Julia Spiegel

Shooting Blanks at Sudan

President Bush’s announcement today that his administration will begin implementing a set of punitive measures -- its oft-threatened “Plan B” -- against the Sudanese Government could have marked a real turning point in U.S. policy to end what the president calls genocide. Unfortunately, it doesn't.

With international diplomatic efforts to halt atrocities in Darfur at a standstill, the President announced three measures intended to change the calculations of the regime in Khartoum and intransigent rebel leaders. First, the U.S. will add 31 Sudanese companies to a list of 130 that are already denied access to the U.S. financial system. Second, the U.S. will freeze the assets of three of the many individuals responsible for the violence in Darfur. And finally, it will "seek" a resolution at the United Nations Security Council to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and expand an ineffective arms embargo that has been violated with impunity.

Three people? After four years? And not one of them the real ringleader of the policy to divide and destroy Darfur? And once again the U.S. is going alone? This is not leadership. This will not create missing leverage. This will not build multilateral pressure. And this will not end the crisis in Darfur.

What small steps that have been announced are largely due to tireless activism from concerned citizens, persistent efforts by members of Congress from both sides of the aisle pressuring the White House, and the president’s own demands for tougher policy options. However, the current Plan B is too unilateral in nature and much too weak to have an impact on the calculations of either Sudanese officials or intransigent rebel leaders.

Unless the U.S. takes the decision to press hard in the UN Security Council for a meaningful resolution that sanctions the top ringleaders and multilateralizes the sanctions against the companies the U.S. has already sanctioned, there will be no bite to this endless barking. And the U.S. must begin to share significant declassified intelligence with the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the building of indictments against those most responsible for the obstruction and destruction in Darfur.

NOT ENOUGH
Expanded unilateral economic sanctions and freezing the assets of three people will not alter the calculations of the Sudanese officials responsible for ongoing atrocities. The U.S. has been blocking transactions with the Sudanese Government and many Sudanese companies since President Clinton first imposed sanctions in 1997. Consequently, the Khartoum regime has had 10 years to develop its oil-driven economy outside the scope of U.S. sanctions, and therefore further unilateral U.S. moves are economically and politically irrelevant. Acting alone, the U.S. has very little leverage. Oil prices are soaring and Khartoum is booming. And the administration’s intermittent leaks to the press about Plan B squandered what leverage it might have built. Khartoum was alerted and had ample time to prepare for any unilateral U.S. moves.

Why is the U.S. acting alone? With U.S. diplomats scrambling with other serious crises -- Iraq, Iran, and North Korea among others -- the Bush administration has not yet decided to exercise the leadership necessary at the United Nations Security Council to secure the votes for tougher action on Darfur. France, Germany, and the UK are all on record in support of tougher sanctions, yet Plan B is largely a solo effort.

As for targeting the individuals most culpable for atrocities, the current U.S. plan will impose sanctions on two senior government officials and one rebel leader. The more senior regime officials who masterminded crimes against humanity in Darfur can breathe easy. They have yet to pay a cost for those crimes. ENOUGH chronicled who these officials are in an earlier statement, "We Know Their Names."

We at ENOUGH will continue to hammer home the point that Plan B -- punishment -- is the right direction, but what is required now is a Plan B with teeth -- multilateral, escalating, and biting. This would include:

• Multilateralized Sanctions Against Sudanese Companies Supporting the Regime: The U.S. should work with the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against the Sudanese companies already targeted unilaterally by the U.S. Unless the current U.S. list of 161 is made multilateral, these sanctions will be meaningless. A UN Panel of Experts should also be established to further investigate which companies are conducting the business necessary to underwrite Sudan's war machine.
• Pressure on International Banks to Stop Doing Business with Sudan: U.S. officials should engage with a number of international banking institutions to strongly encourage them to stop supporting oil transactions with Sudan, with the implication being that if such business continues, then all transactions conducted by those banks with U.S. commercial entities (and those of other countries willing to work with us) would eventually be banned.
• Reinforcement of Divestment Efforts: President Bush should sign an Executive Order putting into law all of the legally possible elements of existing Congressional bills in support of divestment. The executive should be supportive of efforts across the U.S. to pressure university endowments, municipal and state pension funds, and private mutual funds to sell equity holdings in a targeted list of companies whose business bolsters the operations of the Sudanese regime.
• Support for the ICC Indictment Process: The U.S. should provide information and declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the process of building indictments against senior officials in the regime for their role in orchestrating mass atrocities in Darfur. The U.S. has the most such intelligence and should come to agreement with the ICC about what information to share.
• Accelerated Credible Military Planning: The U.S. also should develop credible plans for decisive military action, not only to enforce a no-fly zone, but to protect civilians with ground forces without consent from Khartoum should all else fails. This military planning is both a practical necessity, and a means to build and utilize leverage against the regime.

WHAT YOU CAN DO
ENOUGH urges activist organizations to issue action alerts urging their members to contact the White House, their Senators, and their members of Congress to press for a Plan B with teeth.

Concerned individuals should also write letters, send emails, set up meetings in home districts, and call 1-800-GENOCIDE to leave a message for President Bush, your Senators and member of Congress to tell them to:

• push for the U.S. to introduce -- and diplomatically invest in -- a UNSC resolution that imposes targeted sanctions on key leaders and on the companies already sanctioned by the U.S.;
• urge President Bush to provide information and declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court; and
• call on President Bush to put credible plans in place for a no-fly zone and non-consensual force deployment to protect civilians if the situation deteriorates in Darfur and the Sudanese regime continues to block the UN-led hybrid force.

No Fly Zone Strategy Paper

As part of its continuing effort to crush Darfur's rebellion by attacking civilian populations purported to be supportive of the rebels, the Sudanese regime has again stepped up its aerial bombing campaign, the most definitive tactical advantage the government possesses. Because the regime continues to bomb indiscriminately and because frustrations deepen around glacial forward movement in the peace process and in deploying the proposed A.U.-U.N. hybrid force, voices from across the political spectrum are clamoring for some kind of action. President George W. Bush, former Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.S. presidential candidates, members of parliament and Congress in Europe and the United States, and advocacy organizations on both sides of the Atlantic have considered or called for the military enforcement of a no-fly zone.

This well-intentioned debate over the merits of militarily enforcing a stand-alone no-fly zone underscores the complexity involved in combining political, economic, and military tools to end the Darfur crisis and shines a light on the equally legitimate but sometimes differing perspectives of humanitarian agencies, advocates, and policy-makers.

What is necessary is to avoid debates that are colored by absolutes. The full range of tools available to the international community must be evaluated according to their effectiveness in halting atrocities, bringing about a lasting peace settlement, and alleviating human suffering pending that resolution.

The best means to influence Khartoum to end its pursuit of a military solution in Darfur (and to fully implement the peace deal it signed with southern Sudan) is through much greater international pressure, principally in the form of U.N. Security Council sanctions and robust diplomacy. The question this paper addresses is what form of pressure would most effectively influence the regime to stop using aerial bombardment as a part of its offensive military operations in Darfur. Ultimately, while the reasons so many advocate military enforcement of a stand-alone no-fly zone are understandable, and while the bombing problem is urgent, we conclude that military enforcement of a stand-alone no-fly zone is not the right approach, for the following reasons:

• The implementation of a no-fly zone would likely trigger the regime to ground all humanitarian aid flights and embolden rebel factions to increase attacks, the latter wrongly believing the
  international community would be intervening to support their war objectives. This could create a severe humanitarian crisis, to which the international community is ill-prepared to respond.

   

• With no credible planning for a no-fly zone having been conducted anywhere, and a lack of political will to implement it, calls in support of a no-fly zone give Sudanese President Omaral-Bashir another propaganda tool to rally support for his regime in the Arab and Muslim worlds, while not bringing nearer genuine measures to suppress Sudanese bombing.

   

• With most attacks taking place on the ground by government-sponsored militia, former rebels under Minni Minawi that have joined the government, and a growing number of rebel factions, a
  no-fly zone would do little to deter the increasingly complex drivers of violence, an anarchic situation that is precisely the outcome Khartoum sought since 2003 with its divide-and-destroy Darfur strategy.

   

• Other non-military policy options that we believe would work in changing the government's calculations and thus improve the situation on the ground have not yet been meaningfully pursued (see ENOUGH Strategy Paper #2, "A Plan B With Teeth for Darfur").

However, the Sudanese bombing problem is a real one that demands a response. There are non-military options that could give traction to the Security Council's authorized but as of yet un-enforced ban on offensive military flights in Darfur: an initiative that would monitor, name, shame, and sanction violations of the ban.

