Testimony of John Prendergast, Co-founder of the Enough Project, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Let me first thank Chairwoman Boxer, Senator Feingold, Senator Kerry, Senator Lugar, and all other members of the committee for holding this hearing on a difficult topic and an extraordinary challenge for the international community: how to end the scourge of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan. These two conflicts are characterized not just by appalling death tolls—nearly 8 million and counting since 1983—but also by widespread crimes against humanity. Indeed, heinous crimes against women and girls occur with numbing regularity in Congo and Sudan, where rape has become the tool of choice of many of the armed groups as a means to control, subjugate, humiliate, intimidate, and ethnically cleanse. 

So let’s be absolutely clear: measures to deal with rape as a weapon of war in isolation will fail and fail miserably. If we truly want to end this scourge we must move from managing conflict symptoms to ending the conflicts themselves.

Yet rather than trying to end the conflicts in Congo and Sudan, most international efforts deal with symptoms. We spend billions of dollars a year on humanitarian efforts and peacekeeping, while the root causes of the violence remain inadequately addressed. This is irresponsible and deadly—costly in lives lost as well as costly to American taxpayer.

How revolutionary would it be to deal with the causes rather than the symptoms? Why can’t we focus our policy on ENDING these wars rather than simply dealing with their consequences? From our meeting with President Obama a few weeks ago at the White House, he clearly understands the importance of such a strategic objective. But will his administration organize structures, personnel and assets to achieve these objectives, or will the pursuit of lasting solutions remain largely rhetorical? And will Congress support a sustained interagency effort to end these wars, or will the resources needed to ramp up diplomatic efforts be siphoned off for other ends?

We at the Enough Project believe that the game changer, to use the president’s favorite term, would be a commitment by the Obama administration to make the strategic objective of U.S. policy the resolution of the wars that cause this scourge of gender-based violence.

A comprehensive strategy for protecting women and girls would include the following elements:

• Protection: Reorient efforts of peacekeeping forces in Congo and Sudan—MONUC, UNMIS and UNAMID—to focus on protecting women/girls where they are most vulnerable: camps for internally displaced persons, firewood collection routes, major water points, check points, etc.
• Accountability: Support efforts to prosecute rape as a war crime in both Congo and Sudan. This includes support for police and judicial reform, access to justice programs, and legal training. At the international level, investigations should be intensified into the chain of command that either encourages or allows rape to be utilized as a war strategy.
• Treatment: Expend additional resources on supporting the efforts of Congolese, Sudanese, and international organizations that are supporting the survivors of sexual violence.
• Peace: Over the long term, the United States and other concerned countries must work to change the calculus of the armed groups committing crimes against women and girls and re-invest in diplomacy to help bring these conflicts to an end.
   

Because my time is limited, I will focus my remarks on this fourth point, the crucial steps that the United States can take to promote lasting peace in Congo and Sudan.

A.    Congo—Collapsing the war economy

In my 25 years of working on African conflict resolution, Congo is by far the most complex war I have witnessed. But one of the biggest drivers of the conflict—and on in which most Americans are unknowingly but directly involved—has long been clear: competition over the extraordinary natural resource base. If we don’t address the economic roots of violence, we will only be finding temporary respites from the logic of continued war and exploitation.

Conflict minerals

Sexual violence in Congo is often fueled by militias and armies warring over “conflict minerals,” the ores that produce tin, tungsten, and tantalum—what we call the “3 Ts”—as well as gold. Armed groups from Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda finance themselves through the illicit conflict mineral trade and fight over control of mines and taxation points inside Congo.

But the story does not end there. Internal and international business interests move these conflict minerals from Central Africa around the world to countries in East Asia, where they are processed into valuable metals, and then onward into a wide range of electronics products. Consumers in the United States, Europe, and Asia are the ultimate end-users of these conflict minerals, as we inadvertently fuel the war through our purchases of these electronics products.

Based on calculations by researchers at Enough, the 3T’s and gold together generate as much as $183 million annually for the armed groups that torment women and girls in eastern Congo. One of the biggest money makers in this trade is the FDLR, a Rwandan militia whose high command includes persons responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The FDLR and other armed groups force miners to work in desperate, dangerous conditions for an average of $1-$5 a day. Without alternative sources of income, these miners and their families remain virtually enslaved to armed groups and the conflict minerals trade.

A comprehensive approach to conflict minerals

There is clearly no silver bullet solution to the conflict in eastern Congo. However, if the international community and regional actors work in conjunction with the private sector to align their efforts around the common goal of a revitalized legitimate mineral trade in eastern Congo, long-term efforts could have major impact in resolving the conflict. There are four main components to a new strategy for such efforts:

1. Shining a light on the supply chain. Push electronics companies—the principal end-users of the 3T’s and gold—to change the way they practice business by working together with their suppliers to create a tracing system paired with credible monitoring of the system by independent third parties. This would provide a critical step towards demanding greater accountability for corporate behavior and transparency. With 80 percent of consumer electronics companies trading on U.S. stock markets, U.S.-based activists have some of the most powerful opportunities for leverage on this part of the supply chain.
2. Identifying and securing strategic mines. The United Nations should collaborate with the Congolese government identify key mining sites under the control of armed groups. Properly integrated Congolese security forces, supported by U.N. peacekeepers, should secure these sites and transit routes. This approach must be grounded in a more comprehensive and coherent effort to advance broad security sector reform in Congo, and a well-planned and resourced counter-insurgency effort to eliminate the FDLR as a security threat to the region. Non-military measures, particularly robust support for defections and voluntary disarmament and repatriation to Rwanda of the FDLR’s rank-and-file forces, are vital.
3. Reforming governance. The international community should work hand in hand with the Congolese government to force the will and capacity to exercise control over mining and commerce in eastern Congo. With Congo sorely in need of international funds, there is an opportunity to press for not just commitments but demonstrable reforms to the regulation of mining, commerce, and taxation.
4. Supporting livelihoods and economic opportunities for miners. Impoverished Congolese miners and their families are dependent upon their meager incomes and have few viable economic alternatives. Efforts to end the trade in conflict minerals absolutely must be accompanied by international support for livelihoods and economic opportunities in eastern Congo. This should include legal reform, and investments in both infrastructure as well as alternative livelihoods such as agriculture and manufacturing. The sooner the illicit conflict minerals trade is eliminated; the sooner the people of Congo will actually enjoy the benefits from their own resources.
    

In addition, any effort to address the link between minerals and ongoing violence in eastern Congo must be wed to a broader strategy to generate the political will in Congo and among its neighbors to find diplomatic solutions to the local, national, and regional tensions that have proliferated over the past 15 years. Transparency and accountability must extend across borders to include other governments in the region. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (to a lesser degree) have profited enormously from the illicit minerals trade and Congo’s continued instability—to which they have directly contributed at times. By the same token, Congo’s neighbors have legitimate security concerns and economic interests in eastern Congo, and a more even-handed approach to these regional actors from the United States and its allies is vital to address these security concerns, ending the prominent role these states continue to play in the destructive conflict minerals trade, and promoting the rule of law in Congo and beyond.

Support legislative efforts

The United States Senate has a crucial role to play in advancing these objectives. By introducing the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, original co-sponsors Senators Brownback, Durbin, and Feingold have demonstrated important leadership and welcome dedication to the cause of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and should be congratulated for their efforts. The Enough Project supports this bill and I urge each and every member of this committee to sign on as a co-sponsor to this legislation. This bill would direct the State Department to support multilateral and U.S. government efforts to break the link between the trade in minerals and armed conflict in eastern Congo, require companies listed on U.S. stock to disclose the origin of their minerals to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and expand U.S. efforts to improve conditions and livelihoods for communities in eastern Congo who are dependent upon mining.

B.    Sudan—Building a peace surge

In Sudan, crises in Darfur, the South, and the East continue to place civilians in great peril. Women and girls are especially vulnerable. Concentrating peacekeeping assets on the protection of civilians, particularly women and girls, is an achievable objective that would produce a tangible improvement in the security of populations in areas where the UNAMID forces are deployed. However, ending the violence and cultivating lasting peace throughout all of Sudan is critical to ending violence against civilians once and for all. Doing so means focusing on the root causes of Sudan’s violence, addressing the political causes of war, and doggedly pursuing and implementing credible peace processes.

