Transcript: March 4 ICC Press Call
Center for American Progress
March 4, 2009
9:00 a.m. EST
Operator: Good day ladies and gentlemen and welcome to your Enough Project Conference Call. All lines have been placed on a listen-only mode and the floor will be open for your questions and comments following a presentation. If you should require assistance throughout the conference, please press star zero. At this time, it is my pleasure to turn the floor over to your host, Eileen Read. Ma'am the floor is yours.
EILEEN READ, MEDIA RELATIONS, ENOUGH PROJECT: Good morning. This is Eileen Read speaking. I handle Media Relations at the Enough Project. Our Executive Director, John Norris will be speaking first and then John Prendergast, Co-Founder of the Enough Project and then Professor, David Crane who is the Former Founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. John Norris?
JOHN NORRIS, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, ENOUGH PROJECT: Yes, thank you everyone for joining us. John Prendergast will talk a little bit about the impact on Sudanese politics, the likely fallout of the warrant, David with his extensive experience in international justice will touch on what this means in terms of the broader context for international justice and how this will likely unfold as we go forward. And I just want to add a few comments on top.
I think this is a very good day for international justice. I think it's a very good day for improved prospects for peace in Sudan that there is a lot of commentators and all the folks out there whose first reaction in the face of a warrant, and for – in this case for war crimes and crimes against humanity is just that the situation on the ground will get worse, the peace will somehow become impossible that everything will be more difficult and more risky and I think that's simply isn't borne out by the international experience today.
Clearly, there is no obvious vehicle to deliver Bashir to the court immediately. But as we have seen it with Charles Taylor, as we have seen it with Slobodan Milosevic, as we have seen with the more than 50 people who were convicted by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, justice does find a way and this really does give a clear stamp from the international community that the crimes and the hanis (ph) crimes that have occurred Darfur can be traced in a bright and direct line back to the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. And really, we think that it makes peace much more possible and much more likely because it's the first time the President Bashir has actually been held accountable for any of his actions and it's the first time that he says the significant cause from the international community for his devices – and deadly divide and conquer style politics both in Darfur and in the earlier civil war with the south.
So I think it really is an important day. I think that clearly everybody who has looked at Darfur, who has worked on the ground Sudan really doesn't have a lot of question or doubts that those activities that have taken place, the organizing of the Janjaweed, the attacks on civilians were organized by the government and organized by the government intelligent services of the highest level. So, in some ways I think the court is to be congratulated for handing down the decision that clearly identifies the problem and clearly holds President Bashir accountable. John, do you want to touch a little bit on what this means for Sudan as we go forward?
JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, ENOUGH PROJECT: Thank you. You know three – three kinds of groups, one, inside Darfur; second, the surrounding region, some of the connections and alliances that the government of Sudan has and the impact this warrant will have; and then thirdly, on the internal domestic situation, hopefully in two minutes.
First, inside Darfur. I have been in there eight times now in the last five years. And in those eight visits, we found – from interviewing countless numbers of displaced and war affected Darfurians, they don't see a tension between justice and peace. And they feel that it will be impossible to have peace without justice. And these refugees and displaced people that have been the sort of the – the visible impact of the crimes against humanity that have unfolded in Darfur put the problem, I think, in – in a clearest of terms, one after the other tells you how can you have peace when the President of Sudan is trying to exterminate us. And it's interesting that one of the accounts and then David can speak more about this, this extermination.
Regionally, I think Bashir's troubles are mounting though you are not going to see this play out on the – on the pages of newspapers or in press conferences, I think his staunchest supporters are backing away from him slowly. China is deeply concerned about its oil investments and how they might be put at risk by Bashir's continued warmongory (ph) and the isolation that he will increasingly realize as a result of this warrant and Arab states have very similar concerns about their own huge investments in the oil fueled economic boom that exists in Sudan. Egypt in particular, I think, sees Bashir as a liability given his – given Bashir's word for the assassination attempt against Mubarak in '95 and his support for Saddam Hussein in the two Gulf Wars and then finally his support for Hamas now. Arabia, Egyptians are fed up, President Mubarak sees the Islamic movement in Sudan is the most dangerous in the region and his patience has simply run out.
