Adam O'Brien

Strategy Paper (PDF)

Audio (MP3)

Activist Briefing (PDF)

By Adam O’Brien

The United States and other key actors need to lower their expectations for the upcoming February 2010 national elections in Sudan and develop a multilateral strategy to press the Government of National Unity—the ruling National Congress Party in particular —to enact meaningful reforms regardless of who wins in 2010, revitalize CPA implementation, and establish a framework for talks in Darfur that are consistent with the power-sharing provisions of the CPA.

In February 2010, Sudan is scheduled to hold its first democratic elections in 24 years. General elections are required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, which the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, signed in 2005 to end a second civil conflict between northern and southern Sudan that lasted two decades, killed 2 million people, and displaced 4 million more.

Sudan’s upcoming national election poses a series of thorny questions for the international community, and, to date, these questions have not been acceptably resolved:

•   The NCP is notorious for ignoring the rule of law, persecuting dissenting Sudanese voices, breaking existing agreements, and using ruthless force against civilians. Why should international diplomats believe the NCP will behave any differently during the course of an election, and what guarantees and safeguards will be put in place to prevent cheating?
   

•   How can a credible election take place in Darfur at a time when the international community is struggling to maintain even bare minimum levels of lifesaving aid there and more than 3 million people are still internally displaced or refugees?
   

•    How can the national election be credible if a ballot does not take place in Darfur given its significant portion of Sudan’s total population?
   

•   How do elections fit into a broader strategy of promoting the ultimate goals of power-sharing, governance reform, and the political empowerment of larger numbers of Sudanese citizens? 
   
•    How can the national election be effectively administered given the complexity of the voting systems, the challenge of conducting voter registration during the South’s rainy season, and the slow pace of voter education efforts?
   

When the CPA was signed over four years ago, credible elections in Sudan were a central element of a multilateral strategy to help the Sudanese people fundamentally alter how their country is governed. It was hoped that credible elections would force Sudan’s ruling party—a group that has waged ruthless war on its citizens for over 20 years—to make a choice: change its behavior and compete at the ballot box or maintain the status quo and be voted from power.

However, four years of selective CPA implementation and declining trust between the NCP and SPLM have badly eroded expectations and fundamentally altered both parties’ political calculations. Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir is now also wanted on war crimes charges for his actions in Darfur. Both the NCP and SPLM view the election with a jaundiced eye. President Bashir and his NCP only see the election as useful if it can be sufficiently manipulated to create some NCP claim to popular legitimacy while keeping threats to the party’s rule weak and divided. The SPLM and many in the South see the election as a distraction from the far more important self-determination referendum in 2011. The challenges of holding a safe and credible election in Africa’s largest and perhaps least- developed country are truly daunting, and the threat of election- related violence—particularly in the South and marginalized areas of the North—is very serious.

Holding timely and safe elections would be a welcome step toward keeping the CPA on track and could provide many communities a much- needed outlet to express popular will.  However, given the NCP’s reluctance to embrace free and fair elections that could displace it from power at the national level, elections are unlikely to serve as the main vehicle for radically improving governance and achieving lasting stability in Sudan. Indeed, in light of the numerous delays in key aspects of CPA implementation, the conflict in Darfur, and the international community’s failure to date to harmonize its strategic approach for securing a lasting peace across all of Sudan, the election could prove to be a fiasco.

The United States and other key actors, operating on a tight timeline, need to lower their expectations for the election and develop a multilateral strategy to press the Government of National Unity—the ruling NCP in particular —to enact meaningful reforms regardless of who wins in 2010, revitalize CPA implementation, and establish a framework for talks in Darfur that are consistent with the power-sharing provisions of the CPA. There also has to be a clear and unified international posture with regard to addressing the issue of Darfur, given the near -impossibility of holding a free and fair ballot there.

The international community should use the process of moving forward with the election as an opportunity to press for greater political freedom and participation no matter what the outcome is.  The election should be supported as a way for local and regional entities to contest for power, and as an instrument for people to choose their own representatives as a step on the path toward democratic governance—not as a silver bullet that will produce genuine democratic governance.

Deadlines, delays, and decisions

The CPA radically restructured Sudan’s political landscape by creating a multi-tiered power-sharing system of government during a six-year interim period that was supposed to culminate in a 2011 referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan._¹

By the end of interim period’s fourth year, the CPA calls for voters to cast ballots in executive and legislative races for the Government of National Unity and state governments, and for southern Sudanese to vote in elections for the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS._²

Election timetable

 
The CPA aims to end Sudan’s bloodiest conflict as well as address deep-seated economic and political disparities at the center of the state’s many conflicts through its extensive wealth- and power-sharing arrangements. National general elections, it was hoped, would provide a seal of democratic credibility and popular legitimacy to an institutional arrangement that had resulted from bargaining between Sudan’s two most powerful parties rather than balloting among the broader population. A fair vote would ensure that the CPA’s power-sharing structures would evolve from appointed positions to elected offices, with candidates pledging to uphold the CPA. The elections were also seen as a way to broaden the support base by involving groups excluded from the agreement’s negotiations in the broader political process. Ultimately, it was hoped that democratic elections would help make unity attractive to the South by changing the nature of governance in Khartoum and thereby encouraging nationwide political reform.

The CPA divided representation in the new government structures based on proportions agreed to by the NCP and SPLM during negotiations. The National Elections Act─ a CPA-mandated law passed by the national assembly last year that provides the rules and guidelines for governing the upcoming elections ─calls for a new proportional allocation scheme._³

Under the current arrangement, members of government are political appointees. Elections would be the first time that the Sudanese people would directly determine who holds these offices. Additionally, state elections in South Kordofan and Blue Nile—two flashpoints along the border between northern and southern Sudan—are designed to initiate “popular consultations,” a vague process in which these states will decide whether to accept, reject, or renegotiate the CPA and its application to their areas.

Both the NCP and SPLM were initially reluctant to hold competitive elections during the interim period, but the international community—particularly the United States—pushed hard to include the elections as a vehicle to entrench and expand peace during CPA negotiations. And while the intentions were admirable, the relative failure of both the signatories and the international community to keep CPA implementation on track now means that the 2010 elections present a myriad of political and operational risks.

On April 1, 2009, Sudan’s National Electoral Commission announced that nationwide executive and legislative elections would occur in February 2010, seven months later than called for by the CPA. Although this was another item on a growing list of missed CPA deadlines, the electoral commission’s decision to delay the historic vote by seven months did not come as a surprise.

Even under a best-case scenario, holding elections on the CPA’s original schedule would have been a tough logistical and operational challenge. Sudan is a massive country, and other than in a relatively small radius around Khartoum, it lacks basic infrastructure and critical services. During the summer months when elections were supposed to occur, intense rains swamp large swathes of the South, rendering remote villages inaccessible and isolated populations stranded. Voter registration and polling are made more difficult by the large number of semi-nomadic pastoralists who migrate with the seasons as well as the lingering effects of displacement caused by decades of conflict. Low literacy rates and little experience with democratic elections compound the problem of voter education for the complicated election process, which in some areas will present voters with as many as 12 ballot papers for races on six different levels. Such a complex procedure—one that would require a sophisticated voter education effort in even the most developed of nations—is a very poor fit for Sudan.

Much of Sudan remains plagued by pervasive insecurity. Clashes in Darfur remain very well and rightly publicized, even as violence has spiked up in numerous localities across southern Sudan. President Bashir’s decision to expel 13 western aid organizations from Darfur, as well as the so-called “Three Areas” of Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, has ratcheted up humanitarian and security pressure in exactly those areas where election-related violence is of the greatest concern._⁴

In the South, the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, unleashed a new wave of attacks and abductions following a botched regional military strike, spearheaded by the Ugandan Army in December 2008, against the rebels’ jungle bases in northeastern Congo._⁵

In April, hundreds of people were killed in interclan clashes over cattle, access to resources, and local power politics in Jonglei state. These events highlight the combustible mix of weak government structures, stunted development, ineffective security forces, and heavily-armed civilian populations that creates the potential for even greater instability in much of southern Sudan.