There would be three elements to that initiative. First, observers from the African Union Mission in Sudan or United Nations should be present on all military aircraft and helicopters that fly over Darfur, with any violations to be reported immediately to the Security Council. Second, governments -- such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and others with available technical assets -- should undertake a coordinated intelligence surge to monitor any use of offensive air capacities by the Sudanese government.

Third, naming, shaming, and sanctioning would follow any infraction of the Security Council’s ban on offensive military flights. When a violation occurs, governments collecting the information would share it with the African Union, the Security Council, and the broader public. Naming, shaming, and sanctioning the Sudanese government for yet another violation of yet another resolution will not end the crisis immediately, but it certainly will make it harder for the government to conduct heinous air attacks in the cover of darkness, a strategy they have been exploiting for the last four and a half years.

Debate, Division, or Diversion?
In light of the very real dangers to aid operations that provide sustenance for over 2 million displaced Darfurians, many humanitarian organizations oppose a militarily-enforced no-fly zone. But the difference between advocacy and humanitarian groups on this issue is neither a cause of upheaval nor a sign of ongoing division, as a handful of commentators and reporters have recently asserted. ^[1] It is in fact a healthy debate, with both sides genuinely motivated by a desire to end the suffering of Darfur's people.

This otherwise useful debate has been complicated, however, by public calls for consideration of militarily enforcing a no-fly zone -- by Blair, Bush and some American and European legislators -- but without any
reference to how military planning or diplomacy might be employed to prevent, mitigate, or prepare for the potentially catastrophic consequences should Khartoum retaliate against humanitarian aid operations. We commend those activists, candidates, and policy-makers advocating for a stronger policy response to Khartoum’s destruction and obstruction in Darfur, but calling for military enforcement of a stand-alone no-fly zone is not the best way, as we will detail below. Furthermore, it is clear that, for some, reference to a no-fly zone does not reflect well-considered policy deliberation but is instead -- as Bush said at the G8 Summit in mid-June -- declaratory in nature and intended to send "clearer and stronger messages to President Bashir." Although the sentiment is right, this, too, can have negative repercussions that solidify Khartoum's current intransigence. In any case it is no substitute for a serious analysis of operational feasibility, for planning for both the operation and its potential consequences, and for real mobilization of international engagement to bring a durable end to the Darfur tragedy.

Indeed, these and other pronouncements have proven to be mostly posturing, precisely because no serious practical planning or preparation for enforcing a no-fly zone has been conducted by the militaries of either the United States or United Kingdom, and no legislative requirement from the law-making branches in either country
to draft such plans has been imposed. ^[2] Talking about such action -- as Bush, Blair, and other policy-makers have done -- but then failing to take any action when bombings occur is consistent with the four-year pattern of rhetorical outrage and empty threats that has rendered the international response to the Darfur genocide so shameful and impotent.

Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom, either individually or within an appropriate multinational body, has moved to undertake the serious planning based on rigorous analysis of the feasibility and parameters of a no-fly zone that might provide adequate assurance that the negative impacts would not far outweigh the positive:

• The U.S. government has done nothing more than a back-of-the-envelope assessment of what a no-fly zone would look like, while the U.S. military remains adamantly opposed to the idea, largely
  because of current U.S. commitments elsewhere and the logistical enormity of military enforcement. No working level bilateral discussions on implementation have taken place within the last six months between the United States and United Kingdom, the two governments that have postured most about the enforcement of a no-fly zone.

   

• After strong support by Blair for the concept of a no-fly zone, new U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s administration has muted calls to impose a no-fly zone in light of recent diplomatic efforts to secure the deployment of the hybrid force, and no planning has been done.

   

• No military deliberations or planning have taken place within NATO, the key organization on which the responsibility for implementing a no-fly zone, and responding to negative consequences,
  would likely fall. NATO continues to focus exclusively on the limited airlift and other support for AMIS that it provides at A.U. request, and has stated that it would be willing to consider assistance to the U.N./A.U. hybrid operation if a formal request were submitted. But a no-fly zone is not on NATO’s agenda.

Debating military enforcement of a stand-alone no-fly zone distracts attention from development of other, more effective initiatives to resolve the crisis. Punitive measures that would alter Khartoum's cost-benefit analysis of pursuing its policies in Darfur -- the imposition of meaningful multilateral sanctions through the Security
Council and more proactive state support for the building of further International Criminal Court indictments -- are not being fully exhausted.

In order to evaluate the best way forward in countering Khartoum's bombing of its own people, we will first weigh the pros and cons of militarily-enforcing a no-fly zone over Darfur, and then will describe a better option. We then highlight, for priority policy-maker and advocacy attention, key areas where sustained and forceful
international engagement would more assuredly foster the delivery of security to the people of Darfur and a durable end to the conflict.

The Case For a Militarily-Enforced No-Fly Zone

WHY: Lest we forget, the trigger for the no-fly zone debate is the ongoing bombing of civilian targets and rebel meeting locations by the Sudanese government air force. This is a real problem that demands an international response, thus far lacking. The vast majority of displaced and refugee Darfurians have at some point experienced some form of government aerial assault -- whether high-altitude bombing or helicopter gunship strafing -- that has been an integral part of Khartoum's scorched-earth death and displacement
policy in Darfur. During 2007, government aircraft have also repeatedly disrupted the efforts of A.U. and U.N. envoys to foster coherent rebel participation in the political process by bombing locations where rebel field commanders have been assembled to forge a unified negotiating process. Controlling the skies in wartime is a fair use of a tactical advantage, but when those air assets are used to terrorize civilian targets and soften them up for ground attack, or to obstruct international efforts to advance the internal political dialogue by bombing the sites of rebel unification conferences, it understandably invokes great passion on the part of those seeking to end this conflict and deliver protection and peace for the people of Darfur.

The regime has committed to halt any offensive military flights in various agreements, and the Security Council enshrined this commitment in Resolution 1591. The repeated breach of these agreements should give the international community increased leverage and justification for a more direct and effective response vis-à-vis Khartoum.

WHAT: For the sake of clarity, a no-fly zone may mean either a prohibition on all aircraft or only unauthorized aircraft, such as those used in offensive military operations. The Security Council has already imposed a ban on "offensive military flights" under Resolution 1591 (OP 6) -- a no-fly zone in a very narrow sense of the phrase -- but no significant efforts toward implementation or enforcement have been actively pursued, and there are different views in the international community as to whether Resolution 1591 is legal basis for enforcing a no-fly zone.

WHO: Most advocates assume some form of NATO leadership or participation in a no-fly zone and hope that French airfields and aircraft within proximity could be used.

HOW: When the mechanics of implementation are discussed, they usually revolve around two options, although as previously noted no rigorous analysis of operational feasibility and parameters has taken place. The more robust option would be patrolling the skies with a small number of jets that would have a rapid reaction
capability. Former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak recently argued that a no-fly zone could help to break the "log-jam" in international efforts to provide protection for the people of Darfur using only 12-18 combat aircraft, accompanied by tankers and an Airborne Warning and Control System to provide surveillance and command and control. ^[3]

Others argue for a different approach: when a credible report is filed regarding the bombing of a civilian target, then that plane or helicopter should be destroyed on the tarmac after it has landed. This would not then require ongoing patrolling of Darfur's skies by international aircraft, and presumably would be much simpler to
implement. Roger Winter, quoted in Nick Kristof’s New York Times column of July 16, supports this option and concludes, "No matter how forceful the words we use, we don't act. Or we act in ways that the bad guys in Khartoum find tolerable… It tells them that they can get away with mass murder." ^[4]

The Case Against a Militarily-Enforced No-Fly Zone

First, assuming one could convince highly reluctant France and Chad to agree, carrying out no-fly zone operations from the eastern Chadian airstrip of Abeche (the base most advocates agree would be ideal) could
inflame the simmering proxy war between the governments of Chad and Sudan and likely hinder efforts to improve security and promote peace processes in and between both countries. This aggravation in relations
could provide a pretext for Sudan to increase its sponsorship of cross-border rebel attacks into Chad by its proxies. However, the reality of regular cross-border incursions into Chad from Sudan makes this argument less urgent.

Second, the nature of the conflict has changed since its outbreak in early 2003: while bombing continues to be used by Khartoum as a part of its military strategy, the vast majority of attacks are executed by forces on the ground. Thus a militarily enforced no-fly zone would only weaken a very small piece of Khartoum's killing machine.

