YAMBIO, Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan— “Omer Bashir,” Adrian said, emphatically responding to the question we posed to our local interpreter without waiting for the Zande translation. We had asked who he thought was behind the recent attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, on his community in southern Sudan. “They have been sent. They have been bribed, told to kill the people on this land,” he said. Eight months ago, this 23-year-old—his youthful face hiding the horrors he has witnessed—fled with many others from his village to the largest town in this remote corner of southern Sudan near the Congolese border. Adrian and his fellow villagers now live on land owned by the local Episcopal Church, and have begun building basic homes and cultivating the land.

But after speaking to Adrian and other men in this makeshift village of displaced and traumatized survivors of LRA attacks, it’s clear that they don’t plan to simply wait out the storm. In the absence of an effective response by the Sudanese government to the LRA, many local men and boys have taken community security into their own hands. They are part of a loose-knit, meagerly armed, ­­­local defense force called the Arrow Boys.

The Enemy

The LRA is a brutal, predatory militia that originated in northern Uganda in 1986 and has terrorized civilian populations across central Africa ever since. In December 2008, a U.S.- backed military operation by the governments of Southern Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda, known as Operation Lightning Thunder, attempted to destroy the LRA’s command center based at the time in Garamba National Park in northeastern Congo. Since this offensive, the LRA has moved north from Garamba, fanning out across the dense forests of northeastern Congo, Sudan’s Western Equatoria state, and neighboring Central African Republic. Credible reports by the Ugandan and southern Sudanese armies suggest that members of the LRA are taking refuge (and seeking to resupply) in South Darfur.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the LRA’s messianic leader Kony and two of his commanders for crimes against humanity, but they remain at-large. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the historic link between the LRA and the ruling National Congress Party in Khartoum, thought to have tapered off in recent years, may have been revived. In the minds of Adrian and many of the rank-and-file Arrow Boys operating in southern Sudan, there’s no doubt of this connection.

Enough’s LRA researcher Ledio Cakaj recently documented the failures of the SPLA and the United Nations Mission in Sudan, to protect civilians in Western Equatoria, where a string of ongoing LRA attacks displaced more than 80,000 Sudanese people in 2009. Decentralized and on the move, the LRA has been particularly lethal in recent months, with little standing in their way – except civilian populations. “They are even more dangerous now that they are in small groups,” said Sister Giovanna, an Italian nun in the town of Nzara (20 kilometers from Yambio) who lived in northern Uganda during the height of the LRA violence there.

Mobilizing, Seeking Support, and Taking Action

The concept behind the Arrow Boys preceded the LRA’s most recent arrival in Sudan. Originally, the Ugandan government, seeing its shortcomings in combating the LRA, supported the creation of the Arrow Boys in northern Uganda to protect the local communities, particularly vulnerable camps of displaced people. The title of this local militia came from the primary weapon used by its members. (Watch for an upcoming blog post on the history of the Arrow Boys in Uganda.)

In southern Sudan, the Arrow Boys seem to have sprung up more spontaneously.

The regional leader of the Arrow Boys, who asked for his name not to be used for security reasons, explained that after watching the LRA ravage their communities, southern Sudanese men and boys decided to respond.

“Very many people have died, and many others have had to flee their homes. […] We came with the mind of how to provide security for those that are here and end that threat [of the LRA],” he said.

“When I saw that kind of killing—they could crash the heads of your sons and daughters so they can’t even be recognized—it pained my heart,” said the leader of one group of Arrow Boys. “It depends on the heart. Any boy can be an Arrow Boy,” he said.

Having logged some victories against the LRA and won the support of their local communities and churches, the Arrow Boys turned to the government of Western Equatoria State for endorsement. As a show of solidarity, church leaders and government officials, including Western Equatoria governor Jemma Kumba, participated in a march in September 2009 to raise awareness about the LRA threat in the state. Their protest generated national and international attention, and the Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS, pledged to send additional troops to fend off the predatory militia and defend the local population. But, attacks have continued. Since then, the government has stayed engaged with the Arrow Boys, though the nature of its support remains ambiguous. Some Arrow Boys Enough spoke to claimed that they have received bullets from Sudanese soldiers from time to time, but local and state government officials insist that they are not arming the Arrow Boys; rather, the government has given them permission to operate and convinced GoSS to postpone a scheduled civilian disarmament campaign in Western Equatoria so that its civilians can continue to defend themselves.

Local government sources frame the Arrow Boys as part of an organized counterinsurgency strategy. Col. Joseph Ngere, the Deputy Governor and Minister of Information in Western Equatoria, credited the Arrow Boys with being well placed to produce intelligence for the government. “In terms of information collection, it is not possible to have the army on every border,” Col. Ngere said. “The Arrow Boys know the land well so they should help.” Yambio County Commissioner David Billy reinforced this perspective. He was complimentary of their contribution to the fight but maintained that the Arrow Boys are “not given the power to do things by themselves. They are not engaging on the front line.”

However, visiting areas recently targeted by the LRA, neither the Arrow Boys nor members of their communities gave the impression that their fathers, sons, and brothers are simply feeding information to the army and clearing the way for the Sudanese soldiers to confront the militia. While coordination between the SPLA and the Arrow Boys would almost certainly bolster civilian protection in Western Equatoria, it seems that this collaboration has yet to be fully optimized.

Creative Community Security Measures

With their local guns that shoot only one bullet before needing to be reloaded and their handmade bows and arrows, the Arrow Boys may not seem to be militarily matched to the LRA and their sophisticated weapons. What the Arrow Boys have on their side, though, is the ability to counter one of the LRA’s primary tactics: surprise. The LRA doesn’t expect any resistance, they don’t expect people to fight back,” said an employee of an international organization working in Western Equatoria. Using a system that resembles a neighborhood phone tree, the Arrow Boys stay connected through cell phones dispersed strategically among the leaders of their ranks. They quickly mobilize to reinforce their comrades when the LRA is spotted in the area.

