Maggie Fick

YAMBIO, Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan— “Omer Bashir,” Adrian said, emphatically responding to the question we posed to our local interpreter without waiting for the Zande translation. We had asked who he thought was behind the recent attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, on his community in southern Sudan. “They have been sent. They have been bribed, told to kill the people on this land,” he said. Eight months ago, this 23-year-old—his youthful face hiding the horrors he has witnessed—fled with many others from his village to the largest town in this remote corner of southern Sudan near the Congolese border. Adrian and his fellow villagers now live on land owned by the local Episcopal Church, and have begun building basic homes and cultivating the land.

But after speaking to Adrian and other men in this makeshift village of displaced and traumatized survivors of LRA attacks, it’s clear that they don’t plan to simply wait out the storm. In the absence of an effective response by the Sudanese government to the LRA, many local men and boys have taken community security into their own hands. They are part of a loose-knit, meagerly armed, ­­­local defense force called the Arrow Boys.

The Enemy

The LRA is a brutal, predatory militia that originated in northern Uganda in 1986 and has terrorized civilian populations across central Africa ever since. In December 2008, a U.S.- backed military operation by the governments of Southern Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda, known as Operation Lightning Thunder, attempted to destroy the LRA’s command center based at the time in Garamba National Park in northeastern Congo. Since this offensive, the LRA has moved north from Garamba, fanning out across the dense forests of northeastern Congo, Sudan’s Western Equatoria state, and neighboring Central African Republic. Credible reports by the Ugandan and southern Sudanese armies suggest that members of the LRA are taking refuge (and seeking to resupply) in South Darfur.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the LRA’s messianic leader Kony and two of his commanders for crimes against humanity, but they remain at-large. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the historic link between the LRA and the ruling National Congress Party in Khartoum, thought to have tapered off in recent years, may have been revived. In the minds of Adrian and many of the rank-and-file Arrow Boys operating in southern Sudan, there’s no doubt of this connection.

Enough’s LRA researcher Ledio Cakaj recently documented the failures of the SPLA and the United Nations Mission in Sudan, to protect civilians in Western Equatoria, where a string of ongoing LRA attacks displaced more than 80,000 Sudanese people in 2009. Decentralized and on the move, the LRA has been particularly lethal in recent months, with little standing in their way – except civilian populations. “They are even more dangerous now that they are in small groups,” said Sister Giovanna, an Italian nun in the town of Nzara (20 kilometers from Yambio) who lived in northern Uganda during the height of the LRA violence there.

Mobilizing, Seeking Support, and Taking Action

The concept behind the Arrow Boys preceded the LRA’s most recent arrival in Sudan. Originally, the Ugandan government, seeing its shortcomings in combating the LRA, supported the creation of the Arrow Boys in northern Uganda to protect the local communities, particularly vulnerable camps of displaced people. The title of this local militia came from the primary weapon used by its members. (Watch for an upcoming blog post on the history of the Arrow Boys in Uganda.)

In southern Sudan, the Arrow Boys seem to have sprung up more spontaneously.

The regional leader of the Arrow Boys, who asked for his name not to be used for security reasons, explained that after watching the LRA ravage their communities, southern Sudanese men and boys decided to respond.

“Very many people have died, and many others have had to flee their homes. […] We came with the mind of how to provide security for those that are here and end that threat [of the LRA],” he said.

“When I saw that kind of killing—they could crash the heads of your sons and daughters so they can’t even be recognized—it pained my heart,” said the leader of one group of Arrow Boys. “It depends on the heart. Any boy can be an Arrow Boy,” he said.