As you are well aware, activists all over the world and from all walks of life continue to press their governments to help end the deplorable suffering in Sudan. Some may scoff when public figures use their fame to help bring attention to a crisis, but I don’t think we can question the commitment of my friend Mia Farrow, who just completed a 12 day fast for the people of Darfur. And that effort is continuing. Others are following Mia’s example, and Richard Branson, Peter Gabriel, Pam Omidyar, and even your colleague from the House, Representative Donald Payne, are either fasting now or have pledged to fast in the coming days and weeks.

These activists and millions of people around the world are pushing for one thing in Sudan: peace. And in my more than two decades of closely observing the situation in Sudan I have rarely seen as big an opportunity as we have right now to fundamentally alter that country’s downward trajectory. Here it is: a global consensus exists for peace in Sudan, even if there is not agreement on the best path to achieve this goal. China, the Arab League, the African Union, the European Union, and the United States all want peace, but little has been done to build the necessary infrastructure to help bring it about.

What is the missing ingredient? The Enough Project has held meetings with a number of key actors in the past several weeks—from the French and Norwegian governments, to the United Nations and African Union, to the Sudanese warring parties themselves—and the answer is nearly universal. What has long been missing in Sudan is America’s strategic leadership. The rebels, the ruling party, Sudan’s neighbors, and other key actors have all been waiting for President Obama and his team to engage.

The Obama administration must lead in constructing a multilateral strategy for peace by establishing an inclusive peace process for Darfur, re-vitalizing implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the dangerously neglected Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, and ending Sudan’s proxy war with Chad. Toward that end, General Gration should focus on building a multilateral coalition of countries with significant leverage. At the same time as the processes are being constructed, the United States should work assiduously to create the necessary unilateral and multilateral carrots and sticks to press the parties in the direction of a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of Sudan’s multiple, interlocking conflicts. It is vital that the administration work closely with other key governments in dealing with Sudan; a reliance on bilateral diplomacy will provide Khartoum the opportunity to play one party off against the other, as it has historically done with great success.

The key tasks are as follows:

• Darfur peace process: The structure should be similar to the Naivasha talks that produced the CPA, and some of the ingredients are already in place. As did Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo with the Naivasha process, AU/UN mediator Djibril Bassolé should lead the Darfur process, which can be based in Doha, Qatar (although Qatar’s recent diplomatic support for Bashir in the wake of the ICC indictment has impaired its credibility as a facilitator of negotiations). He must be supported by a strong team of diplomats and regional experts and backed by a small group of countries with leverage, high-level support, and full-time representation at the talks. We believe that this inner circle should consist at a minimum of the US, UK, France, China, and Egypt. An outer circle group of countries and multilateral organizations (UN, AU, Arab League) should also be engaged in a formal manner to discourage spoilers, and other key nations such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa would need to be thoroughly consulted.
• CPA implementation: The Assessment and Evaluation Commission established by the CPA is clearly insufficient to monitor and press the parties to implement the deal (largely because it lacks sufficiently senior representation and clear reporting guidelines). As a matter of international peace and security, CPA implementation should be at the forefront of the U.N. Security Council’s agenda and the Council should back a new ad-hoc mechanism to guide implementation. The Obama administration should quickly work with other Security Council members, relevant U.N. agencies, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, to establish core benchmarks for the parties, a clear timeline, and genuine penalties for failure to meet deadlines. An international meeting on CPA implementation could provide a vehicle for reenergizing efforts around the CPA and provide the launching pad for the creation of the ad-hoc implementation mechanism.
• Chad/Sudan peace process: The Sudanese government continues to seek a military solution for Darfur through regime change in Chad, and Chad continues to back the JEM in response. The Obama administration should work with France and China to support high-level negotiations in Libya aimed at reducing state support for foreign armed groups and eventual normalization of relations.
• Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement monitoring: Eastern Sudan remains volatile. The Obama administration should work with its international partners (particularly the UK and Norway) and with the Eritrean and Saudi governments to establish a monitoring group for the agreement that will report on implementation and make recommendations for improvements.

Building the necessary leverage

A serious peace process with credible mediation putting forward fair proposals will secure a deal for Darfur. A competent and higher level oversight mechanism with the involvement of countries with influence will ensure the implementation of the CPA. Having the right balance of meaningful pressures and incentives will ensure that prospects for success are much greater.

In broad strokes, the U.S. should present the Sudanese regime with a choice:
 
Behind Door One: if the Sudanese government permits unimpeded humanitarian access, removes the indicted president, and secures peace in Darfur and the South, a clear process toward normalization will be mapped out. Almost all of the incentives for Sudan come in the form of more normal relations with much of the world, the lifting of sanctions, a return to more normal patterns of trade and diplomacy, and the other benefits that would naturally flow from Sudan achieving stability as a result of more equitable power and wealth sharing.

Behind Door Two: if President Bashir and his party remain defiant by continuing to undermine efforts at peace for the country, a series of escalating costs will ensue, including diplomatic isolation, targeted economic sanctions, an effective and expanded arms embargo, and, if necessary to stop massive loss of civilian life, eventual targeted military action.
 
If the benefits of Door One and the consequences of Door Two are meaningful, the chance for peace in Sudan increases dramatically.  The missing ingredients in efforts to date for Darfur and CPA implementation have been adequate leverage and lack of strategic vision for resolving comprehensively the country’s conflicts. Without real sticks and carrots, the warring parties in Sudan will remain focused on military confrontation. The international community needs to help change the incentive structure in Sudan from war to peace.
 
On the incentive side, phased cooperation with and—ultimately—normalization with the United States is the largest carrot the Obama administration has to offer. Removal of certain unilateral sanctions and penalties could be undertaken in response to verifiable changes on the ground in Darfur and the South. Full normalization should only occur once the Sudanese government adheres to its obligations under various peace agreements. Any negotiating process must be guided by the reality that Khartoum has a long history of grabbing carrots, then failing to follow through on commitments.

On the pressures side, there seems to be an erroneous belief that there are no meaningful pressures left to use. In fact, a number of points of leverage are available. Until now, however, most sticks have been unilateral and have had limited effect on the regime’s calculations. Substantial and focused multilateral pressures have not been tried and should form the basis of the new administration’s strategy. Clearly, equally robust pressures and incentives should be developed and applied impartially to the rebel factions and SPLM to the degree to which their actions may warrant these measures.

I am happy to discuss the available pressures in greater detail in the Q and A.

The United States should now begin stronger and more sustained efforts to build a coalition for peace. But this effort will only be successful if we treat the situation in Sudan as a strategic priority, build the necessary leverage, and invest in the diplomacy critical to achieve an equitable and lasting solution.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.

Testimony of the Enough Project’s Co-Founder John Prendergast before the House Appropriations Subcommittee for State Foreign Operations

• Funding for Special Envoy for Sudan and team. Naming a senior special envoy will signal a serious and sustained high-level commitment to both Darfur and the CPA. But this person will need a full team of staff based in the region, adequately funded to rapidly engage with all parties. 
• Peace dividends for the people of Sudan. Sizeable sums have already been spent, especially in South Sudan, but with little in the way of a tangible peace dividend. The United States should support spending on infrastructure, especially roads, education, and healthcare, including temporary salary support for teachers, doctors, and other critical service providers. 
• Security sector reform and support. Several areas of support will be critical to shoring up security in southern Sudan in advance of elections and the referendum. This includes an air defense system for the south, training to both the SPLA and local security forces to curb conflict among heavily armed civilian populations, and efforts to transform Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) which are currently dysfunctional and destabilizing, as indicated by events in Abyei and Malakal.
• Support to Government of Southern Sudan to build capacity and fight corruption. Severe shortages of human capital and growing evidence of corruption are costing the Government of South Sudan its credibility. For wider reconstruction efforts to bear fruit, the U.S. must invest in building capacity and battling corruption at all levels of government in the South. 
• Elections and democratic development that delivers. Elections are a key component of the CPA and a huge element of U.S. support to Sudan. The $95 million in U.S. assistance is third only to Iraq and Afghanistan. But these elections are a logistical nightmare that could consolidate the peace or help unravel it. This money must be spent more effectively and wisely. 