Finally, thirdly, inside Sudan – inside the capital. Tensions, I think are boiling within the – within the government in response to these challenges and – and particularly in response to this warrant. Some insiders within the regime want to find an exit strategy for Bashir, whether that involves some kind of retirement or standing in doubt in advance of coming elections, I don't think he will be humiliated, but I do think that there is a sentiment that says we don't want going into the elections later in 2009, we don't want an indicted war criminal as our – as our candidate. This group would then shift if they could manage a replacement towards greater accommodation of the international community, which then gives us more an opening for peace. But others – there are other voices, as there always are, that are much more hard line, wanting to impose martial law, withdraw from the north peace deal and – and you are going to see some probably fairly substantial reprisals against some of the NGOs, the humanitarian groups in the coming weeks.
And I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that that millions of Sudanese lives in Darfur and in the south hang in the balance on which group emerge as victorious in regards to whether a new attack is taken of accommodation or whether escalation is the – is the rule of the day and how the Obama administration handles all this is going to – is going to have a major impact on the outcome. We can talk about that in the discussion.
David, go ahead.
DAVID CRANE, FORMER FOUNDING CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: Well, thank you, John, both John Norris and John Prendergast. I think it's been a, not only an amazing day but just to put it in a brief context, an amazing week. Last Wednesday we started out this amazing seven days with the conviction of the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front, whom I indicted back in March of 2003 and we saw convictions for not only Charles's soldiers and for the first time in history attacks on UN peacekeepers. So, one that is very important and significant and that is a new crime against humanity which we drafted, call forced marriage in times of our conflict. We also saw last week on Friday the prosecution team from the special court for Sierra Leone rest its case against former President Charles Taylor, the African Head of the State ever to be indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
On Sunday, we see the international trial – Administrative Tribunal of Lebanon start the process in the case of – for the assassination of Hariri. I mean of course today, we see the arrest warrant of the sitting President of Sudan, Umar al-Bashir. Just to put this quickly in context, I mean just ten years ago, this would evolve in a legal period; I know that John Norris and John Prendergast would – would (INAUDIBLE) on this. We have moved incredibly though sometimes strict fully and then certainly not defending that it's perfect, but we have made great strides in the movement of facing down what I call the beast of impunity. This indictment today in my opinion, as it did, when I sealed the indictment against President Charles Taylor in June of 2003, we will bring peace. I agree with John, I think that the President of Sudan's political support will begin to soften and dry out as people pull away because no one wants to be seen or dealing with a – an indicted war criminal.
But the Taylor case, the parallels between the first indictment against the sitting Head of the State, Charles Taylor and Umar al-Bashir are striking, it was a peace process. We have the indictment. We see diplomats and politicians seeking solutions to deal with the indictment. We see Taylor's and will probably see Bashir's political support unraveling. There was a solution made and Taylor and I am sure Bashir eventually will be forced to move in some kind of political accommodation at first. But then what's important is that the peace process truly began to move forward either the comprehensive peace process that we have in Sudan or the (INAUDIBLE) peace courts that we are starting when I unsealed the indictment the day it started back in June of 2003. And that peace process that was begun with the indictment of Charles Taylor ended up with the election of first female Head of State in the history of Africa, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia and now is on at least a tentative road to potentially a sustainable peace.
So this is an incredible week, an incredible day for International Criminal Law, but it's also an important day and we always have to remember that this is for and about the victims of – of these horror stories that we were discussing and the justice though imperfect moves forward and this whole process has been capped by the arrest warrant that was issued this morning.
So with that, I will – I will finish and I look forward to a good dialog.
NORRIS: Eileen, do you want to moderate the questions? How this next step going –
READ: The operator is still to conduct. We will go ahead and start. Is Scott Valoff (ph) on the call?
Operator: Ma'am, would you like me to open the floor for questions?
READ: Yes, yes please, operator.
Operator: Thank you. The floor is now open for questions. If you do have a question, please press star one on your telephone keypad at this time. Questions will be taken in the order they are received. If you are using a speakerphone, we ask that while posing your question you pick up your handset to provide favorable sound quality. If at any time your question has been answered, you can remove yourself from the queue by pressing pound. Again, ladies and gentlemen, if you do have a question or comment, please press star one on your telephone keypad at this time. Please hold while we hold for questions.