Third and most worrisome: assuming these logistical and political challenges were somehow to be overcome, the likely consequences of militarily enforcing a no-fly zone could be dire for the very people it is intended to help. In the eyes of the Sudanese government, a no-fly zone would likely be considered tantamount to an act of war. Humanitarian aid agencies have expressed grave concern that the regime might retaliate by grounding all aid agency flights to and from Darfur and possibly further constraining humanitarian operations. Based on
experience with Khartoum over the years, both in Darfur and earlier in southern Sudan, these fears are well-grounded. Even if the high-end option of a militarily-enforced no-fly zone is implemented, Sudan is still a sovereign country, the regime could ensure all aid convoys and flights would be halted from Khartoum, and the international community would largely be impotent to respond to such a draconian option, which would likely only be implemented by Khartoum in the context of such a perceived act of war.

Only 10 percent of all flights in Darfur are for commercial and Sudanese government purposes. The rest are used by the United Nations and African Union to reach the millions affected by the conflict throughout Darfur. If aid operations were shut down or greatly hindered, either because of flight groundings or increased government or rebel attacks (rebel factions might be emboldened by any military measures to enforce a no-fly zone and might ramp up military operations, including attacks on aid convoys and on locations that would result in localized stoppages of aid deliveries), 2.5 million Darfurians dependent on aid for survival ^[5] would be left to fend for themselves. Furthermore, should the government of Sudan decide to ramp up its ground attacks, vulnerable civilians would be caught in the crossfire (if not targeted directly), with scarce outlets for assistance given Darfur's expansive and arid landscape. ^[6]

There has been no planning by governments for responding to a collapse of humanitarian aid, even in the face of repeated warnings from U.N. and NGO leaders that the operations in Darfur are fragile and susceptible to massive deterioration at any moment due to the deteriorating security environment and ongoing government obstruction. No plans or resources are in place to supplant the crucial international humanitarian lifeline for millions in Darfur should the humanitarian agencies be unable to sustain their activities. So if a militarily-enforced no-fly zone led to an escalation of ground attacks or a collapse of humanitarian aid, the international community would be devastatingly unprepared and likely unwilling to intervene in what could become another 1994 Rwanda (mass killing) or 1984 Ethiopia (denial of aid as a strategy of war) scenario.

In accordance with the U.N.-adopted "responsibility to protect" doctrine, the "balance of consequences" test must be applied. If, as in the case of a militarily-enforced stand-alone no-fly zone, it appears that many more negative than positive effects would result from the non-consensual deployment of external forces, then this intervention option should be shelved until the balance begins to tip the other way.
We agree with Clinton that rigorous official study of the operational feasibility and parameters of an effective no-fly zone, as well as analysis of the potential consequences and ways to address them, should be undertaken immediately. Until the results of such a study are known and assessed to bode positively for ending the conflict in Darfur while protecting the welfare of the vulnerable displaced, we would recommend that advocates and policy-makers shift their focus from the proposal to militarily enforce a no-fly zone to other pressure mechanisms that offer a surer prospect of bringing durable peace to Darfur and its people. In the meantime, non-military measures such as those described below should be pursued robustly to confront the bombing.

A Better Way to Address the Bombing: Monitor, Name, Shame, and Sanction

As stated previously, there are non-military options that could give traction to the Security Council's authorized but un-enforced ban on offensive military flights in Darfur: monitor, name, shame, and sanction. AMIS, the proposed U.N.-A.U. hybrid force, concerned governments and the Security Council could and should do more to
enforce the ban on offensive military flights set out in Resolution 1591, which has been routinely violated without repercussions. According to Resolution 1591, the African Union's Ceasefire Commission can monitor and report to the Security Council about ban compliance, with targeted sanctions to be considered for those authorizing and executing violations.

Governments with advanced military capabilities should undertake a coordinated intelligence operation to monitor violations of the Security Council ban and then share this information with the Security Council, the African Union, and the public. Furthermore, an AMIS or U.N. observer could be present on all military aircraft and helicopters that fly over Darfur, with any violations to be reported immediately to the Security Council. This is theoretically within the African Union’s mandate, stemming from the Darfur Peace Agreement and the November 2004 Abuja agreement -- but it would require a more robust and proactive A.U. interpretation.

The Security Council should then follow up on its repeated -- but, so far, empty -- threats and impose targeted sanctions on those persons most responsible for those violations.

Conclusion
Current posturing by policy-makers in support of a militarily enforced no-fly zone has left the Khartoum regime unaffected and uninfluenced. Regime officials simply use it as fodder for their anti-Western propaganda machine -- and know that no real enforcement is forthcoming because they are well aware of the absence of real planning.

The only way Khartoum will stop bombing civilians, allow the unconditional deployment of the A.U.-U.N. hybrid, and make necessary concessions in a revitalized peace process is if the political calculation in key Security Council countries is changed by citizen pressure advocating for a real response to the human suffering in Darfur.

Instead of being distracted by debates -- in a vacuum of analysis and planning -- over military enforcement of a stand alone no-fly zone (which raises serious concerns that outweigh its benefits, and which no capable state is currently prepared or willing to implement), the focus of both policy-makers and activists now must be on measures with more demonstrable potential to solve the crisis in Darfur:

• Greater leverage and urgency must be brought to bear around a revitalized peace process with a clear end-state and rational division of international labor (see ENOUGH Strategy Briefing #3 "An Axis of Peace for Darfur").

   

• More effective multilateral advocacy and pressure in support of the unconditional deployment of the hybrid force is needed, especially as familiar signs multiply that Khartoum is once again using
  its "cat and mouse" tactics to evade its most recent commitment. (See ENOUGH Strategy Briefing #4 "Peacekeeping for Protection and Peace in Darfur").

   

• If any party remains intransigent on forward movement of either the peace process or the hybrid force deployment, and/or if Khartoum continues to flout Security Council resolution 1591banning offensive military flights, then the Security Council must urgently impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for obstructing peace and protection objectives. At the same time, those governments with information about culpability for crimes against humanity -- such as the United States -- should expand their cooperation with the ICC in order to support the building of indictments against those responsible. These punitive measures (see ENOUGH Strategy Paper #2 "A Plan B With Teeth for Darfur") should be proactively imposed in support of the peace process and the hybrid deployment.

Military enforcement of a stand alone no-fly zone is not a policy panacea for ending the death and destruction in Darfur, and would likely make matters worse. The focus instead must center on increasing pressure on all parties to move forward in the peace process and on the government, in particular, to facilitate the unconditional and rapid deployment of the hybrid force. In that context, much more could be done to implement the Security Council ban on offensive military flights. Those responsible for continuing to destroy Darfur and/or obstruct efforts to reverse the crisis should pay a price through the Security Council. After four and a half years without any cost for the atrocities that have occurred, it is no wonder that regime officials continue to pursue military solutions by any means they deem necessary, including preventing U.N. deployment, undermining a credible peace initiative, and bombing and terrorizing civilians from the sky.

John Prendergast is co-chair of the ENOUGH Project and co-author with Don Cheadle of Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. Julia Spiegel is a policy analyst for ENOUGH.

Darfur Hybrid Force Strategy Paper

Now that the United Nations Security Council has authorized a UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping force for Darfur, problem solved, right?

Not by a long shot. Serious obstacles threaten to derail the rapid deployment of this protection force, called UNAMID[1]. The brutal and deplorable September 29 attack on African Union peacekeepers is a stark reminder of the threats that UNAMID -- an important component of the overall solution -- faces in Darfur[2]. This attack, and the continued fracturing of Darfur's rebel groups, also severely diminishes the prospects for success at peace talks set to begin in Libya later this month. Nonetheless, assertive diplomacy, cooperation and coordination from international donors, and the judicious use of targeted pressures can overcome the obstacles, get the force on the ground, and set the stage for the only thing that can bring an end to Darfur's long nightmare -- a viable peace process.

The UN, in consultation with the AU, is moving quickly to amass and deploy UNAMID's 26,000 military personnel and civilian police, attain sophisticated military hardware, and assemble facilities and infrastructure in the harsh, isolated terrain of Darfur. Yet UNAMID faces immediate impediments:

• Roadblocks thrown up by the Government of Sudan. Taken separately, each one of the roadblocks may seem insignificant. Taken collectively, the words and deeds of the Sudanese government clearly demonstrate a policy of deliberate and stealthy obstruction.
• Insufficient support from the most important donors, such as the United States. As unmistakably demonstrated by the criminal attack against AU peacekeepers, UNAMID is deploying to a war-zone and must have sufficient intelligence-gathering capabilities, mobility, and firepower to defend itself and to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. The great irony is that after all the sound and fury aimed at Darfur from the major donors, it turns out there are plenty of non-donor countries offering troops but not enough equipment and logistical support from countries such as the U.S. and its European allies.
• Uneven UN-AU collaboration. Disagreements over the composition of the force and the unequal capacities of the two organizations have created friction and threaten to delay the deployment of UNAMID, and possibly complicate its subsequent operation.