• Funding for Special Envoy for the Great Lakes and team. Naming as soon as possible a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes to deal multilaterally with these overlapping issues would be catalytic.  The envoy needs a team to work on these issues full time across borders, supported by appropriate carrots and sticks, consulting the wide array of armed groups, political parties, and civic organizations within Congo.
• Funding for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs. Increasing numbers of FDLR and LRA rank-and-file are seeking to come out of the bush, but the numbers remain relatively low. Increased livelihoods packages for defectors and fully funded DDR programs can incentivize defection. U.S. funding should emphasize the reintegration component of this process, which is often under-funded compared to disarmament and demobilization. 
• Security Sector Reform. Supporting the professionalization of the army and police is crucial. Human rights training is particularly necessary, along with military justice to prevent abuses. 
• Basic Infrastructure for Eastern Congo. Roads are a critical prerequisite to improved security and economic opportunities in the east. 
• Funding to address conflict minerals and create legitimate economic opportunities for eastern Congo. Capabilities to verify and monitor efforts to staunch the trade in conflict minerals, as well as processes to engender a legitimate mining sector in the east, as well as alternative livelihoods. 

Statement of Enough Project Co-chair, John Prendergast to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

February 12, 2009

Thank you Chairman Kerry for allowing me to participate in a first of what I hope will be many discussions regarding the future of Sudan. I believe the exchange of ideas and knowledge is a key and initial step to effectively end the violence that plagues the region.

The precarious peace between northern and southern Sudan stands at a crucial crossroads. Intended by its architects as the cornerstone of peace in a country fractured by conflict, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, has been hamstrung by the National Congress Party’s intransigence, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s growing pains, and the international community’s neglect. With two years remaining before a referendum on self-determination for the south, confidence in the CPA is diminishing, mistrust between the NCP and SPLM is mounting, and both sides are arming in preparation for a resumption of hostilities. While the International Criminal Court’s investigation in Darfur has already internationally isolated and internally weakened the NCP, pending arrest warrants against NCP leader Omar al-Bashir add another layer of uncertainty to the CPA’s fate by creating the risk of escalated violence, the possibility of a change in political leadership, and the promise of accountability after decades of impunity in Sudan. U.S. leadership was instrumental in negotiating the CPA and could be pivotal in preventing a relapse into a full-scale war that would have grave humanitarian consequences and further destabilize an already volatile region. Congress must work with the Obama administration to revitalize U.S. support for CPA implementation, and develop a clear and comprehensive diplomatic strategy that encompasses both north-south issues and Darfur as the core of a renewed push for peace in Sudan. 

The international community has been slow to respond to the sputtering pace of implementation and the NCP’s attempts to undermine the CPA. The genocide in Darfur diverted international focus and funds away from implementation of the agreement. Eager to gain humanitarian access and stop the slaughter in Darfur, international actors became less willing to press the NCP to fulfill its CPA commitments. (This is sadly ironic given that the conflict in Darfur stems from many of the exact same causes as the earlier north-south civil war, and has been prosecuted by Khartoum using many of the same brutal strategies). The Bush administration, which had played a lead role during negotiations, was unable to harmonize competing objectives in Sudan: implementing the CPA, managing the genocide in Darfur, and maintaining its close ties with the Sudanese government on intelligence sharing and counterterrorism. As a result, U.S. attention to the CPA has flagged during the interim period. The U. N. Security Council also lost capital and leverage as a credible international guarantor by failing to follow through on threatened sanctions against the NCP for repeated violations in Darfur. Emboldened by the example set in Darfur, the NCP saw little risk in obstructing implementation of any CPA provisions that did not serve their political interests. Constrained by a narrow mandate and limited capacity, the 10,000-strong United Nations Mission to Sudan, or UNMIS, has often been relegated to the role of a spectator.  However, with the elections and referendum looming on the horizon, difficult decisions can no longer be delayed.

Among the many indicators of the CPA’s fragmentary implementation and the fragility on the ground are the following:

• Violence in Abyei: Clashes between the Sudanese army and SPLA in Abyei in May 2008 killed 89 people and displaced 50,000, raising fears that the delicate peace would not hold.
• An arms race: Both sides are stockpiling weapons.  Most recently, efforts by the Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS, to purchase 100 refurbished tanks came to public light after a third of these tanks were seized by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia.
• Falling revenues: Declining world prices and diminishing oil revenues have had a considerable impact on budgets already strained to deliver development and meet increased military expenditures. Oil revenue accounts for 97 percent of the south’s budget and 50 percent of the north’s budget. As the pool of oil profits shrinks, competition for control over oilfields will likely intensify.
• Uncertain impact of the ICC: President Omar al-Bashir has responded to the issuance of a potential arrest warrant by the ICC for his actions in Darfur with blustering threats that have sparked concern about the impact on security and CPA implementation.
• Proxy militias on the loose: The Lords Resistance Army, a brutal Ugandan rebel group with a long history of serving as Khartoum’s proxy in the South, has resumed attacks in Western Equatoria State following the breakdown of peace negotiations and the launch of a regional military campaign to capture Joseph Kony, the rebel commander indicted by the ICC.
• Local violence: The proliferation of small arms in southern Sudan continues to fuel widespread local violence among pastoralists competing for resources and power that has not been reduced by GoSS-initiated civilian disarmament campaigns.

The CPA is not a lost cause. However, it badly needs focused support from the international community in terms of both incentives and pressure to send a clear and consistent message that full implementation of the agreement is the essential foundation for peace in Sudan. Over the next two years a range of issues—including elections, border demarcation, the ICC, Abyei, and the referendum—will all test the resolve of the parties and the strength of the agreement.

A fresh infusion of international commitment is needed to help navigate these challenges or the CPA may become a missed opportunity, with tragic consequences for Sudan and the region. Just as U.S. leadership was crucial in brokering the CPA, U.S. engagement carried out in concert with its multilateral partners will be central in bolstering the agreement’s chances for success.

A reinvigorated strategy to build peace in Sudan should be grounded by three central policy pillars:

• Reprioritize CPA implementation as part of a comprehensive approach to ending Sudan’s conflicts Sudan, Southern Kordofan, and Northern State, and a shaky peace between the north and south  U.S. policy must be shaped by the fact that these complex conflicts have a common core: flawed governance by a center that exploits and marginalizes an underdeveloped periphery. Not only does the CPA provide a roadmap for resolving the longest and bloodiest of these conflicts, but it also offers a framework for the kind of democratic, structural transformation necessary to alter the root cause of Sudan’s many recurring conflicts.
• Focus on both the short- and long-term.  The overriding policy objective of too many in the international community seems to be to limp toward 2011 by preventing a premature collapse of the CPA and accomplishing the bare minimum necessary to stamp the referendum as free and fair. Since there are so many hurdles to be cleared in the short term and foreign governments are sensitive to prejudge the referendum’s results, there has been very little focus during the interim period on long-term policy planning. With the referendum drawing nearer, this myopic complacency about the potential scenarios and likely risks moving forward is no longer sustainable.
• Actively engage in Sudan through a combination of strong leadership and multilateral collaboration with international partners.  The United States does not need to shoulder the burden alone. The CPA was the result of a regional mediation framework reinforced by robust   commitments from international partners such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Norway. This equation provided a formula for success during negotiations and could be reconstituted. Similarly, the United Nations Security Council and UNMIS provide a platform for ensuring CPA implementation and protecting vulnerable civilian populations. As one of the integral guarantors of the CPA, the United States should spearhead a multilateral, multitrack international initiative to help see the agreement through its next critical phase.