Having logged some victories against the LRA and won the support of their local communities and churches, the Arrow Boys turned to the government of Western Equatoria State for endorsement. As a show of solidarity, church leaders and government officials, including Western Equatoria governor Jemma Kumba, participated in a march in September 2009 to raise awareness about the LRA threat in the state. Their protest generated national and international attention, and the Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS, pledged to send additional troops to fend off the predatory militia and defend the local population. But, attacks have continued. Since then, the government has stayed engaged with the Arrow Boys, though the nature of its support remains ambiguous. Some Arrow Boys Enough spoke to claimed that they have received bullets from Sudanese soldiers from time to time, but local and state government officials insist that they are not arming the Arrow Boys; rather, the government has given them permission to operate and convinced GoSS to postpone a scheduled civilian disarmament campaign in Western Equatoria so that its civilians can continue to defend themselves.

Local government sources frame the Arrow Boys as part of an organized counterinsurgency strategy. Col. Joseph Ngere, the Deputy Governor and Minister of Information in Western Equatoria, credited the Arrow Boys with being well placed to produce intelligence for the government. “In terms of information collection, it is not possible to have the army on every border,” Col. Ngere said. “The Arrow Boys know the land well so they should help.” Yambio County Commissioner David Billy reinforced this perspective. He was complimentary of their contribution to the fight but maintained that the Arrow Boys are “not given the power to do things by themselves. They are not engaging on the front line.”

However, visiting areas recently targeted by the LRA, neither the Arrow Boys nor members of their communities gave the impression that their fathers, sons, and brothers are simply feeding information to the army and clearing the way for the Sudanese soldiers to confront the militia. While coordination between the SPLA and the Arrow Boys would almost certainly bolster civilian protection in Western Equatoria, it seems that this collaboration has yet to be fully optimized.

Creative Community Security Measures

With their local guns that shoot only one bullet before needing to be reloaded and their handmade bows and arrows, the Arrow Boys may not seem to be militarily matched to the LRA and their sophisticated weapons. What the Arrow Boys have on their side, though, is the ability to counter one of the LRA’s primary tactics: surprise. The LRA doesn’t expect any resistance, they don’t expect people to fight back,” said an employee of an international organization working in Western Equatoria. Using a system that resembles a neighborhood phone tree, the Arrow Boys stay connected through cell phones dispersed strategically among the leaders of their ranks. They quickly mobilize to reinforce their comrades when the LRA is spotted in the area.

Another advantage that the Arrow Boys use to better protect their communities is their knowledge of the area. Given their familiarity with the terrain, the Arrow Boys can predict which routes the LRA will take and stake them out, capturing or killing LRA who fall into their ambush. In one area Enough visited, groups of 15-20 Arrow Boys take turns conducting nightly patrols, arguably the most important practice of protecting civilians from the LRA. The Arrow Boys and their sympathizers also keep in close touch with both southern Sudanese and Ugandan army contacts in the region. “I never thought a cell phone could be so useful. Thank God that Zain [cell network] is here now,” said Sister Giovanna, underscoring the tremendous impact basic technology can have on grassroots, civilian protection.

The regional leader of the Arrow Boys described how his group coordinates with village leaders to keep track of the people who come and go. They can gauge the approximate location of the LRA based on information from displaced people who arrive from sites of fresh LRA attacks. In partnership with village elders, the Arrow Boys also spread information about the tactics of the LRA so that local communities can do their best to remain alert and attempt to avoid succumbing to ploys the LRA use to gain access to the communities. One known maneuver is pretending to surrender – a tactic that recently led to the death of five civilians in a village we visited.

Local Security or a Budding Militia?

“We support them, but the idea is not to create another militia,” said the deputy governor of Western Equatoria. “The Arrow Boys are under our control,” said County Commissioner Billy.

The men and teenage boys we interviewed in displaced persons settlements and on the outskirts of insecure villages that have seen multiple LRA attacks do not resemble hardened militiamen or battle-ready soldiers. They are mainly farmers in an area that saw little fighting during the violent North-South civil war in Sudan. The Arrow Boys insist that they will disband as soon as the threat of the LRA subsides in their own communities. “We have only one plan, which is to provide security just here, because it is very hard for us to continue following [the LRA],” said the regional Arrow Boys leader. They don’t have the resources or the organizational structure to pursue the LRA farther afield, he said, acknowledging reports that the LRA may be moving north toward Darfur. “What we normally do is just to keep security here tight and provide a defense system to our own people.”