Another advantage that the Arrow Boys use to better protect their communities is their knowledge of the area. Given their familiarity with the terrain, the Arrow Boys can predict which routes the LRA will take and stake them out, capturing or killing LRA who fall into their ambush. In one area Enough visited, groups of 15-20 Arrow Boys take turns conducting nightly patrols, arguably the most important practice of protecting civilians from the LRA. The Arrow Boys and their sympathizers also keep in close touch with both southern Sudanese and Ugandan army contacts in the region. “I never thought a cell phone could be so useful. Thank God that Zain [cell network] is here now,” said Sister Giovanna, underscoring the tremendous impact basic technology can have on grassroots, civilian protection.

The regional leader of the Arrow Boys described how his group coordinates with village leaders to keep track of the people who come and go. They can gauge the approximate location of the LRA based on information from displaced people who arrive from sites of fresh LRA attacks. In partnership with village elders, the Arrow Boys also spread information about the tactics of the LRA so that local communities can do their best to remain alert and attempt to avoid succumbing to ploys the LRA use to gain access to the communities. One known maneuver is pretending to surrender – a tactic that recently led to the death of five civilians in a village we visited.

Local Security or a Budding Militia?

“We support them, but the idea is not to create another militia,” said the deputy governor of Western Equatoria. “The Arrow Boys are under our control,” said County Commissioner Billy.

The men and teenage boys we interviewed in displaced persons settlements and on the outskirts of insecure villages that have seen multiple LRA attacks do not resemble hardened militiamen or battle-ready soldiers. They are mainly farmers in an area that saw little fighting during the violent North-South civil war in Sudan. The Arrow Boys insist that they will disband as soon as the threat of the LRA subsides in their own communities. “We have only one plan, which is to provide security just here, because it is very hard for us to continue following [the LRA],” said the regional Arrow Boys leader. They don’t have the resources or the organizational structure to pursue the LRA farther afield, he said, acknowledging reports that the LRA may be moving north toward Darfur. “What we normally do is just to keep security here tight and provide a defense system to our own people.”

But as the scope of the Arrow Boys’ operations expand to include other policing duties, like rounding up local drunkards and troublemakers, and the public perception of a southern Sudanese government unable or unwilling to confront the LRA threat persists, the Arrow Boys seem to be making themselves increasingly indispensable. Should some sub-group or powerful local leader within the Arrow Boys decide that the group should broaden its mandate and extend its existence beyond the horizon of the LRA threat, many complicated questions will arise. Who will attempt to disband and disarm the Arrow Boys (and how)? What will the impact be of the dissolution of the Arrow Boys—largely made up of men and boys who may have found ways to profit from their membership in this group, and who may be reluctant to relinquish their status as defenders of their communities?

Apart from the LRA violence, we heard much talk of tension in Western Equatoria state between the agrarian Azande people and the cattle-keeping Dinka and Mbororo groups. “It is the other small sickness, the virus, in southern Sudan,” said Adrian, reflecting on just one of the numerous, deep internal ethnic fissures in southern Sudan. Whether the LRA moves away from Western Equatoria on its own volition, or the Arrow Boys help to push the LRA out of this territory, one can already anticipate a possible future source of instability – indeed, so-called ‘tribal clashes’ killed more than 2,500 people last year in other parts of southern Sudan. Given the history of proxy warfare in Sudan, it’s not difficult to imagine how the government in Khartoum might exploit these local rivalries following the exodus of the LRA from the region.

LRA_Congo.pdf

LRA_Congo_Activist_Brief.pdf

Enough field researcher Ledio Cakaj details the abuses of both the Lord's Resistance Army militia and the Congolese Army against civilians in Congo. 

The Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, continues to pose a severe threat to civilians in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.[1] Since the LRA began attacking civilians on Congolese soil in September of 2008 through the end of 2009, it has killed approximately 1,800 civilians, [2] with 300 deaths during December 2009.[3] More than 100 people were killed during January 2010.[4]

Units from the Congolese national army, or FARDC, sent to protect civilians and fight the LRA have shown little interest in either task. Congolese soldiers largely refuse to engage LRA while constantly harassing the local population. Incidents of rape, looting, beatings, and even killings of innocent civilians by Congolese soldier abound. There were 116 reported cases of rapes allegedly committed by Congolese soldiers last October in just one neighborhood near the Congolese army base in Dungu.[5] Meanwhile, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo, or MONUC, is stretched too thin to adequately protect civilians in the vast region where the LRA operates, often in diffuse cells.

The movement of some LRA elements into Darfur should alarm policymakers and spark revitalized international efforts to deal with the militia.[6] But these efforts should not neglect the LRA’s continuing ability to wreak havoc in northeastern Congo. Both the Congolese army and MONUC should urgently prioritize the protection of civilians. The Congolese army should take swift action to deal with abuses committed by its soldiers, prosecuting those who commit abuses with a focus on command responsibility. Moreover, a credible investigation into the embezzlement of U.N.-provided rations and supplies for the Congolese army is urgently required. The misuse of such materials contributes to the army’s bad behavior and is an obstacle to more effective efforts to deal with the LRA.