Our first question comes from Isabel Qualo (ph), an African Correspondent. Please state your question.
ISABEL QUALO (ph), AFRICAN CORRESPONDENT: My question is what do you think about the fact that the genocide charge has not been accepted at this stage by the judges? My second question would be what is now the biggest not to crack (ph) in terms of lobbying? Will it be China, will it be the U.S., which abstained from the referral at the Security Council? Thank you very much.
NORRIS: David, do you want to handle the first part of that question and then John and I can handle the – the second half?
CRANE: That will be fine. Well, again, I don't think it's a moment to take – to be disheartened by the fact that – that the charge of genocide was not returned. The issue being is has the (INAUDIBLE) of the offences against the people of Darfur still been framed in indictment, and the answer is it has. Be mindful of semantic issues related to what we call, what has been going on. There is still some debate as to whether it was or was not a genocide. But at the end of the day, the end result is we have a – a prosecution for the – the horror story that was Darfur and then as they go forward with the various parts of the charges, the facts will come out and that the world will know what the President of Sudan has done as well as his – as his cohorts. And the key to these types of international prosecutions as we did in West Africa is to ensure that the world understands and appreciates through the – the delivery of facts in a court room exactly what took place and then there is accountability based on that.
So, the fact that genocide charge was not – not brought back, that's not something that will – will prevent justice from being done. Genocide is a tough charge to prove and it's – I think a good example that the International Criminal Court has looked at this coldly, soberly, fairly and openly and they have allowed a movement forward with a – with an indictment that is supportable. And then in reality, you will see the facts that has played out over the past many years and Bashir and his men's rule, will still come out and – and the prosecutor has said he has a strong and should there be a conviction, then the world will know what – what has happened in Darfur and that there will be a solid historical record as well as a legal record as to what took place.
NORRIS: On the issue of the deferral, this is John Norris, I think there is zero momentum for invoking Article 16 at this point in large part because I think the U.S. has been a staunch supporter of the Court moving forward and I think that there is very little sentiments from Susan Rice, the UN, from Secretary of State, Clinton, the State Department from President Obama, who has spoken very forcefully out on the situation in Darfur to give Sudan a free pass at this point. And the other reason that there is very little momentum for a deferral is frankly the actions of President Bashir, he has been fiercely unapologetic. He has made no concrete or demonstrable step towards peace. His intelligence and security officials are threatening to cut off limbs of people who speak out in favor of the Court in Khartoum. Bashir himself said that the Court could eat its warrant yesterday. There have been continued aerial attacks from the Sudanese government in Darfur in violations of numerous UN resolutions and breaking any number of commitments, and not a single sign that Sudan's government is serious about peace, about allowing IDPs and refugees to return home and absent those conditions why in God's name would anyone consider a deferral. Deferral and Article 16 can only be invoked in extraordinary circumstances and in the broader interest of peace. And it's clear right now that the government of Sudan isn't interested in peace and thus there is no need, I think, to even consider Article 16.
PRENDERGAST: And to the question of China, and it's definitely the most difficult diplomatic not to crack as you are asking, I think, and – and the opportunity really exists here for the United States and China to work together on the thing that they do agree on. They certainly don't agree on the Article 16 invocation as China will continue to halfheartedly introduce conversations in New York at the Security Council in favor of – just to appease and satisfy its commercial partner in Khartoum. But they do share – the U.S. and China share an interest in peace in Darfur and peace in the south and I think this is a tremendous opportunity now for the Obama administration to name its special envoy, get that envoy out into the field and one of its – his or her first visits ought to be to Beijing to talk to the Chinese about how we can work together on securing and supporting this – this securing of a peace deal in Darfur and the implementation of the CPA.
QUALO (ph): Thank you.
PRENDERGAST: Next question.
Operator: Thank you. Our next question comes from Olivia Ward, Foreign Affairs Writer. Please state your question.
OLIVIA WARD, FOREIGN AFFAIRS WRITER: Hello. I would like to ask probably John Prendergast, what will happen if Bashir were to be arrested, what are the other possibilities? And do you think that they would really be significantly better?