But as the scope of the Arrow Boys’ operations expand to include other policing duties, like rounding up local drunkards and troublemakers, and the public perception of a southern Sudanese government unable or unwilling to confront the LRA threat persists, the Arrow Boys seem to be making themselves increasingly indispensable. Should some sub-group or powerful local leader within the Arrow Boys decide that the group should broaden its mandate and extend its existence beyond the horizon of the LRA threat, many complicated questions will arise. Who will attempt to disband and disarm the Arrow Boys (and how)? What will the impact be of the dissolution of the Arrow Boys—largely made up of men and boys who may have found ways to profit from their membership in this group, and who may be reluctant to relinquish their status as defenders of their communities?

Apart from the LRA violence, we heard much talk of tension in Western Equatoria state between the agrarian Azande people and the cattle-keeping Dinka and Mbororo groups. “It is the other small sickness, the virus, in southern Sudan,” said Adrian, reflecting on just one of the numerous, deep internal ethnic fissures in southern Sudan. Whether the LRA moves away from Western Equatoria on its own volition, or the Arrow Boys help to push the LRA out of this territory, one can already anticipate a possible future source of instability – indeed, so-called ‘tribal clashes’ killed more than 2,500 people last year in other parts of southern Sudan. Given the history of proxy warfare in Sudan, it’s not difficult to imagine how the government in Khartoum might exploit these local rivalries following the exodus of the LRA from the region.

_{Photo / Enough}

By Maggie Fick

Duk Padiet, Jonglei state, Southern Sudan -- Nyamun Dit Luol Kuai saw her husband shot dead when her hometown of Duk Padiet was attacked on Sunday, September 20. Nyamun’s husband was shot in the forehead when he raised his head out of the grass to look for the attackers who were advancing on his home. Duk Padiet—a town of roughly 35,000 people according to the 2008 census—is about 250 kilometers North of Bor, the capital of Jonglei state. Duk Padiet is the administrative center of Duk county, which is largely populated by the Dinka, one of the major ethnic groups in southern Sudan.

The United Nations estimates that at least 70 people from Duk Padiet were killed and nearly 40 wounded in the attack, including 11 Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army, or SPLA, soldiers, four southern Sudanese policemen and an estimated 60 people from the Lou Nuer militia. Tukuls, or mud huts, in the market and in residential areas of the town were burned to the ground. Administrative structures such as the police station were also razed and the hospital and a World Food Program warehouse were ransacked. An estimated 570 people were displaced from Duk Padiet following the attack, adding to the total of nearly 360,000 people who have been displaced by violence in southern Sudan this year.

Jonglei state: Epicenter of Insecurity

In recent months, Duk County and other neighboring, largely Dinka counties in western Jonglei state, have been afflicted by several violent attacks by armed, organized, and well-trained militia from the Lou clan of a significant rival ethnic group in the South, the Nuer. These attacks come in the context of an upsurge in violence throughout Jonglei state that has pitted all of the main ethnic groups of the state against each other in patterns that often mirror the historic dynamics of intra-South conflict during the North-South civil war: violence between the Nuer and Dinka, the Murle and Nuer, and between Nuer clans are some of the central trends of the conflict reemerging in Jonglei today.

Although Jonglei has been the deadly epicenter of inter-communal violence this year in southern Sudan, armed attacks are occurring in several other states. In Upper Nile state, near Jonglei state’s northern border, Dinka raiders have attacked several Shilluk settlements near the junction of the White Nile and Sobat rivers in the past month, displacing Shilluk populations north towards the already tense town of Malakal.