 In support of these principles, several actions should be taken:

• Encourage negotiations between the NCP and SPLM on a long-term wealth sharing agreement.  Disentangling the issues of land and oil by negotiating a long-term wealth-sharing arrangement could ease tensions over border demarcation, generate momentum for further cooperation, and ensure that the referendum is not a zero-sum game with high probability for conflict.
• Expand efforts to deliver a peace dividend.  Although the overall situation has improved since the end of the war, insecurity and underdevelopment remains a fact of life for most Sudanese. As long as that is the case, the GoSS will have difficulty consolidating the peace and holding together an ethnically divided south with competing political visions. Corruption and the general lack of trained administrators within the GoSS further stifle growth and fuel popular discontent.
• Enhance efforts to professionalize and modernize the SPLA.  The SPLA has struggled to transition from a guerilla movement to a formal army, a process complicated by attempts to integrate southern militias that opposed the SPLA during the war. To ensure that the south is stabile and the GoSS can deliver a peace dividend, the SPLA must continue to modernize through a well-supported process of security sector transformation that improves discipline, command and control, capacity, and competency. Toward this end, Congress the Obama administration should explore the sale of an air defense system to the GoSS.  Although introducing new weapons systems into a volatile military environment could be interpreted as contrary to donors’ responsibility to make unity attractive, it is in the interests of lasting stability that the GoSS spend money on defense wisely. Unlike the aforementioned refurbished tanks, an air defense is non-offensive and helps level the playing field by neutralizing the north’s major tactical advantage in the event of renewed hostilities.
• Support efforts to neutralize the SAF’s preferred war tactic of arming and supporting proxy militias against its enemies.   There will be no peace dividend without security, and the LRA are a brutal, blunt-edged tool that may well undermine elections and the referendum over the next two years if left unchecked. Although the ongoing military operation against the LRA was poorly planned and provided inadequate protection to vulnerable civilians, it does provide a window of opportunity to decisively defuse the LRA threat. The United States could provide logistical and intelligence support to improve civilian protection and help remove a CPA spoiler that also presents a threat to regional stability. Strategic efforts to apprehend the LRA’s leadership and deliver them to international justice would also provide an important boost to accountability in the region. To reduce the threat of other potential proxy militias, UNMIS must increase  its capacity to monitor weapons flows and the GoSS must work with its partners, including the United States, to ensure full integration of the SSDF and others into its own armed forces.
• Name a special envoy.  U.S. diplomatic efforts require a high-level focal point to directly engage the parties and send a strong message of U.S. commitment to building peace in Sudan. The Obama administration should move rapidly to name a special envoy who is supported by two deputies: one focused full-time on promoting CPA implementation and the other on achieving a peace deal for Darfur consistent with the CPA.
• Work with the U.N. Security Council to ensure that UNMIS has the necessary capacity to fulfill its mandate and protect civilians.  The May clashes in Abyei and the resulting displacement of 50,000 people reinforced concerns about UNMIS’s capacity to monitor threats to the CPA, reduce tensions before they escalate into violence, and protect civilians in imminent threat of danger. UNMIS must be able to effectively monitor the areas around Abyei and could prevent further clashes by helping negotiate a demilitarized zone along the border and in key flashpoints. Both the elections and referendum also carry a high risk of violence that will test UNMIS’s capability and will to act as a guarantor of the agreement’s implementation. The United States should lead efforts within the Security Council to strengthen UNMIS’s ability to support the CPA.
• Oppose any effort within the Security Council to suspend the ICC’s investigation in Darfur that is not tied to tangible peace and justice guarantees.  Ending impunity for grave human rights violations is an important step in breaking the cycle of conflict and building a sustainable peace in all of Sudan. Anticipating arrest warrants at any moment, President Bashir is attempting to avoid accountability and ensure the survival of his regime by using the threat of violence to hold the ICC’s investigation hostage. However, the ICC’s investigation has created leverage for a just peace in Darfur and an opening for party pragmatists to jettison Bashir as a leader with too many liabilities. In light of Bashir’s lack of credibility and the NCP’s long legacy of crimes, an Article 16 deferral of the ICC’s investigation by the Security Council could only be appropriate if it is linked to a credible, alternative accountability program acceptable to Darfuris, demonstrated progress toward full implementation of the CPA, and the wholesale return of Darfuri refugees and internally displaced in an environment of security, peace, and reconstruction overseen by a credible U.N. peacekeeping force.

Even while immediate challenge posed by the expected arrest warrant commands attention; it is becoming increasingly clear that Congress must work with the Obama Administration to quickly establish clear policy objectives focused on a real and lasting all-Sudan solution for Darfur, the South, and the rest of this embattled country.  While both Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice pledged strong action on Darfur during their recent Senate confirmation hearings, the need for a holistic approach to Sudan’s crises could not be greater as deadlines for Sudan’s national elections and other crucial elements of the CPA’s implementation loom large.

In summation, it is time to stop simply managing the consequences of crisis after crisis in Sudan and put an end to these crises.

Chairman Kerry and honorable Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this Roundtable and look forward to working together to end the crisis in Sudan.

Testimony of John Prendergast
Co-Chair of the ENOUGH Project

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this esteemed Committee, for the opportunity to share my views on the deepening crisis in Darfur and what our role should be in pursuing a coordinated and comprehensive approach to resolve it.

In the last couple of months, mounting attacks have been reported on all sides of the conflict in Darfur, with rebel groups jockeying for power, infighting between various Arab tribes, deadly attacks on African Union peacekeepers, and continued government bombings and ground attacks against rebels and civilians. The question then becomes: Is what is happening now in Darfur a matter of anarchy, chaos, and "inter-tribal" warfare? In other words, is the genocide in Darfur over?

Clearly, the violence in Darfur has escalated –- but suggesting that the crisis there is now a free-for-all, with the moral equivalency that phrase implies, ignores the political logic driving a catastrophe that appears, on the surface, to be defined by armed chaos. The reality is far different –- and for the recently-authorized UN/AU peacekeeping force and upcoming peace negotiations to be successful, that reality must be understood.

Descriptions of Darfur as demonstrating a definable transition "from genocide to anarchy" and a "murky world of tribes-in-arms and warlords who serve the highest bidder" is precisely what the architects of genocide in Khartoum had in mind when, beginning in mid-2003, Sudan's government set forth to destroy and displace the civilian support base for Darfur's rebel groups. The promotion of anarchy and inter-communal (or, popularly, "inter-tribal") fighting is part and parcel of Khartoum's genocidal counter-insurgency campaign. The conditions in Darfur and eastern Chad today are not evidence of an end to genocide and the onset of an entirely new and different war –- they are the echoes of genocide.

The regime's behavior is unswerving. Khartoum employed a similar divide-and-destroy strategy during its war with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, or SPLA, during the 1990s. Having sown the seeds of divisions between various southern Sudanese ethnic groups, government officials in Khartoum sat back and watched as inter-communal violence tore southern communities to pieces. Some of the worst violence occurred when Dinka and Nuer commanders in the SPLA fought in Upper Nile, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of people. Only when the SPLA reunified and communities began to work toward reconciliation did a peace deal for southern Sudan become possible.

Who is Primarily Responsible?

In Darfur, the same government officials lit the match to ignite the genocide and fuel the chaos we are witnessing today. As the government’s divide and destroy policy envisioned, there is indeed increased fighting between and among communities, including among Arab groups which previously had worked together to destroy non-Arab villages. But this masks the more intentional, better-resourced, and well-camouflaged strategy of the Sudanese regime, within which many of those leading the fighting on the ground today in Darfur are but pawns.

With varying degrees of intensity, the regime and its assortment of militia allies and turncoat rebels continue to employ multiple tactics to achieve its objectives to destroy the Darfurian opposition, to permanently alter the demographics of Darfur, and to deny Darfurians a meaningful role in national politics, including:

• killings resulting from direct attacks against non-Arab civilians by Sudanese armed forces and allied militias;
• rape and sexual violence;
• forced displacement of civilian populations into camps;
• systematic destruction of livelihoods;
• aerial bombardments;
• resettlement of Arab civilians (including citizens of Chad and Niger) onto land belonging to the displaced; and
• anarchic conditions that prevent displaced persons from returning home and relief workers from saving lives.