PRENDERGAST: You know I think that – that we know illusions about who – this is a cabal, a hunter, a group of – of people who make a – who make the major decisions and Bashir is the face of that cabal. He is not – his voice is not any more powerful than say his Head of Security, Salah Gosh or his Presidential Advisor, Nafie Ali Nafie. These are the – these are the three probably most important actors along with the Defense Minister. And so, I think that if there was a replacement engineered and I think this would be a – I think it will be a consensus position that would be secured within the ruling party's leadership as opposed to (INAUDIBLE) and I think that it would be done with the – with the international relations in mind with other states that otherwise will have a tremendous problem with conducting business as usual with the regime headed by an indicted war criminal as David said.
So, I think it's much better, I think that the opportunity if Bashir is replaced is much better for a peace deal than if he stays because I think that there can be some measure of placing the sins of the regime on this – on this occurring at a state (ph) and then moving inside and pursuing a more accommodation as well. That is clearly the best case scenario but one that can be influenced by a very strong and united international response to this indictment. If no one backs it up by downgrading their relations with this regime, if no one – none of the major ICC supporters particularly in Europe do anything about it then, certainly it will probably continue to be business as usual for the Sudanese regime, they probably will continue to do as John has just described, and in terms of the escalation of attacks if there is no response but a few speeches by people in New York or – or other places. But if there is a very significant repercussion, even if it's a slight downgrade in diplomatic relations, this matters greatly to this government, it's not the Taliban, they don't want to be isolated. And so, this would be the – the cause that would actually influence the behavioral change and potentially a change in leadership.
And so that's – that's I think in itself would be one of the principal drivers for a more accommodation, is more flexible position on the part of the government over the course of the next year with respect to peace negotiations, which puts the owners of responsibility on the international community, particularly the Obama administration to A, ensure that there is a strong response to the – to the indictment, particularly the arrest warrant and then B, that there is a follow-up effort to bring about a peace deal in Darfur that is much more focused and comprehensive than the existing one.
Next one?
Operator: Thank you. Our next question comes from Margaret Besheer of the Enough Project. Please state your question.
MARGARET BESHEER, VOICE OF AMERICA: Hi. I think they got that wrong. I am from Voice of America. I am just wondering first of all, can they try Bashir in absentia at the ICC and how long will the – will the case take? And also, how does this impact now the other cases with (INAUDIBLE) I mean in terms of Article 16, do you think they might be more amendable to turning them over now and maybe getting a 16 for Bashir or how do you think that's going to play out?
NORRIS: David, that sounds like it's perfectly up your alley.
CRANE: Yes, well, there is no trial in absentia in modern international criminal law. So he will have to be personally present for his trial, which at the end of the day will take place. This is now a process that will begin in, as John Prendergast, I think very correctly pointed out, the politicians and diplomats now are going to have to inform their conduct to now this indictment that's on the table, the work is already and has already been working on and what do we do now with him. And so, we will eventually see him set aside and then he will be handed over to the court. This may take weeks, months or could even take years as in – as in the Charles Taylor case.
As to the – the other indictments, certainly one can do – one of the several things one can join them as we say as we did in the West African tribunal where we had three joint criminal trials against the leadership of the war infection (ph). So, indictments could be joined and have one joint criminal trial with Bashir and others. That's a possibility, but that's a decision that's made by the prosecutor, I think could be efficient way to do it because of the same evidence, same witnesses, what have you. So, I would be looking for that. I don't think that they would try them one at a time. But I don't think the Article 16 idea, which I fully agree with John Norris and John Prendergast, I know of no real other than from various fractions in the African Union, I know of no real political interest at this point of going down that road, I think that they are going to allow the indictment to stand and let the political process because now, in some ways ladies and gentlemen, this is really now a political process, it's about to start, not a legal one. The legal work has been done, the indictment has been drafted, the case is spared, the chamber has issued an arrest warrant. Now it is up to the obligations and for state parties to turn the indicted war criminals go for open and fair trial.
That will be a political decision with political arrangements being made, particularly since one of the indictees is a sitting Head of State.