Jonglei is geographically the largest of the ten states in southern Sudan. According to the recent census, it is also the most populous state, with 1.3 million people counted. The rampant insecurity in Jonglei is exacerbated by a profound lack of civilian protection throughout the state, which stems from the failure of the Government of Southern Sudan and its security forces to intervene when violent clashes occur and from a United Nations Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, presence that has proven to be much less proactive and preventive than its current civilian protection mandate allows. These issues have been well documented this year by Human Rights Watch.

The presence of small arms among the majority of the local population, who seek to protect themselves in the absence of a reliable and responsible state authority at the local level, is another enduring problem in Jonglei state, where at least three unsuccessful and violent civilian disarmament campaigns have been attempted since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, was signed in 2005. Last month, the Government of Southern Sudan directed the southern army, or SPLA, to initiate another disarmament campaign in Jonglei. Given that the government’s approach to disarmament remains coercive and flawed, this new campaign is likely to be an impetus for further violence and instability in the run-up to the April 2010 elections. Figures from the National Electoral Commission as voter registration for the elections were ongoing indicate that Jonglei state had seen the lowest voter registration turnout, with below 20% of the population registering.

The persistent and destabilizing internal security dynamics in Jonglei state must not be ignored, as they will continue to shape the security situation in southern Sudan regardless of the outcome of the South’s self-determination referendum in 2011. However, the marked increase in 2009 of well-organized militia attacks, such as the attack in Duk Padiet, begs broader questions related to the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the two Sudanese parties to the CPA— the National Congress Party in Khartoum, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which heads the semi-autonomous southern government in Juba.

The North’s Upper Hand

The most politically charged question related to this year’s violence stems from the allegations by senior members of the SPLM-led southern government that the National Congress Party, or NCP, is supporting the violence in the South by supplying proxy militias with weapons. Although no source—including the southern government, UNMIS, or any external actor—has produced a “smoking gun” to prove the involvement of Khartoum is once again sponsoring violence throughout the South, this does not mean that the possibility of northern involvement should be discounted.

This conjecture is not lacking in historical basis. During the North-South war, NCP used a similar divide-and-destroy policy to great effect across southern Sudan, skillfully manipulating internal divisions within the South and supplying weapons to local groups, with the aim of weakening the SPLA movement led by the late John Garang. Given the history of northern involvement with numerous proxy militias, and the porous borders on all side of southern Sudan—including its contested and not yet demarcated border with the North—it is naïve to think that there are not broader political power dynamics at play in the violence that has sparked throughout the South this year.

Some groups accuse southern SPLM politicians of purposefully masking internal southern problems by blaming the North for insecurity and point to an unresponsive southern government that has so far failed to deliver “peace dividends” to its largely rural population. While this critique is justified, from the perspective of the CPA’s international “guarantors”—nations such as the United States who committed to help the Sudanese parties implement the peace agreement—the possibility that the North is arming militias to destabilize the South is a cause for increasing concern as Sudan hurtles toward elections that could further ignite both North-South and South-South tensions. Likewise, additional external pressure is needed on the Government of Southern Sudan to improve its response to local violence, ramp up its measures to protect civilians, and increase the presence of the southern Sudan police and security forces in tense areas of Jonglei and other states.

Historic Tensions, Current Crisis

In the area of Jonglei state where the recent Nuer-Dinka attacks occurred, the history of hostile relations between the Dinka and Nuer run deep. This was “ground zero” of the most serious split within the southern army, or SPLA, during the civil war, which occurred in 1991 between the leader of the SPLA, John Garang, a Dinka from Bor county, in Jonglei, and several of his senior commanders, including, Riek Machar, a powerful Nuer military leader who is the current vice president of southern Sudan.

The recent violence in this area, the presence of well-armed Lou Nuer militias, and the all-too recent violent past have given some members of the SPLM ruling party in Juba reason to accuse the NCP of resorting to its old tactics of proxy militia armament. Suspicions abound in the South of the reactivation of “marriages of convenience” that formed during the North-South civil war between southern leaders from minority groups such as the Nuer, militias such as the “White Army,” and former SPLA factions with former northern allies.