The sputtering pace of CPA implementation, elections preparations, and required legal reforms sealed the need for postponing elections. The National Elections Act, which was supposed to be enacted by January 2006, was not passed until July 2008. Five months later—and four months late—President Bashir appointed a committee to lead the National Electoral Commission, which is mandated by the Elections Act to oversee the voting process. The electoral commission formally asked the United Nations for electoral assistance in February, but the broad request led to little actual activity on the ground because the NEC lacked an operational structure beyond its nine-member executive committee and had not set a timetable for the vote. With four months to go and no plan or preparations for a vote, the electoral commission had little choice but to delay the elections. Further, changes proposed by the NCP to laws governing media and security will make free and fair elections even more challenging. Particularly worrisome draft laws currently under parliamentary review would allow Sudan’s security services to detain citizens for 30 days without charge and expand press censorship. Free and fair elections can only plausibly occur in an atmosphere of reduced repression, which has yet to be achieved.

The political calculus of elections

The technical hurdles remain considerable, but the core problems that have hindered elections preparations are political. The premise and promise of elections—democratic transformation, consolidating the peace, and making unity attractive—have been marred by the NCP’s four-year pattern of obstructionism, which has stalled progress on CPA implementation and sapped good will between the parties. The original aspirations of the agreement are no longer is synch with actors’ current agendas, and the tunnel vision of short-term interests and zero-sum calculations has replaced long-term goals of political partnership and national unity.

Both the NCP and SPLM want to use the elections to strengthen their positions prior to the 2011 referendum without precipitating a premature collapse of the CPA or exposing their own internal weaknesses. In many ways the fate of the elections will remain hostage to other CPA implementation issues—including the status of Abyei, border demarcation, referendum preparation, and long-term, wealth-sharing agreements—and whether any progress is made on these matters before February 2010.
 

The National Congress Party

The NCP is propelled by an instinct for survival and a strategy of opportunism, and its overriding interest is self-preservation. Since the CPA was signed, NCP hardliners have attempted to delay, undermine, or ignore the implementation of any provision that might loosen the party’s grip on power. With two years remaining in the interim period and the growing probability of an independent South, the NCP faces the looming possibility of losing one-third of its territory, many of its oilfields, and control over upstream access to water from the Nile. Continued conflict in Darfur, tense uncertainty in Abyei and South Kordofan, international war crimes charges against the president, and declining oil revenues all risk corroding the NCP’s control beyond Sudan’s riverine core. President Bashir has attempted to hunker down and rally the base after the International Criminal Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant against him for war crimes in Darfur, but the charges have further isolated the NCP internationally and increased internal friction between pragmatists and extremists within the party.

The NCP, under heightened pressure, views elections as both a threat and an opportunity. The party is broadly unpopular and has much to fear from any ballot that genuinely open’s Sudan’s constricted political space. However, the NCP agreed to elections during CPA negotiations in hopes that they could head a political partnership with the SPLM that would draw democratic support and gain international legitimacy while simultaneously subordinating the SPLM’s national ambitions and reducing SPLM presence in power-sharing institutions. As deteriorating confidence in CPA implementation led to dwindling prospects for an electoral partnership, the NCP resorted to its default fallback tactic of obstructionism by neglecting passage of the election law.

The ICC’s arrest warrant against President Bashir altered the NCP’s calculations and once again endowed elections with potential utility as an instrument of legitimacy and control. After the court announced its decision, NCP officials offered the SPLM a deal: if the SPLM agreed to presidential elections in July, the NCP would rapidly push media, security, and other legislation necessary to bringing national laws into conformity with the CPA and enabling fair elections. The SPLM declined, but the NCP’s proposition demonstrates President Bashir’s revived interest in elections as a means to polish his image abroad and purge the party of potential rivals who eye the warrants as an opportunity to push Bashir aside.

 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

The SPLM has three main interests in the elections. First, the SPLM does not want elections to interfere with the South’s ability to decide its fate through a fair and timely referendum on independence by February 2011. Unimplemented CPA provisions and unrealized peace dividends have reinforced popular perceptions in the South that the NCP is not a reliable peace partner and unity is not a viable option. For many in the South, the CPA’s hopes have been reduced to holding the referendum on schedule and ensuring that the South has an accurately demarcated border and secure access to the oil wealth flowing from the fields that line the region dividing North and South.

Elections potentially cast a shadow over the referendum in several ways. Holding elections in July, during the deluges of the South’s rainy season, would have made it extremely difficult for southerners to vote, for organizations to provide adequate support, and for observers to monitor the fairness of the entire process. Coupled with concerns that the census results—used to determine national power-sharing proportions—dramatically understated the South’s population, some in the SPLM worry that the NCP will use elections to gain a stranglehold in the National Assembly and thwart the referendum. While the SPLM wanted elections during the southern dry season—roughly November to May—to avoid mass disenfranchisement, it also can not allow elections to continue sliding down the same slippery slope of delays that has tripped up CPA implementation. With only two dry seasons remaining before the end of the interim period, the SPLM needed elections to occur during the first dry season to ensure that the second dry season remained reserved for the referendum. Finally, the SPLM does not want the political competition of elections to trigger a military confrontation that could endanger the CPA just when the referendum is within grasp.

The SPLM’s second main interest is to bolster its base in the run-up to the referendum. While smaller political parties in southern Sudan are too weak and fragmented to present a real threat of opposition to the SPLM’s dominant position within GoSS, the SPLM enters the final crucial phase of CPA implementation facing numerous challenges that could be exacerbated by the elections. Southern Sudan is riddled with politicized ethnic divisions among a heavily-armed civilian population that can escalate into destabilizing violence easily exploitable by the NCP. In June 2008, GoSS launched an ineffective civilian disarmament campaign in large part motivated by a desire to neutralize remaining tribal trouble spots prior to elections.

GoSS President and SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir has done an impressive job under difficult circumstances to create a cohesive governing structure that reflects the South’s diversity and responds to its needs, but disappointment with GoSS’s performance remains significant. The GoSS has struggled to deliver a substantial peace dividend to poor, remote regions where access to water, food, health care, economic markets, and education remains elusive for the majority of southerners. The dreadfully slow dispersal of development assistance pledged by Western donors and declining oil revenues have depleted GoSS’s budget, making it more difficult to invest in development, purchase patronage, and pay an army in need of training and modernization. Corruption and the siphoning off of oil funds for personal profit is a serious problem that has bred resentment and disillusionment among desperately impoverished southerners, and understandably chilled enthusiasm among development donors. GoSS’s current push to decentralize will in theory place more power and resources at the disposal of state authorities, increasing the stakes for these seats and potentially accelerating the centrifugal forces. Elections could focus local-level ire at GoSS’s uneven performance, aggravate deep ethnic divisions, and pose a threat to prominent individuals with vested interests in holding onto power.

The SPLM is composed of a mosaic of actors and a variety of interests that reflects the South’s complexity. The SPLM has historically struggled to reconcile its own competing visions for Sudan, the “South-first” strategy of secession and John Garang’s “New Sudan” strategy of national unity through democratic transformation. Salva Kiir has worked to ensure that both factions are represented within GoSS, but the vying visions have not been reconciled and will likely come into sharper focus as the referendum approaches. Some spoilers who fought against the SPLA during the war and joined GoSS for the spoils may be biding their time until they have an interest and opportunity to bolt. For the SPLM, elections, and the rapidly approaching referendum run the risk of exposing these rifts and hastening a reckoning or realignment of interests within the party.