U.N. presence, especially in the areas worst affected by LRA violence, is crucial. Unsurprisingly, LRA attacks happen most frequently in places with no peacekeepers. A promised contingent of Tunisian peacekeepers should be deployed immediately to Province Orientale. The majority of the newly arrived troops should be deployed to Niangara, Ngilima, and Bangadi, with at least some presence in Bas Uele. This force will need rapid response capability, including helicopters and other vehicles. In the meantime, MONUC should conduct frequent and routine joint patrols with FARDC soldiers. Joint patrols help enormously in terms of protection and evidence demonstrates that Congolese soldiers behave better when in the company of peacekeepers.

If the Congolese army can improve its behavior, U.N. cooperation with it should expand to include information sharing and coordinated operations aimed at protecting civilians and neutralizing the LRA. Wherever possible, such cooperation should also be established with the Ugandan army, which is still operating in Congo in pursuit of the LRA. Successful cooperation between Congo’s army, MONUC, and Ugandan forces appears to have succeeded in protecting the population of Faradje from attacks last year and compelling the LRA commander, Lt. Colonel Charles Arop, to surrender in November.

Practical steps to improve civilian protection can also contribute to a more coherent regional approach to end the threat posed by the LRA. MONUC’s civilian component also has an important role to play. Political affairs officers with the capacity to collect and analyze information on the LRA should be deployed to Dungu. Likewise, increasing cross-border cooperation between U.N. operations in Congo, Sudan, and Central African Republic, or CAR, could help to develop a more holistic strategy, under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council.

The Lord's Resistance Army in Congo

Attacks by the LRA in northeastern Congo continued throughout 2009. While it is easy to mistake the LRA’s operations for mindless violence, the patterns of attacks reflect deliberate tactics on the part of the fighting force as it has reconstituted itself as a regional threat.[7]

Attacks, abductions, and a growing humanitarian crisis

Following the LRA’s large-scale massacre of some 900 Congolese civilians in December 2008 and January 2009, LRA attacks in northeastern Congo continued throughout last year.[8] The majority of LRA attacks have taken place in and around a “triangle of death” formed by the towns of Niangara, Bangadi, and Ngilima in Haut Uele territory, with some attacks also occurring in neighboring Bas Uele. [9]

The brutality of attacks sharply increased during the final three months of 2009. For the first time in more than a year, the LRA resumed deliberate mutilations, with at least five such cases in December. Enough spoke to a man from Bangadi who was mutilated on December 2, 2009. He said the rebels beat him and cut off his lips and ears in complete silence.

Other particularly brutal practices include burning people alive. A man from Nakwa, a village 9.3 miles south of Bangadi, described such an incident: “The LRA locked our family inside our house and set it on fire, but I was able to force open the door and escape the LRA who came after me.”[10] The brutality is intended to send a message of strength to Congolese and Ugandan officials while simultaneously terrorizing Congolese civilians so that they will not disclose LRA’s whereabouts or assist people escaping LRA captivity.

Attacks have caused massive displacement and hunger. The United Nations estimates that more than 450,000 people have been internally displaced in Haut and Bas Uele, mostly due to LRA attacks.[11] Another 16,000 Congolese have sought refuge in neighboring countries.[12] As people flee their villages and gather in town centers, concerns about hunger and malnutrition have multiplied. More than 15,000 people have moved within less than a mile of Bangadi center, abandoning their crops for fear of attacks and abductions by the LRA.[13] Although aid organizations have reported severe malnutrition rates in Bangadi and Ngilima, the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies have suspended food aid in some of the worst affected areas after noticing a pattern of immediate LRA attacks just after distributions. “It is against the ‘do no harm’ principle,” said an international aid worker, “but it creates a bizarre situation where by adhering to principled positions we are letting thousands starve.”[14]

To safeguard food aid, some military force will need to stay and protect civilians up to two weeks after food is delivered. MONUC officials claim they do not have enough troops on the ground to do this. Aid workers say that based on their past behavior, Congolese soldiers cannot be trusted to protect civilians and might also loot the food themselves.

LRA's whereabouts and wherewithal

The LRA continues to cause mayhem and suffering far disproportionate to its actual size, making efforts to apprehend the leadership all the more vital. Dominic Ongwen, an International Criminal Court indictee and a notoriously brutal commander, is in charge of LRA operations in Congo.[15] He has at least 200 fighters operating in small groups of 7 to 10. The Dungu groups total about 150 fighters with another 25 to 50 located in Bas Uele. In late 2009, another LRA group, commanded by Lt. Colonel Charles Arop and operating further east in Faradje, surrendered to the Ugandan army. Close to 200 fighters were believed to be CAR, including the units that have now crossed over into South Darfur in Sudan. Of this group, approximately 50 were operating under leader Joseph Kony. Maj General Okot Odhiambo and Colonel Okot Odek are also part of this group.[16] The total LRA fighting force as of December 2009 was around 400 people.[17]

The LRA resumed the practice of abducting and indoctrinating children to fill its ranks, a practice that had declined during the first half of 2009. International aid organizations believe that 1,400 people have been abducted by the LRA in the past 18 months. At least 800 remain in captivity. More than two-thirds are children.[18] Children from Central African Republic and Sudan are used to fight in Congo, while Congolese children fight in the neighboring states.[19] Abductions are not limited to children, either. More than 250 people, mostly adults, were reportedly abducted during an attack in Tapili.[20] These large-scale abductions suggest that LRA groups might have settled and need people to farm. In December 2008 when the LRA was based in Congo’s Garamba National Park, 300 forced laborers were used to cultivate food in more than 15 square miles of land. [21]

Eyewitnesses describe three LRA bases in Haut Uele that roughly correspond to the “triangle of death”—one north of Niangara, one close to Bangadi, and another base in Ngilima.[22] The bases near Bangadi and Niangara were attacked by Ugandan soldiers in November and December of 2009. Some of the particularly brutal December attacks in Bangadi appear to have been a response to the Ugandan army’s actions. The LRA believed that people from Bangadi had informed the Ugandans of their location.[23]

The road from Niangara to Bangadi is of strategic importance to the LRA. North of Bangadi, the road leads across the border into two large forests in neighboring Western Equatoria State of Southern Sudan, the Bire Kpatua and the Mbarizunga Game Reserves. Most of the LRA attacks that plagued this part of southern Sudan during 2009 were launched from these forests by rebels under Ongwen’s command. In addition, a parallel path from Bangadi continues northwest into the Ango region of Bas Uele, and continues northward into the Central African Republic.

