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What the Warrant Means: Justice, Peace, and the Key Actors in Sudan

Submitted by Pete Johnson on February 12, 2009 - 8:40am.
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Ocampo & BashirThe issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s sitting head of state for crimes against humanity offers the Obama administration a chance to catalyze multilateral efforts to bring about a solution to Sudan’s decades-long cycle of warfare. One of the crucial missing ingredients to conflict resolution efforts has been some form of accountability for the horrific crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated by the warring parties in Sudan, primarily the Khartoum regime.  Peace without justice in Sudan would only bring an illusion of stability, without addressing the primary forces driving the conflict.

Author: 
Enough Team
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Feb 12, 2009
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What the Warrant Means - PDF

The issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s sitting head of state for crimes against humanity offers the Obama administration a chance to catalyze multilateral efforts to bring about a solution to Sudan’s decades-long cycle of warfare.  One of the crucial missing ingredients to conflict resolution efforts has been some form of accountability for the horrific crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated by the warring parties in Sudan, primarily the Khartoum regime.  Peace without justice in Sudan would only bring an illusion of stability without addressing the primary forces driving the conflict.

The decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court, or ICC, to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is unsurprising given the long pattern of profound abuses in Sudan directed from the highest echelons of government. Over the past several weeks, President Bashir has escalated violence in Darfur and increased human rights violations in Khartoum in a last-ditch effort to force the United Nations Security Council to defer the ICC’s investigation for one year “in the interest of peace.”1  However, as Enough argued when ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo requested the warrant in July 2008, the prior indictments of former Liberian President Charles Taylor and former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic demonstrate that the pursuit of justice can be a catalyst for peace—if the international community stands resolutely behind efforts to promote accountability for genocide and crimes against humanity.2   The situation in Sudan is no different.  Senior officials within Bashir’s National Congress Party, or NCP, are deeply concerned about the possibility of further charges by the ICC, and a growing fissure between Bashir’s loyalists and potentially more pragmatic elements of the NCP could lead to the president’s removal.

To ensure that any potential leadership change within the regime will actually produce meaningful movement toward peace on the ground, the international community must fashion a firm and coordinated peace strategy conditioned on actions rather than words and policies rather than personalities. What should be clear to the international community, including the United States, is that President Bashir should be delivered to the court to face a fair trial on the charges against him. Furthermore, the international community needs to use multilateral diplomacy, well targeted pressures, and judicious incentives to bring both the NCP and Darfur’s rebel groups to the negotiating table, while making a major effort to revitalize the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, as part of a broader and more strategic peace effort for all of Sudan.

How the warrant affects the key actors in Sudan

Sudan is teetering on a dangerous precipice: Violence in Darfur is escalating and CPA implementation is faltering. An NCP-backed coup attempt in neighboring Chad seems increasingly likely. (Rebels supported by Khartoum have reached the capital N’Djamena twice already, in 2006 and 2008). The response of key actors in Sudan to the ICC’s move against Bashir is still obviously a work in progress, but the choices made in the coming weeks by the NCP, as well as the main rebel groups in Darfur, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, will have profound impact on the country’s future.  Understanding the calculations of these actors is fundamental to leveraging the arrest warrant into progress toward peace.

The National Congress Party

Sudan’s ruling NCP has faced substantial pressures both from within and without in anticipation of the warrant against Bashir. Internally, Bashir and his loyalists face growing opposition from a group led by Sudan’s Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha, its intelligence chief Salah Abdullah Gosh, and its energy minister Dr. Awad al-Jaz.  Tensions between the two camps have been mounting for months, and Gosh blames Bashir and his senior advisor Nafie Ali Nafie for Sudan’s increasing international isolation.

With the warrant now out in the open, this jostling between these two main factions will likely intensify and could split the party. Although Bashir, an army general, still commands loyalty within the regular armed forces, this rival alliance is represented by powerful actors in Sudan’s political, security, and economic sectors. Taha and Gosh bear significant responsibility for crimes against humanity committed during the regime’s 20-year rule, yet they have shown willingness to work with the international community. Taha was the NCP’s point person in negotiating the CPA, and Gosh has become the United States’ favored interlocutor on counterterrorism.  Within a ruling party increasingly focused on its own survival, Bashir may become a sacrificial lamb for a party in search of more pragmatic leadership.

Externally, Bashir’s efforts to force a deferral of the ICC investigation have run aground, and the new Obama administration has already raised the possibility of additional punitive measures against the regime. The African Union, the Arab League, and China have all maintained vocal support for a deferral, but the United States’ outspoken opposition has effectively neutralized these efforts.

Furthermore, the recent government attacks in Darfur have made it difficult for even some of Bashir’s most loyal allies to use their typical arguments while seeking to defer justice.  In the weeks leading up to the arrest warrant, some of the regime’s most stalwart allies already began distancing themselves from Khartoum. Most important is Egypt, which for years used its influence in the Arab League to rally support for Bashir’s government. However, relations between the two countries have cooled since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak met Bashir in Khartoum in November 2008. According to Sudanese officials, Mubarak called Bashir to task for failing to implement the CPA and for driving the South toward independence, a situation that would complicate maintaining the uninterrupted flow of the Nile River, Egypt’s main interest in Sudan.  Mubarak also voiced concerns that the Sudanese Islamist movement is the gravest security threat in the region, and blamed the Sudanese government for instability in Chad, and the continued predations of the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA.  If Egypt expresses a willingness to accept new leadership in Khartoum, other allies in the Arab world will likely follow suit, further weakening Bashir’s internal position.

Given these internal and external pressures as well as the regime’s historic patterns of behavior, there are three likely scenarios for how the NCP will react to the indictment:

Scenario one—President Bashir opts for confrontation with the international community:  By intensifying the aggressive crackdown in Darfur that he began in Muhajiriya in advance of the warrant, increasing aerial bombardments of civilians, restricting or expelling humanitarians and peacekeepers, stepping up support for Chadian rebels, threatening to withdraw from the CPA, or backtracking on counterterrorism cooperation, Bashir could force the international community to take more assertive action or back down.  At the same time, Bashir could work internally to assert firm control of the NCP by jailing opponents, imposing martial law, and increasing military presence in Khartoum and elsewhere.  While many humanitarians and U.N. officials have expressed deep concerns about this scenario, it is important to note that such maximalist behavior by Bashir would only serve to further galvanize international support for decisive action against his government.