Finally, the SPLM’s third main interest—at least among the South-first bloc—is to develop the building blocks of a new state that will have internal stability and international support. The GoSS government elected in February 2010 will be responsible for steering the South during the referendum period and beyond. The vast majority in the South seems eager to vote for independence were the referendum held today, while a fledgling state in southern Sudan will face immense economic, political, and security challenges: poor but endowed with the mixed blessing of oil, sprawling but landlocked and bordering numerous security vacuums, and uneasily united in opposition toward NCP misrule but divided by internal schisms. Establishing democratically elected institutions will strengthen the South’s standing as well as claims for recognition and assistance among the international community.

Thus far, the SPLM’s strategy toward elections reflects the diversity of its multiple, moving parts. Publicly, many SPLM officials claim that the party will use the general elections to mobilize the marginalized masses across Sudan, unseat President Bashir, and replace the NCP’s majority in the National Assembly with a coalition of the periphery led by the SPLM. This, they argue, is not only consistent with Garang’s vision, but is also supported by secessionists who think that the only way to ensure the referendum is to gain control of the National Assembly. While the threat of reaching out to northern constituencies and expanding the SPLM’s existing presence in the north may have utility as a bargaining chip with the NCP to build leverage and gain concessions in other contentious CPA areas, this is unlikely to become reality. Pushing for the presidency or attempting to capture Khartoum by the ballot would be a high-risk strategy that could provoke a showdown with the NCP—remains in a strong position in relation to northern opposition parties —while bringing little benefit for the majority of southerners who would prefer to exit rather than fix Sudan. 

The SPLM will also need to decide which candidate to run against President Bashir. GoSS President Kiir, who is also vice president the GNU, cannot run for both the presidency of GoSS and GNU. For those loyal to Garang’s approach, elections may be the last chance to argue that a unified Sudan serves the South’s interests. If the NCP stifles elections and further marginalizes the South, then the staunchest advocates of the New Sudan strategy may reach the point where they no longer see the practicality of any path other than independence.

What about elections in Darfur?

The ongoing catastrophe in Darfur poses one of the greatest challenges to national elections. The volatile security environment and contested census results (most accounts suggest that the census in Darfur was even less comprehensive and representative than in the South) cast serious doubt as to whether elections can even be held. And National elections can hardly be considered credible if 7 million people—more than 17 percent of Sudan’s estimated population of 41 million—are disenfranchised.  If the decision is taken to hold elections in Darfur, the obstacles are overwhelming. Aside from resolving disputes over the census and logistical and security hurdles, overcoming pervasive distrust of the government poses a serious challenge. For example, many displaced Darfuris are deeply concerned that registering as residents of internally displaced persons’ camps will delegitimize their land rights outside these camps. In this charged atmosphere, elections could actually lead to more violence and, potentially, give the government an excuse to forcibly close displaced persons camps. The international community, which remains eager—at least rhetorically—for elections to stay on track, has not made clear their position on how the issue of Darfur and the elections should be addressed, and this gap remains a yawning one.

Rewards and risks

Democratic elections are still vital to the fate of the CPA and the future of Sudan, but it will take more than a poorly managed election to address the root of Sudan’s crisis—the hoarding of wealth and power in Khartoum at the expense of a marginalized periphery.  It is important, then, to manage expectations and have realistic goals that reflect the current challenges and constraints. Elections will not magically transform Sudan, but pushing to complete elections peacefully in February 2010 could provide impetus to clear the cluttered backlog of delayed CPA benchmarks and help identify the major challenges to holding a credible referendum in 2011.

Postponing the vote until February was a first step to adequately prepare and support the electoral process, but major risks and concerns remain. The new election timetable announced by the electoral commission leaves many problems unanswered and raises many new questions. On May 23, the electoral commission announced plans to establish state committees throughout the country. Six days later, it signed an agreement with UNDP that paves the way for $68.7 million in electoral assistance. However, the electoral commission does not yet have operational structure in place, and it will take months at best for it to establish regional offices, hire and deploy staff, and begin functioning effectively on the ground. If the electoral commission doesn’t build basic capacity by the beginning of June, according to some observers in Juba, it is unlikely that they will be able to hold and manage elections—credible or not—during the next dry season.

The electoral commission’s decision to conduct voter registration during the South’s rainy season is also potentially problematic. Just as there were concerns that polling during the rainy season would lead to disenfranchisement, attempting to register during the same period could lead to large numbers being left off the voting rolls in the South. Lastly, citizens will not be able to campaign and participate in the electoral process without fear of censorship, repression, and human rights abuses, unless the National Assembly amends and alters existing legislation—including the press and security laws—to provide adequate safeguards for civil liberties.

The very challenging security environment in which these elections must be held is equally daunting. Absent swift implementation of a political settlement in Darfur—something that looks exceedingly unlikely absent much stronger U.S. leadership—elections can simply not be held in that region of the country, which is home to approximately 7 million people. In other marginalized areas—particularly in the South—the potential for ethnic manipulation and violence is high. Elections will bring political competition and confrontation within heavily militarized and mutually suspicious populations and give the NCP an opportunity to stoke intercommunal violence. Small sparks on a local level from tribal power politics or local grievances can spiral out of control rapidly and state security forces have little capacity to provide security or contain conflict. And if large numbers of people are disenfranchised by logistical complications or political manipulations, electoral losers may become peace spoilers.

Finally, the GoSS has rejected the recently released results of Sudan’s national population census, which is supposed to be used by the electoral commission to delineate constituencies for the elections. According to the census results, the South comprises 21 percent of Sudan’ total population and only 520,000 southerners live in the North. Comparatively, under the CPA’s pre-election power-sharing proportions, the South is currently allocated 34 percent of seats in the National Assembly, and GoSS officials had previously declared that they would reject the census and could boycott elections if the results did not give the South 30 percent of the population. The continued impasse over the census results could derail not only the elections preparations but the entire CPA.

How to address elections

The landscape in Sudan has changed in the four years since the CPA was signed, and the international community has to adjust its expectations for the elections and recalibrate its strategy to revive CPA implementation. In many ways, the slow pace of CPA implementation to date, and the likelihood of a badly flawed election mean that the international community will enmesh itself in a very difficult game of damage control and limitation.

Elections are a litmus test for international engagement more generally, which must be more consistent, coordinated, and resolute to prevent Sudan from plunging back into war. All involved must remember that elections are one element of a much larger peace process—not the other way around. The goal of international support should be an overarching peace for all of Sudan accompanied by a peaceful vote that helps create creating momentum and builds confidence for implementing the remaining major CPA provisions, particularly how to hold a credible self-determination referendum. The United States plans to spend $95 million to support the elections—its third largest commitment to electoral support behind Iraq and Afghanistan—and the United Nations and other donors are also prepared to provide substantial financial and technical assistance. This eagerness to support elections is not surprising, but donors must be wary about stamping a seal of approval on a process that could embolden President Bashir as he faces war crimes charges and continues to practice divide and rule tactics in Darfur and the South. The international community should make clear that it will not unconditionally support elections that do not meet baseline standards such as a level playing field for political parties to compete and an opportunity for all entitled individuals to freely exercise their right to vote.

The main priorities for the international community must the following:

1.    Building capacity

• Ensure that the electoral commission has an operational structure in place as soon as possible: While it now has a framework and funding, the electoral commission still lacks the necessary field infrastructure and capacity—including functional offices, trained staff, and physical supplies—necessary to adequately prepare and conduct elections during the next dry season. The pace of the electoral commission’s development has been slowed by a lack of political will in Khartoum, and the commission’s leadership must be open and its decision-making transparent to build confidence in the electoral process.