Bas Uele: A new safe haven?

Bas Uele is the region to the immediate west of Haut Uele and makes up the northwest corner of Province Orientale. A group of LRA fighters led by Major Kidega Murefu moved west into Ango territory in Bas Uele last summer, attacking civilians along their way, in a deliberate effort to clear the area.[24] By mid-October 2009, more than 2,500 people had fled across the border to CAR.[25] At the end of November, Congolese army troops deployed to Ango were attacked head on by the LRA, a fairly unusual practice that underlines the importance of this territory to LRA. [26]

The events in Bas Uele are significant as they indicate the possibility that the larger LRA groups, including the high command, might relocate to Ango territory if the pressure on the LRA elsewhere increases. Ango is significantly farther west in Congo than where Ongwen’s groups are now and immediately south of the large Zemongo forest in Central African Republic. Kony and the rest of the LRA troops, close to 200 fighters, were believed to have been in Zemongo in December 2009.[27]

The move of the LRA in Ango territory is bad news for the military effort to finish off the rebels. Ango is a vast and sparsely populated area with little Congolese and Ugandan military presence and no U.N. troops. The river Uele that runs south of Ango acts as a natural barrier to movement from the south while the porous border with Central African Republic lies to the north. West of Ango is Equateur Province, a hotbed of Congolese rebel activity. Any troops in pursuit of the LRA would have to pass from the east on the Doruma—Ango axis that is easy to monitor. Continuing to hunt the LRA as far as Ango seriously stretches the Ugandan army’s supply lines, and could entangle regional security forces in an unending cross-border game of cat and mouse, with the LRA able to move among Congo, Central African Republic, and Sudan.

It is possible that Ango has already been used as a safe haven for LRA leadership. A Congolese girl who recently escaped after spending a year as a wife to one LRA commander told an international aid worker that she had seen Kony in Congo in August 2009, but was unable to say exactly where. “There was a big ceremony,” she said, “and a group prayer was held in his honor.”[28]

The Congolese army: Making a bad situation worse

The Congolese army has almost 6,000 troops in Province Orientale, with headquarters in the district capital of Dungu. Despite this sizeable presence, Congolese troops have utterly failed to protect the local population from LRA attacks. Ngilima, Bangadi, and Niangara have repeatedly been targeted by the LRA despite considerable Congolese army presence in all three places. Many of the people Enough spoke to said that Congolese soldiers were too scared to confront the LRA or simply unwilling to do so. “The FARDC only faces the LRA when they encounter them by accident,” said a local aid worker.[29] In Bangadi, repeated LRA attacks have occurred in the town market, less than a mile from a base where about 500 Congolese soldiers are stationed. [30]

Unpaid and unfed soldiers

The Congolese army lacks both the means and the motivation to protect civilians from the LRA. FARDC soldiers in Haut Uele were not paid for the last four months of 2009 until December 2, when they received only one month’s salary.[31] This sparked a protest outside of their base in Dungu, during which one soldier managed to fatally injure himself with his own grenade.[32]

Congolese soldiers maintain that their commanders misappropriate food and money intended for the rank and file. [33] Congolese soldiers were found using counterfeit 500 Congolese francs bills (worth approximately 80 cents) in the Dungu market. It’s unclear whether the fraudulent bills were sent from Kinshasa or issued by commanders who pocketed the genuine money sent from the capital, as some soldiers claimed.[34]

Food provided to the Congolese army by MONUC is often sold directly in the market with very little going to the soldiers themselves. As part of supporting the Congolese army, MONUC provides food worth $1 per day for 6,000 FARDC soldiers. Hardly any soldiers actually receive this amount of food. Troops based in and around Dungu say they receive 30 percent to 50 percent of their rations, while soldiers based further afield in Bangadi reported receiving as little as 10 percent of the rations.[35]

Enough researchers saw hundreds of MONUC-provided sardine cans on sale in the Dungu market. Two market vendors said that they bought the sardines in bulk from the Congolese army but would not provide the names of the sellers.[36] Likewise, a U.N. source described unopened 50 kilogram sacks of flour for sale in the market. [37] It is unlikely that such large amounts were sold by individual soldiers. Many believed that high FARDC officers were involved in the market dealings.[38]

Lack of discipline and training remain two of the biggest problems with Congolese troops in Orientale. These shortcomings are most acute with the so-called integrated troops: former rebel fighters granted amnesty and integrated in the national army. One-third of the 6,000 soldiers in Orientale are former fighters of the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, the pro-Tutsi militia from the Kivus formerly led by Laurent Nkunda. These former rebels were supposed to receive military training as part of their integration in the military. Many of the integrated soldiers never had any training as rebels and never received any training or underwent rigorous vetting when joining the FARDC. There are, for instance, many underage fighters within FARDC ranks. In a one-day screening in December of three Congolese army camps, including the headquarters in Dungu, U.N. and humanitarian workers found 37 soldiers believed to be less than 18 years old, with more expected to be found in other camps.[39]