The tensions in Nuer-Dinka relations continue into today. The Nuer populations in the counties bordering Duk to the East harbor grievances against the Juba and Jonglei state governments, which they perceive as Dinka-dominated and unresponsive to the needs of the non-Dinka southern groups. For example, the Lou populations in the large towns of Ayod and Waat, to the East of Duk Padiet, are cut off from trading routes and access to health and other services because the road from Dinka population centers, in Duk and Twic East counties, is entirely impassable. Like the Dinka, the Nuer peoples’ livelihoods revolve around cattle. Access to water sources for cattle during the dry season has been a recurrent flashpoint of conflict when broader political dynamics have soured relations between neighboring Dinka and Nuer populations. Armed youth living in cattle camps are understandably susceptible to manipulation by outside actors, especially when these youth do not trust the local or central government who they perceive as unresponsive to their needs. These politicized tensions are not new, and attempts to defuse tensions through prior coercive disarmament campaigns in Jonglei state have arguably worsened relations between local groups.

All Eyes on the South

The violence in Duk Padiet and the story of Nuer-Dinka tensions in the surrounding region is only a microcosm of some of the daunting challenges facing southern Sudan today. This reality should not lend credence to the recent claims of some diplomats and members of the international community that southern Sudan is “ungovernable” or that a unified Sudan will be more stable than an independent South. The role of the CPA’s guarantors is to promote and protect the fundamental tenets of the peace agreement, one of which is the right of southerners to vote in a self-determination referendum. Given that all anecdotal evident and every public opinion survey indicate that southern Sudan will vote for independence in January 2011, now is the time to harness international efforts in support of a more stable and peaceful southern Sudan in the final remaining year of the CPA’s interim period.

The international community must work with the Government of Southern Sudan to improve security in particularly threatening areas of southern Sudan, such as Jonglei and Upper Nile states, to closely monitor further attacks in the South to better understand the dynamics behind the violence, and to apply pressure on the United Nations Mission in Sudan—a $1 billion per year international mission— to take more proactive and targeted measures to protect civilians in areas where there is a strong likelihood of violence breaking out in the coming months. The North’s historic role in fueling this instability should also inform the international community’s approach. Absent sustained support and focused attention from the international community to the root causes of conflict in the South, the growing tensions within the South are unlikely to subside in the current volatile political climate in Sudan.

By Maggie Fick 

JUBA, Southern Sudan -- Sunday, November 1st marked the start of the month-long period of voter registration throughout Sudan, a key step toward the first democratic elections to be held in the country in 24 years, now slated for April 2010. Here in Juba, the capital of southern Sudan, a parade organized by the United Nations Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, along with Sudanese civil society groups and international NGOs helped to kick off the process. But it is hard to find much reason for celebration in such an occasion, given the enormous risks and threats that the electoral process presents in the coming months for the citizens of Sudan and for the fragile peace between the North and South.

To be sure, the deck is stacked against a free and fair election in five months. Severe impediments to press and personal freedoms and ongoing violence in southern Sudan are just two of the many factors contributing to a climate that, if unchanged, could make elections a trigger for further insecurity and political violence in southern Sudan. At worst, the elections could stir tensions at the local, regional, and national levels that, once provoked, will be very difficult to contain in the CPA’s waning interim period.

Compounding Challenges

At an August press conference in Khartoum, Ray Kennedy, the top U.N. elections official in Sudan, made clear that Sudan’s elections are among the most “complex and challenging on record.” In any nation, elections for six simultaneous offices to be decided in several different ways, with twelve distinct ballots per person in southern Sudan, would be a formidable task for an electoral body. In Sudan, the obstacles of extremely limited infrastructure throughout most of the country and a largely illiterate population compound these issues, and the lagging timeline and multiple postponements in this process are a testament to this.