• Educate voters:  The elections process as determined by the CPA is extraordinarily complicated and many Sudanese have never voted before.  In southern Sudan, for example, voters will be asked to complete twelve separate ballots. Low literacy rates—only 24 percent in the South—add to the challenges of ensuring that voters understand how the election will work. Donors should support basic voter education programs so that Sudanese can participate meaningfully in the election, and have a greater understanding of their fundamental rights even if the election does not come to pass.
   

2.    Mitigating violence

•  Bolster the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Southern Sudan, or UNMIS: In an ethnically charged environment, national elections have the potential to further destabilize parts of the country and could be the spark for further conflict. At this late point, the safety of the elections must take priority, and UNMIS should be bolstered from the pre-election period to prevent and resolve emerging conflicts that will arise or be stoked in the context of the electoral process. The ability to get U.N. personnel on the ground in real time—even in remote locations—to monitor and report after local clashes will be essential to preventing small incidents from blowing up into large ones.

• Postpone elections in Darfur:_⁶
  Holding elections in Darfur without an inclusive political settlement will not contribute to peace in the region and could make things worse. A more autonomous regional government and new arrangements for wealth and power sharing are core demands of most Darfuris.  Thus, a majority of Darfuris would reject not only any outcome that legitimizes the current political leadership in Darfur, which is drawn almost exclusively from the NCP, but also the very structure of governance in the region. The priority for Darfur right now must be the negotiation of a peace agreement that meets the core demands of Darfuris for representative wealth and power sharing and allows displaced persons to return home voluntarily and safely. Elections should only be held once that fundamental goal has been achieved.

• Target election support to the Three Areas: The Three Areas have not received a meaningful peace dividend from the CPA. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, where there is little understanding of the CPA, high levels of militarization, and no option for a referendum as an exit strategy should the NCP continue to quash meaningful political participation by the nation’s periphery. In Abyei, which will vote in 2011 whether to stay with the North or become part of the South, the elections are seen as a dry run for the referendum. Working toward more credible results in the Three Areas is thus critical.

• Support conflict prevention and management programs: Recent clashes in Malakal and Jonglei demonstrate the potential for destabilizing bloodshed and the need to expand support for local-level conflict resolution initiatives that identity flashpoints and encourage community participation in peace-building activities to prevent violence during the elections.

 
3.    Focusing on the big picture

• Press for comprehensive governance reform: The process of moving forward with the legal framework for elections should be used as an opportunity to revise existing national laws, such as those governing the press, that make both fair elections and more accountable government  extraordinarily difficult. In the South, the international community has an important opportunity to stress that continued (and vital) assistance is dependent on practical steps by the GoSS to combat corruption and establish sensible plans for tackling key development challenges that reflect community input.

• Initiate a diplomatic push for progress on the remaining major CPA challenges and end the war in Darfur: Support for elections must be part of a sustained international strategy of incentives, disincentives, and leverage that will help prevent Sudan from relapsing into a third North-South war, allow the South to hold a credible self-determination referendum in 2011, and help achieve a political settlement to end the war in Darfur and allow refugees and internally displaced persons to return home._⁷

   

END NOTES

1.  Abyei, an oil-rich and ethnically-charged area along the contested north/south border, will also hold a referendum on whether to be part of northern or southern Sudan. For a background on Abyei, see “Abyei, Sudan’s ‘Kashmir’,” by Roger Winter and John Prendergast, available here. return

2.  The Government of National Unity has a bicameral legislature composed of the Council of States, which has 2 representatives from each of Sudan’s 25 states, and the National Assembly.return

3.  Under the CPA, the president of the unity government is from the NCP and the First Vice President is from the SPLM, while in the National Assembly, the NCP has 52 percent of the seats, the SPLM 28 percent, other northern political forces 14 percent, and other southern political forces 6 percent. In contrast, in the post-election National Assembly, 60 percent will be elected to represent geographical constituencies, 25 percent will be women elected by proportional representation from party lists, and 15 percent will be political parties elected by proportional representation from party lists. return

4.  The disputed border between northern and southern Sudan, lined with oilfields essential to the both areas budgets, is tense. Clashes in February between the SPLA and Sudanese army in Malakal, which killed 60 soldiers and civilians, demonstrate how quickly the situation can flare out of control. return

5.  According to estimates by the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the beginning of April, LRA-related incidents in the southern Sudan states of Western and Central Equatorial have displaced 37,000, killed 160, and lead to the abduction of 83 children and adults. As a result of LRA attacks in Congo, 17,695 refugees have spilled over the border into Sudan. For Enough’s recommendations on how to end the threat posed by the LRA see “Finishing the Fight Against the LRA”, by Julia Spiegel and Noel Atama, available here. return

6.  There is a precedent for postponing elections for a region of Sudan in times of war. National elections in 1965 were not held in parts of southern Sudan (especially Equatoria) because of lack of security. By-elections were held in the south 1967 to complete the parliament. Even then, however, the results were largely unrepresentative of southerners’ political views, as the voters were mainly northerners living in the south. For a history of elections in Sudan, see “Elections in Sudan: Learning from Experience”, available here.return

7.  For Enough’s comprehensive strategy for peace in Sudan see “President Obama and Sudan: A blueprint for Peace”, available here. return

Audio

Peace on the Rocks.pdf

The precarious peace between northern and southern Sudan stands at a crucial crossroads. Intended by its architects as the cornerstone of peace in a country fractured by conflict, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, has been hamstrung by the National Congress Party’s intransigence, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s growing pains, and the international community’s neglect. With two years remaining before a referendum on self-determination for the south, confidence in the CPA is diminishing, mistrust between the NCP and SPLM is mounting, and both sides are arming in preparation for a resumption of hostilities. The International Criminal Court’s, or ICC’s, forthcoming arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir will further isolate the NCP and adds an additional layer of uncertainty to the CPA’s fate.¹  U.S. leadership was instrumental in negotiating the CPA and could be pivotal in preventing a relapse into a full-scale war that would have grave humanitarian consequences and further destabilize an already volatile region. The Obama administration must revitalize U.S. support for CPA implementation, and develop a clear and comprehensive diplomatic strategy that encompasses both north-south issues and Darfur as the core of a renewed push for peace in Sudan.

Lasting peace or temporary pause?

The NCP and SPLM signed the CPA in January 2005 after 22 years of civil conflict that claimed an estimated 2 million lives and displaced more than 4 million people. Scorched earth tactics and divide-and-conquer strategies created a massive humanitarian catastrophe where famine was an instrument of war and civilians became either expendable pawns or heavily armed proxies. The government’s pursuit of a radical Islamic and overtly racist political agenda were major catalysts for the conflict, but the underlying cause lay in the concentration of power and privilege among a narrow stratum of northern elites who viewed the state as a means to extract resources and accumulate control over the sprawling state’s resource-rich periphery. As a result of this political marginalization and economic underdevelopment, deep-seated conflict took root in Sudan.

The CPA is a complicated, ambitious document that aims to create a sustainable peace by remedying these historical imbalances. Through an array of wealth and power-sharing arrangements mandated over the course of a six-year interim period, the CPA seeks to remold the skewed state and promote a political partnership between the NCP and SPLM, while offering the south a clear exit strategy if these terms are not met. The agreement created a new central governing body, the Government of National Unity, or GNU, and granted the south semiautonomous status administered by the Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS. National elections are mandated to be held by July 2009, and the GoSS is required to receive 50 percent of all revenue from oil fields in southern Sudan. While the goal is to make unity attractive by giving the south an equitable stake in the state, the south can choose to become an independent nation through a referendum in 2011.