PRENDERGAST: And – and in light of that, this is John Prendergast. In light of that political kind of next phase that we are – that we are just beginning now to – to try to zero in on the question, I don't believe that – that those that are against the invocation of Article 16 now will be impressed with at this late point, the Sudanese government handing in the two other suspects, sort of trading them for the – the indictment of Bashir. So I don't think that's on the table. I think the only thing that people would – would give people pass and potentially be a catalytic moment for the use of the Article 16 would be if a peace deal was actually signed in for Darfur and there was actually the beginning of the implementation. I think then if you look at the ICC charter in the interest of peace and you could see the possibility of a significant debate amongst those that have held out so far against Article 16 about whether or not to invoke it at that point. And again, as David said, that's a political decision, not necessarily any kind of an empirical or automatic trigger for a one kind of issue or another, it's definitely a political process. Next question?
Operator: Thank you. Our next question comes from Joe Lauria of the Wall Street Journal. Please state your question.
JOE LAURIA, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL: Yes, I would like to ask John Prendergast, what it makes a criticism out of Africa and elsewhere and this is essentially white justice or Eurocentric justice because you have never seen American or European leader being indicted like this for similar crime?
PRENDERGAST: No, I think that – that the prosecutor is attempting and – and the state so far involved in ICC cases are attempting to address the – the three big ticket items that the ICC is – what's created to address, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. And, you know three of the first four cases have been the government themselves referring the cases, in the case of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and Uganda, it's not like these or – European states referring these cases. It is the governments themselves that have chosen their signatories to the ICC to refer some fairly extraordinary crimes that are being committed in their – in their territories to the – to the tribunal. The only one that isn't – that wasn't a government itself – government referred case is this case of Darfur which the Security Council referred two years ago. And I – I know that this prosecutor is examining evidence on a few other cases, I am sure David can talk a little more about it and he loves it, you would, David, but that – that it is, I think we are going to see ten years from now, a fairly global reach on the part of this court, it's beginning where it's – where it's got the opportunities which is where governments themselves had actually referred cases. And in the case of Sudan, a highly political process led to the Security Council against many predictions actually referring the case. So, it is a very, very difficult process to get in the – to get the Security Council to agree unanimously to refer a case. So, David, do you want to say anything more about this – about this?
CRANE: Well, yes, there are – there is no sinister plot or a major focus on just Africa. John very correctly points out that almost all of the – the cases that have been referred to the ICC had been done through the Security Council or state party referral. The prosecutor hasn't referred something by himself yet. He has only been doing what he has been asked to do and I think that's important to know. And he is certainly involved in other investigations worldwide, Colombia just comes to mind.
So again, I agree with John, in ten years we will see as this new Court and we have in this Court (ph) – this new Court, this new permanent Court begins to flex its links, we will see that it will be seeking appropriate cases throughout the world. So, I think it's a matter of circumstance and not intent. I just like to point out that you know the – there were 20 African countries that – the founders of the International Criminal Court. And I think currently there are 30 that are state's parties. So, again, Africa has stepped up to replace. Africa is ready to seek justice for victims and they certainly have done so by signing on to the International Criminal Court. And so, again, I would just underscore that it's circumstance not intent as far as the way this has been going thus far.
NORRIS: And I would – this is John Norris, I would just add to that, certainly if you look at the case of the former Yugoslavia and that was done by intent. Hague tribunal before the ICC was created, but there I think we see that Europeans say it's those in North America you know were equally tough on demanding justice regardless of the color of anyone's skin that we have seen more than 50 prosecutions across the former Yugoslavia. I think in almost every one of the successor of states of the former Yugoslavia, there was intense pressure by the European Union to turn over indicted war criminals as a precondition for moving towards membership in the European Union. And I think that the application of justice really does not fall disproportionately on any one content or the other. And I think what we are seeing is a shared sentiment around the globe that impunity is simply is no longer credible in this day and age and that any country and any leader that engages in wholesale attacks on their own civilians and then on their own population will be held accountable.
PRENDERGAST: Next question?
Operator: Thank you. Our next question is from Neil Macfarquhar, a UN Correspondent. Please state your question.