Integrated soldiers often remain loyal to commanders from their former rebel groups, creating a parallel chain of command within the ranks and sometimes sowing conflict between former adversaries. Reports of in-fighting within the army started just after the arrival of integrated troops in May 2009 when one Congolese soldier beat to death two other soldiers in Niangara on July 18, 2009.[40] Two soldiers were killed by other soldiers last October.[41]

A lack of discipline and training has led to a highly unprofessional force that frequently endangers the local population. Congolese soldiers carry their weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, bazookas, and grenades in densely populated areas, even when on leave. Eyewitnesses in Dungu reported that on October 5, 2009, a soldier slipped and accidentally launched a propelled grenade 500 meters from the central market.[42] On December 3, 2009, Enough witnessed one soldier attempting to shoot a colleague next to the central market in Dungu. The soldier was restrained by two other soldiers but a great number of people in the market, including children, had to scramble as the soldier kept erratically pointing his loaded gun in all directions in an attempt to shake off the hold of his colleagues.

Instead of sleeping in their barracks three miles from Dungu town, many soldiers instead stay in the town. “It is strange that a force supposed to protect civilians lives in the middle of populated areas and not outside to protect it from attacks,” said a resident of Dungu. “In case of attacks, the soldiers will be better protected than the civilians.”[43] Being in such close proximity to the population increases the potential for abuses against civilians that Congolese soldiers are committing in great numbers.

Abuses against the population

A U.N. official in Orientale told Enough, “Not a day goes by that we don’t receive complaints about FARDC abuses.”[44] This has prompted Congolese and U.N. authorities to make interagency visits to areas where the complaints originate. During such a visit in September in Bangadi, a community elder and pastor from the local church said, in front of the delegation complete with army commanders, that he was likely going to be killed for speaking but that the people of Bangadi were “tired of FARDC crimes against us, they [FARDC] steal, kill, rape our wives and daughters and arrest and jail anyone for no reason. We want them out of Bangadi and we the people of Bangadi are more afraid of FARDC then the LRA because of the attitude adopted by FARDC which are similar to LRA.”[45]

In some time periods, abuses by the Congolese army have been more pervasive than those of the LRA.[46] An aid worker said that there were 116 reported cases of sexual violence, including rape, for the month of October 2009 in Bamokandi alone, 1.8 miles from the big army base in Dungu.[47] Sexual assault, including rape, is also prevalent in Bangadi, Ngilima, and Niangara. A particularly egregious case involved the gang rape of a pregnant woman by five Congolese soldiers near the market of Bangadi on October 8, 2009.[48] A humanitarian organization that collects known cases of sexual violence states that there were 49 cases of sexual assault against minors in Bangadi for the second part of 2009 alone, equally attributed to FARDC and the LRA.[49] In Ngilima, there were on average 10 registered cases of sexual violence every month with 60 percent attributed to the LRA and the rest to the FARDC.[50] An international aid worker specializing in helping victims of sexual abuse noted that for every one woman who admitted to having been sexually abused at least two more people were also abused but were too afraid or ashamed to come forward.[51]

Abuses by the Congolese army against the local population also include killings, beatings, and severe injuries. In Bangadi, FARDC soldiers killed nine people from March to December of last year. The reason, according to residents of Bangadi, was mostly due to civilians refusing to hand over cash or their properties to soldiers. An internal U.N. security report for the month of October 2009 details eight confirmed civilian deaths and four injuries attributed to Congolese soldiers in Haut Uele during that month.[52] A particularly brutal case happened on November 13, 16.7 miles southeast of Dungu, when two FARDC soldiers killed a 4-year-old child and his parents so that they could steal their possessions.[53]

Cases of lootings and forced labor are daily occurrences. FARDC soldiers man checkpoints along the main axis where they charge “tax” to travelers ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 Congolese francs. A representative of a Congolese NGO estimated that instances of FARDC extortions are in the thousands per month. “It is almost an accepted fact by the population,” he said.[54]

People who cannot pay ”tax” are forced into manual labor such as collecting fire wood and washing the soldiers’ uniforms and boots. Often, Congolese civilians are kept for days at checkpoints, forced to work for the soldiers. Having no means of transport, Congolese soldiers who have to walk many miles to their postings steal bicycles from the local population and harass the local motorcycle taxi drivers. Fed up with this occurrence, residents of Niangara came out in public protests at the end of October 2009 demanding an end to the theft. Residents of Ngilima, in anticipation of a Congolese army troop rotation, declared December 27 as the “Day without bicycles” and hid their bicycles from the soldiers.[55]

Enough researchers spoke to the FARDC commander in Dungu, General Leon Mushale, about the rampant abuses. He claimed that the problem was isolated: “It is the fault of the man, not of the organization … we are dealing with the problems on a case–by-case basis.” [56] It is unclear if any FARDC soldiers have been punished for abuses committed against the population. “We have taken up the matter of abuses many times with the FARDC high command,” said an international humanitarian worker, “but all they have done is to relocate the worst people, moving the problem, not dealing with it.”[57]

A MONUC military expert said that the problem lies with the leadership of the FARDC and that commanders can do much more to stop the abuses. Residents of Bangadi directly accused the FARDC commander in charge, Major Nelson Mugaba of Battalion Urse, a former CNDP fighter, of allowing his soldiers to commit abuses against the population with absolute impunity. Residents said that the previous commander of the same FARDC troops was better behaved and that there were fewer FARDC abuses prior to the arrival of Major Mugaba in Bangadi. “During his time in Bangadi, living with the FARDC has been like living with a viper,” said a resident of Bangadi.[58] Interviews in Faradje, Ngilima, and Dungu revealed that the behavior of FARDC soldiers depended to a great degree on the behavior of their troop commander.