Scenario two—Internal pressure forces Bashir from office: Given the mounting pressure from within, Bashir could decide to peacefully step aside and cede control to a new NCP candidate, who would participate in the upcoming national elections. Alternatively, rivals within the party could attempt to take power by force. Salah Gosh is one of the strongest advocates for removing Bashir, and Sudan is no stranger to coup d’états. However, Bashir has reportedly told Gosh that he may step down if the divisions within the NCP become irreconcilable. Some Sudanese officials have cited the possibility of exile in Saudi Arabia, which is not a party to the ICC. The new leadership of the NCP could then adopt a more pragmatic approach to the international community by negotiating an end to the war in Darfur and recommitting itself—although unenthusiastically—to the CPA. Bashir’s peaceful departure would undoubtedly be in the best interests of the NCP and the country as a whole, but some Bashir loyalists have threatened to kill Vice President Ali Osman Taha if any attempt is made to remove Bashir from power. Here again, it is important to note that after charges were brought against both Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milosevic much was made of the fact that there was no clear mechanism to deliver them to The Hague—yet that is exactly where both men eventually found themselves. This was in large part because in both cases loyalists recognized the increasingly steep cost of resisting international norms on an issue as fundamental as crimes against humanity.

Scenario three—Bashir stalls for time: After years of what the new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice calls “bluster and retreat,” by the international community, Bashir may well calculate that the pressure arising from the arrest warrant will eventually dissipate. The NCP has weathered heavy external pressure in the past and survived by exploiting the inherent divisions in the international community. It may be entirely possible that Bashir, rather than take dramatic action in response to the warrant, will bide his time, and commit the bulk of his energy and resources to facing internal challenges.

The Darfur rebel groups

Bashir’s indictment fundamentally alters the context for Darfur’s rebel groups, presenting a rare opportunity for the more politically savvy groups in the region to gain some legitimacy at the expense of the regime. Darfur’s most significant rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, supports the issuance of an arrest warrant.  At the same time, however, Mr. Ocampo is pursuing cases against the rebels, and the leaders of the JEM and the various factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, or SLA, have to weigh their support of a warrant for Bashir against the possibility that they are potentially subject to a similar fate.

Given the JEM’s dominant military and political status vis-à-vis the other rebel groups, its response to the warrant will strongly influence other rebels.  The JEM’s recent behavior—renewed military offensives, bellicose threats against the government, and overtures to the international community—suggests that the rebels are keeping their options open.  Although the JEM took control of Muhajiriya, South Darfur, by force in late January, the rebels withdrew when Khartoum requested that peacekeepers from the joint United Nations/African Union mission, or UNAMID, leave the area and threatened to level the town. Afterward, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim met in the Chadian capital N’Djamena with a senior UNAMID official and stated that the JEM is “willing to establish a working relationship with UNAMID for the protection of civilians.”3  

The JEM’s gesture toward UNAMID, a recent JEM visit to the United States (at the invitation of the outgoing Bush administration), and its decision to participate in “talks about talks” in Qatar suggest a broad effort to present itself as a credible political actor. However, the JEM continues to warn of greater military action down the road, including another attack on Khartoum if Bashir’s indictment leads to “chaos.”4  Although government forces routed the rebels when they attacked the Khartoum suburb of Omdurman last May, the JEM could seek to rally support for a new offensive meant to remove a president charged with war crimes from power. Provoking a heavy-handed response from the Sudanese government could also be a way to force external actors—particularly the United States—to increase pressure on the regime and potentially take military action to protect civilians against wholesale casualties.  Generating a threat of force from the international community to buttress one’s own strength is nothing new: The Kosovo Liberation Army used this tactic to great effect during the run-up to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.
    
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

The SPLM is largely in reactive mode, and senior officials within the party disagree on the possible effect of the arrest warrant. Salva Kiir, the president of the Government of Southern Sudan and Sudan’s first vice president in the national unity government, is deeply concerned that Bashir’s indictment signals the end of the CPA. Other SPLM officials are optimistic that second Vice President Ali Osman Taha will remove Bashir and recommit the NCP to CPA implementation.  Taha’s influence has diminished since the death of SPLM leader John Garang, and the NCP has sought to undermine CPA implementation. Yet many within the SPLM believe that Taha understands the importance of the CPA to the survival of his party, and that he will make some sacrifices—as he did while negotiating the CPA—to keep the deal on track. If Bashir were to step down, the new NCP leadership would have to work with the SPLM to reorganize the government of national unity, which an interim president would lead until elections and the formation of a new government.

Next steps for the Obama administration

Although no one can accurately predict how various actors in Sudan will respond to the warrant for Bashir, the international community, including the Obama administration can—through effective multilateral diplomacy, a willingness to call Bashir’s bluff, and practical steps to increase pressure on Khartoum in pursuit of a comprehensive peace deal that includes both Darfur and revitalized CPA implementation—make the pursuit of peace the most attractive option for the NCP and Darfur’s rebel groups. The Obama administration’s response to the immediate challenge posed by the warrant should take into account the calculations and possible scenarios discussed above, but it should also flow from answers to broader and more strategic questions: What is the end game? What is the overall strategic goal? And what level of force is the administration and its allies willing to use, if the Sudanese government chooses to escalate confrontation? Answering these big picture questions up front is fundamental since many of the tactical responses to the situation on the ground and arrest warrant could inexorably lead to a much higher stakes game.

A comprehensive policy approach to Sudan must include several components:
 