Having gained Khartoum's consent on the deployment of UNAMID, international attention has shifted back to peace talks between Darfur's many rebel factions and the Sudanese government that are scheduled to begin in Libya on October 27. Concerned nations rightly realized that while peacekeepers can help protect civilians and potentially improve stability in the short-term, only a fair, workable, and inclusive peace agreement can ultimately end the crisis and allow millions of displaced people to return to their homes and rebuild their lives.

The difficulties that are compromising UNAMID's prospects remind us that progress on peacekeeping and on the political process for a durable settlement must occur in parallel, and must both receive continuous international attention. Take the spotlight off either, and Khartoum works in the shadows to undermine previous pressure and sabotage previous progress. That has been the case with UNAMID since the adoption of Resolution 1769. To prevent UNAMID from failing even before it really exists, the international community must accompany the push for a peace agreement with more support for, and closer monitoring of, its deployment, including targeted sanctions against persons or parties intentionally impeding the operation.

1. Khartoum's Roadblocks

As should have been expected, Khartoum is systematically impeding UNAMID's deployment at every turn[3]. To date, regime officials have taken the following actions:

• refused to lease all necessary land to the UN and provide access to scarce water resources, deterring construction of necessary new bases and expansion of those the AU forces are already using;
• denied the UN full and uninhibited use of airports in Darfur and limited night flight access, impeding the rapid deployment of troops and equipment;
• refused permission to the UN to upgrade runways, ensuring that large cargo planes carrying critical heavy equipment are unable to land;
• delayed approval of visa requests by UN personnel; and
• stated ever more insistently that non-African forces are not needed in Darfur.

A full-court diplomatic press is needed to force the Sudanese government remove these obstacles. The Security Council, particularly the five permanent members and the three African members, should
highlight Khartoum's dilatory tactics and set a clear deadline for the Government of Sudan’s acquiescence. If the government fails to meet that deadline, the Security Council should move to mandatory sanctions against the regime officials most responsible.

Movement earlier this year by the U.S. and the United Kingdom to introduce a draft resolution in the Council imposing such targeted sanctions was halted by Khartoum's purported unconditional agreement to the deployment of UN/AU peacekeepers to Darfur, and its promises to facilitate that deployment. However, continued flagrant transgressions by the Government of Sudan, coupled with serious diplomatic pressure, could be enough to compel China, Russia, and others to support (or at least not oppose) a new round of targeted sanctions -- including asset freezes and travel bans -- that would be lifted when all parties to the conflict are demonstrably cooperating fully with the deployment of UNAMID [4].

Diplomacy must be given a reasonable time to succeed, but the international community must also maintain the threat of even further targeted sanctions as leverage to compel the government and the rebels to agree to a ceasefire and participate in peace talks. If that is to be achieved, it is critical that the UN Secretariat assertively record and publicly report to the Council on major violations by any party. Resolution 1769 requires monthly reporting to the Security Council on progress on implementation. Secretary-General Ban must make use of that vehicle to oblige member states to exercise their leverage with the Sudanese government.

2. Donor Letdowns

The UN has had little difficulty in finding countries willing to contribute troops to UNAMID. It has been less successful, however, in obtaining the logistical support and military equipment to deploy a force with the capacity to protect themselves and Darfur's civilians from an array of armed groups spread across nearly 200,000 square miles of challenging, nearly trackless terrain. The United Nations does not have equipment stockpiled for peacekeeping missions -- including the sophisticated hardware needed in such a logistically challenging mission -- and relies on its member states for contributions. Moreover, there is a clear division of labor in these kinds of missions. The countries that contribute troops usually cannot afford to provide equipment, logistics, and money; those contributions come from major donors, such as the U.S., European powers, Japan, and others. However, these donors' track record in Darfur is already abysmal. The inexcusable September 29 attack on the AU demonstrates just how, despite international promises of support, poorly equipped their forces are and highlights the need for immediate equipment contributions to UNAMID.

CALLING ON DONORS TO SUPPORT UNAMID

The head of UN peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, has insistently expressed concern over lack of commitments to UNAMID of high-level engineering units, tactical transport, trucks, and helicopters, as well as difficulties in recruiting the roughly 6,000-strong police force. Guehenno is particularly critical of European countries that have pushed hard for UNAMID but have done little practically to support it[5].

Canadian Senator Roméo Dallaire, who commanded the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda in 1994, recently addressed these donor letdowns in an open letter to General Martin Agwai, UNAMID's force commander. "You should bring great pressure," Dallaire writes, "working with senior UN and AU leadership, to pressure more resource-rich [UN] member states to provide the specialized capacities you need."[6]

As a leading member of the UN Security Council and a vocal supporter of the Hybrid force, the U.S. should bolster the mission now by doing the following:

• Working through NATO to support UNAMID. The current capacity gaps are clear, and NATO should quickly develop a package to help fill them. The new French government's affirmative commitment to ending the Darfur conflict may ease the internal NATO debate on support for UNAMID.
• Pressing other nations to contribute essential hardware to UNAMID. Darfur is an international crisis. The United States and NATO should not be responsible for meeting all of UNAMID's needs. Other countries have the needed capabilities to contribute and they should also do so.
• Providing equipment, provisions, and airlift to UNAMID units. The UN has received commitments from several African nations for roughly 3,000 troops to deploy quickly and help establish security in Darfur while preparations are being made for the deployment of the full UNAMID force. However, most of these troops lack the equipment and resources to deploy in a self-sustaining fashion. The U.S. should work with members of NATO and the EU, as well as other states with advanced military capabilities, to equip, supply, and airlift these forces to Darfur.
• Funding the U.S. share of the UNAMID mission. The sheer size and expense of the UNAMID mission was unforeseen in the President’s Fiscal Year 2008 budget, meaning that the United States is short an estimated $725 million for its share of UNAMID for the fiscal year starting on October 1. The Administration and Congress must work together urgently to remedy this critical funding gap.

3. Hybrid Hiccups

The African Union's continued equivocation over the deployment of non-African forces to Darfur and cooperation gaps between the AU and UN threaten to severely impede full deployment of UNAMID. The Security Council has agreed that UNAMID will have an "African character," but AU Commission Chairman Alpha Oumar Konare has since insisted on an all-African force, going so far as to reject units from Uruguay, Thailand, and Norway, all of which have significant peacekeeping experience and capacity.

Chairman Konare's resistance has undermined the cooperation needed between the UN and the AU to establish UN command and control of peacekeepers in Darfur by the end of 2007. His position is also troubling given that he first enunciated it in Khartoum after meeting with President Omer al-Bashir in August, and is being ever more sharply matched by Sudanese government statements also rejecting non-African peacekeepers.

Many African countries have served admirably in UN peacekeeping missions, past and present, and several African countries, including Nigeria, Rwanda, and Ethiopia have volunteered forces for UNAMID. However, the appalling attack on September 29 demonstrates the fundamental limitations of an all-African force in an environment like Darfur. African forces often lack basic equipment and requisite training for peacekeeping operations and, equally important, the logistical capacity to deploy quickly to remote regions. By contrast, traditional UN troop contributors such as India, Pakistan, and Malaysia can more quickly deploy large numbers of trained and equipped troops.

At the planning and operations levels, the resources at the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations dwarf and threaten to overwhelm the AU secretariat's nascent peacekeeping unit. The Security Council, in particular the five permanent members and the three African members, should work assiduously behind the scenes to cement agreement from Chairman Konare on the participation of non-African forces and affirmation of the UN's command and control role. Left to fester, these critical issues could undermine the mission's effectiveness down the road.

4. A Sense of Urgency Needed

As if we needed any reminders, the recent violent escalation in Darfur and the direct full-scale assault on AU peacekeepers demonstrate the urgent need for a robust UNAMID. Shortly after President al-Bashir agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities during a meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, aerial bombings and attacks resumed. In the last month alone, a surge of rebel attacks and clashes with government militia have been reported in Hashkanita, North Darfur, Adilla, South Darfur, and Wad Banda in Kordofan.

Humanitarian workers also continue to come under attack -- gunmen recently shot and critically wounded three workers from the American NGO World Vision -- and access to vulnerable populations is decreasing. Even in some displaced persons camps, malnutrition rates have reached 30 percent -- twice the emergency threshold. The world's largest humanitarian response -- upon which more than 4 million Darfurians now depend -- is under serious threat.

