investment in diplomacy, led in part by the United States and backed by significant incentives and pressures. That hard-won agreement would not now be in jeopardy if the investment in diplomacy had been maintained and the international community had continued its pressure to ensure that the agreement was implemented.

A U.S.-led peace strategy

The advent of a new administration will open a window of opportunity for the United States to use its tremendous experience in peacemaking. Moreover, given that the next president will face enormous challenges—ranging from a full-blown financial crisis to active wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan—a significant investment in peacemaking in Sudan is both cost-effective and has the greatest chance of ending Sudan’s suffering.

Leverage for peace in Sudan can best come from the following actions.

Continue the International Criminal Court investigation.

Accountability for crimes against humanity in Darfur remains an essential element of a lasting peace in Sudan, and evidence to date suggests that the recent moves by the International Criminal Court have generated genuine pressure on the Sudanese government. A premature deferral of the cases against Sudan’s leadership for war crimes through invocation of Article 16 of the ICC’s Rome Statute would be a grave mistake and would set back the cause of peace.¹ Nothing less than a peace deal in Darfur that includes alternative accountability mechanisms broadly acceptable to Darfuri civilians and real evidence of implementation of the CPA could be sufficient to justify deferring the ICC investigation on a year-to-year renewable basis. The United States should veto any steps toward invoking Article 16 at the Security Council and provide the ICC with any evidence it has regarding Sudan’s direct involvement in planning the Darfur genocide. The bottom line: don’t trade accountability for war crimes for empty promises from Khartoum.

Enhance multilateral, non-military coercion.

The new president should work through or with selected members of the U.N. Security Council to bring a larger collection of nations on board with targeted sanctions against those most responsible for violence in Sudan. If the Security Council fails to pass these broader sanctions, then the new administration should build an international coalition to bring this pressure. Along with the ICC, these instruments can create much higher legal, financial, and political costs to those who are responsible for violence against civilians. If efforts to pass targeted sanctions through the Security Council fall short, a concerted effort should be made to work with the European Union to jointly apply U.S.-EU sanctions. In addition, the possibility of capital market sanctions for oil companies contracting with the Sudanese government should be explored.

Expand the arms embargo.

Given the government of Sudan’s continued attacks against civilians in Darfur and compelling evidence that weapons from other nations, including China, are finding their way to the frontlines, a comprehensive arms embargo against the Khartoum government should be imposed by the Security Council. The embargo should include a robust international monitoring mechanism to ensure its effectiveness.

Make UNAMID effective.

UNAMID, the hybrid U.N.-African Union mission in Darfur, is failing to achieve its central goal of protecting the civilian population in the region. Much of this failure can be traced directly to the practice of giving the Sudanese government—the prime perpetrator of the genocide—a de facto veto over the mission’s composition and operations. This is simply unacceptable. Given the ICC prosecutor’s accusations against Bashir and his loyalists, the United States and United Nations must not allow Khartoum to decide the mission’s force size, national composition, the extent of AU versus international participation, timeframe for deployment, or civilian protection mandate. A robust force on the ground in Darfur with a competent lead nation and a clear command-and-control structure is essential for saving lives, creating an environment amenable to the peace surge and establishing the international credibility required to ensure that a broader peace strategy succeeds.

Ban offensive military flights.

Both U.S. presidential candidates have taken a robust position on the need to counter Sudan’s aerial attacks on civilians in Darfur, and have voiced support for enforcing a no-fly zone. Continued Sudanese aerial attacks in Darfur—there have been at least 43 this year—have rightly generated considerable attention. The U.N. Security Council has demanded an end to offensive military flights several times, most recently in Resolution 1769, which authorized UNAMID.² UNAMID has not enforced that demand. It is clear that the next administration and the U.N. Security Council need to consider how best to counter these continuing aerial flights and provocations.

The transition team should under take the following before the new president takes office on January 20:

• Identify the senior official who will own this issue so that individual can begin working as rapidly as possible.
• Develop a practical and escalating menu of options for exerting leverage on the government of Sudan and rebel movements to create an environment conducive to credible negotiations.
• Task relevant agencies, including the Pentagon and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, to explore direct ways to make ongoing civilian protection efforts more effective, including steps to make UNAMID more robust and capable and to enforce a ban on offensive military flights.
• Identify foreign service officers to staff a diplomatic cell that will be deployed to the region to work the issues around the clock in the mannerthey deserve.
• Identify two senior diplomats experienced in peacemaking to be the deputies to the president’s special envoy, one for Darfur and the other for the CPA.
• Reach out to interested parties with leverage in Sudan and the region, especially China, the United Kingdom, France, and key African countries, to coordinate efforts on the peace surge, protection of civilians, and accountability.

By taking these practical steps, the next president will be well positioned to launch a credible peace surge for Sudan, and work with key countries and the U.N. Security Council to build momentum for the one end-state with which no external country disagrees: peace.

A historic choice

The government of Sudan has tried to frame the options for the international community as either full military engagement (an option it knows is unrealistic) or limited humanitarian efforts. In fact, there is a world of opportunity in between, if there is the necessary political will to see an end to the killing in Sudan. The next president must assume international leadership in highlighting these options, rallying the world to respond in unity—including many countries that have been content to stand on the sidelines—and deploy the best and brightest in America’s diplomatic corps to end the slaughter. Our future in Africa will be directly shaped by whether we succeed or fail in Sudan.

If the international community shows weakness, if Darfur continues to burn, if the CPA is allowed to collapse at any point, then we may as well start digging new graves, because the two and a half million who died in southern Sudan and Darfur over the past 25 years will just be a prologue for a fresh cataclysm.

Because we know and because we have choices, if we still do nothing, then we will share in the responsibility for the result.

Endnotes
¹ Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after
the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” The Sudanese government so far has failed in getting Security Council support for a 12-month suspension of the investigation, in large part because of the dismal situation on the ground in Darfur and the government’s lack of seriousness in addressing the peace process.

² The U.N. Security Council banned offensive military flights over Darfur in March 2005 (UNSC Resolution 1591). In July 2007, Resolution 1769 demanded that “that there should be no aerial bombings and the use of United Nations markings on aircraft used in such attacks.” The Sudanese government has violated this ban consistently and without consequence.