A civil society leader in Juba recently told me about some of the concerns that he and his colleagues and fellow citizens have about the current voter registration process:

• Voter education and mobilization efforts are not reaching the many southern Sudanese who live in extremely rural areas.
• Distributing resources for the registration process to the many areas of southern Sudan inaccessible by road is a serious challenge.
• Concerns about election security could result in low voter turnout.

International elections advisors had initially recommended that the National Electoral Commission, or NEC, deploy 10,000 static registration teams. However, I spoke with several sources who confirmed that the number of trained registration officials that the NEC will use in the registration process will be significantly lower than this recommendation. All that the NEC has announced thus far is that two teams of three registration officials each will be present in each constituency.

A northern opposition party recently protested the length of the voter registration period, noting that less than 30 days is insufficient to register all voters, particularly in remote areas to be served by “mobile registration centers.” It is hard to imagine how the projected number of 20 million voters will be registered in the span of thirty days, especially with so many tasks—such as the aforementioned transport of registration and voter education materials and training of voter registration officials--incomplete. Although the National Elections Act does not prohibit extending the month-long period voter registration period, this would impinge upon the timeline for candidate nomination and electoral campaigning. With polling set to begin in April, there is little room for error or further delays.

Money is also an issue. The funding for Sudan’s elections falls far short of the budgets for comparably complex elections, such as the 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As Kennedy told me last week: “With the resources that we have, we are providing all the assistance we can. But resources are limited and the [United Missions in Sudan] as a whole has a range of other areas in which it is supporting CPA implementation.”

The Bigger Picture

Proactive efforts to curb political violence are getting short shrift amid the daunting list of electoral challenges in Sudan. The threat of political violence is real not only in Darfur, where armed conflict and rampant insecurity continue, but also in the South, where more than 350,000 people have been displaced, and more than 2,000 killed, this year. With tensions running high at the local level across the South, and inter-ethnic clashes and Lord’s Resistance Army attacks continuing, the international community should dedicate resources and coordinate efforts to protect civilians and prevent outbreaks of election related violence that could well contribute to a return to full-scale war.

While the international community focuses intensely on elections, many southern Sudanese are looking beyond the election to 2011, when the South holds a self-determination referendum. One U.N. official I spoke with recently noted that, after the four decades-plus history of brutal conflict between Sudan’s North and South, his impression is that much of the population of southern Sudan doesn’t understand the point of national elections: “They fought for the referendum, at the least, the right to choose independence.” This is not to say that citizens lack interest in expressing their will and choosing their elected representatives, just that the “main event” in the South is undoubtedly the referendum.

The voter registration process could serve as a useful barometer for gauging Sudan’s preparedness for the elections. It could also serve as a trial run in which some of the issues that could negatively impact the polling period could be resolved. Alternately, the registration process could expose a reality that, based on my conversations here in Juba, has been felt on the ground for some time: these elections could destabilize already insecure areas as the all-important 2011 referendum draws nearer.

By Maggie Fick 

JUBA, Southern Sudan -- 28 Days. That is the amount of time left for Sudan’s rival parties to resolve their differences over a law that will determine the critical details of southern Sudan’s looming, landmark self-determination referendum. In January 2011, southerners will vote to remain united with northern Sudan or to secede and become an independent state. The referendum holds enormous significance for Sudan and its peoples, both northerners and southerners, and the contentious negotiations between the North’s NCP and the South’s SPLM parties over the referendum law are one testament to this fact.

The referendum process, like the nationwide elections scheduled for April 2010, is already badly behind the schedule mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But the southern referendum and the national elections are not even comparable in terms of importance for the people of southern Sudan. In Juba, the capital of the South, voter registration for the elections is underway. Over the weekend, as the month-long registration period kicked off, registration flyers appeared around town, on public buses and in traffic circles. But if you ask a Sudanese person on the street in Juba, say a motorcycle driver or a cell phone vendor, about the elections, you are not likely to hear great enthusiasm – or even general understanding – about the process. It’s hard to blame anyone for these sentiments: the elections process itself is enormously complex, and the polling period has been postponed twice (forcing it into the time period when preparations for the referendum should be the top priority). In addition, rising insecurity and violence give citizens in the South good reason to be nervous about even registering to vote or turning out to the polls when the time comes.