  • Consistent high-level diplomacy: Given the scale and complexity of the crisis in Sudan, the president should appoint a special envoy to serve as the United States’ point person on Sudan policy and lead U.S. efforts to forge a multilateral coalition that supports more robust measures to help end the war in Darfur and ensure full implementation of the CPA. This envoy must have direct access to President Obama, and appropriate staff and resources, including authority over the State Department’s Sudan Programs Group. This envoy would need a dedicated team and sufficient resources to carry out his or her work.
  • Firm messaging to the NCP: Messages should be conveyed to the key actors within the NCP both publicly and privately. In terms of public messages, the administration should make it clear that it fully supports justice and accountability for Darfur’s genocide, and will not tolerate any obstruction of aid efforts, deployment of UNAMID, or implementation of the CPA. There will be consequences for such actions that will directly affect the leadership of those entities party to the conflict. Behind-the-scenes, the United States must make clear that continued attacks on civilians or peacekeepers, the anticipated proxy coup attempt in Chad, or efforts to cut off humanitarian aid will be viewed as a major escalation of hostilities by Khartoum and will be treated as such by Washington and its allies. Any credible peace effort will demand an unconditional ceasefire and a peace deal in Darfur that includes accountability mechanisms broadly acceptable to Darfuri citizens, real movement on CPA implementation, and the demonstrable return of large numbers of Darfuri IDPs and refugees to a secure environment.
  • Firm messaging to the rebels: The Obama administration should make clear to Darfur’s rebel groups that it and the international community will apply a common set of standards to all sides of the Darfur conflict. The U.S. envoy should make clear to JEM and others that the international community will hold rebels accountable for crimes against humanity and that attempts to provoke external intervention will be met with consequences.
  • Contingency planning: The Obama administration must take steps to detach humanitarian and peacekeeping operations from dependence on Khartoum. Contingency plans should be established to reposition all non-life-saving personnel, and to provide life- saving programs in non-permissive environments.  The United States should consider providing air assets and logistical support to facilitate these steps if needed, and Washington’s allies should consider similar measures. Too often, UNAMID has been left in the position of pleading with the Sudanese government and rebels not to be a target of attacks. UNAMID should be in a position to respond with decisive force to provocations from any side and to effectively protect civilians. Until it can meet those basic standards, it cannot be considered an effective peacekeeping mission.
  • Clear consequences: The international community should establish clear consequences if Sudan fails to deliver Bashir to justice. These measures should include rapid escalation of targeted sanctions, an expanded arms embargo, imposition of an oil blockade on Port Sudan, and targeted airstrikes against air assets used by the regime for offensive military operations, with escalating strikes against military and government installations if there is continued intransigence. To that end, the Obama administration should task Pentagon and NATO planners with developing options for a multinational force to carry out the military options outlined above. Such a force could also temporarily buttress UNAMID by providing the robust command-and-control capabilities UNAMID currently lacks and badly needs.
  • Direct diplomacy with the SPLM: Although more robust measures aimed at Khartoum carry risks to the CPA, the United States ought to reaffirm its commitment to southern self-determination and take advantage of the SPLM’s role in the national unity government to encourage more pragmatic elements within the NCP to step forward.
  • Deeper engagement with China:  The Obama administration should engage more deeply with the Chinese to make clear that the U.S. goal in Sudan is stability and lasting peace—goals which Beijing should also support and which the two countries could work together to secure.  An American envoy should invite closer collaboration between the United States and China in support of Darfur peace and CPA implementation. Bashir is increasingly an obstacle to those goals and his behavior risks creating more danger and instability for the international community.

An historic choice

The situation in Darfur is changing daily, and it is impossible to predict what will occur in the immediate post-warrant period within the ranks of the NCP and among the key rebel factions. One thing, however, is certain: This is a moment of opportunity during which the United States has a crucially important choice to make.  It can help lead the international community in the pursuit of a credible and strategic approach to peace and justice, or it can let the situation worsen absent serious pressure from outside actors. Now is the time for the Obama administration to follow through on its promises to end the crisis in Darfur and lead international efforts toward a peaceful future in Sudan.

Endnotes

1 Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” The Sudanese government so far has failed in getting Security Council support for a 12-month suspension of the investigation, in large part because of the dismal situation on the ground in Darfur and the government’s lack of seriousness in addressing the peace process.
2 See Enough’s strategy paper by John Norris, John Prendergast, and David Sullivan, “The Merits of Justice” (July 2008).
3 See ReliefWeb, “UNAMID JSR Adada meets with JEM Chairman in N’Djamena, Chad,” February 5, 2009.
4 See “Darfur JEM claims free reign in the region, warns government,” Sudan Tribune, January 31, 2009

RELEASE: Sudan Advocacy Groups, in Letter to Obama, Seek Policy Changes

Submitted by Zack Brisson on September 9, 2009 - 7:48am.
in

The Obama Administration has almost completed its policy review on Sudan. There is, however, a major problem with the administration’s emerging policy, notes an open letter to President Obama from a group of Sudan advocacy organizations. While it is welcome that the U.S. government has agreed on the tactical pressures and incentives with which it will approach Sudan, the broader diplomatic strategy guiding this effort is fundamentally flawed.

Sep 9, 2009

Sudan Now Coalition Partner Logo

 

For Immediate Release
September 9, 2009
Contact
Eileen White Read, 202.741.6376
eread@enoughproject.org
 
RELEASE: Sudan Advocacy Groups, in Letter to Obama, Seek Policy Changes

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Obama Administration has almost completed its policy review on Sudan. There is, however, a major problem with the administration’s emerging policy, notes an open letter to President Obama from a group of Sudan advocacy organizations. While it is welcome that the U.S. government has agreed on the tactical pressures and incentives with which it will approach Sudan, the broader diplomatic strategy guiding this effort is fundamentally flawed.

 
The full text of the letter can be found here.
 
Signatories to the letter included members of the Sudan Now campaign – the Enough Project at the Center for American Progress, Investors Against Genocide, Stop Genocide Now, and Humanity United – along with the Genocide Intervention Network.
 
The letter, titled “Avoiding Total War in Sudan: The Urgent Need for a Different U.S. Strategy,” comments that the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, is eager to undermine the self-determination referendum scheduled for 2011 that will determine if South Sudan is to become independent. In particular, there are mounting signs that the ruling NCP is again arming proxy militias in the South. Left unchecked, the NCP’s behavior will trigger a war in the South and make it all the more difficult to resolve the still-simmering crisis in Darfur.
 
Regarding the South, the current U.S. diplomatic strategy is making peace more difficult by opening the door to a renegotiation of key aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s implementation through the current tripartite talks. The U.S. diplomatic strategy should instead refocus on strict adherence to the CPA, particularly the provisions associated with preparations for the referendum, and ensure that there will be consequences for any actions by the parties that undermine the CPA—either through non-implementation or by the arming of ethnic-based militias. 
 
Regarding Darfur, the current U.S. approach is inadvertently leading to further divisions among rebel factions in Darfur and lacks an endgame focused on specific proposals that will result in a lasting peace. Instead, the U.S. must adopt a diplomatic strategy that puts the horse before the cart in Darfur by developing a draft peace plan that is backed by the diplomatic structure and leverage necessary for success. 
 
Said Enough Co-founder John Prendergast, “To avert a plunge to full-scale national war in Sudan, the Obama administration must alter its diplomatic strategy in both the South and in Darfur. In the South, the U.S. should work to develop costs for the ruling National Congress Party’s provision of support to ethnic-based militias and deliberate obstruction of the implementation of the CPA. In Darfur, the U.S. should lay down a peace proposal that addresses the core issues of displaced and refugee Darfuri populations, and work to get the parties on board. Only when the diplomatic strategy is right will the new Obama policy framework have any chance for success.”
 
The full text of the letter can be found here.
 
For additional information:

VISIT the Enough Project’s blog, Enough Said, for updates on this issue.

FOLLOW the Enough Project on Twitter, http://twitter.com/enoughproject.