A swift and fully supported deployment is critical to providing protection for vulnerable civilians, bolstering the peace process and showing Khartoum that it cannot give the international community the run around -- yet again with impunity. With the Security Council's deadline for the UN to assume command and control of peacekeeping operations in Darfur on December 31, international attention must focus now on securing land, water, and Khartoum's full commitment to the speedy deployment of the force. Darfur's civilians have waited far too long for adequate protection. Further delays will only deepen their frustration and leave them unprotected at a time when the threats are multiplying at the local level in Darfur.

Delays and internal squabbles fit perfectly into the plans of the Sudanese regime -- the architect of a genocidal counter -- insurgency strategy which in part aims at dividing and destroying the communities that might support the rebels in Darfur. If the U.N. force is not deployed quickly and a peace deal is not reached as soon as possible, those responsible in Khartoum may succeed with impunity. And the failure to muster an adequate response will fall on the shoulders of the international community and key member states that could and should have done more. Resources are critical to success, but the missing link remains shoring up the requisite political will and long-term dedication to afford Darfurians a real chance at building a lasting peace.

[1]
See also Gayle Smith, "Peacekeeping for Protection and Peace in Darfur: Requirements for the Success of the U.N./A.U. Hybrid Mission," ENOUGH Strategy Briefing #4, June 27, 2007.

[2]At the time of this writing, there was no confirmation about which group
(or groups) was responsible for the September 29 attack on the AU group site at Haskanita.

[3]
ENOUGH interviews with UN and U.S. government sources. September 2007.

[4]
The Council has already imposed sanctions on four individuals, and it can designate additional targets on the basis of reports by its Panel of Experts, as well as information from eminent persons, experts, and member-states. The Panel of Experts' reports identify individuals and companies responsible for committing human rights violations, breaking the Darfur arms embargo, violating the Security Council's ban on offensive military overflights, or impeding the peace process.

[5]
"UN peacekeeping chief tells French daily European support lacking for Darfur mission," Associated Press, September 19, 2007.

[6]
Romeo Dallaire, "A daunting mandate," The Guardian, September 17, 2007.

Don't Quit Now: Bringing the Darfur Genocide to an End

Reading the headlines and watching the news about Sudan can certainly be discouraging. The litany of gloom and doom is well documented. The U.N.-authorized protection force for Darfur is being held up. ^[1] Peace talks for that region are having difficulty getting off the ground. The peace deal in Southern Sudan is in trouble. ^[2] And President Bashir presides gleefully over all this bad news, defying the international community and carrying out policies that—if unchecked—will lead to further war throughout the country.

What the media doesn’t tell you is that significant progress has been made in finally getting the policies right toward Sudan, mostly because of pressure from activists and the U.S. Congress. And if these policies are pursued with additional vigor, we have a real chance at ending the continuing cycles of violence in Sudan. This is the time to step up efforts to end the genocide in Darfur and consolidate the peace in Southern Sudan. We need to turn up the heat, demand real action from our policymakers, and forge links between those active on Darfur and those who worked for peace in Southern Sudan before that war ended in 2005.

Let’s remember that for social and political movements throughout history—be it the civil rights movement in the United States, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, or worldwide efforts to end colonialism and slavery in Africa and elsewhere—gains were rarely instantaneous or immediately tangible. But with time and momentum, they achieved what most people during those eras believed to be unachievable.

Over the last four years, what started as a few students, a few religious leaders, and a few members of Congress has grown into a broad-based nationwide campaign on Darfur.^[3] People from across political, religious, cultural and ethnic divides have joined forces in an effort to end the crises in Sudan, and to prevent future crises in the region from unfolding. With every passing day, this campaign has grown larger, stronger and smarter.

This represents the first popular movement against a real-time genocide since the term “genocide” was coined over half a century ago. This is an extraordinary accomplishment in and of itself. Most participants in this movement have never been to Darfur. Most have never met a person from Darfur. And yet they write letters, come to demonstrations, and become what Pulitzer Prize-winning author Samantha Power calls “upstanders” in the face of the most horrific crimes against humanity.

The point is simple and clear: Activism matters. This movement has become a formidable force for change, and its accomplishments so far include helping to press for serious peace negotiations, protection for innocent civilians, and accountability for those most responsible for crimes against humanity. To put the daunting news out of Darfur in context, we thought it would be helpful to take stock of all this burgeoning movement has accomplished so far.

Wars and genocide do not end overnight. In most cases, an end requires that the key international actors start working together and get the policies right.^[4] After four and a half years of death and destruction in Darfur, for a variety of reasons and motives, the international community has finally begun cooperating and moving in the right direction.

The evidence is everywhere, but you don’t read it in the headlines or see it on the nightly news. But if you look closer, you can see that the international picture is shifting considerably regarding Sudan, and it is because of activist pressure.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO END THE CRISIS

Look first at China. The global campaign to tie the Chinese government and its multi-billion dollar investments in the Sudanese oil sector to the atrocities in Darfur is biting hard in Beijing. Just recently, Dream for Darfur—a leading activist group bringing pressure to bear on China—issued a report grading Olympic sponsors on their response to Sudan. This public grading, as well as other activist and celebrity pressures on the Chinese government in relation to the upcoming Olympic Games, ^[5] has led the Beijing government to begin to play a much more active behind-the-scenes role in encouraging progress in Darfur. For example, China’s quiet pressure on the Khartoum regime led the latter to accept the U.N.-authorized hybrid force, but China has not sustained that pressure and as a result the Sudanese government has not allowed the force to deploy. More pressure on China is needed to ensure that it is judged by the results in Darfur, not by its new attitude.

Look at France and Great Britain. President Sarkozy responded to citizen pressure in France and pledged to work to bring the Darfur crisis to an end. He and Prime Minister Brown of the U.K. have pledged to go to Darfur together to support the peace process, and both have said that they will consider sanctioning those undermining peace and protection in Darfur. This is a huge step forward, but there needs to be more pressure in London and Paris—in the form of rallies, demonstrations, and letter-writing campaigns—to ensure that these two leaders live up to these promises of accountability.

Finally, look at the United States itself. President Bush finally decided earlier this year, over four years after the genocide began, to begin to ratchet up pressure on the government he accused of committing the genocide. But unfortunately the pressures were all unilateral in nature. Now is the time for the United States to lead in the U.N. Security Council to make those pressures multilateral by leading the Council to impose targeted sanctions against anyone obstructing the deployment of the force. (See the activist action at the end of this briefing for what you can do).

China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States represent a potent quartet whose potential for bringing leverage and ingenuity to the cause of peace in Sudan is unlimited, and as yet not fully realized. This is progress that we must capitalize on as activists.

GETTING THE POLICIES RIGHT: ACTIVIST SUCCESS STORIES

Activists are responsible for helping to change or influence a number of the key policies that are critical prerequisites for ending the crisis in Sudan. Progress is being registered across the 3 Ps of crisis response: peace, protection, and punishment. These are the three ingredients for bringing peace to Sudan.

Peace

• Activists and their allies in the U.S. Congress succeeded in having a Special Envoy named to address the crisis. We need to push harder to make sure the administration has a full-time envoy backed by a team of diplomats working full-time in the region. Two deputies should focus on and closely coordinate between Darfur and Southern Sudan, respectively.
• Activists have kept up the drumbeat of support for a credible peace process. After a false start in early November, the mediators are making adjustments and assessing options for a more effective approach. (See “A Strategy for Success in Sirte” at www.enoughproject.org)
• Earlier this year, China appointed an experienced diplomat in Africa, Liu Giujin, as its special envoy to Darfur, despite its general distaste for envoys of this kind. This was due directly to global activist pressure. Since assuming his post in May, Liu has visited Darfur several times and traveled to Libya for the peace talks.
• In a related move, activists and their congressional allies also pressured the administration to name an envoy to deal with the conflict in Northern Uganda (see “What to do about Joseph Kony,” at www.enoughproject.org), which has done much damage in, and has close links to, Sudan.
• Activists are beginning to develop important links between the Darfur movement and the constituencies that helped to focus U.S. government attention on Southern Sudan. This will provide the impetus for an even more politically potent push to deal with Sudan as a whole and end the cycles of violence that have plagued that country since independence.