Check back later this week for more detailed analysis of these issues, but for now, back to 28 days. The NCP and SPLM, via their designated mediators for the referendum law negotiations, Ali Osman Taha (of the NCP) and Riek Machar (of the SPLM), seemed close to agreement a little over a week ago on the key bones of contention in the referendum law: namely, what is the threshold percentage of votes required for secession, and what percentage of voters must turn out to validate the referendum. Taha and Machar announced the good news, saying that after they conferred again with their respective parties, the bill could go to the National Assembly for a vote and would likely be passed into law.

More than a week later, rumors of sharp internal disagreement over the aforementioned key percentages within the SPLM have emerged, and the clock is still ticking. Meanwhile, Saturday marked the first outright appeal by the president of the Government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir, for southerners to vote for independence. President Kiir said at a prayer service in Juba:

When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours: you want to vote for unity so that you become a second class in your own country, that is your choice.

The referendum law must be passed in order for the Referendum Commission to be formed. The Commission will take the lead in organizing and conducting the referendum in January 2011. But the National Assembly must pass the law by November 30, before going on recess until after the April elections, when new members of the assembly will be elected. If the urgency is not evident in my tone, then I will say it outright: Time is running out. If the census and electoral processes in Sudan have taught anyone anything, it is that processes like an election with 12 ballots in Sudan, Africa’s largest country, take time. The leaders of the NCP and the SPLM owe it to their people to forge an agreement on the referendum law to initiate the preparation for this monumental event. This is, of course, easier said than done.

By Maggie Fick 

Juba, South Sudan -- Here in Juba, the capital of southern Sudan, the need for 'fierce urgency' in implementing the Obama administration's new policy couldn't be more clear. Tensions are running high and political rumors are flying in this town, which is ground zero for implementation of the peace agreement that is emphasized prominently in the Obama administration's Sudan policy. In southern Sudan, President Obama's new policy will be put to the test in the coming months, as elections loom and the threat of continued violence casts a shadow over North-South relations. It is a good sign that the administration is focusing on offering incentives and pressures based on 'verifiable changes in conditions on the ground' instead of more signed pieces of paper. For the people of southern Sudan, actions and real changes will certainly speak louder than words and pieces of paper.

Even today, the day after the Obama administration’s Sudan policy was unveiled in Washington, people all over Juba were talking about the new policy. A local women’s civil society organizer I met with this morning told me, “The message of the policy is good because the CPA really needs to be worked on. We know that dates have been changed and the politicians are now playing around with the referendum.” And at other meetings I had today with officials from the Government of Southern Sudan and United Nations, the new U.S. policy seemed to be on everyone’s minds. At a briefing for the international diplomatic corps in Juba this afternoon, the Minister of Regional Cooperation said, “The Sudanese people welcome this policy and stand in support of it.” The positive reaction from the Government of Southern Sudan was not matched by their counterparts in Khartoum; today, one of President Bashir’s key advisors critiqued the policy for its lack of practical steps.

I arrived in Juba late last week, where I’m setting up shop as Enough’s new southern Sudan field researcher. You’ll be hearing much more from me once I get my bearings over here. I’ll strive to bring you up-to-date coverage and analysis on southern Sudan in this critical period.

As the clock ticks toward 2011, when the people of southern Sudan will vote in a historic self-determination referendum, I am glad to be here in Juba. Through my work, I hope to be a resource for people outside of the region looking to learn more about the issues at stake here; stay tuned and feel free to give me feedback at mfick [at] enoughproject.org.