 
 
###
 
Sudan Now is a coalition of anti-genocide advocacy organizations committed to bringing meaningful and lasting peace to Sudan and encouraging strong American leadership and action to achieve this goal. For more information, visit SudanActionNow.com.
 
The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values. Enough is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on crises in Sudan, Chad, eastern Congo, northern Uganda, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. Enough’s strategy papers and briefings provide sharp field analysis and targeted policy recommendations based on a “3P” crisis response strategy: promoting durable peace, providing civilian protection, and punishing perpetrators of atrocities. Enough works with concerned citizens, advocates, and policy makers to prevent, mitigate, and resolve these crises. For more information, contact Eileen White Read, 202.741.6376; eread@enoughproject.org.
 
If you would rather not receive future email messages from Center for American Progress, let us know by clicking here. Center for American Progress, 1333 H St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005-4707 United States.
 

 

Congo's Dangerous Crossroads

Submitted by Pete Johnson on January 30, 2009 - 10:37am.
in

Last week’s arrest of Congolese rebel leader Laurent Nkunda and the deployment of an estimated 4,000 Rwandan soldiers into eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, as part of joint Rwandan-Congolese military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, represent a major, and dangerous, crossroads.

Author: 
Enough Team
Jan 30, 2009

Last week’s arrest of Congolese rebel leader Laurent Nkunda and the deployment of an estimated 4,000 Rwandan soldiers into eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, as part of joint Rwandan-Congolese military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, represent a major, and dangerous, crossroads. One on hand, this unusual collaboration between Congo and Rwanda could be a catalyst for fundamentally changing the dynamic of the war and ending the deadliest conflict since World War II.  On the other hand, it is obvious to all involved that Congolese citizens face grave new dangers ahead. The details of the operation already underway in eastern Congo’s densely forested terrain are murky, but if previous attempts to dislodge the 6,500 strong FDLR are any indication, Congolese civilians are likely to bear the overwhelming brunt of the violence. The international community must take the following urgent actions:

  • protect civilians in FDLR areas by immediately enhancing the capacity of the U.N. peacekeeping force, known as MONUC, and by pressuring Congo and Rwanda to minimize collateral damage;
  • increase the desertion rate of rank-and-file FDLR through more effective and transparent disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and repatriation, or DDRRR, programs;
  • demand international military observation of the operations and a more clearly defined role for MONUC; and,
  • halt the impunity that fuels rampant atrocities by securing the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda and supporting the swift expansion of the ICC’s investigations into the North and South Kivu Provinces.
     

If, and only if, those conditions are met, the international community should consider assisting the operations in targeting FDLR commanders by providing intelligence and tactical support.

In September and October 2008, Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense of People, or CNDP, engaged in weeks of intense fighting with the Congolese army and its allied militias, including the FDLR. The fighting had a devastating effect on eastern Congo’s civilian population, exacerbating an already catastrophic humanitarian situation. Nkunda’s forces advanced to the doorstep of the strategic city of Goma in late October, but rather than attack, Nkunda declared a ceasefire and demanded political talks with the Congolese government. Efforts by the United Nations and others to negotiate a political solution stalemated by mid-December.

The Enough Project has consistently argued that an effective international strategy to apprehend FDLR leadership and dismantle its various militias is a necessary step to break the political deadlock and nearly 13 years of conflict in eastern Congo. Removing the FDLR would force the Congolese and Rwandan governments—along with scores of armed groups in the region—to seek political solutions to the conflict’s other main drivers—a war economy driven by illegal extraction of minerals, tensions over land-use and citizenship, and the political and economic security of ethnic minorities—and create conditions for local conflict resolution and, eventually, post-conflict reconstruction. However, as Enough has also argued, a poorly planned and executed military operation against the FDLR carries severe consequences for civilians and could propel this crisis in unpredictable and dangerous new directions. 

The deal struck between Kinshasa and Kigali to arrest Nkunda and collaborate militarily against the FDLR is a seismic shift in regional relations. The broad strokes of what was agreed upon are clear: Congolese officials sought Rwandan help to get rid of Nkunda and end the CNDP rebellion, and in exchange the Rwandan military would be allowed to re-enter eastern Congo to hunt down the FDLR, whose leadership bears responsibility for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. On December 5, following bilateral talks in Goma, North Kivu Province, Congolese Foreign Affairs Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba and Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Rosemary Museminali agreed on a plan for joint military operations. However, several aspects of the operation emerging on the ground should alarm policymakers. These include:

  1. Collaboration with an indicted war criminal: In a fantastically cynical move, the Congolese and Rwandan governments agreed to replace Nkunda with his Chief of Staff, Bosco Ntaganda.  Ntaganda is wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC, for war crimes committed in 2002-2003 during the conflict that raged in Ituri province. Human Rights Watch recently documented his direct involvement in CNDP’s massacre of at least 150 civilians in the town of Kiwanja, in North Kivu. His participation in the operation is a clear threat to civilians.  As a signatory to the Rome Statue that establishes the ICC, the Congolese government is obligated to arrest Ntaganda, and are thus currently in full violation of international law. His central role in the operation makes it very difficult for the international community to be supportive of much needed action against the FDLR. Using war criminals to pursue war criminals makes little sense – no matter how expedient it may appear to the operation’s planners in Kigali.
     
  2. Increased vulnerability of civilians: Many FDLR have lived in eastern Congo for nearly 15 years, simultaneously integrating into and terrorizing Congolese communities. Past military operations against the FDLR have proven disastrous for these communities as FDLR fighters have chosen not to stand and fight, but have melted into the forest, and returned later to conduct “reprisal” attacks on civilians.  Early reports from the ground confirm that this scenario is playing out again, and political actors in North Kivu have appealed to MONUC to protect civilians during the operation. If the bloody aftermath of recent failed operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, in northeastern Congo is any indication, the international community should be bracing itself for heavy civilian casualties and displacement.
     
  3. Limited international involvement: Although most external actors agree that removing the FDLR is critical to lasting stability in the Great Lakes region and that they could provide intelligence, planning assistance, and technical/logistical support, Congo and Rwanda devised, planned, and began to execute this operation on their own. Though MONUC recently agreed to provide logistical and medical support, it has been kept deliberately in the dark about details and plans for the joint operation. As one MONUC official told Enough, “We aren’t part of anything here. We are just simply in a position of playing ‘catch up’.”  The United States, European Union, African Union, and other external actors are in a position to offer support if Rwanda and Congo take practical steps to protect civilians and observe international alw, but none of these actors are playing a visible role or are close enough to the action to help prevent a worst-case scenario from unfolding.
     