NEIL MACFARQUHAR; UN CORRESPONDENT: Hi, good morning. I have two questions. One technical and one analytical. The first one is a technical. Are other states in the region accountable for arresting Bashir if he attended an Arab summit or if he went to a peace conference in Doha and Qatar, something like that? Or they under any obligation to arrest him? That's first question. Second one, since the possibility of indictment has been first – was first broached there has been kind of a sentiment in the UN that the Sudanese has been amendable, they have been more cooperative with UNAMID deployment issues and things like that and they also did attend the peace talks in Doha. So, do you see now that it's been – the warrant has been handed down, will that – will they continue that and try find ways to cooperate or would they go the other way and just sort of kind of evolve away from any kind of cooperation, go back to their belligerent – more belligerent stance that had in the past?
NORRIS: Well, I will go ahead and address the arrest obligation issue. When one is indicted as a war criminal be it through the ad hoc tribunals or the hybrid tribunals or in the International Criminal Court, all parties that are members of the United Nations or states parties to their own statute do have an obligation to – to arrest and turn over to the International Criminal Court anybody who is indicted for an appropriate trial. So …
MACFARQUHAR: But if they are not signatories to their own statute, does it – does it matter, I mean if they are not …
CRANE: Well, actually, you know it really doesn't matter, Neil, the – the Geneva conventions back in 1940, and I will go all the way back to state that when one commits war crimes, there is an obligation by anyone all nations to – to investigate, arrest and prosecute or handle, or to an appropriate party and prosecute anyone. So, the concept and the process has been around for – for many, many decades and the current modern international criminal law still reflects the – this obligation. So, the indictments now really from a practical point of view box in President Bashir because certainly no state is going to allow him to land in their territory knowing that they have an obligation to do something, it will be very embarrassing and also a slap in the face of international justice or at least laying down a marker saying here is how we feel about this indictment to allow Bashir to travel anywhere because again, this all encompassing obligation to – to arrest and hand over, which has always been a problem ladies and gentlemen, related to international criminal justice and that is the legal process moves forward like we have seen. And again, this is the political decision as to what we do with that legal process. And again, the handover of a sitting Head of State or any war criminal in most instances a critical decision. So, prison (ph) arrest obligation. And so, I – I – it will be interesting to see if he travels at all.
PRENDERGAST: I think – Neil, it's John Prendergast. I think like Mugabe, he will test it and there will be some non-signatory states who will gladly welcome him, and somebody (ph) knows that these kinds of institutions. But I think in general terms, anyone who has been a signatory would follow what David is saying but I do think there are some states that – that will be happy to have him come just to – just to make some kind of a symbolic statement against this kind of world government.
On the second – on your second question, the – the – I think we are going to see a – an increase of course in redirect like what we saw with Salah Gosh the other day talking about beheading anyone who supports this thing. And I think we will see in practical terms on the ground increased witch hunts particularly within the relief agencies and Darfur civil society, human rights or civil rights groups, anyone who cooperated in any way, shape or form with the ICC investigation or even those that they don't want any more in the country, they are going to accuse of having cooperated with the ICC and we will see expulsions and in some cases probably arrests and torture if they are Sudanese. And I think – so that – that is definitely going to – we have already seen an increase in that in the – in the week or two before the announcement today.
But on the – on the broader political questions with respect to UNAMID deployment with respect to their negotiating posture (ph) in Doha or wherever the follow-on negotiations end up being, especially if the United States gets involved in a more direct way and with respect to the comprehensive peace agreement between the north and the south, you are going to see the potential for a much – a much more amendable position on the part of Khartoum because well, for two reasons, I think; number one, Bashir himself has invested interest in being seen to be more moderate. It's his only ticket; again, it's all political, as David said. So no one can tell us for sure if or if not he will ever get a Article 16 deferral. But I can tell you his chances increase astronomically for a deferral if he is able to (INAUDIBLE) a peace deal for – in Darfur. And if he is replaced or retired and his – whoever comes in behind him and there is a discussion about that now within the ruling regime, within the ruling party, then similarly this will blend the possibility of Ocampo bringing further indict, further arrest warrants, further cases against other senior members of the National Congress Party.