From the outset, the CPA has faced an uphill struggle. The death of SPLM/A head John Garang on July 30, 2005 in a helicopter crash was a major setback. Garang was a strong leader who formed personal bonds with key NCP leaders and their allies in the Arab world to create a climate of confidence that enabled negotiations to succeed. The sudden loss of Garang and the resulting scramble to fill the leadership void exposed old divisions in the south between those who favor his “New Sudan” strategy of unity and national transformation and those who prefer a “south first” strategy whose ultimate goal is independence. As the SPLM struggled to consolidate control over a vast territory emerging from decades of conflict with an ethnically diverse population and little infrastructure, it also had to reconcile its competing visions for the future.

Garang’s death altered Khartoum’s calculations and led the NCP to increasingly obstruct CPA implementation. The prospects for a NCP/SPLM national partnership were always tenuous, but they became even more problematic once the NCP concluded that Salva Kiir, the new GoSS president, was more committed to the path of independence than to Garang’s “New Sudan.” The NCP rejected the findings of a commission set up to determine the border of Abyei, a politically sensitive, oil-producing flashpoint along the fault line between north and south.²  The NCP also withheld funding for a national census and demarcation of the north-south border, delaying crucial CPA benchmarks that impact oil revenue sharing, national elections, and the self-determination referendum. Both the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, and Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, were slow to redeploy their forces, leaving large concentrations of troops in close proximity along hotly contested border areas despite a ceasefire.

The international community has been slow to respond to the sputtering pace of implementation and the NCP’s attempts to undermine the CPA. The genocide in Darfur diverted international focus and funds away from implementation of the agreement. Eager to gain humanitarian access and stop the slaughter in Darfur, international actors became less willing to press the NCP to fulfill its CPA commitments. (This is sadly ironic given that the conflict in Darfur stems from many of the exact same causes as the earlier north-south civil war, and has been prosecuted by Khartoum using many of the same brutal strategies). The Bush administration, which had played a lead role during negotiations, was unable to harmonize competing objectives in Sudan: implementing the CPA, managing the genocide in Darfur, and maintaining its close ties with the Sudanese government on intelligence sharing and counterterrorism. As a result, U.S. attention to the CPA has flagged during the interim period. The U. N. Security Council also lost capital and leverage as a credible international guarantor by failing to follow through on threatened sanctions against the NCP for repeated violations in Darfur. Emboldened by the example set in Darfur, the NCP saw little risk in obstructing implementation of any CPA provisions that did not serve their political interests. Constrained by a narrow mandate and limited capacity, the 10,000-strong United Nations Mission to Sudan, or UNMIS, has often been relegated to the role of a spectator.

After four years of fragmentary implementation of the agreement, the situation on the ground remains fragile. In May, clashes between SAF and SPLA in Abyei killed 89 people and displaced 50,000, raising fears that the delicate peace would not hold.³  Determination of the Abyei border has been referred for international arbitration, but sporadic violence prevents the majority of civilians from returning, military tensions remain high, and UNMIS continues to be subject to freedom of movement restrictions imposed by the SAF that severely curtail its ability to monitor troop activities north of Abyei. Both sides are building up their forces along the border and devoting increasing amounts of their budgets to military rearmament. Efforts by the GoSS to purchase 100 refurbished tanks came to public light after a third of these tanks were seized by pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. Declining world prices and diminishing oil revenues have had a considerable impact on budgets already strained to deliver development and meet increased military expenditures. Oil revenue accounts for 97 percent of the south’s budget and 50 percent of the north’s budget. As the pool of oil profits shrinks, competition for control over oilfields will likely intensify.

Additionally, Omar al-Bashir, the NCP leader and president of the GNU, has responded to the issuance of a potential arrest warrant by the ICC for his actions in Darfur with blustering threats that have sparked concern about the impact on security and CPA implementation. The Lords Resistance Army, a brutal Ugandan rebel group with a long history of serving as a SAF proxy, has resumed attacks in Western Equatoria State following the breakdown of peace negotiations and the launch of a regional military campaign to capture Joseph Kony, the rebel commander indicted by the ICC.⁴  The proliferation of small arms in southern Sudan continues to fuel widespread local violence among pastoralists competing for resources and power that has not been reduced by GoSS-initiated civilian disarmament campaigns.

With the elections and referendum looming on the horizon, difficult decisions can no longer be delayed. The next two years set out a compressed agenda of highly contentious, interrelated issues that leave little room for maneuver. Although the Border Committee was scheduled to submit its report in November 2008, disagreements over the boundary between White Nile and Upper Nile have prevented consensus on the findings and pushed back demarcation. The census results are expected in early 2009, but some southern leaders have already stated that the outcome will be rejected unless it is determined that the south comprises at least 30 percent of Sudan’s total population. Rejection of the census would be another setback for national elections, which have already slipped past schedule due to the daunting logistics and delays in passing enabling legislation. Flawed or failed elections could provide a convenient rationale for either or both sides to repudiate the CPA and resume hostilities. Continued uncertainty about the census and border demarcation not only complicates elections and oil revenue sharing, but it will also begin to cast a shadow over the referendum unless progress is made soon. While the parties have muddled through four years of uneven implementation, failure to hold a credible referendum on schedule could potentially sound the death knell for the CPA and spark a new war.

Action plan for the Obama administration

The CPA is not a lost cause. However, it badly needs the international community to provide focused support, in the form of both incentives and pressure, to send a clear and consistent message that full implementation of the agreement is the essential foundation for peace in Sudan. Over the next two years a range of issues—including elections, border demarcation, the ICC, Abyei, and the referendum—will all test the resolve of the parties and the strength of the agreement. A fresh infusion of international commitment is needed to help navigate these challenges or the CPA may become a missed opportunity, with tragic consequences for Sudan and the region. Just as U.S. leadership was crucial in brokering the CPA, U.S. engagement carried out in concert with its multilateral partners will be central in bolstering the agreement’s chances for success.

A reinvigorated strategy to build peace in Sudan should be grounded by three central policy pillars:

Reprioritize CPA implementation as part of a comprehensive approach to ending Sudan’s conflicts 

Sudan’s vast landscape features a seething genocide in Darfur, smoldering tensions in eastern Sudan, Southern Kordofan, and Northern State, and a shaky peace between the north and south. Diplomatic initiatives have tended to compartmentalize Sudan’s myriad conflicts, essentially falling victim to Khartoum’s familiar ‘divide and rule’ strategy. By diffusing and distracting international focus, the ruling regime has been able to tighten its reign on power without making systemic changes to the structure of the state. However, U.S. policy must be shaped by the fact that these complex conflicts have a common core: flawed governance by a center that exploits and marginalizes an underdeveloped periphery. Not only does the CPA provide a roadmap for resolving the longest and bloodiest of these conflicts, but it also offers a framework for the kind of democratic, structural transformation necessary to alter the root cause of Sudan’s many recurring conflicts.

Focus on both the short- and long-term

The overriding policy objective of too many in the international community seems to be to limp toward 2011 by preventing a premature collapse of the CPA and accomplishing the bare minimum necessary to stamp the referendum as free and fair. Since there are so many hurdles to be cleared in the short term and foreign governments are sensitive to prejudge the referendum’s results, there has been very little focus during the interim period on long-term policy planning. With the referendum drawing nearer, this myopic complacency about the potential scenarios and likely risks moving forward is no longer sustainable.