Failure in the fight against the LRA

Despite military agreements with the Ugandan army, the Congolese army has spectacularly failed in waging any sort of war against the LRA. Operations against the LRA were supposed to be conducted as part of two military operations. The first, Operation Rudia, was launched in September 2008 in an effort to contain the LRA within Garamba National Park and encourage defections. [59] The second, Rudia II, a joint operation with Ugandan intelligence cooperation, began in May 2009 and continues today. The Congolese army has failed to achieve its objectives under these operations. Some FARDC commanders have also intentionally weakened local self-defense forces, the only native groups that put up meaningful resistance to LRA, thus making life easier for the rebels.[60]

It is no coincidence that the worst-behaved FARDC units tend to dismantle the local self-defense forces, the only people who have the capacity to resist both the LRA and abusive Congolese soldiers. Referred to as Arrow Boys due to their primitive guns that include bows and arrows and locally manufactured guns, self-defense forces comprise civilians who try to defend their communities from LRA attacks. In Bangadi, the self-defense forces were forcibly dispersed when Major Mugaba arrived in June 2009. At least two self-defense force members from Bangadi were killed by Congolese soldiers. One of them, killed in June 2009, was shot in the middle of the Bangadi market with no warning, while at least two other members, including the leader of the force, were beaten up and imprisoned for many days.[61] Similarly, self-defense forces in Ngilima and Niangara were also dismantled by Congolese soldiers. “The self-defense forces were the only people who actually fought the LRA,” said a resident of Ngilima, adding, “without them, we are at the mercy of the LRA.”[62]

The role of MONUC[63]

As part of their mandate to protect civilians, MONUC peacekeepers conduct joint patrols with the FARDC. [64] Enough researchers were told by MONUC officials that patrols are conducted in Dungu daily and nightly, although residents of Dungu denied that night patrols took place. MONUC troops in Faradje conduct infrequent joint patrols with the FARDC. Interviews with aid workers familiar with the situation in Dingila revealed that the 15-strong force there does not conduct patrols or any protection activities of any kind. There was no U.N. presence in the areas most affected by LRA violence—Ngilima, Bangadi, and Niangara—as of December 15, 2009.[65]

While the peacekeeping force is offering some protection and access to areas where it has presence, the lack of troops in the worst-affected areas is troublesome. “Our soldiers are tired and too few to oversee such a huge area,” said a MONUC officer, adding, “We have troops in four places and we provide protection to humanitarian agencies to the degree that we can.”[66] The need for more troops has been evident for some time now. A designated 800-strong force from a Tunisian battalion that was supposed to arrive in June 2009 has not yet arrived. A MONUC military officer said, “It is easy to blame us for not protecting civilians but we don’t have enough soldiers. There are 40,000 troops in Kosovo, but only 17,000 in the entire DRC which is a vastly bigger country.”[67]

MONUC troops can certainly do more with the same number of peacekeepers, however. There is a huge need for better communication with the local population, which is growing increasingly hostile to the U.N. presence in the area.[68] A Congolese civil society leader said that there is frustration at the appearance of U.N. soldiers with guns, armored vehicles, and helicopters sitting in Dungu while the LRA kills many in nearby areas.[69] More has to be done to ensure that MONUC’s material support to the Congolese army actually benefits the rank and file and does not simply line the pockets of commanders.

MONUC also offers some training to FARDC soldiers in terms of joint patrolling and escorting convoys. But joint patrols are not done frequently despite evidence that overwhelmingly suggests that Congolese soldiers behave much better when on patrol with MONUC peacekeepers.[70] A Moroccan officer in MONUC said that while patrols happen, in many cases they are decided by the head of unit in charge. He said, “Our primary task is to escort humanitarian convoys and protect the humanitarian agencies and NGOs. MONUC troops are not in charge of protecting civilians. The FARDC is in charge of protection.”[71]

The civilian component of MONUC should play a bigger role in tackling the LRA issue. There is no central cell in Dungu gathering and analyzing information on the LRA. The civilian component is scattered in Kisangani and Goma, many miles away from where the attacks are happening. It is surprising that MONUC did not organize such structures earlier, especially following the brutal LRA attacks of the 2008 “Christmas Massacres.”

Finally, the LRA should be regarded as a regional concern and not just a Ugandan problem. The U.N. Security Council should act accordingly and make the LRA a joint issue for the peacekeeping missions in DRC, Sudan, and CAR. There exists little cooperation at the moment between these missions. After at least three years of LRA activity outside of Uganda, one meeting of high U.N. officials from missions in the region gathered for the first time last December to discuss, among other things, how to deal with the LRA. A previous attempt planned for September 2009 failed because no MONUC high officials turned up.

Conclusion

With the LRA on the run, and facing escalating crises in eastern Congo and southern Sudan, the U.N. Security Council was content to keep the LRA on the backburner of the international security agenda during 2009. It was assumed that the Ugandan army, quietly assisted by the United States and the Congolese army, would be able to keep the LRA off balance and increasingly unable to cause trouble in one of the most remote areas in the region. Despite tangible progress, especially the surrender of several commanders and their troops, the impact of a resurgent LRA and predatory Congolese army presence in Haut Uele attest to the human cost of this arm’s-length approach to the LRA problem. That some LRA fighters have taken refuge in areas of south Darfur, Sudan controlled by the Government of Sudan is yet another disturbing development that merits urgent international investigation and response.