Violence is unrelenting in Darfur, but "tribes-in-arms" do not have a monopoly on violence against civilians. More than 500,000 people have been displaced in the last 15 months, most often from attacks by government army and air force, the former rebels under Minni Minawi's command that have joined the government, or other government-backed militias. In June 2007, a large-scale government offensive in the Jebel Marra region displaced 30,000 civilians. In August, another 25,000 civilians fled from government-sponsored attacks and inter-communal violence. Recent heavy fighting between Darfur rebel groups and government forces spilled into Western Kordofan state. And the brutal September 29 attack which left 10 African Union peacekeepers dead is a testament to the effectiveness of this strategy at stoking violence and instability.

The phenomenon of Arab militias turning on each other fits neatly into the government's strategic agenda as well. Having cut deals and granted impunity to various Arab militias to kill, rape, and loot non-Arab civilians, the government now derives strategic benefits from watching its former allies attack each other over the spoils. First, these agreements guarantee that no stakeholder in Darfur can assume military, strategic, or economic control of Darfur, and thus ensures itself an upper hand in peace negotiations. Second, they intensify the disruption of relief programs in Darfur.

The Human Toll

As a direct result of policy decisions made at the highest levels in Khartoum, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. Chronic insecurity generates a steady flow of displaced civilians into large camps, putting further strain on UN agencies and non-governmental organizations already caught in the line of fire. In the last 12 months attacks against humanitarian workers have increased by 150 percent. What better way to restrict access than by fomenting violence and lawlessness? The regime learned much from its 20-year war with southern Sudanese rebels about how best to undermine humanitarian operations through helping to create conditions of insecurity that then prevent relief agencies from regular access. Unsurprisingly, despite some of the press accounts, malnutrition rates are increasing substantially for the first time since the end of 2004. Many of the largest camps in all three provinces of Darfur, are reporting a significant spike in the number of malnourished children and adults. For the first time in the last three years, malnutrition rates are climbing above emergency levels. Contrary to what some authors have recently suggested, Darfur is not "saving itself."

The recent uptick in violence has come at the worst possible time. Darfur is at the tail end of its rainy season, exacerbating the hunger gap; humanitarian access is already restricted and surplus food supplies are depleted. Weakened by hunger, the victims of Khartoum's policies are even more susceptible to cholera, malaria, typhoid, and other communicable diseases that increase during the rainy season. Strangely, some "analysts" have focused on the uncertainty surrounding how many people may have actually died so far in Darfur. Without any remotely comprehensive mortality study, such an argument is counter-productive and not based on any empirical evidence. The real issue is not some abstract number-crunching debate, but significant pressure on the Khartoum regime to stop blocking aid agencies from conducting the kind of comprehensive mortality and morbidity studies that help inform their work and help create more realistic estimates of the number of lives lost in this tragedy.

With its presence in the field, the humanitarian community is best placed to determine the facts on the ground, and the Darfur they describe in confidence is a place where civilians continue to die in large numbers. Yet aid groups are walking a tightrope: speaking out publicly about the worsening situation would almost certainly elicit a strong reaction from Khartoum and jeopardize the only lifeline for 4 million people in need of assistance. In late August, the government of Sudan expelled the country director of the non-governmental organization CARE, which provides assistance to nearly 525,000 Darfurians (and implements humanitarian and development projects to assist millions more Sudanese citizens). The message is clear: Khartoum is in firm control of the humanitarian community in Sudan, and can expel anyone, at any time, for any reason. In this case, the regime had obtained an internal CARE email outlining security conditions on the ground and various scenarios for maintaining the security of CARE staff.

The government also expelled Canadian and European Union diplomats. Why is the government of Sudan stepping up its intimidation of humanitarians and diplomats now, so soon after it agreed to the deployment of the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force? The answer is very simple: The pragmatic and survivalist policy-makers in the ruling National Congress Party constantly calculate how much they can get away with. And with the hybrid force's deployment foremost in the minds of the international community, Khartoum believes that the international community will respond meekly to these expulsions for fear that strong condemnation could jeopardize the hybrid agreement. (The purpose of course is to strengthen the regime's hand in dictating the terms of the hybrid force's deployment and in influencing the next steps in the peace process.) Evidently the government of Sudan is correct; the EU apologized, and their representative was allowed to stay on in Khartoum. (Canada, on the other hand, responded appropriately -- condemning the Sudanese government and expelling a Sudanese diplomat from Ottawa.)

While a violent free-for-all between numerous armed groups -- rebel factions, Arab militias, and organized criminals -- has consumed parts of Darfur, the ruling National Congress Party in Sudan has managed, for the most part, to contain the chaos in Darfur and export it to Chad with minimal disruption to its main business: Hoarding Sudan's growing oil wealth while it undermines the landmark 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLM.

The Need for a Coordinated and Sustained Diplomatic Front

Three years ago, the U.S. Congress harangued President Bush about not calling the Darfur crisis "genocide" until he finally did so. His administration then spent the next few years using the term repeatedly, bird-dogging other nations about their lack of action, issuing vague statements about the use of force for which the Pentagon has not done serious planning, strong-arming one of the rebel groups to sign a peace deal that made matters worse on the ground, imposing unilateral sanctions that had no impact on the culprits, and sending millions of dollars of humanitarian aid to substitute for effective political action.

During this timeframe, the U.S. could be forgiven for being disappointed in China and Europe. Beijing ran interference for the Khartoum regime in the UN Security Council while pumping Sudanese oil and selling arms to the government. France and the UK provided no direction to the European Union and sat on the sidelines, despite a reservoir of leverage in Paris from its relationship with Chad, and high octane speeches from former Prime Minister Blair about no-fly zones.

However, in one of those kairos moments, everything is suddenly changing. China has come under intense pressure from activists for its support for the Sudanese regime, which it wants to shake off so it can host a controversy-free 2008 Olympics. France elected a president who wants to work with the U.S. on Darfur. Britain's new prime minister has been actively working with the new French president to press for forward movement on the peace process in Darfur.

This quartet could work together and through a wider contact group to do the following:
 

• support the resumption of a serious peace process for Darfur;
• press the Government of Sudan to facilitate the unconditional and full deployment of the AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping mission;
• demand that the rebels and government stop attacks against civilians and allow unimpeded and full access for humanitarian aid operations;
• press for the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) -- the blueprint for a democratic transformation in Sudan -- between the regime and southern-based rebels; and
• ensure that Khartoum continues to cooperate on counter-terrorism issues.

All four will have different styles of engagement and different comparative advantages in promoting solutions. China can't be expected to publicly condemn the Khartoum regime or actively support punitive measures. France has limitations within the European Union (EU) and inherits regional alliances that complicate its diplomacy. The U.S. carries baggage from other global entanglements and its counter-terrorism cooperation with Khartoum.

What is needed isn't exactly rocket science. Perhaps the single most influential action that could be taken now to end the horrors in Darfur would be for the U.S., France, the UK and China to convene an informal quartet similar to the "troika" of countries -- U.S., UK and Norway -- that helped bring an end to the North-South war in Sudan. All four countries now have Special Envoys focused on Darfur. All four have leverage with either the Sudanese regime or the rebels, or both. All four are permanent members of the UN Security Council. All four have compelling political reasons to invest more heavily in supporting solutions in Sudan. All four need to find global issues where common ground on ultimate objectives will allow them to work together and rebuild international cooperation in the midst of global division. And there is no better way for the U.S. to improve bilateral relationships with France and China than to work closely together toward a common goal on something like bringing peace and stability to Sudan.

With this "quartet," the U.S. and the greater international community must take immediate and significant action on the three following fronts to end the cycle of death and destruction once and for all in Sudan.

1. Promote the Peace: To create the missing and essential point of coordinated leverage on the parties involved in peace efforts, the quartet countries should send senior diplomats to the region to assist in the development of benchmarks and a clear end state vision as needed by the UN/AU mediation team. This sustained support is critical to garnering forward movement in the buildup to the Tripoli discussions that will start on October 27.