Narrowly focusing on reaching the referendum neglects key dynamics. First, regardless of the referendum results, both northern and southern Sudan will be mutually dependent for the foreseeable future on the oil that straddles their shared border. Even if the south opts for independence and controls most oilfields, the only available pipeline and refining capacity at this time are in the North. Water, infrastructure, migratory populations, and security will also continue to create shared issues of common concern. Second, marginalized northerners who fought alongside the SPLM in the war do not have the option of voting in a referendum. These areas, including South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, are reliant on the CPA’s wealth and power-sharing provisions to stimulate inclusion, development, and peace. Third, the worsening crisis in Darfur and the unpredictable consequences of the forthcoming ICC arrest warrant against President al-Bashir directly affect the calculations of both sides and could potentially lead to an open split within the NCP. Finally, after four years the CPA has not forged a partnership between the NCP and SPLM or made unity more attractive for the south. While the ultimate outcome of the referendum will be influenced by how issues like the border, elections, Abyei, and oil transparency are resolved, the south would likely vote overwhelming for independence were the referendum held today. In short, if the United States and its allies do not get the CPA back on track, they could face a new civil war in Sudan and the violent dissolution of Sudan as a state.

Actively engage in Sudan through a combination of strong leadership and multilateral collaboration with international partners

The United States does not need to shoulder the burden alone. The CPA was the result of a regional mediation framework reinforced by robust commitments from international partners such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Norway. This equation provided a formula for success during negotiations and could be reconstituted. Similarly, the United Nations Security Council and UNMIS provide a platform for ensuring CPA implementation and protecting vulnerable civilian populations. As one of the integral guarantors of the CPA, the United States should spearhead a multilateral, multitrack international initiative to help see the agreement through its next critical phase.

In support of these principles, several actions should be taken:

• Encourage negotiations between the NCP and SPLM on a long-term wealth sharing agreement. While shrinking reserves and falling prices might ultimately wean Sudan off oil revenue dependency by forcing broader economic diversification, the north and south will have to find a mutually beneficial framework for developing the oilfields along their border in the meantime. Disentangling the issues of land and oil by negotiating a long-term wealth-sharing arrangement could ease tensions over border demarcation, generate momentum for further cooperation, and ensure that the referendum is not a zero-sum game with high probability for conflict.
• Expand efforts to deliver a peace dividend. Progress has been slow in providing education, health services, access to water, and basic infrastructure to the peripheral areas of Sudan. Although the overall situation has improved since the end of the war, insecurity and underdevelopment remains a fact of life for most Sudanese. As long as that is the case, the GoSS will have difficulty consolidating the peace and holding together an ethnically divided south with competing political visions. Corruption and the general lack of trained administrators within the GoSS further stifle growth and fuel popular discontent.
• Enhance efforts to professionalize and modernize the SPLA. The SPLA has struggled to transition from a guerilla movement to a formal army, a process complicated by attempts to integrate southern militias that opposed the SPLA during the war. To ensure that the south is stabile and the GoSS can deliver a peace dividend, the SPLA must continue to modernize through a well-supported process of security sector transformation that improves discipline, command and control, capacity, and competency. Toward this end, the Obama administration should explore the sale of an air defense system to the GoSS.  Although introducing new weapons systems into a volatile military environment could be interpreted as contrary to donors’ responsibility to make unity attractive, it is in the interests of lasting stability that the GoSS spend money on defense wisely. Unlike the aforementioned refurbished tanks, an air defense is non-offensive and helps level the playing field by neutralizing the north’s major tactical advantage in the event of renewed hostilities.
• Support efforts to neutralize the SAF’s preferred war tactic of arming and supporting proxy militias against its enemies. Over the course of the war, the government supported many proxy militias against the SPLA, including the Southern Sudan Defense Forces, or SSDF; the Popular Defense Forces, or PDF; the “white army”; the Murahaleen militias; and, most pressingly, the LRA.  There will be no peace dividend without security, and the LRA are a brutal, blunt-edged tool that may well undermine elections and the referendum over the next two years if left unchecked. Although the ongoing military operation against the LRA was poorly planned and provided inadequate protection to vulnerable civilians, it does provide a window of opportunity to decisively defuse the LRA threat. The United States could provide logistical and intelligence support to improve civilian protection and help remove a CPA spoiler that also presents a threat to regional stability. Strategic efforts to apprehend the LRA’s leadership and deliver them to international justice would also provide an important boost to accountability in the region. To reduce the threat of other potential proxy militias, UNMIS must increase its capacity to monitor weapons flows and the GoSS must work with its partners, including the United States, to ensure full integration of the SSDF and others into its own armed forces.
• Name a special envoy. U.S. diplomatic efforts require a high-level focal point to directly engage the parties and send a strong message of U.S. commitment to building peace in Sudan. The Obama administration should move rapidly to name a special envoy who is supported by two deputies: one focused full-time on promoting CPA implementation and the other on achieving a peace deal for Darfur consistent with the CPA.
• Work with the U.N. Security Council to ensure that UNMIS has the necessary capacity to fulfill its mandate and protect civilians. The May clashes in Abyei and the resulting displacement of 50,000 people reinforced concerns about UNMIS’s capacity to monitor threats to the CPA, reduce tensions before they escalate into violence, and protect civilians in imminent threat of danger. UNMIS must be able to effectively monitor the areas around Abyei and could prevent further clashes by helping negotiate a demilitarized zone along the border and in key flashpoints. Both the elections and referendum also carry a high risk of violence that will test UNMIS’s capability and will to act as a guarantor of the agreement’s implementation. The United States should lead efforts within the Security Council to strengthen UNMIS’s ability to support the CPA.
• Oppose any effort within the Security Council to suspend the ICC’s investigation in Darfur that is not tied to tangible peace and justice guarantees. Ending impunity for grave human rights violations is an important step in breaking the cycle of conflict and building a sustainable peace in all of Sudan. Anticipating arrest warrants at any moment, President Bashir is attempting to avoid accountability and ensure the survival of his regime by using the threat of violence to hold the ICC’s investigation hostage. However, the ICC’s investigation has created leverage for a just peace in Darfur and an opening for party pragmatists to jettison Bashir as a leader with too many liabilities. In light of Bashir’s lack of credibility and the NCP’s long legacy of crimes, an Article 16 deferral of the ICC’s investigation by the Security Council could only be appropriate if it is linked to a credible, alternative accountability program acceptable to Darfuris, demonstrated progress toward full implementation of the CPA, and the wholesale return of Darfuri refugees and internally displaced in an environment of security, peace, and reconstruction overseen by a credible U.N. peacekeeping force.

 
Endnotes

1  See Enough’s recent strategy paper on the impact of the ICC arrest warrant, “What the Warrant Means: Justice, Peace, and the Key Actors in Sudan” (February 2008)
2  Enough has done extensive reporting and analysis on the crisis in Abyei. For a background on Abyei, see Roger Winter, “Abyei: Sudan’s Kashmir” (January 2008)
3  For an eyewitness account of the devastation in Abyei, see Roger Winter, “Abyei Aflame: An Update from the Field” (May 2008)
4  See Enough’s recent statement on the LRA, “No Excuses: The End of the Lord’s Resistance Army is in Sight” (January 2009)

Diplomatic Surge Strategy Paper

Dissension, disarray, deaths, and defections within the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army leadership provide a major opportunity for negotiators to pursue—parallel to an expeditious conclusion of the formal negotiations process in Juba—the conclusion of a swift deal with LRA leader Joseph Kony himself. Such a deal would seek to find an acceptable set of security and livelihood arrangements for the LRA leadership—particularly those indicted by the International Criminal Court—and its rank and file. This moment of weakness at the top of the LRA must be seized upon immediately. If diplomats don’t, the LRA’s long-time patron, the government of Sudan, will eventually come to Kony’s rescue as it has in the past, and new life will be breathed into the organization in the form of weapons and supplies.

The time to strike—diplomatically—is now.