  4. Fissures within the Congolese government: Kabila’s decision to allow Rwandan troops to re-enter Congo was made behind closed doors and without the consent of key players in his government. Influential Kabila advisers National Police Inspector John Numbi and Minister of Interior Celestin Mbuyu appear to be the main supporters of the deal. Speaker of the National Assembly Vital Kamerehe, who comes from South Kivu, publicly voiced concern over the presence of Rwandan troops, saying he was not informed about this plan and that there appeared to be no diplomatic or political oversight for the current operations. After having lived through Rwanda’s bloody hunt for genocidaires in eastern Congo in 1996 and its de facto occupation of the Kivus from 1998-2002, Congolese resentment toward Rwandan intervention remains a palpable threat to Kabila’s popular support, especially in the East.
     
  5. Unspoken motivations and simmering tensions: Rwanda’s stated objective for sending troops into Congo is to wipe out the FDLR. However, considering Rwanda’s strong economic interests in eastern Congo and their history of intervention and occupation, the international community should be asking questions about other unspoken reasons for this sudden military incursion. Many analysts are speculating that Rwanda’s swift intervention may also be about securing direct access to mines held by the FDLR and protecting the political and economic interests of the Tutsi community in North and South Kivu.  Reportedly, Rwanda became increasingly irritated with Nkunda throughout recent months, particularly with his vocal shift from a political agenda of local empowerment to one of national liberation. With Nkunda now out of the picture and with plans for CNDP fighters to integrate into the Congolese army, the Rwandan government will seek other avenues to protect its interests. The demise of CNDP does not alleviate dangerous communal tensions. Disconcerting rumors have resurfaced regarding a plan to divide North Kivu into two provinces—the districts of Masisi and Rutshuru then becoming a predominantly Kinyarwanda (the language spoken by Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu) speaking province. Tutsi are not currently represented in the provincial assembly in North Kivu, and as the date for local elections approach, many local politicians have expressed concern over unfair Rwandan influence—compounded by the numbers of displaced people in the province—and are calling for elections to be postponed.
     

In its present form, the joint military operation is far more likely to lead to atrocities against civilians than to successfully dismantle the FDLR. Immediate action is required to increase the transparency and efficacy of the operation, ensure accountability, and more effectively focus the international community on a shared core objective: the elimination of the FDLR as a security threat to the region. Non-military measures, particularly robust support for defections and voluntary disarmament and repatriation to Rwanda of the FDLR’s rank-and-file forces, are vital.

Full recommendations:

The Obama administration should immediately appoint a special envoy to lead U.S. engagement in a sustained multilateral effort to achieve stability in the Great Lakes region, paying immediate attention to the threat posed by the FDLR and the LRA. (For Enough’s policy recommendations on the LRA, please see our January 16 statement.) The U.S. envoy should be based in the region, have appropriate staff and logistical support, and work to accomplish the following goals in North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces:

  1. Protect civilians from atrocities
    1. While MONUC will now provide logistical and medical support to the joint operations, for the sake of civilian safety the Congolese and Rwandan governments must involve MONUC more directly in military planning to enable U.N. peacekeepers to protect civilians. Despite MONUC’s poor track record on civilian protection, it is the only force on the ground explicitly charged with protecting civilians, and it must be able to fulfill this responsibility.
    2. The United States and European Union must demand that military observers from U.S. Africa Command, NATO, and/or the EU deploy with Rwandan and Congolese forces on the ground to help temper combatants’ worst tendencies and be allowed to deploy to areas where civilians are most vulnerable.
    3. If the above conditions are met, and Bosco Ntaganda is handed over to The Hague, U.S. Africa Command, NATO, and/or the EU should offer technical assistance and intelligence/logistical support in apprehending key FDLR leaders.

     

  2. Incentivize defection from armed groups
    1. MONUC is reporting an increase in the number of FDLR rank-and-file seeking to come out of the bush, but the numbers remain relatively low. The Rwandan and Congolese governments must work with and through MONUC to offer assurances to non-genocidaire FDLR that they can safely return to Rwanda or re-settle in Congo without fear of prosecution for war crimes.
    2. The Congolese and Rwandan governments must also enhance livelihoods packages for defectors, and donors should urgently contribute funds to demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation programs.

     

  3. End impunity for crimes against humanity
    1. Bosco Ntaganda poses a serious threat to civilians and the Congolese government or Rwandan forces should apprehend him immediately. The international community cannot condone his participation under any circumstances and must deny any suspension of the ICC arrest warrant, such as that which was recently requested by the Congolese Minister of Justice. 
    2. The international community must aggressively enforce U.N. authorized sanctions targeted at FDLR leadership. These include asset freezes and travel bans on FDLR leadership living abroad. A small group of Rwandan exiles living in countries such as France, Germany, and the U.S., still exert enormous influence over militias in eastern Congo. Expanded sanctions against individuals with ties to the violence in eastern Congo will isolate military leadership from their political masters and will encourage more FDLR deserters.
    3. If Laurent Nkunda is extradited from Rwanda to Congo, the international community must demand the Congolese government hold Nkunda accountable for crimes his troops have committed in the Kivus in a trial that meets international judicial standards. However, given the government’s understandable hostility toward Nkunda and Congo’s highly politicized judiciary, a fair trial would most likely only be possible at the International Criminal Court.

     

  4. Address other root causes of conflict
    1. Dismantling the FDLR is only a first step in securing peace and stability for eastern Congo and the Great Lakes region. The international community should work with U.N.  special envoy Olesegun Obasanjo and Great Lakes mediator Benjamin Mkapa to mount an inclusive political process to find lasting solutions to other major drivers of the conflict in eastern Congo: land tenure issues, minority representation and security concerns, the culture of impunity in the region, and the fight for control over Congo’s mineral wealth.
    2. The United States should lead international efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to the exploitation of Congo’s mineral wealth by armed groups. This must include efforts to reduce international demand for minerals that benefit armed groups, as well as accompanying efforts to strengthen security and governance, and to create legitimate channels for economic activity in eastern Congo.

 

No Excuses: the End of the Lord’s Resistance Army is in Sight

Submitted by Tom Burton on January 15, 2009 - 10:15pm.
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The U.S supported military offensive against LRA rebels has backfired and must change to stop senseless civilian killing, according to a new report. The U.S. can take swift action to salvage the poorly executed offensive by insisting the operation refocus on apprehending the LRA leadership and stop civilian deaths asserts Enough Project and Resolve Uganda in a joint statement

Author: 
Enough Project and Resolve Uganda teams
Military operation must try to apprehend Joseph Kony and his fellow LRA leaders
Jan 16, 2009
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No Excuses: the End of the Lord’s Resistance Army is in Sight

Enough Project/Resolve Uganda Statement on ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ 

January 16, 2009 (Washington, D.C./Kampala) — After nearly four months of renewed attacks on civilians in central Africa by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, efforts to apprehend top rebel commanders responsible for the violence are long overdue. However, ‘Operation Lightning Thunder,’ the joint military operation against the rebel group launched in mid-December by the armies of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Government of Southern Sudan—with the support of the United States—has been poorly executed to date and has so far only made the crisis worse. However, swift and decisive action by the incoming Obama Administration to protect civilians from further violence and demobilize the LRA can salvage this window of opportunity to end the conflict. 
 