With the LRA replenishing its ranks and close to being able to establish a relatively safe haven near the borders of Sudan and Central African Republic, and the egregious behavior of the Congolese army effectively aiding the rebels, it’s time to up the ante. MONUC should develop a comprehensive civilian protection strategy that should prioritize more effective use of existing resources, especially greater cooperation with the Congolese army that is more rigorously conditioned. Far greater coordination between the U.N. missions in Congo, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic is long overdue, and should be encouraged with the authority of the Security Council, which should treat the LRA as the grave threat to regional peace and security that it has repeatedly demonstrated itself to be.

Endnotes

Enough experts lay out the preliminary deal between the Sudanese Government and the Darfuri rebel group JEM.

^{AP Images / Alfred De Montesquiou}

As the ink still dries on a preliminary deal between the Government of Sudan and Darfur’s largest rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, the situation at the Darfur peace talks in Doha, Qatar is changing rapidly. Here’s an update capturing what we are hearing from various sources in Doha or close to the talks, recognizing that the situation remains highly fluid.

The Justice and Equality Movement - Government of Sudan Framework Agreement

Following up on a draft framework agreement signed in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena last weekend, the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leadership met in Doha on February 23, 2010, to sign a final version of a deal that sets out the terms of their forthcoming negotiations over peace in Darfur. (AlJazeera captured footage from the signing ceremony.)

In large part, the agreement is a pledge to have further negotiations, but it does include some important immediate steps. Key provisions include a two-month ceasefire, release of JEM prisoners in Khartoum (this notably includes JEM leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim’s half-brother), and recognition of JEM as political party. The framework agreement also identified some of the key topics to address during formal talks, including power and wealth sharing and compensation for Darfuri victims, and stipulates that negotiations should conclude by March 15. This rapid timetable is obviously somewhat unrealistic given the complexity of issues such as the demobilization of forces, a fact which even some of the mediators quietly acknowledge.

There is also talk of postponing the state and gubernatorial elections in Darfur until a later date (perhaps November) Contrary to some press reports, our source was confident that the presidential election in Darfur will proceed as planned in April. This formulation on elections has appeal to both JEM and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Bashir would get to claim ‘legitimacy’ with an April presidential victory that included Darfur, and JEM would be given more time to establish itself as a political party before parliamentary and gubernatorial elections take place in Darfur.

JEM’s Khalil Ibrahim insisted in a press conference that no one from his group would stand in the upcoming elections. This declaration would seem to be at odds with his desire to establish JEM as a viable political party. And the insistence perhaps unwittingly acknowledges an unwritten understanding that the Sudanese government would grant political posts to JEM before the rebels would even need to run for office.

We understand that there is also tacit agreement between JEM and the Government of Sudan that a vice presidential position would go to a Darfuri, but not a JEM leader. Ibrahim might receive a governorship.

The Liberation and Justice Movement

Making the situation even more murky, the process of negotiations between JEM and the Sudanese government has been accompanied by a parallel effort to unite other Darfuri rebel groups, a number of whom are now negotiating as a block called the Liberation and Justice Movement. Tensions clearly remain between JEM and these other groups, and the ability to reconcile these tensions will likely determine if the agreements of the last several days are a genuine breakthrough or yet one more series of broken promises.

The African Union-United Nations mediators, the Qatari hosts, and U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration are pushing for the Liberation and Justice Movement to negotiate with the Government of Sudan on a parallel track to JEM, with a plan to bring the two tracks together toward the end of talks. The Liberation and Justice Movement, the Government of Sudan, and the mediators are reportedly putting finishing touches on a framework agreement, which is expected to be made public shortly. The Liberation and Justice Movement framework agreement reportedly closely resembles JEM’s (minus the prisoner release provision).

The Liberation and Justice Movement consists of 10 separate groups, five of which reportedly receive backing from Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi. The groups have more or less rallied around a leader, former governor of Darfur Tijani Seise, though there are already reports of some displeasure among the ranks because he is a civil society leader and not a rebel. There is an understanding that he could be named vice president at the end of negotiations.

One rebel faction still not bought in to this coalition is the group with ties to prominent Darfuri leader Abdel Wahid, who lives in Paris and has refused to join the talks in Doha. This group, known as the Wahid Commanders, issued a statement declaring a commitment to peace, but refusing to join the Liberation and Justice Movement or to accept Tijani Seise as the leader because of his presumed links to the Libyans. Wahid himself was dismissive of the agreement with JEM, calling it a “ceremonial peace.”  International negotiators have long been frustrated by Wahid’s reluctance to join unified talks, but it is also clear that he maintains an important base of support among Darfuris.

Dual Track Negotiations

The mediation team is charging ahead with its dual track approach to negotiations, despite the protestations of JEM leader Ibrahim, who appears to feel that smaller rebel groups and civil society do not deserve a prominent place at the negotiating table. The African Union-United Nations mediators, the Qataris, and the U.S. special envoy all seem to support the parallel negotiation track, not necessarily because they see it as ideal, but because they think it is the best they can do at this moment. This may be an accurate assessment on their part, but there are obvious pitfalls to such an approach.

Perhaps most dangerous to the prospects for peace, JEM appears to be quite cool to the idea of other Darfuri players being given a seat at the table. While JEM may be the most important military force, it is far from representative of all Darfuris. In a press conference, Dr. Khalil suggested that it would be a waste of time to negotiate with the other groups because they do not represent movements. To paraphrase from Dr. Khalil’s statement at a press availability (an exact transcript was not available):

Some of these so-called leaders are taxi drivers in N’Djamena and street sweepers in the Netherlands. They will not negotiate with the Government of Sudan while we are also negotiating. It is up to this forum to choose whether to let us negotiate alone or have the others negotiate. People in Darfur and Kordofan will not accept that movements will be made in the lobby of hotels.