Protection

• For the first time in four and a half years, the United Nations Security Council— in a unanimous, 15-0 vote—authorized the deployment of a United Nations/African Union hybrid force to Darfur, and the Sudanese regime accepted the force. This was an extraordinary accomplishment, brought about partially as a result of the global activist efforts that are multiplying in countries throughout the world, including the 35 countries that held “Global Day for Darfur” rallies in the spring of 2007. Now an even harder task is at hand: getting that force deployed and protecting Darfur’s vulnerable people. We need to finish the job.

Punishment

• Activist pressure resulted in the United States stepping aside and allowing the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution referring Darfur to the International Criminal Court. This resolution gave the ICC authority to investigate and prosecute those most responsible for human rights violations committed in Darfur. Activists reminded the administration that it would want to avoid a headline reading, “U.S. vetoes justice for genocide in Darfur.”
• In response to intense congressional and activist pressure, the Bush administration finally expanded sanctions on transactions involving the Sudanese oil sector earlier this year, signaling that the period of “all bark and no bite” was over for U.S. policy toward Darfur. Those sanctions must become multilateral through the U.N. Security Council to have maximum meaning, but the U.S. action is a start. These expanded sanctions were announced shortly after Darfur activists in the United States participated in over 450 “Global Days for Darfur” events in 47 states calling for action to stop the genocide.
• Activists have launched the most effective divestment campaign since the anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s and early 1990s targeted South Africa. The efforts have targeted endowments, public pensions, and mutual funds. The effect of such an initiative is political as much as economic, as it casts Sudan and the companies that support it as pariahs that must change their behavior or be denied international investment capital.

• Twenty-two U.S. states have divested so far, a collection of both red and blue states, as well as big and small ones. Ten cities have also divested.
• Due to activist pressure, the U.S. Congress is nearing passage of the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, a vehicle for getting foreign companies operating in Sudan to suspend or change their Sudan business operations or lose their contracts with the U.S. government.
• Fifty-eight universities have divested, and 47 more have active ongoing campaigns aimed at cleaning their endowments of stocks underwriting genocidal policies.
  

  • Eight countries have initiated targeted Sudan divestment campaigns (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, and Germany).
  • Fidelity, a massive mutual fund company, has sold more than 90 percent of its holdings in PetroChina in response to a major activist campaign. Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway followed suit after being targeted at his shareholder meeting, selling 100 percent of his PetroChina holdings.

   

 

An example of success—La Mancha Resources

“La Mancha Resources, a Canadian mining company, and the primary foreign player in Sudan's mineral extraction industry, recently took extraordinary steps in response to the situation in Darfur, even though all of its operations take place on the other side of the country. After weeks of engagement with the Sudan Divestment Task Force, the company publicly committed to refraining from new investment in the country until a peacekeeping force consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1769 has been deployed in Darfur with the full compliance and cooperation of the Sudanese government. Additionally, the company's President recently met with Sudan's Minister of Energy & Mining, Dr. Awad Ahmed al Jaz, to discuss the situation in Darfur and to encourage the Government to fully comply with the implementation of UNSCR 1769.”

-- Adam Sterling, Sudan Divestment Task Force ^[6]

DON’T GIVE UP NOW!

Change takes time. Ten years ago, most experts saw no end in sight for the horrific wars plaguing Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Burundi. Today those countries are at peace, growing economically, and healing the scars of the past. With a little help, Sudan can also join the ranks of the many post-conflict countries in Africa and around the world. Activists, legislators, journalists, and policymakers can play a major role in accelerating that transition to peace in Sudan. They’ve already made a huge difference in raising awareness and fostering policy change.

It is our choice what we do with our time, where we place our priorities. Even as we grow frustrated with the struggle for peace in Sudan, it is crucial to realize that things often get worse just before they get better in most conflict zones throughout history. We must continue our important work and recruit more members into the first anti-genocide movement in history organized against an ongoing genocide. We have a chance to help bring this crime against humanity to an end.

On our watch.

IMMEDIATE ACTION NEEDED

The world united around the U.N. Security Council’s unanimous authorization of the hybrid protection force just a few months ago. Now, however, the Khartoum regime is obstructing the deployment of that force. The United States should lead the U.N. Security Council in imposing targeted sanctions against senior Sudanese officials most responsible for obstructing the deployment of the force.

Call the White House through the Genocide Intervention Network’s hotline: 1-800-GENOCIDE and urge the administration to lead the United Nations in imposing targeted sanctions.

 

• 
  Demand that the United States push for U.N. Security Council targeted sanctions against senior Khartoum regime officials by calling your senators and representatives, at 1-202-224-3121.
• 
  Ask the presidential candidates to support these sanctions now and speak out about them on the campaign trail.

^[1] For the most exhaustive commentaries on the current state of play, see Eric Reeves’ columns at www.sudanreeves.org.

^[2]
Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “An All Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South” (Washington: ENOUGH Project, 2007).

^[3]
It was less than four years ago that the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the American Jewish World Service convened a meeting which led to the founding of the Save Darfur Coalition, a broad-based coalition dedicated to ending the genocide that now has over 180 member organizations and a constituency of 1.3 million citizens willing to take action.

^[4]
See John Prendergast, “Africa’s Sudden Splash of Good News,” Washington Post, September 23, 2007.

^[5]
Mia Farrow’s advocacy has been particularly effective on this issue.

^[6]
Adam Sterling, Sudan Divestment Task Force, Senate Banking Committee hearing testimony, October 3, 2007.

A New Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda Strategy Paper

Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony’s failure to sign a peace deal in April drove a nail into the coffin of the Juba peace process—a process that is grinding to an unsuccessful end.^[1] The talks have certainly contributed to northern Uganda’s current state of relative peace and created a mechanism to address tensions between the people in the North and the southern-dominated government in Kampala. But without real leverage and without a direct channel of negotiations to Kony himself, the LRA leader has exploited this last year of negotiations to stave off international pressure, collect food and money from the mediators and donors, and buy time to abduct, train, and equip new combatants. Another meeting with the LRA high command and the mediators set for May 10 looks like it will just be more of the same.

Over the past two years, Kony has successfully morphed from a rebel/predator in northern Uganda into a genuine regional warlord, with small but deadly units marauding throughout eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The LRA abducted between 300 and 500 people in the region during the three-month lead up to the dramatic non-conclusion of the peace process.^[2] These actions warrant investigation by the International Criminal Court and strong international censure. The LRA also established a new safe haven in southeastern Central African Republic (where it is abducting new recruits), complementing its established sanctuary in the Garamba National Park in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

The failure to reach a final deal with Kony last month sheds light on the critical issue that has plagued the Juba peace process from the outset. Negotiating a deal with the LRA diaspora delegation that purportedly represented Kony’s interests in the talks does not translate into a deal with Kony; his core interest in his personal security and livelihood is unrelated to the laundry list of grievances and negotiating positions of the diaspora delegation that negotiated.

With hopes of a peace agreement dashed by Kony’s intransigence, it is time for a new approach. While the Juba peace process did have certain benefits, it no longer makes sense for the mediators to attempt to appease an LRA that is intent upon spreading its terror across the region, and no longer worth delaying justice for the 1.5 million Ugandans who remain in the displaced persons camps created out of Kony’s horrors in northern Uganda. Some religious and cultural leaders from the North continue to reach out to Kony in the hopes of re-energizing the peace process. While their efforts are commendable, it has become clear that Kony is not interested in signing this agreement.^[3] Talks therefore must come to a close.

What is needed now is a two-track strategy that will both enable northern Uganda to consolidate its relative peace, and will address the regional threat that Kony now poses.

Track 1: Assist the people of the North with rebuilding their lives: In contrast to the remote chance of a deal with Kony, a huge opportunity exists in northern Uganda to facilitate the return of the long-suffering displaced people to their homes. While Kony and the LRA remain a looming regional threat, a serious attack in the North in the short term is unlikely. It is thus critical to use this time to promote reconstruction and development while providing maximal protection with Ugandan police and military forces so that civilians who choose to return home are not at undue risk. The Acholi communities—those in the North most affected by this war—should no longer be held hostage by the fits and starts in Juba. ^[4]

Track 2: Deal with Kony as a regional threat: The international community must demonstrate to Kony once and for all that his days of impunity are over. International leverage must be forged through the development of a credible regional military strategy to apprehend Kony and the other two LRA commanders indicted by the ICC.^[5] Military planning should be accompanied by efforts to reduce external support for the LRA from the Sudanese government and from small, radicalized elements of the Ugandan diaspora who want to undermine Ugandan President Museveni’s rule. Specifically, the United States and the United Kingdom should sponsor a resolution through the United Nations Security Council to investigate diaspora members undermining peace efforts, and then provide information to the council to expedite further action by the Council. A list of spoilers should be made public and the Security Council should impose targeted sanctions against these individuals.