Though the offensive has weakened the LRA by cutting off food stores and other supplies, it has also forced the LRA into a familiar position as a highly mobile insurgent force. With the LRA flushed deeper into the jungle, Ugandan forces have lost an important measure of initiative: the LRA knows the tricky terrain better than their adversaries; LRA fighters are able to move and disperse quickly and in small numbers; and the LRA has shown every willingness to loot and pillage to survive. Kony and his key commanders have ordered their forces to retaliate by committing brutal attacks against Congolese civilians. Neither the regional militaries involved nor the international community more broadly has a coherent plan to apprehend top rebel commanders or protect civilians from LRA atrocities. Urgent action is needed to increase international support for more effective and better designed regional military response to the LRA threat and provide Kony and his inner circle with a clear choice between accepting a negotiated solution and facing decisive military force. 
 
As long as Kony insists on playing a spoiler role in efforts to end the war peacefully, a coordinated, surgical effort to apprehend the LRA leadership, in conjunction with continuing efforts to help speed reconstruction and development in northern Uganda, remains the best way to end the conflict. Well organized and targeted military action to apprehend those key LRA figures indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2005 for war crimes and crimes against humanity became increasingly necessary in late 2008, when over two years of peace talks failed to result in a signed agreement between the Ugandan government and the LRA. Since last September, Kony has balked several times at signing a reasonable peace deal, which had been negotiated and explained to him at length, while simultaneously ordering a new wave of attacks and abductions in northeastern Congo. It is intolerable for Kony to endlessly string out talks as a means for the LRA to continue its reign of terror. 
 
Coordination and cooperation amongst regional countries to address the LRA threat is welcome, especially given their antagonistic history. However, the recent Ugandan military effort, carried out in Garamba National Park in eastern Congo, has been operationally flawed and has so far failed in its objective to end the LRA insurgency. This aerial bombardment of LRA hideouts in northeastern Congo and subsequent ground operation have not achieved their initial goal of surprise, and ensuing military incursions have been indiscriminate—endangering children previously abducted by the LRA and creating significant risk for civilians in the region. In the past four months, a spate of LRA attacks killed roughly 500 civilians in northeastern Congo and Southern Sudan, and displaced another 70,000, bringing the total number of displaced in the area to over 100,000. Unless circumstances change, many others are likely to fall victim to a similar fate. 
 
The LRA camps were largely empty of fighters and high-level commanders when struck by Ugandan aircraft, suggesting that either operational security was compromised or the initial intelligence that was used to design the attack was flawed. Moreover, the operation’s failure to cordon off the camps, cut off escape routes, or put in place mechanisms to protect surrounding communities from reprisal attacks before the bombing began indicates poor military planning. Scattered LRA units are now stretched across hundreds of kilometers, able to either conduct hit-and-run attacks against their pursuers or make a push toward a tempting sanctuary in southeastern Central African Republic, or CAR. Also troubling is the limited number of LRA fighters who have voluntarily surrendered. Had the bulk of the LRA rank-and-file really been as demoralized and frustrated as many engaged in the peace process had thought, far more would have taken these attacks as an opportunity to throw down their arms. It is possible many are still hiding and intend to turn themselves in if the opportunity arises, but initial signs are not encouraging. 
 
‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ is still salvageable, but it will require an immediate shift from an open-ended counter-insurgency to a much more targeted and focused mission. The following shifts in strategy and execution are therefore essential to the success of this mission going forward, all of which require greater international engagement: 
 
Prioritize Civilian Protection 
 
Given the LRA’s track record of atrocities, civilian protection must be a critical component of any military operation, and should have been a much higher priority at the outset of ‘Lightning Thunder.’ Now that the LRA has scattered in small units, protecting vulnerable populations has become a much greater logistical challenge. Recent history in eastern Congo’s North Kivu Province demonstrates the immense difficulty of protecting civilians over a wide area from predatory armed groups. LRA units have faced negligible resistance over the past few weeks as they slaughtered defenseless civilians in major Congolese civilian centers in Orientale Province, such as Faradje and Doruma, as well as committed atrocities in South Sudanese communities. Working through the U.N. Security Council, the United States and others should press the Congolese, Ugandan and Southern Sudanese governments to prioritize civilian protection, and press U.N. peacekeepers in Congo to deploy in greater numbers to LRA-affected areas with explicit orders to protect vulnerable populations. The United States and other international donors must also step up to the plate with increased humanitarian assistance for people affected by the violence, many of whom are living in increasingly desperate circumstances. 
 
Focus on apprehending the LRA’s leaders 
 
The LRA will continue to commit atrocities so long as Joseph Kony and his top commanders remain at large and able to abduct and indoctrinate new fighters. However, the LRA’s highly centralized hierarchy is one of the rebel group’s key weaknesses. Therefore, it is imperative that the regional militaries focus their efforts on the LRA leadership. ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ must therefore not devolve further into an open-ended war against the LRA, as tricky as it might be to avoid that scenario given the dispersed nature of the rebels following the aerial assaults. A broader counterinsurgency will almost certainly result in far more non-combatant casualties, as we have already seen, and would place LRA abductees at greater risk.
 
Improve intelligence coordination and rapid response capacity
 
The Ugandan, Congolese, and Southern Sudanese armies face an enormous challenge in trying to secure the region’s vast, difficult terrain with only a relatively small number of troops. The United States, the U.K., and France, as well as U.N. Peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Southern Sudan should provide intelligence and offer technical and logistical support to the regional militaries participating in ‘Lightning Thunder.’ Greater international support should be conditioned on the operation narrowing its goals to target top leaders, while also showing restraint against abductees and protecting civilians from reprisal attacks. With this support, regional forces will be much more effective in identifying the whereabouts of LRA leaders and deploying rapidly to intercept them. Given U.S. monitoring and electronic communications tracking capacities, it is difficult to believe that the United States could not directly assist in pinpointing Kony’s location. 
 