Photo: Men gather under a tree in Rumbek, southern Sudan. Enough/Maggie Fick

 A political settlement for Darfur: A practical roadmap

• Wealth sharing and power sharing proposals based on figures from the 1992 census that showed Darfur to be 20 percent of Sudan’s total population. This particular recommendation is based on the agenda of the seventh and final round of the Abuja talks, which interpreted the DOP as a commitment by all parties to agree on wealth and power sharing based on the 1992 figures. Since the 2009 census is controversial and flawed, the best way forward is to use a measure that parties have previously agreed upon.

• The creation of a single region of Greater Darfur. The question of how Darfur should be administered—and whether it should remain as three states or establish a regional government, as was the case until 1989—is at the center of political negotiations over Darfur’s future. The DPA establishes a transition period before a regional vote on Darfur’s status to be held no later than mid-2010 (a date that would obviously have to be revisited). However, some rebel factions continue to demand an immediate return to a regional government, while others have openly called for self-determination and even independence. The mediation team must work with the parties to establish consensus on the question of autonomy before moving on to the specifics of power sharing.

• Establishment of a semi-autonomous government in Darfur with meaningful decentralization but without the provision for a referendum on self-determination. This is the only way that Darfuris would accept a comprehensive peace deal. Darfuris who are not a member of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, should constitute the majority in such a government.

• Restitution that includes individual as well as community compensation, addresses the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their original homelands, and holds the perpetrators of crimes to account. Compensation, or diya, is a central part of traditional conflict resolution in Darfur. The primary purpose of compensation is to recognize the harm done to a community and (partially) satisfy the victims’ demand for justice. In Darfur, this can only occur when the Government of Sudan, as the party most responsible for systematic killing, rape, torture, and looting, adequately compensates victims. Moreover, compensation for Darfur must be separate and distinct from any reconstruction and development funds that may be offered once peace is achieved. The DPA authorized a compensation fund of $30 million for Darfur. Using a very crude calculation, equal distribution among the 2.5 million displaced people would amount to a $12 payout for each victim. Given the scale of the economic losses in Darfur and the complexity of determining and distributing compensation, the Government of Sudan must allocate substantially more funds and agree to an international monitoring mechanism ensure that those funds are dispersed fairly.

• The complete dismantling of the structures of violence: the Janjaweed and other proxy militias and the various rebel factions. The people of Darfur will simply not accept any agreement that fails to establish a clear, internationally monitored process to disarm the militias that have marauded with impunity for more than six years. Simply arguing for greater state control over law and order in Darfur, as the U.S. special envoy has recently done, is insufficient and unlikely to deal with the root causes of earlier bouts of violence. The DPA holds the Government of Sudan responsible for disarming its own proxies, a responsibility that the government has pledged to honor and then ignored on at least six occasions. Instead, the mediation should seek agreement on an internationally monitored process to assemble irregular armed groups, collect their heavy weapons, and implement an aggressive program to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate combatants. Moreover, the process must take into account the realities on the ground. Although weapons have flooded the region since the crisis began in 2003, many farmers and herders in Darfur have carried rifles for years to defend their land and livestock. Disarmament programs should seek to take apart the militias without disrupting the traditional livelihoods of civilians.

• A comprehensive security arrangement that will address all the above as well as end the proxy wars across the border and stop the spillover of violence and resulting counter violence that would threaten the fragile, newly signed peace. Elements of this arrangement should be drawn from the DPA and updated to reflect current security realities. Most importantly, security arrangements must include an internationally supported mechanism that allows for the safe and voluntary return of the nearly 3 million displaced Darfuris to their homes.

• A stronger and better resourced United Nations mission in Darfur, or UNAMID, will be critical to overseeing any agreement’s implementation. UNAMID’s role must be clearly articulated in any final peace agreement, particularly the force’s specific responsibilities to help ensure that civilians who want to return to their villages of origin can do so safely and with dignity. Full deployment of a robust force with a competent lead nation, an experienced division-level headquarters staff, and a clear command-and-control structure will be critical to ensure that all sides adhere to their commitments.

Endnotes