A deal is there for the taking, but a more formalized and regular channel needs to be opened between Kony and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.^[1] The talks must be brought directly to him in his Congolese jungle hideout, since he won’t go to Juba, and phone negotiations are inadequate. A robust round of shuttle diplomacy is needed now to bring Kony directly into the fold, in which security and livelihood proposals can be passed to him and final agreement reached.

Both in terms of process and substance, now is the time to place Kony center stage.

Furthermore, while a diplomatic surge is focused on Kony, donors should provide real assistance to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or DDR, process as a pull factor for more defections, as most of the LRA still in the bush are worried first and foremost about their survival after they surrender.

U.S. engagement, a necessary but largely neglected key to success, has become more visible and concerted in recent months. The United States is providing financial support for the consultation process and a special advisor for conflict resolution has been named to support peace efforts over the objections of key State Department officials.^[2] These are overdue steps in the right direction, but much more can be done.

To keep the peace process focused and moving forward, several steps are necessary from the Juba negotiators, the U.N. Special Envoy, and the United States:

• Deal directly with Kony on the core issues: Addressing the LRA military leadership’s security and livelihood is the neglected heart of this peace process and is best handled by directly engaging Kony. The LRA leader will need incentives to come out of the bush and end the war: his personal security and the kind of lifestyle he will be able to maintain once he is no longer commanding a predatory militia.
• Discipline the Juba process: The LRA’s prime strategy is gaining strength and options by securing time, space, supplies, and an improved image. Donors and mediators must provide thorough oversight, reasonably tight time frames, and clear financial constraints to prevent peace talks from enabling the LRA to stall and rebuild.
• Develop leverage by devising a fallback military strategy: Both a clear carrot and a strong stick are necessary to bring Kony out of the bush. The current process lacks a credible backup plan to apprehend the LRA leadership should talks fall apart and countries willing to apply this leverage. While a credible Plan B military strategy is developed to give leverage to a diplomatic or legal solution, it is crucial that the United States and others should not endorse a premature declaration of failure of diplomacy in order to make room for a military approach that has little chance of succeeding without sufficient preparation.
• Prepare for a follow-up process in Northern Uganda to address long-term issues of resettlement, redevelopment, and reconciliation: A broad-based, inclusive forum within Northern Uganda, not Juba, is the only way to build a sustainable peace capable of breaking the cycle of conflict that has ensnared the area for 20 years. Such a process should be community-led and would include discussions on compensation and mechanisms for a truth and reconciliation process.

I. State of Play

A recess in the Juba peace talks stretched into its sixth month as LRA negotiators began touring Uganda for local consultations on domestic justice mechanisms while an apparently fragmented LRA military leadership turns on itself in Congo. The arrival of the LRA in Uganda to consult with stakeholders was accompanied by a meeting with President Museveni and an extension of a cessation of hostilities agreement that has brought unprecedented security for 1.5 million Northern Ugandans still languishing in squalor, displacement, and fear. Formal negotiations, however, are unlikely to begin before January at the earliest.

According to a recent U.N. report, over 400,000 people have ventured out of the IDP camps. Many others are moving back and forth to their home areas. Some people would not want to leave the camps unless a peace agreement is signed, while others cannot move because there are no schools and other basic social services such as safe drinking water and health centers in what used to be their home villages.

The regional environment is shifting and the LRA command structure is unstable, complicating efforts to finish the hard work and difficult decisions that remain. There has been massive defection by LRA commanders. This string of defections began with Patrick Opio Makasi accompanied by his two wives and children, followed by 30 others. Three hundred more defectors are waiting in the wings.

Sudan’s troubled Comprehensive Peace Agreement which brought an end to the 20-year war with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army appears increasingly precarious, threatening to distract the Government of Southern Sudan from its role as peace broker and creating an incentive for Khartoum to once again use the LRA as a destabilizing proxy force. Rumors are swirling that the Khartoum regime is in touch with Kony, an ominous sign and one that means that if the regime provides Kony with new arms and support, he could plunge the region into new rounds of violence if he is not dealt with soon. The Congolese Government and UN Mission to Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC, are preoccupied with a looming conflict in North Kivu, channeling resources and commitment away from creating a credible threat of pressure against the LRA. The LRA’s operations director, Patrick Opio Makasi, defected in November, and its deputy commander, Vincent Otti, was reportedly detained and allegedly killed by LRA leader Joseph Kony.

The recent development in the LRA changes the Juba peace process dynamic significantly. Could the defections signal the unraveling of the LRA? And how credible is the LRA’s peace negotiating team against the current backdrop? Kony is allegedly not talking to the LRA’s chairman of its peace team at the talks. The chairman thinks Kony has sent assassins kill him and has not been participating much in the consultations.

Time is of the essence in this process. The longer this drags on, the more likely it becomes that the Government of Sudan will re-inflate the LRA with new support in an effort to destabilize Southern Sudan in advance of the 2009 elections and/or the 2011 referendum. Therefore, a clear timeline must be established for the remaining steps in the process, and a direct, formal channel should be opened with Kony himself to discuss his fate and that of his top deputies, the biggest stumbling block to peace in Northern Uganda.^[3]

II. Justice Consultations

The June 29 agreement on reconciliation and accountability between the Ugandan government and LRA obligated each party to conduct consultations with the people of Uganda prior to talks aimed at translating the deal’s broad principles into specific domestic justice mechanisms against people who committed atrocities or grave human rights abuses during the brutal conflict. The agreement is an initial attempt to tackle one of the talk’s most vexing issues: reconciling the pursuit of a negotiated settlement with unexecuted arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court against four rebel commanders, including the LRA leader Joseph Kony. While the results of the consultation process are not binding on either party, it was hoped a credible consultation process would bolster an eventual deal by increasing local acceptance and international legitimacy.

While the consultation break was initially scheduled to take only one month, administrative delays and unrealistic LRA demands stalled the process for months. Unable to agree on a simultaneous process that could have saved time and money, the Ugandan government began its own nationwide consultation tour that began in August and ended on September 27. Led by chief negotiator and Internal Affairs Minister Dr. Ruhakana Rugunda, the Ugandan government’s program reached out to a broad geographic and social spectrum in collecting views on what form of accountability the LRA leadership should face. Opinions appear to have been diverse, with calls for forgiveness often set against demands for some form of punishment.

After demanding $2 million to pay for a consultation process that included a tour of post-conflict countries such as Argentina and Sierra Leone, the LRA finally agreed with donors on a slightly less ambitious and significantly less expensive $800,000 three-stage consultation program. First, the LRA will conduct a nationwide tour of Uganda collecting views in the same way as the Ugandan government. Second, 400 to 500 people from Uganda and the Diaspora will converge near the LRA’s base along the Sudan/Congo border for a large meeting to exchange views on reconciliation and accountability with Kony and his commanders. Finally, roughly 200 people will be invited by the LRA to meet in Juba, collate the views collected, and formulate clear LRA proposals for negotiations on specific justice mechanisms to be outlined in an annex to the agreement on reconciliation and accountability. LRA consultations in Uganda are scheduled to conclude by December 13, but no dates have been set for the entire process to end.

The main LRA delegation arrived in Uganda on November 1 to launch their consultations. Delegation head Martin Ojul released a white dove in Kampala as a symbolic gesture of peace, then visited President Museveni and signed an addendum to the cessation of hostilities agreement that extended the pact for another three months. Ojul then led the delegation up to Gulu and appeared on a local radio station asking for forgiveness from the local population.

III. Confusion and Turmoil in Garamba

The landmark visit by an LRA delegation to Uganda was overshadowed, however, by a violent split at the top of the rebel’s military leadership. On October 2, LRA operations chief Patrick Opiyo Makasi and his wife fled the rebel’s base in Congo near Garamba National Park. Makasi turned himself in to MONUC forces in the town of Dungu one week later and was then transferred to Congolese control in Kinshasa. Makasi arrived in Uganda on October 31, where he applied for amnesty and claimed that he escaped due to escalating tensions among the LRA leadership.