One interpretation of Dr. Khalil’s remarks was that JEM is trying to intimidate the mediators into giving JEM the greatest possible leadership role even while recognizing that the mediation team won’t back down from the parallel track approach and that other groups will have to have their voices heard over time. Ultimately JEM also likely recognizes that this brinkmanship has its dangers, and they could well be blamed if talks collapse – leaving them in a vulnerable position both politically and militarily. Diplomats remain optimistic that the two-track negotiations would proceed and hope that an agreement on the terms of the formal talks can be made public next week.

Calculations for Each Side

The Government of Sudan:
The primary calculations driving the position of the Sudanese Government and its ruling National Congress Party are not difficult to discern in this case. First, an agreement with JEM would allow the western front of Darfur to remain relatively quiet over the next year while the government turns its attention to the larger strategic issue of possible independence for South Sudan and the independence referendum scheduled for January 2011. If war with the South were to reignite, which remains a distinct possibility, the ruling National Congress Party does not want to be fighting a two-front war.

The deal with JEM has also generated considerable speculation that both the National Congress Party and some like-minded Arab states are eager to unify Sudan’s Islamists at a time when the country is facing considerable secessionist pressures. Speculation on this front was further heightened when Dr. Khalil spoke in his public comments about working for the unification of Sudan. This likely struck a nerve not just among southern Sudanese, who very much have their sights set on the independence referendum, but among non-Arab Darfuri rebels and members of civil society. The fact that the Qataris have facilitated the deal with offers of incredible largesse may also fuel concerns surrounding the motives and timing of the JEM deal.

President Bashir is also deeply focused on using the April 2010 national elections as a means to legitimize himself, help fend off war crimes charges from the International Criminal Court, and minimize threats to his rule within his own party. A “successful” election in Darfur, ironically financed in no small part by the international community, would allow Bashir to again argue that he should not be held accountable for his repeated and flagrant violations of international law.

It is also clear from comments of the U.S. special envoy that President Bashir hopes to use the JEM agreement to pave the way for lifting of U.S. sanctions. One can only hope that any consideration of altering the current sanctions regime is based on demonstrable changes on the ground, as per the U.S. policy on Sudan, not simply the willingness for Khartoum to sign a piece of paper.

The Justice and Equality Movement:
Recent Chad-Sudan steps to mend relations put JEM in a difficult military position, with the rebels potentially losing a key source of material support from Chad as well as its base of operations within Chad. JEM leadership likely recognized that this unique moment of time – with the convergence of interests between the presidents of Chad and Sudan and the Qataris pushing hard for a deal – was likely the high water mark for them being able to gain concessions. By striking a deal, JEM may also calculate that they could be seen as a genuine game-changer by Darfuris, allowing them to expand their influence from being primarily based on military strength to becoming more of a political force.

The Liberation and Justice Movement:
The various factions unified under the newly formed Liberation and Justice Movement understand that they must present a united front to negotiate with the Sudanese government, and they have been feeling pressure from international actors to do so. While some of these smaller groups may be uncomfortable with how negotiations have played out so far, some are genuinely eager for peace and others are feeling squeezed by their respective patrons. In short, those groups that have joined the Liberation and Justice Movement may see this as the only game in town.

Qatar:
Qatar has driven the negotiations, much more so than the United States, European Union, African Union-United Nations mediators, or the Egyptians. The Qataris are eager to be able to take credit for backing the negotiations. They demonstrate an Arab unity of purpose, and are willing to put in enormous resources to advance their goals. Amid initial reports that the Qataris pledged $1 billion for reconstruction in Darfur, they upped the ante and pledged $2 billion. The gravitational pull of these huge financial sums on rebel groups should not be underestimated. As the Egyptians look on with ambitions to step in as host if the Doha talks fail, Qatar remains under pressure to bring a deal to closure. Notably, while Qatar may be in a position to broker the deal, there is little to suggest that they would be an effective force in overseeing its implementation.

United States:
Special Envoy Gration’s number one priority seems to be nailing down the security arrangements for Darfur and stabilizing the country in preparation for southern Sudan’s 2011 referendum on self-determination. There seems to be an understanding between the special envoy and National Congress Party officials that rolling back sanctions is the prize on the table for negotiating with Chad and making inroads in talks with Darfuri rebels.

The African Union-United Nations mediation team:

The contract for lead mediator Djibril Bassolé will expire in just over two months, so he is under pressure to show that the peace process has progressed during his 18 months at the helm.

Potential Warning Signs

Obviously, a durable and comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur would be enormously welcome, and could help pave the way for the three million Darfuris who have been violently driven from their homes to return in an environment of genuine security. But by the same token, the numerous failed peace deals that have littered the landscape not only in Darfur, but in Sudan more broadly, remind us that good faith has often been absent from these deals. Agreements on paper have often not even been cursorily implemented. The hard experiences of Sudan’s recent history mandate that optimism be tempered with realism.

In that spirit, the rapid timetable for negotiating highly complex issues, JEM’s dismissive attitudes toward other Darfuri groups, including civil society, and the reluctance of certain key rebel groups to join the process stand out as distinct warning signs. Any set of agreements should also include international mechanisms for monitoring their implementation, something that has been a major flaw of earlier pacts. It remains somewhat troubling that these agreements do not seem to reflect a well-coordinated international position, but rather a series of ad hoc arrangements between a diffuse set of actors trying to calm the situation without necessarily resolving it. Moreover, the situation on the ground in Darfur remains highly volatile, posing a threat to the negotiations in Doha. It is our hope that all of these obstacles can be overcome, and further agreements can be supported by a robust, effective peacekeeping force on the ground – an element that has been painfully missing to date.