2. Protect the People: The United States should work with the United Nations and African Union to ensure that hybrid force is fully funded and equipped, and is on track to be deployed as quickly as possible. Troop contributions surprisingly are not the problem. Rather, it is insufficient support from the most important donors, including the U.S., that threatens to delay the deployment and hinder the force’s ability to protect civilians. As a leading member of the UN Security Council and a vocal supporter of the hybrid force, the U.S. has a particularly important role in ensuring these obstacles are overcome. Specifically, the U.S. should work with NATO and the European Union to provide the necessary equipment and logistics, press other nations to contribute essential hardware, and fund the U.S. share of the mission.

3. Punish the Perpetrators: To build leverage for peace and protection, it is crucial that any party who undermines efforts to promote peace and protect civilians face repercussions. Specifically, the U.S., France and the UK should be prepared to lead efforts in the United Nations Security Council to impose immediate and specific measures against any government, militia or rebel official who obstructs the deployment of the hybrid force, undermines the forward movement of the peace process or is responsible for attacks against civilian populations. Additional assistance should also be given to the International Criminal Court to execute indictments, support the prosecution of those indicted, and help accelerate the Court's preparation of additional cases against senior Sudanese officials responsible for crimes against humanity.

Conclusion

The world has done little over the last four years but condemn Khartoum’s actions while granting its wishes. It should be no surprise to any observer that the violence has increased, that rebel factions have splintered, that militias have turned against one another, or that Darfur’s civilians are paying the price. If this administration can set aside all its posturing, roll up its sleeves, send a diplomatic team to the region, and start working multilaterally, it could, finally, help drive a durable solution.

Testimony of Gayle E. Smith
Co-Chair of the ENOUGH Project

Full transcript of Smith's testimony
Mr. Chairman, and Honorable Members of the Subcommittee:

Testimony of Gayle E. Smith
Co-Chair of the ENOUGH Project

Full transcript of Smith's testimony
Senator Feingold and Members of the Committee:

Thank you very much for the opportunity to brief the Caucus on this important and too often neglected topic. Before I begin, I, along with all of my colleagues at ENOUGH, would like to extend our condolences to the family and friends of Congressman Tom Lantos. Congressman Lantos was a tireless advocate for human rights. His passing is a loss not only to those of us working on these issues, but to all of the disenfranchised and oppressed people in the world who have been touched by his leadership and vision.

I have been asked to discuss the humanitarian situation in the Congo. For the purposes of this briefing I will focus my remarks on the crisis in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, which for so long have been the epicenter of one of the world’s largest and most ignored humanitarian catastrophes, and particularly on the plight of women and girls caught in the vice-grip of atrocities committed by all sides in this relentless conflict.

While a recent ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and European Union is hailed as a diplomatic success, the continued suffering of Congolese civilians remains an international failure. According to the International Rescue Committee’s latest study of mortality in Congo, 5.4 million people (and counting) have died in the conflict since 1998, mostly due hunger, disease, and other consequences of violence and displacement. Despite a peace deal signed in 2002 and relatively fair elections held in 2006, preventable death continues at the same pace—a staggering 45,000 people die each month, half of whom are children under five.

Indeed, war in the Great Lakes region has really been in a state of suspension over the last few years. Heavy fighting occasionally makes the news, but systematic and widespread crimes against humanity simmer below the surface. Congolese women and girls in particular bear the vicious brunt of this crisis. Without question, eastern Congo right now is the worst place in the world to be a woman or a girl—perhaps ever. Sexual violence and rape occur on a scale seen nowhere else on earth. Violence against women is intended to mutilate and humiliate. Rape as a weapon of war—defined by the United Nations as a war crime—is causing the near total destruction of women, their families, and their communities.

I was in eastern Congo in July 2007, and I will be heading to North Kivu province again next week. The humanitarian situation was dire last year, and has only gotten worse. The end of 2007 was accompanied by an escalation in armed conflict and displacement, and all sides—Congolese rebels, the Congolese army, and numerous Congolese and foreign militia groups—were guilty of attacks on civilians.

The continued atrocities in the East have two underlying causes:

1. The long-standing structural weaknesses of the Congolese state, in particular the predatory nature of its armed forces and the general state of impunity and lawlessness across the country; and

2. The rise of parasitic armed groups—driven by competition for vast natural resources, struggle for political power, communal tensions, and legitimate security concerns—which fill the vacuum of the state and feed off its people. These groups include 8,000 to 9,000 Rwandan and Ugandan rebels and 5,000 to 8,000 local militiamen that operate in the East. The most dangerous of these groups is the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, a Hutu militia that includes some of the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

A tragic illustration of the situation facing Congolese civilians occurred in the early morning of November 13, 2007 outside the provincial capital of Goma. Congolese rebel forces attacked a Congolese army base established near to camps for internally displaced people—people who had already fled for their lives. Within hours, an estimated 30,000 people deserted the two camps closest to the fighting and fled toward Goma. A field researcher for ENOUGH spoke with a number of displaced people along the main road to Goma who described their fear, frustration, and anger about being forced to flee yet again, this time from an area meant to be secure. The majority who fled the camps slept along the road or with local communities that were kind enough to offer them shelter. By afternoon the following day, many had returned to the camps, only to find that the Congolese army and less empathetic locals had looted the belongings they left behind.

In early December 2007, the Congolese army launched an offensive against rebels led by a dissident Congolese General named Laurent Nkunda. It was the largest military offensive of Congolese President Joseph Kabila’s seven-year tenure. At least eight local militias—also parties to the peace deal—helped the 20,000 Congolese troops fight Nkunda’s superior forces. The offensive ended in fiasco as troops from both sides raped, looted and killed in the process.

As armed groups fought, moved, and dispersed from one town to another, so did the civilian population. The fighting in December caused the seventh major wave of civilian displacement in North Kivu since November 2006. A officer with the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Congo, or MONUC, suggested that as many as 70-80,000 people have been displaced as a direct result of the botched offensive. Thus, the past year of hostilities in North Kivu has displaced an estimated 437,000 people. Previously, the majority of displaced people found shelter with host families and communities. However, many communities can not absorb more displaced people, and newly uprooted Congolese are settling in camps. Recent reports estimate nearly 170,000 people are living in camps in North Kivu.

Now, finally, there is some good news to report from eastern Congo. On January 23rd, the government signed a peace deal with nine rebel groups in the eastern North Kivu region. And, finally, the United States has, for the first time in almost a decade, put some diplomatic muscle to work to help find a solution. Tim Shortley, special advisor to Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, spent two weeks hunkered down in the eastern Congo, shuttling between rebel and government delegations. Senior diplomats for the European Union and Belgium cancelled appointments and followed suit.

The centerpiece of the peace deal is a ceasefire between the government and the rebels led by General Nkunda. The ceasefire orders the creation of a commission—chaired by the government and co-chaired by the international community—to oversee several aspects of the deal, including military integration of Nkunda’s forces; the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants; the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the ceasefire, the reinforcement of United Nations Peacekeepers’ presence to protect the civilian population; the implementation of the plan to disarm and repatriate foreign armed groups; and the creation redeployment calendar of armed groups into transit and demobilization centers. This is what can be achieved when the international community puts its mind to it, and the Bush administration—particularly Mr. Shortley—deserves credit. But this is also just the beginning; most of the heavy-lifting has yet to be done.

Unsurprisingly, there is a very tight correlation between continued conflict and high death rates. And therefore the policies needed to achieve twin goals in eastern Congo—ending conflict and reducing human suffering—are closely linked. As is the case in Darfur, Somalia, and Iraq, the extreme human suffering in Congo will not abate until progress is made to resolve the political crisis at the root of the problem.

According to the United Nations, at least 1.2 million people are displaced inside Congo, most of them in the East. In the western part of Congo, death rates are similar to those in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In the East, the rates are double. People die in eastern Congo in huge numbers, indirectly due to the ripple effects of violence: continuing attacks, ongoing rapes, and routine looting and forced labor all lead to waves of displacement, frequent epidemics, limited access to basic health services, persistent hunger and malnutrition, and spiraling impoverishment.