Block the LRA from finding safe-haven in the Central African Republic 
 
This operation will not be a success if it simply displaces the LRA from eastern Congo to CAR. In the spring of 2008, the LRA allegedly mapped and practiced its escape route to CAR, where they reportedly buried stockpiles of food and weapons for future use. A number of soldiers were reportedly sent to cut off this corridor from Garamba to CAR, but reports suggest that the fighters deployed were exceedingly ill equipped and unprepared. Due to its near complete lack of state authority, southeastern CAR is an ideal place for the LRA to take root and establish a new safe haven. Regional actors will have limited means to hone in on the LRA’s leadership once in CAR, and their further inadequate planning and execution could allow the LRA to re-group and organize itself for another round of abductions and atrocities. 
 
Encourage concrete steps toward a negotiated solution 
 
Given that Kony has repeatedly delayed and derailed efforts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict, it would take practical and tangible commitments on his part to pursue a negotiated solution—such as assembling LRA leaders in designated areas by a set time as per previous agreements. Absent such concrete steps, any efforts to revive negotiations would need to move forth in parallel with mounting military pressure on the LRA. In the meantime, UN peacekeepers and regional governments should be more proactive in facilitating the escape and demobilization of scattered groups of rebels interested in laying down their arms.
 
Conclusion: A special role for the United States 
 
Given the close U.S. relationship with key actors in ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’—in particular Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir—the United States is uniquely placed to support better targeted military efforts. The United States’ pre-existing support for the operation gives it an added responsibility to ensure that the consequent spiraling violence comes to an end. Furthermore, resolving this conflict would also advance U.S. interests in the broader region by helping to prevent a return to war in Southern Sudan, where a resurgent LRA could renew its role as a proxy for the Sudanese government, and securing peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where nearly 12 years of warfare has cost an estimated six million lives. 
 
The United States should use its significant diplomatic clout in central Africa and in the U.N. Security Council to make protection of civilians affected by LRA violence a priority, while building momentum and consensus for a strategy to apprehend top LRA leaders and demobilize lower-level members. The United States military has strong ties to the Ugandan military and has assets based nearby at the U.S. military base in Djibouti. The incoming Obama administration should provide greater intelligence and logistical support and should consider direct support to, and collaboration with, Ugandan forces on the ground in direct action against the LRA. 
 
A permanent end to two decades of violence in northern Uganda and other LRA-affected areas will require long-term recovery and reconciliation processes. However, ending the LRA insurgency is a crucial step towards a sustainable peace, and with relatively little U.S. and international investment an immediate halt to the violence is attainable. If the regional militaries and the international community do not alter their hazardous and costly approach at this critical juncture, ‘Lightning Thunder’ will simply become the latest in a long list of failed attempts to end Joseph Kony’s 20-year reign of terror. More lives will have been lost, and the political will to decisively end this conflict will have been squandered once again. 
 
Press Contacts:
 
Eileen Read 
Associate Director of Communications, The Enough Project 
202.741-6376
 
Michael Poffenberger
Executive Director, Resolve Uganda 
Office: 202.548.2517
Cell: 574.229.1301
 

Shooting Blanks at Sudan

Submitted by on December 10, 2008 - 4:56pm.
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President Bush’s announcement today that his administration will begin implementing a set of punitive measures -- its oft-threatened “Plan B” -- against the Sudanese Government could have marked a real turning point in U.S. policy to end what the president calls genocide. Unfortunately, it doesn't.

Author: 
John Prendergast, Colin Thomas-Jensen and Julia Spiegel
May 29, 2007
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Shooting Blanks at Sudan

President Bush’s announcement today that his administration will begin implementing a set of punitive measures -- its oft-threatened “Plan B” -- against the Sudanese Government could have marked a real turning point in U.S. policy to end what the president calls genocide. Unfortunately, it doesn't.

With international diplomatic efforts to halt atrocities in Darfur at a standstill, the President announced three measures intended to change the calculations of the regime in Khartoum and intransigent rebel leaders. First, the U.S. will add 31 Sudanese companies to a list of 130 that are already denied access to the U.S. financial system. Second, the U.S. will freeze the assets of three of the many individuals responsible for the violence in Darfur. And finally, it will "seek" a resolution at the United Nations Security Council to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and expand an ineffective arms embargo that has been violated with impunity.

Three people? After four years? And not one of them the real ringleader of the policy to divide and destroy Darfur? And once again the U.S. is going alone? This is not leadership. This will not create missing leverage. This will not build multilateral pressure. And this will not end the crisis in Darfur.

What small steps that have been announced are largely due to tireless activism from concerned citizens, persistent efforts by members of Congress from both sides of the aisle pressuring the White House, and the president’s own demands for tougher policy options. However, the current Plan B is too unilateral in nature and much too weak to have an impact on the calculations of either Sudanese officials or intransigent rebel leaders.

Unless the U.S. takes the decision to press hard in the UN Security Council for a meaningful resolution that sanctions the top ringleaders and multilateralizes the sanctions against the companies the U.S. has already sanctioned, there will be no bite to this endless barking. And the U.S. must begin to share significant declassified intelligence with the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the building of indictments against those most responsible for the obstruction and destruction in Darfur.

NOT ENOUGH
Expanded unilateral economic sanctions and freezing the assets of three people will not alter the calculations of the Sudanese officials responsible for ongoing atrocities. The U.S. has been blocking transactions with the Sudanese Government and many Sudanese companies since President Clinton first imposed sanctions in 1997. Consequently, the Khartoum regime has had 10 years to develop its oil-driven economy outside the scope of U.S. sanctions, and therefore further unilateral U.S. moves are economically and politically irrelevant. Acting alone, the U.S. has very little leverage. Oil prices are soaring and Khartoum is booming. And the administration’s intermittent leaks to the press about Plan B squandered what leverage it might have built. Khartoum was alerted and had ample time to prepare for any unilateral U.S. moves.

Why is the U.S. acting alone? With U.S. diplomats scrambling with other serious crises -- Iraq, Iran, and North Korea among others -- the Bush administration has not yet decided to exercise the leadership necessary at the United Nations Security Council to secure the votes for tougher action on Darfur. France, Germany, and the UK are all on record in support of tougher sanctions, yet Plan B is largely a solo effort.

As for targeting the individuals most culpable for atrocities, the current U.S. plan will impose sanctions on two senior government officials and one rebel leader. The more senior regime officials who masterminded crimes against humanity in Darfur can breathe easy. They have yet to pay a cost for those crimes. ENOUGH chronicled who these officials are in an earlier statement, "We Know Their Names."