Makasi’s defection has been accompanied by rampant speculation about the fate of Vincent Otti, the LRA’s deputy commander and the main link between the elusive Joseph Kony and the current peace process. Otti, who was normally accessible for interviews via satellite phone, became suddenly unreachable in October. According to published yet unconfirmed reports citing Ugandan security sources, Kony and Otti clashed over the direction of the peace process in early October. It was initially reported that Otti and five other commanders were executed by Kony.

It appears that the split was precipitated by Otti’s belief that Kony is not interested in the Juba peace process. Earlier, Otti had to cajole Kony into meeting U.N. Special Envoy Joachim Chissano and former U.N. humanitarian chief Jan Egeland. For his part, Kony felt that Otti and Ojul had turned the peace talks into a business, and that they were buying land and houses in Nairobi, Kenya. Kony has told confidantes that Otti was planning to assassinate him and take over the leadership of the LRA.

U.N. Special Envoy Chissano and the LRA delegation to the peace talks attempted to meet the LRA leadership on October 21, but were snubbed. Kony told Chissano that a meeting was impossible because recent rainfall made rivers in the area impassable and that Otti was unavailable because he had cholera, a claim repeated by the LRA delegation during their consultations. Yet Gulu District Chairman Norbert Mao said on November 7 that he spoke with Kony, who claimed that Otti was being detained and investigated for conspiring against the interests of the LRA. Okot Odhiambo, another ICC-indicted commander, is reportedly the new second in command.

It is too soon to tell what impact these high-level defections and inexplicable disappearances will have on the peace process. In some ways, Otti was an ideal interlocutor for mediators attempting to build confidence among the LRA. Otti was older and, unlike many of the other commanders who were abducted as youth, had some education and experience in the world. He spoke English well—unlike Kony—and could negotiate directly with the mediators. Without Otti, the LRA chain of command and key decision-makers has become less clear.

On the other hand, by losing its top two military commanders below Kony, the LRA would certainly be weakened militarily in the short-term and perhaps be more prone to compromise. In meetings, ENOUGH staff has been told by several people close to the talks that Otti was often the most uncompromising and belligerent of the commanders. Otti had the most to lose from the process, whether it succeeded or failed. Otti directly led some of the most brutal atrocities committed by the LRA, and was considered by many in Northern Uganda as having the most blood on his hands. Kony has attempted to purge LRA commanders who became spokespeople and intermediaries after previous failed peace processes, a pattern that would have spelled trouble for Otti if the current initiative proved unsuccessful. By sidelining Otti, Kony could be attempting to clear the way for a final agreement by removing obstacles and individuals who could testify against him in a local or international trial.

IV. Narrowing Window of Opportunity?

Cracks in the LRA military leadership are not the only source of uncertainty about the peace process. The LRA began pursuing the current peace process because changes in the regional context, most notably the signing of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, reduced the LRA’s room for maneuver. Recent developments in Sudan and Congo are a reminder that these changes may not be permanent.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s decision on October 11 to suspend its participation in the national unity government established by the CPA demonstrated the precarious position the deal is in due to non-implementation by the ruling National Congress Party on a number of key elements of the agreement. Signed on January 9, 2005, the CPA helped in several ways to open a window of opportunity for peace in Northern Uganda. First, the LRA lost its safe haven in Southern Sudan as Khartoum relocated its forces—which had provided protection, supplies, and training to the LRA since 1994—out of Southern Sudan.

Second, the CPA created a third party, the Government of South Sudan, known as GoSS, with a clear, strong interest in ending the conflict in Northern Uganda. The GoSS needs security to implement the CPA, and the brutal, Khartoum-backed LRA is a potent threat to both the GoSS and the CPA. As a result, the GoSS was willing to play the role of peace broker and provide a forum for peace talks. Khartoum will have a strong interest in using the LRA once again as a proxy to destabilize Southern Sudan if the fragile CPA eventually collapses completely, and the GoSS’s focus will shift from mediating peace talks to fending off threats.

As the fleeting window of opportunity closes and the LRA gains more alternatives to peace, the Ugandan government’s patience for lengthy delays will likely erode. Efforts to ensure that the talks don’t go on forever have already intensified in recent months. On October 1, Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa gave a speech to the U.N.’s General Assembly calling on time limits for the peace talks and MONUC’s mandate and resources to be bolstered in case a military strategy against the LRA is necessary. President Museveni has similarly lobbied foreign governments. During a visit to Uganda on September 13, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer said the process should not be “open-ended” and the United States would support military action against the LRA if talks failed, although it is unclear what this means in terms of the level of U.S. involvement.

During a September summit in the Tanzanian city of Arusha, President Museveni and Congolese President Joseph Kabila signed an accord stating the process of dealing with “negative forces” on Congolese soil must be “demonstrably undertaken” within 90 days. The agreement does not commit either party to military action within 90 days, but calls on the Congolese government to “formulate an action plan to neutralize” groups like the LRA by January 2008. Rising tensions in North Kivu between the Congolese government and rebel General Laurent Nkunda, however, make it unlikely that the Congolese government will have the resources or capacity to prioritize dealing with the LRA within the next three months. The United States and others should work to prevent any possible premature cross-border military action by Uganda into Congo if the diplomatic track is still alive and the Congolese government is not fully supportive of such cross-border strikes, which is highly unlikely.

V. Conclusion

The Ugandan government is pushing for a rapid conclusion to the talks, and LRA delegates visiting Uganda said that a final, comprehensive agreement should be finalized by February 2008. The Ugandan government is even more ambitious, and wants a peace agreement signed before Christmas. Combustible situations in Southern Sudan and Eastern Congo, coupled with continued humanitarian suffering in Northern Uganda, make time a luxury this process cannot afford. However, the LRA consultation process is set to sprawl into January, and the rebels’ fondness for foot-dragging makes further delays probable. If a swift conclusion to this long war is possible, it will require opening a formal and concerted negotiating line directly to Kony about his security and livelihood, and those of his senior commanders.

Northern Uganda hovers tentatively between peace and conflict. The Juba peace process lingers uncertainly between agreements on broad principles and final deals on crucial details like accountability, security, and livelihood packages for Kony and other top commanders. Bridging this difficult divide will require focused, effective leadership from the United States in support of the broader international and regional efforts. With its unutilized leverage, the United States could play the key role in preparing a final deal. The question of whether it will apply that leverage and undertake that higher level of diplomatic engagement is purely a question of political will.

ACTIVIST ACTION REQUIRED

Call the White House (1-202-456-1414) and the U.S. Congress (1-202-224-3121), 9:00am–6:00pm EST, Monday through Friday, to tell our leaders that the United States should:

• help strike a deal with Kony to end Africa’s longest war; and
• fully fund DDR efforts to reintegrate ex-LRA back into their home communities.

Sign up in advance for the Uganda Lobby Days in late February through Resolve Uganda at www.ugandalobbyday.com/.

^[1] Until now, there have been numerous efforts to interact with Kony on an ad hoc basis. He has been given satellite phones and airtime, and Internal Affairs Minister Rugunda has gone to the bush to meet with Kony. It is time to upgrade and formalize those efforts into a concerted negotiating channel that lays out real options for Kony, backed by international actors with leverage, like the United States.

^[2] The appointment of Tim Shortley was largely secured due to activist and congressional pressure on the administration. Shortley has hit the ground running and is playing a helpful role in demonstrating U.S. interest in peace in Northern Uganda.

^[3] For more on how to deal with Joseph Kony, see John Prendergast, “What to do about Joseph Kony” (Washington: Enough Project, 2007), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/node/51.