Having suffered through years of avaricious leadership and simultaneous economic decline, the Congolese state is simply unable to respond to and protect its citizens. Worse, the Congolese army is guilty of widespread human rights abuses, and impunity for sexual violence is the norm. The misconduct of soldiers is often condoned or ignored by high ranking officials. The prevailing attitude of the army is that soldiers cannot be held accountable for their actions and that it is the woman’s fault for being raped. At a recent educational event about the consequences of sexual violence in Goma, a top ranking army official announced publicly: “women should know not to go out in places where there are armed men.”

A non-functioning state means that there is no recourse but to the slivers of international assistance that trickle in via heroic aid agency efforts, but the scale of the problems in the Congo dwarfs the response of donor governments. Moreover, humanitarian access to these vulnerable populations is under constant stress, and UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, are fighting an uphill battle to save lives. Where aid agencies do get involved, death rates go down. However, the humanitarian aid trickling through is a small drop in an ocean of need, and UN officials report they have less access now in parts of North Kivu than they did in the fall of 2006.

In eastern Congo, divisive issues such as citizenship and land ownership have, over decades, splintered into innumerable grievances, stoked by politicians and militia leaders who benefit from conflict. With an army that is more a predator than a protector, the civilian population is forced to rely on armed militias to defend and guard their respective interests. But armed groups rarely act on behalf of the civilians they claim to defend. Militia groups pursue their own interests—particularly control over lucrative mineral resources—and as new grievances develop, so do new factions. Armed groups, old and new, terrorize communities into accepting their control or punish those loyal to the opposing parties/forces. And, again, women bear the brunt of this punishment.

It is not just armed groups that are guilty of rape; the civilian population is increasingly culpable as well. Rapes committed by civilians are on the rise. Throughout the recent conflicts, Congolese traditional society (such as community chiefs) has also suffered a slow disintegration. Without a strong presence of traditional higher authority or state authority, the general civilian population can commit crimes and not be held accountable. This is especially true for large cities. In Goma alone from January to September 2006, 3,500 victims received care and treatment for rape. In some places in North Kivu, the number of rapes committed by civilians is threatening to eclipse those committed by armed men.

Even though adjustments have been made to Congolese penal code to help deal with the epidemic of sexual violence, the foremost problem in Congo is a culture of impunity because of the lack of a strong Congolese state. For the women and young girls who have had the courage to publicly identify their rapists, prosecutions are slow to non-existent. Perpetrators thrown into jail are often able to simply pay guards for their release. Some have even just broken through the walls. There is little to no follow-up by authorities if a man escapes. Even worse, because there is no witness protection program in Congo, many perpetrators are able to find and terrorize their accusers again. There are numerous accounts of victims being re-raped in revenge. Women and young girls have even had their mouths cut off so that they “won’t tell again.”

Faced with gruesome acts of violence and sexual torture, international condemnation unaccompanied by dramatic action is simply unacceptable. Although the international community has agreed on its “Responsibility to Protect”, its efforts to protect civilians in the Congo —in particular women and girls—are failing spectacularly.

ENOUGH’s field researcher recently asked a rape survivor named Jacqueline (not her real name) what she thought of the ceasefire she replied “There won’t be any peace. Peace will only come from god, because men can’t do it.” Jacqueline was raped years ago in Rutshuru by a group of armed men that broke into her house. Right now she is waiting for her fifth fistula repair surgery in a safe house outside of Goma. A fistula is a hole that can develop through days of difficult childbirth, or, in this case from extremely violent rape. Essentially, the blood supply to the vagina is cut and the tissue deteriorates and tears. Jacqueline told ENOUGH that she has seen peace deals come and go, and it is hard for her imagine that the conflict will ever end.

Fortunately for Jacqueline, we do believe that this crisis can be brought to an end. At ENOUGH we are in the business of providing policy solutions, and we have argued consistently that international efforts to end the crisis must focus on two principal short-term objectives: to negotiate an and to the conflict in North Kivu province between the Congolese government and dissident Congolese General Laurent Nkunda, and to remove the predatory FDLR from eastern Congo.

A comprehensive peace strategy requires vigorous pursuit of the 3Ps of crisis response: peacemaking, protection, and punishment:

Peacemaking: The international community—led by a quartet of guarantors that includes the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union—must consolidate a recent ceasefire agreement to a lasting peace agreement that addresses the root causes of conflict in eastern Congo and deals squarely with the FDLR. Follow through must include additional funding and personnel for programs to demobilize ex-combatants and stabilize the region.

Protection: The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Congo, or MONUC, must lead protection efforts by increasing troop presence in the eastern Kivu provinces and deploying to areas where sexual violence is most prevalent. Donor nations must increase support for humanitarian and development initiatives aimed at reducing sexual violence and dealing with its after effects.

Punishment: The international community must break the cycle of impunity for crimes against humanity by helping to build the capacity of the Congolese state to respond to and protect its citizens. Additionally, the International Criminal Court, or ICC, should open an investigation into the use of rape as a war crime in eastern Congo.

In closing, the short term measures to end the crisis must be accompanied with a coordinated long-term strategy to deal with the structural causes of Congo’s plight. My ENOUGH colleague Gayle Smith testified on this topic before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs last year, and I have brought copies of her testimony to the briefing today.

Thank you again for the opportunity to brief you today, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

With its latest invasion-by-proxy in Chad, the Sudanese government is taking its defiance of the United Nations Security Council to a new level. As we speak, Khartoum is sponsoring and supporting an open and transparent effort to overthrow a neighboring government. A month ago, the regime burned the strategic town of Abyei to the ground, leaving the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) at extreme risk. This comes against the backdrop of a government offensive in Darfur and ongoing support to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), whose actions threaten the children of four countries.

These constitute grave threats to international peace and security. But Khartoum’s violations do not end there. The regime has directly and repeatedly defied the will of the Security Council by:

• Not arresting the ICC indictees;
• Obstructing UNAMID’s deployment;
• Continuing offensive military flights;
• Maintaining support to the Janjaweed; and
• Flouting the arms embargo and buying weapons from Security Council members

In response, the Security Council has passed 9 resolutions and issued 19 presidential statements on Sudan since Darfur’s war began in 2003. But the crisis in Darfur is only escalating, and the CPA is at risk of collapse in the coming year. The lack of an effective response to Darfur is putting the credibility of the Security Council on the line for future efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping around the globe.

Not imposing consequences for such destruction and obstruction emboldens Khartoum to continue to undermine the security of Sudan and the surrounding region, and encourages other rogue regimes globally to defy the Council’s will. The rebels have also contributed to Darfur’s insecurity, partly because of the lack of Security Council consequences.

The role of the UN Security Council is clear. By imposing consequences, you can provide the leverage – the pressures and incentives – that will provide influence for the mediators, the ICC and UNAMID to do their jobs effectively. In the absence of such leverage, and if you pass more resolutions that don’t create real consequences for non-compliance, Sudan will continue to burn.

While my colleagues have spoken about accountability, civilian protection and humanitarian imperatives in Darfur, I would like to focus on the need for a diplomatic surge focused both on creating an effective peace process in Darfur and pressing for implementation of the CPA.

In pursuing peace in Darfur, the Security Council must simultaneously drive efforts to secure a deal for Darfur and to implement the CPA, while building the leverage to help achieve a peaceful Sudan.

1. DARFUR

To prevent the further deterioration of this volatile situation, the U.N. Security Council must take immediate steps to lead in launching and sustaining an effective peace process for Darfur. In the absence of some kind of more robust action from the Council, the process threatens to drift interminably without a strategic direction and without the kind of mediation structure that would give peace a chance.

The Security Council should immediately appoint a single, empowered mediator: One strong lead mediator must replace the current structure of dual AU and UN special envoys. A single mediator is necessary, because a diffusion of responsibility leads inevitably to a diffusion of effectiveness. The mediator must be fully supported to drive an ongoing process and must be supported by a full-time peace secretariat with expertise in all of the relevant issues under negotiation. The process leading to the CPA—led by a single, empowered Kenyan mediator—provides a crucial model for success. The mediator must deal equally with the Sudan-Chad proxy war, as well as closely coordinate with those working for the implementation of the CPA.