We at ENOUGH will continue to hammer home the point that Plan B -- punishment -- is the right direction, but what is required now is a Plan B with teeth -- multilateral, escalating, and biting. This would include:

  • Multilateralized Sanctions Against Sudanese Companies Supporting the Regime: The U.S. should work with the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against the Sudanese companies already targeted unilaterally by the U.S. Unless the current U.S. list of 161 is made multilateral, these sanctions will be meaningless. A UN Panel of Experts should also be established to further investigate which companies are conducting the business necessary to underwrite Sudan's war machine.
  • Pressure on International Banks to Stop Doing Business with Sudan: U.S. officials should engage with a number of international banking institutions to strongly encourage them to stop supporting oil transactions with Sudan, with the implication being that if such business continues, then all transactions conducted by those banks with U.S. commercial entities (and those of other countries willing to work with us) would eventually be banned.
  • Reinforcement of Divestment Efforts: President Bush should sign an Executive Order putting into law all of the legally possible elements of existing Congressional bills in support of divestment. The executive should be supportive of efforts across the U.S. to pressure university endowments, municipal and state pension funds, and private mutual funds to sell equity holdings in a targeted list of companies whose business bolsters the operations of the Sudanese regime.
  • Support for the ICC Indictment Process: The U.S. should provide information and declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the process of building indictments against senior officials in the regime for their role in orchestrating mass atrocities in Darfur. The U.S. has the most such intelligence and should come to agreement with the ICC about what information to share.
  • Accelerated Credible Military Planning: The U.S. also should develop credible plans for decisive military action, not only to enforce a no-fly zone, but to protect civilians with ground forces without consent from Khartoum should all else fails. This military planning is both a practical necessity, and a means to build and utilize leverage against the regime.

WHAT YOU CAN DO
ENOUGH urges activist organizations to issue action alerts urging their members to contact the White House, their Senators, and their members of Congress to press for a Plan B with teeth.

Concerned individuals should also write letters, send emails, set up meetings in home districts, and call 1-800-GENOCIDE to leave a message for President Bush, your Senators and member of Congress to tell them to:

  • push for the U.S. to introduce -- and diplomatically invest in -- a UNSC resolution that imposes targeted sanctions on key leaders and on the companies already sanctioned by the U.S.;
  • urge President Bush to provide information and declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court; and
  • call on President Bush to put credible plans in place for a no-fly zone and non-consensual force deployment to protect civilians if the situation deteriorates in Darfur and the Sudanese regime continues to block the UN-led hybrid force.

We Know Their Names

Submitted by on December 10, 2008 - 4:56pm.
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The U.S. has issued so many hollow threats over the past three years that senior National Congress Party, or NCP, officials will dismiss even a clear and direct warning from the President of the United States. President Bush must immediately end the dangerous state of impunity that fuels continued state sponsored violence in Darfur by punishing those same NCP officials.<br />

Author: 
John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen
May 14, 2007
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We Know Their Names

On April 18, in a speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, President Bush correctly stated that Sudanese President Omer al Bashir’s “record has been to promise cooperation while finding new ways to subvert and obstruct the U.N.'s efforts to bring peace to his country.” The President continued, “The time for promises is over -- President Bashir must act.” Today, one month later, the government of Sudan continues to obstruct the deployment of a stronger peacekeeping force, support the Janjaweed and other militia groups, and harass and intimidate humanitarian workers. The U.S. government officials tasked with determining how President Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) has responded to the Bush administration’s latest ultimatum have concluded that the threat of “Plan B” has not impacted Khartoum’s behavior. But why should it?

The U.S. has issued so many hollow threats over the past three years that senior NCP officials will dismiss even a clear and direct warning from the President of the United States. President Bush must immediately end the dangerous state of impunity that fuels continued state sponsored violence in Darfur by punishing those same NCP officials.

Using its current chairmanship of the UN Security Council, the U.S. should propose a new list of names for targeted sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans. The administration’s current Plan B will impose sanctions on three individuals. However, the proposed targets do not include three of the people most responsible for what the administration terms genocide: Assistant to the President Nafie Ali Nafie; Director of National Intelligence Salah Abdallah Abu Digin (AKA Salah Gosh); and Minster of Defense Major General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein.

Salah Gosh and Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein have already been named by the UN Panel of Experts charged with investigating crimes against humanity in Darfur. The Panel found that both men had “command responsibility” for the atrocities committed by the multiple Sudanese security services. Hussein was found responsible for “coordination operations between entities within the Sudanese Armed Forces and militia groups” -- code language for orchestrating Janjaweed attacks on civilians.

The principal policymaker for Sudan’s national security and intelligence affairs, Nafie Ali Nafie continues to advocate a military solution in Darfur. His latest policy is to reward the Janjaweed for their crimes in Darfur by forcibly installing his Arab allies into positions of traditional power and resettling Arabs on non-Arab land, fundamentally altering the demography of Darfur and finalizing a policy of ethnic cleansing.

If we know who is responsible, why is the Bush administration afraid to punish those responsible for what it calls genocide?

ENOUGH urges activists to dial 1-800-Genocide to connect directly to the White House, tell President Bush that the time for a Plan B with teeth is now, and demand that Nafie Ali Nafie, Salah Gosh, and Adbel Rahim Mohamed Hussein be punished for crimes against humanity in Darfur.

Peacekeeping for Protection and Peace in Darfur: Requirements for the Success of the U.N./A.U. Hybrid Mission

Submitted by on December 10, 2008 - 4:54pm.
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Several critical factors will determine whether the proposed peacekeeping mission will achieve success and finally fulfill the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians in Darfur: mandate, management, manpower, mobility, methodology, and money.<br />

Author: 
Gayle Smith
Jun 26, 2007
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Peacekeeping for Protection and Peace in Darfur

Headlines this month are heralding the news that the Sudanese government has agreed -- again -- to the deployment of a U.N./A.U. hybrid peacekeeping mission for Darfur.

Peace Process Near Collapse in Eastern Congo

Submitted by on December 10, 2008 - 4:54pm.
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The peace process in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is on the verge of collapse due to resumed hostilities between Government forces and rebels loyal to Congolese general Laurent Nkunda. Absent immediate and robust diplomatic pressure on the Congolese government and a more impartial effort by United Nations peacekeepers to stop the fighting, the region could descend back into total war.

Author: 
Enough Team
Oct 1, 2008

The peace process in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is on the verge of collapse due to resumed hostilities between Government forces and rebels loyal to Congolese general Laurent Nkunda.

Averting Renewed Regional War in Eastern Congo

Submitted by on December 10, 2008 - 4:54pm.
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The offensive by the rebel Laurent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense of People, or CNDP, has dramatically worsened the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. This latest fighting threatens to once again draw Congo’s neighbors directly into the fray in a damaging escalation that would effectively undo a six-year regional and international effort to stabilize the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.

Author: 
Enough team
Oct 31, 2008

The offensive by the rebel Laurent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense of People, or CNDP, has dramatically worsened the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.