Fundamental to the success of this strategy is also a focused effort to induce more defections by LRA commanders in order to isolate Kony and erode the LRA’s core capacities. This, in turn, requires an effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy and attendant funding. Once backed into a corner by the weight of the ICC indictments and a real threat of apprehension, Kony should be offered a take-it-or-leave-it third country exile option.^[6] The idea of Kony having the luxury of exile is repugnant, but given the speed with which he and his forces are infecting the region, the immediate imperative is to remove him from the scene.

By addressing the grievances in the North that gave rise to the LRA in the first place and by directly dealing with Kony with both carrot and stick, the international community could seize the chance to end the LRA menace once and for all.

The Signing Mishap

After repeated delays called for by the LRA delegation to the Juba talks, the LRA and the Uganda government agreed that a final peace deal would be signed by Kony in Ri-Kwangba, a ghost town in southern Sudan near the Congo border on April 10. Within days, tents, latrines, and food had been flown into the remote bush area in preparation for a dignified peace ceremony. More than a hundred members of civil society, journalists, religious, and cultural leaders from the North, the LRA and Ugandan government delegations, and international observers were flown to the site to attend what would have been the momentous end to a 22-year long war. But Kony never showed.

What went wrong?

Kony's lack of seriousness: Since December of last year, communication with Kony has been erratic, primarily because of his self-isolation, the mobility of the LRA, and his general mistrust of the other parties involved in the peace process. Kony refused to speak to key leaders trying to broker peace, including chief mediator and Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riek Machar and UN envoy Joaquim Chissano. That he was essentially incommunicado made it impossible for mediators to determine the rebel leader's position on a host of issues, the most important of which were his security and livelihood concerns. It also created serious disconnects between the LRA in the bush and its diaspora delegation in Juba, and between the LRA, Machar, and other invested parties. Furthermore, Kony's movement to and establishment of a base in the Central African Republic, the numerous raids and abductions conducted by the LRA in southern Sudan during the negotiations, and his decision to execute his second-in-command Vincent Otti all indicated that Kony was less than serious about peace.

The LRA’s internal divisions: Both the LRA delegation in Juba and main command in the bush are plagued by significant infighting that has undermined the peace process. LRA delegations to the peace talks have been hamstrung by suspicion and corruption. And within the LRA camp in the bush, a division between Kony and Otti loyalists persisted throughout the last round of negotiations and persists today. Meanwhile, recent reports indicate that internal battles in February and April have left several LRA combatants dead, although rumors that one of Kony's key commanders, Okot Odhiambo, was killed in these disputes have proven false.^[7] This divide could trigger a large number of defections, particularly in eastern Congo where MONUC is well placed to facilitate an exit strategy for those wanting to leave the bush.

The international community had no stick: Over the last 22 months or so, the LRA has incurred no costs, nor seen any meaningful pressure developed by the international community for repeated delays and significant violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement. Absent any repercussions, the LRA—and Kony specifically—felt little incentive to follow through on its commitments. Kony’s failure to show up at the signing ceremony was only the latest in a long series of breaches by a deadly militia that has terrorized civilians across three countries and spurned the international community without any fear of repercussions.

The mediation—Kony disconnect: The mediation also suffered from a critical flaw because the mediators had no direct channel to Kony. Instead, they relied on third parties and a diaspora delegation that was a step removed from the LRA in the bush. The absence of a direct channel not only meant that the mediators could not access and therefore more effectively persuade, cajole, and pressure Kony, but also that they were at the mercy of second- and third-hand accounts of his positions—accounts that, according to numerous international officials engaged in the talks, were often exaggerated. At the very least, the mediators have brought the talks to their conclusion. Thus the delivery to the LRA of money, medicine, cell phone minutes, and, most critically, time can now come to an end.

From Ugandan Rebel to Regional Warlord

The LRA will continue to terrorize the region until Kony comes out of the bush of his own volition, by force of arrest, or military defeat. With a new and largely impenetrable base in the Central African Republic, Kony and his forces pose an immediate threat to neighboring southern Sudan, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and southeastern Central African Republic. Northern Uganda is the most difficult of Kony’s potential targets; it is far from his current operational base and better defended than other targets in the sub-region. It could, therefore, be spared from any attacks in the short term. However, civilians in neighboring countries are vulnerable, and if the LRA is not neutralized well in advance of the 2009 elections in Sudan, there is a real danger that the Sudanese government will, as it has done in the past, use the LRA as a proxy force to destabilize parts of southern Sudan in the run-up to the polls.

Urgent and Immediate Priorities

Two critical problems must be addressed now to salvage peace efforts in northern Uganda. First, the current peace effort lacks a channel to negotiate directly with Kony on the make-or-break issue of this deal: his security. On the remote chance that he will ever come out of the bush of his own accord, it will be conditioned on a credible guarantee that he will not be killed. Second, the peace process lacks leverage, which only the combination of the ICC indictments, a credible regional military threat, and a diminution of external support to the LRA, can provide.

There are now two main tracks that must be pursued simultaneously to secure peace in Uganda and the region: The first is to consolidate the fragile peace that does exist and enable the people of the North to return home and rebuild their communities, and the second is to address Kony and the regional threat he poses.

Track 1: Assist the people of the North with rebuilding their lives

ACTION ONE: The Ugandan government, backed by international donors, must rapidly begin implementing its reconstruction and development plan for the North.

Given the relatively low risk of renewed LRA attacks in the North, the people there should not be held hostage by Joseph Kony’s refusal to sign a peace agreement. Moreover, the people in the Acholi sub-region of the North need to see evidence of a real commitment from the government of Uganda and international donors to build on the improvements in security that have been achieved in the past year so that they can begin the long process of rebuilding their lives—even before a final peace deal is signed.

Last October, the government of Uganda launched a three-year, $600 million Peace, Reconstruction and Development Plan for the North, but due to funding, bureaucratic, and political obstacles, implementation has yet to begin. Getting development and reconstruction projects started is a critical step toward restoring the confidence of the people in the North and encouraging people to return home.

Immediate needs are immense. Take, for example, the district of Pader. An estimated 189,117 of those displaced—roughly half of the district’s population—have already moved to more than 130 transit sites as an intermediary step, and another 39,196 people have moved home.^[8] These people need clean water, education and health facilities, access to roads, food security, and employment, as well as support for the reconciliation and psychosocial programs. According to a United Nations humanitarian situation report in February, the current pupil-to-classroom ratio is 1-to-80, compared to the national average of 1-to-54. Classes in 63 schools take place under trees due to a lack of classroom facilities.^[9] Robust engagement by international donors, including the United States, could help to kick-start the government’s plan.

It is critical that the Ugandan government work to restore its relationship with those living in the North in order to tackle one of the root causes of this longstanding conflict. While the LRA is partially responsible for the displacement of nearly two million people in the North, the Ugandan government holds the majority of blame for herding people into camps, a move they undertook because of their inability to provide sufficient protection to them in their home villages. The government thus bears responsibility to help them return home. Development and reconstruction efforts must also be accompanied by the pursuit of accountability and promotion of reconciliation. Because no specific mechanism for dealing with Ugandan military atrocities is proposed out in the Final Peace Agreement, these crimes will need to be addressed by other means, whether through traditional truth-telling and/or transitional justice mechanisms, in order for peace to take hold. As stated by Uganda analyst Adam O’Brien, “If meaningful implementation does not begin soon, the PRDP will join the large graveyard of previous initiatives that aimed to help develop and reconstruct the North, and Acholi distrust of Museveni will be reinforced.”^[10]

ACTION TWO: Ugandan security forces must provide protection in the North.

While the LRA is unable to mount the number or style of attacks today that it launched in the past, small LRA remnants could still attack Ugandan civilians from across the Sudan border. Thus northern Ugandans have ample reasons to fear returning home and will need to see some measure of government protection in order to return to their home areas with confidence. As well, there is a need to protect returnees from a few small “sleeper cells” of LRA elements in the North and the few combatants that remain in areas not far from the border between southern Sudan and Uganda.

Ugandan security forces—both the army and the police—must deploy in ways that maximize the protection of potentially vulnerable areas in order to provide a deterrent to LRA attacks and a psychological comfort to returning Acholi civilians who have been traumatized by more than two decades of violence. Historically, the Ugandan military has not had clean hands either; as one Acholi leader told ENOUGH: "Our people have two enemies—the LRA and the Ugandan government—and no friends," largely because of abuses committed by the government’s military in the North over the years. Overcoming this prevalent attitude is a huge barrier to lasting peace, and a failure to do so quickly could spawn yet another insurgency.^[11]

Track 2: Deal with Kony as a regional threat

The push-and-pull strategy that has been missing from the peace process thus far now must be applied.