The Security Council should support that mediator with coordinated international leverage: The process that led to the CPA was backed by a “Troika” of countries (the UK, U.S., and Norway, with many others participating in supportive roles) providing coordinated international leverage. Peace efforts in Darfur require the same kind of organized structure. The P-5 all have significant points of leverage in Sudan. The P-5, or some subset thereof, should designate full-time diplomats and deploy them in support of the mediator, just as the “Troika” did in pursuit of the CPA. They would focus on backing up the mediator and neighboring states with clear and focused incentives for and pressures on all key actors to achieve a peace deal for Darfur, implement the CPA, support the ICC, and deploy UNAMID.

2. CPA

For over a year, the Security Council has known that the town of Abyei was a flashpoint with the potential to detonate the entire CPA. The worst fears were realized last month when Brigade 31 of the Sudanese Armed Forces displaced the entire civilian population of Abyei and burned its market and housing to the ground.

This was predicted and preventable. Because the mechanisms for oversight of the CPA did not function and the Sudanese government refused to implement the recommendations of the Abyei Boundary Commission despite its commitment to do so in the CPA, the Security Council must become much more involved in making sure this damaged peace agreement does not collapse.

The Security Council should ensure there is robust monitoring of the terms of the CPA, and sanction non-compliance. If there is no consequence for non-implementation of the CPA’s many provisions, particularly the ones regarding Abyei and other flashpoints, and the agreement collapses, then war will again erupt between the ruling party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.

The Security Council should ensure that UNMIS has a clear presence in Abyei and is actively involved in overseeing the implementation of the CPA terms for Abyei and the recent agreement to de-escalate that area. The Council should ensure also that the UNMIS presence in Abyei town is reinforced with a permanent UN military and civilian presence to effectively monitor the situation, accurately report conditions on the ground, and promote local reconciliation.

3. LEVERAGE

Ending the catastrophe in Darfur requires a three-pronged effort that involves international protection for civilians, accountability for human rights abuses, and a peace agreement that resolves the underlying political issues. Equal efforts must also go into ensuring the implementation of the CPA and its provisions such as national elections and the referendum for the South.

The Security Council must impose meaningful consequences for individuals who impede efforts at protection, peacemaking, humanitarian access, and accountability. Without such costs, the war calculation will remain unchanged.

To build leverage, the Security Council should expand the list of individuals identified for targeted U.N. sanctions and impose a full arms embargo on Sudan, with an appropriate carve-out for southern Sudan if the Government of Southern Sudan continues to show good faith in implementing the CPA. A cost must be imposed on the government for its attacks upon civilian targets in Darfur (including violations of your ban on offensive military flights), its violation of the arms embargo, its refusal to implement key provisions of the CPA, its obstruction of the full deployment of UNAMID, and its failure to arrest International Criminal Court indictees Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb. Absent measures to significantly alter the calculations of senior NCP officials, the situation will continue to deteriorate. The Council should impose similar sanctions against rebel officials who obstruct peace and protection initiatives and are responsible for crimes against humanity.

- John Prendergast, Co-Chair of the ENOUGH Project
 

Testimony of Gayle E. Smith: "From Nuremberg to Darfur: Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity"
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action Fund
Co-Founder, the ENOUGH Project
Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law

I would like to thank the caucus for holding this hearing today, and once again demonstrating much needed leadership in this arena. The Human Rights Caucus continues to be one of the great unsung heroes of the Congress, and a terrific example of the bipartisan commitment in the Congress to fundamental rights around the globe.

I would like to approach my testimony today from a more personal level. For the record, I am not an expert in fiduciary instruments or investment law. I am not a regulatory expert or an investment lawyer. However, during my career I have had the dubious pleasure of sitting down face-to-face with a good many war criminals in places where they live and work – in Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. I can tell you without reservation, that all
of these men were acutely aware of investment laws and practice in the United States. These men eagerly awaited every mention of sanctions, every list of state sponsors of terrorism and every trafficking report out of the U.S. Government. They pay close attention to divestment campaigns. You will also be pleased to note that many of them seemed quite familiar with testimonies offered in front of the Human Rights Caucus!

Just as we see with Sudan today, it is important to remember that the leaders who direct and organize genocides and crimes against humanity often rely on shady economic deals and patronage to keep their criminal and political networks in place and in power. President Charles Taylor relied on blood diamonds, the Sudanese government relies on oil profits, and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe relies on a dual exchange system that has systematically looted his country, made government insiders filthy rich and fuelled a 66,000 percent inflation rate. One of the reasons that former Yugoslav President Milosevic fell from power after the 1999 Kosovo conflict was the growing dissatisfaction of key money men in his regime who acutely felt the impact of NATO’s bombing campaign on their own investments. The web of investments and international financial flows are fundamental to understanding how almost every government conducting crimes against humanity, as well as armed militias preying on citizens in places like eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, manages to stay in power.

That leads to an obvious conclusion and, just as Deep Throat advised Woodward and Bernstein more than 30 years ago, if we want to end genocide, we need to follow the money. It is remarkable to me that while the United States has put in place a very dynamic range of controls to ensure that terrorists around the globe cannot freely move money and assets, those same controls and that same level of scrutiny are not routinely applied to governments and individuals perpetrating mass atrocities against their own citizens. Why not? Why should Sudanese leaders, now responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions, receive softer treatment than a terrorist trying to blow up explosives on a public bus?

In the case of Sudan, it is abundantly clear that the Government continues to feel empowered to attack its own citizens because of the country’s substantial oil wealth and the lack of an effective response from the United States and its allies. In essence, the Sudanese regime is calculating that the U.S. Government is unwilling to take concrete action on the economic front, and thus Sudan’s government is more than willing to attack refugee camps, as it did recently while as a powerless UN force fails to intercede.

By taking practical steps toward making genocide-free investment a reality in this country, the Congress can help cut off the lifeblood of some of the worst governments in the world, and send a powerful message that we will not tolerate business as usual when it comes to crimes against humanity.

The organization which I represent, the Enough Project, was formed in 2006 to lead an effort to help build and expand a permanent constituency against genocide and war crimes. In almost every community across America, across the entire political spectrum, we have found that people are incredibly eager to help end the Darfurs of the world, but often feel they lack the tools to do so.

The question we hear most often is: what can I do? Yet, this simple and powerful question comes at a time when more than half of American households own equities of some sort. The answer to how millions of Americans can effect change abroad lies no further than their monthly mutual fund statement. But it is also obvious that we need your help and leadership to unlock this powerful tool.

Most family investors do not have the time, patience or expertise to determine if the myriad of holding represented in their average mutual fund are somehow caught up in bankrolling a genocide. Most Americans naturally assume that their own government would not stand idly by and watch as companies that deal with governments conducting crimes against humanity were freely traded on the market.

I think we also expect limited leadership from the financial industry itself on this issue. Other than a small number of socially responsible funds, most large investment companies and houses continue to busily wash their hands of any responsibility. They try to keep change at bay with a bevy of lawyers, lobbyists and public relations experts, just as companies and boards long resisted basic environmental protections, child labor laws and any number of
reasonable safety standards. Some in the investment community decry efforts to ensure that portfolios are genocide-free as intrusive, but Congressional intrusion is certainly warranted in a situation where the financial industry itself has been unwilling to lead.

Doing business with a government like Sudan’s or Zimbabwe’s is ultimately a disservice not only to the people of these countries suffering under the yoke of their own repressive governments, but to investors’ bottom lines. We have seen again and again that relationships and investments with rogue regimes are inherently unstable, and these investments are not secure over the long-term. What happened to the many American investors who were told that investing in the Shah of Iran “was just good business sense?”

Over time, governments in places like Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma will be replaced by less authoritarian regimes, and we need to ask ourselves if the American government, the American people and American investors want to be on the right side or the wrong side of history. Any new governments will surely remember those countries and investors, such as China, that provided full backing for the former oppressors-in-chief. Congress would only be doing due diligence in ensuring that the basic procedures and regulations are in place to ensure that genocide-free investment can be achieved.

There must be a financial cost to governments conducting some of the worst human rights abuses on the planet. Congress is in a position to work collaboratively with both the human rights and financial communities to make sure that basic ethical consideration and guidelines are put in place with regard to the standards that we develop for mutual funds and their management.

Thank you.