The Push: Plan for military action and cut lines of support

ACTION ONE: The international community—regional states, U.N. missions, and key donors—must prepare to implement a regional military strategy.

It is time to send the signal that if Kony will not come in from the cold, then the international community will come after him. Drawing on their combined influence and distinct capabilities, the peacekeeping missions in the region^[12] and the governments of Uganda, southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, as well as other interested countries, should commence planning for operations to contain and ultimately apprehend Kony and other LRA leaders indicted by the ICC.^[13]

This is not only a matter of international justice and the rule of law; if Kony and his LRA remnants are allowed to roam free, they can and will destabilize the region and rebuild their forces. All of the regional stakeholders, and their international partners, should collectively craft and be prepared to implement a military strategy to apprehend Kony and disband the rest of the LRA. This should be done under the auspices of the African Union or the Great Lakes contact group, but it will need the backing of strong international players with leverage and influence over the key regional actors.

Some rightly fear the serious risks that go hand-in-hand with military action. But the LRA cannot be allowed to burrow into the vacuum of southeastern CAR, where there is little government presence, even less international support, and thus few actors able to stop the LRA from resurrecting their supply lines to Khartoum. The potential cost of allowing the LRA to build its forces in the region unchecked would be disastrous for civilians in Uganda and its neighbors. The LRA push into the Central African Republic could also potentially pull French forces—based in Central African Republic and supporting its fragile government—and European Union peacekeepers into direct confrontation with the LRA. These concerns highlight the importance of both constructing a well-coordinated and well-planned regional military plan.

The United States, United Kingdom, and France should work quietly with African countries in the region to develop a special forces capability focused on apprehending the remaining ICC suspects, starting with Joseph Kony. This could either be embedded in existing UN missions in the region or parallel to it. The three peacekeeping missions in the LRA’s orbit—MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMIS in southern Sudan, and EUFOR ^[14] in the Central African Republic—should create a joint-intelligence cell now that can report to the group of actors that are planning. Other countries with strong intelligence capabilities should also be involved to coordinate communication and the formation of strategies.^[15]

ACTION TWO: The international community must sever support to the LRA by a small number of individuals in the Ugandan Diaspora.

LRA supporters in the diaspora who are bitterly opposed to this process will do everything they can to ensure there is no deal. These individuals are few in number but staunchly opposed to the Museveni regime— largely due to over two decades of marginalization of the North—and eager to see a continuation of this war. They are thus likely to support LRA fragments or, in the unlikely event that Kony accepts a deal that does not satisfy either their political demands, a new rebel group.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and other government with intelligence capabilities in the region should work to name, shame, and sanction those diaspora members who are providing support to the LRA. All efforts should be made to try to move these sanctions through the U.N. Security Council as well. A U.N. panel of experts should also be appointed to investigate LRA sources of supply. At the very least, this will put Kony, Khartoum, and diaspora spoilers on notice.

ACTION THREE: Working in conjunction with their respective host country governments, international peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan, and Central African Republic—MONUC, UNMIS, and EUFOR respectively—must deploy forces to the areas where the LRA is likely to attack.

While Uganda is experiencing relative peace, civilians throughout the broader region are at risk and have increasingly fallen victim to LRA attacks. In southeastern Central African Republic, people have already asked the government to arm them, but the government has refused.^[16] Civilians in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are also extremely vulnerable. As one international official said to ENOUGH, “If the people resist, as they did in Uganda, you can be sure the LRA will massacre them just as they did in Uganda.”^[17] And if increasing numbers of civilians resist, the numbers of casualties will grow. It is thus critical that efforts are made now to ensure the protection of civilians from this emerging and increasingly dangerous regional threat.

The Pull: Force Kony to make a choice

ACTION: Backed by the dual leverage of a military planning process and continuing investigations by the ICC, the United States and other key actors should quietly construct a channel to Kony that creates an exile option for him and the other indictees to an ICC non-signatory country.

Kony has been able to gain time, money, and medicine out of these peace efforts without making any real commitments. Now he must be forced to make a choice by a certain deadline—determined by the government of Uganda and backed by the international community—so this deliberation process does not last indefinitely. This strategy requires an effective communication channel to be made between the government, the international community, and Kony himself, with a credible proposal that deals with Kony’s personal security and livelihood concerns.

A concerted effort must be made by the Ugandan government and key international players to press Kony to make a choice about his future. Kony has three choices. First, he can sign the peace deal and begin assembling his LRA forces in Ri-Kwangba. Second, he can agree to a third-country asylum arrangement representing exile or banishment from northern Uganda as a consequence for his crimes, thus removing himself from the battlefield and giving peace a real chance. Or third, he can walk away from the agreement and formalize his status as a regional warlord, which will almost certainly trigger a manhunt that could leave him on the run for the rest of his life.

The Ugandan government has voiced an interest in working with religious and cultural leaders to create a direct channel of communication with the rebel leader. Based on the failed peace signing attempt, it has become clear that the "if we build it, he will come" model will not work.

Conclusion

To bring an end to the LRA threat in northern Uganda and the surrounding region, the peace strategy must shift from one that relies solely on negotiations to one that develops leverage through military planning, presses Kony to make a choice about his future, and pushes forward a development and security strategy for northern Ugandans to return voluntarily, even in the absence of a peace deal. Otherwise, absent a concerted effort to address the regional threat that Kony now poses, no civilian within a four-country radius can rest assured that they will not fall victim to the next LRA attack.

Paul Harera Sebikali conducted research for this report.

Endnotes

^[1] There were haunting similarities between the last phase of the Juba peace process and the international effort to broker peace in Darfur, the latest iteration of which was an elaborate meeting prepared in Libya which numerous external governments and institutions attended but the rebels boycotted. Both are examples of diplomatic strategies that misdiagnose rebel intentions and fail to develop significant leverage.

^[2] The report was withheld “in the interest of peace” during what was supposed to be the final legs of the Juba peace process. The decision to keep this report quiet added to the public delusion that Kony was meaningfully engaging in negotiations.

^[3] Numerous insiders have stated that Kony has no interest in this process. And they argue that his main reason for agreeing to a meeting on May 10 is to get more money and airtime. It is critical that the mediators do not fall into this trap.

^[4] The U.S. government, and in particular senior advisor on conflict Tim Shortley, has been calling for the de-linking of the Juba peace process from returns and redevelopment in the North. Other international donors should join the call to press the Ugandan government to deliver on these promises now.

^[5] Two of the five original International Criminal Court indictees are now dead, so only three, including Kony, remain.

^[6] The ICC’s indictments provide essential leverage while not preventing the signing of a peace deal. There are legitimate ways to deal with the warrants short of formal prosecution in The Hague if the LRA chooses—and the LRA is aware of these options. But instead it has chosen to stall and quibble rather than move forward.

^[7] ENOUGH interviews, Kampala and Washington D.C., April 2008.

^[8] Inter Agency Standing Committee Update on IDP movement, April 2008. Note that the statistics provided in this update refer to total movements as of February, not April.

^[9] U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Uganda humanitarian situation report, February 1-29, 2008.

^[10] Email correspondence, Adam O’Brien, May 1, 2008.

^[11] Kony’s LRA emerged in 1989, in the immediate aftermath of another northern-based insurgency, led by Alice Auma “Lakwena,” in 1986 and 1987.

^[12] There are three main peacekeeping operations in the region: MONUC in Congo, UNMIS in South Sudan, and EUFOR in the Central African Republic (and Chad). While these three missions have a mutual problem in the LRA, little has been done to coordinate efforts on intelligence sharing or strategizing to deal with the threat from a regional perspective.

^[13] There are positive developments in the U.S.-sponsored Tripartite Plus Commission—a regular meeting of senior officials in the Great Lakes region to discuss mutual security concerns—but this group does not include Sudan or the Central African Republic. The United States is now backing cooperation between the Great Lakes pact, which includes the relevant states, but this grouping is relatively new and needs to be strengthened. Such cooperation would not only help in dealing with the LRA but also with other threats in the region.

^[14] EUFOR is part of a multi-dimensional operation that includes the UN mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

^[15] The LRA is now affecting four states with seven authorized military forces operating in those territories. The LRA move with ease between three of those countries (less so in Uganda), so building cooperation on information sharing and strategies is critical.

^[16] ENOUGH interview, international official, April 2008.

^[17] Email correspondence with ENOUGH, April 2008