So I think we are going to – and last, and the one – the one thing that can clear the mist is if there is no response for the international community, if they don't – if there is a big shoulder shrug in response to this arrest warrant and the Sudanese government sees once again that its words and not action that the international community is – is bringing to the situation then I think we will see some escalation and intensification on the ground in Darfur, some pulling back on implementation of the CPA particularly preparation for referendum and election. And of course, in – back to the ways of – of selection with respect to UNAMID. But you are right, there has been some incremental changes in terms of the practical acts – interactions with the government on a day-to-day basis, has with the international on some issues, then I do think that is a reflection of the leverage that the arrest warrant is going to provide to the international community should they choose to use it to gain some fairly significant progress on some of the interactable issues that have plagued the country over the last couple of years.
NORRIS: And I would just add, this is John Norris again that I think this is a mistake that kind of armed chair analysts make again and again, they made it in former Yugoslavia looking at Bolshevik, in Liberia looking Taylor and in Sudan looking at Bashir and assuming that an arrest warrant or indictment will make the President completely belligerent. And I think the – the indictee in that position understands that they need to be belligerent enough to try to control their internal opposition, but if they really do become maximalists. If they start going after UN peacekeepers, if they go on a wholesale offensive, they will only effectively galvanize a more forceful international response. And I think that there is a lot of people in Bashir's own party who understand that probably as well or even better than Bashir.
So, I think they will test the senses as John Prendergast rightly points out, they will be antagonistic if there is no effective international response but I think that they understand the mistakes have really risen dramatically today. And then if they continue the practices that they have in the past, they will face an escalating cause for that (INAUDIBLE).
Next question? Operator?
Operator: Thank you.
NORRIS: Thanks.
Operator: I am sorry.
NORRIS: That's OK.
Operator: Our next question is from Marisa Buchanan of Producer. Please state your question.
MARISA BUCHANAN, PRODUCER: Hi. I just wanted to follow up on something that was mentioned earlier. What are your thoughts on the next steps for the Obama administration and how they reconcile not technically recognizing the ICC and supporting this arrest warrant going forward? And then also, in terms of an envoy that's been bantered about a little bit, what do you think of the timetable for that – for the U.S.?
NORRIS: John, do you want to go ahead?
PRENDERGAST: On the – you got the first and I will take the second one. On the – on the envoy, I do know that – that in the aftermath ironically of – of a – a visit by everyone's favorite Hollywood Darfur activist to – to the White House last Monday when Clooney came out afterwards and announced to the press that the administration was going to name a special envoy. That certainly accelerated the timetable in a positive way for the naming of a senior official. So we have – we have I think in the – the works are fairly intensive process within the – the administration, both the policy review which you know every administration does on high profile issues, anyway, the matter of course, which is – which will be concluded soon and the – the search for the right person to do the job of special envoy and a team that would go with that person. So, I think it's all coming soon and I think the – it's unfortunate as it was not in place today so that they could start from – from this extraordinary opportunity of – of leverage that is provided by the arrest warrant to actually start working. But – but I think it will come soon, I think people are, as they say, sees at the matter and I think that this search will be concluded soon hopefully and we will get somebody named in the game. Go ahead and get the first question there, John.
NORRIS: Yes. And in terms of how the administration approaches the broader issues of international justice and whether it supports the court or not, I think in a lot of way can be effectively disentangled from this specific case. Clearly the big issues with Bashir are what is the Obama administration's approach on Article 16. I think they made it clear that they will not support a deferral or are they willing to put in place a senior special envoy and try to lead coordinated and strategic peace process that looks not only at the situation in Darfur but at the (INAUDIBLE) fray in the north-south peace agreement, are they willing to hold partners feet to the fire on Bashir and on the peace process, are they willing to have smart and strategic diplomacy with the Chinese and other economic partners of Sudan, they make the case that stability can best be achieved without Bashir at this point. And I think those issues really are in a lot of ways separate from the much longer and detailed review that the state department and other say that they are going to conduct on the administration's position towards the court that involves a lot of complicated issue including the treatment of U.S. servicemen serving in peacekeeping operations or in military operations of their own. You know I think that will take a great deal of time before they land on a position, then I know that David, I am sure can speak on this and appreciate that better than I do. There is an awful lot of complicated legal issues from Geneva conventions to Guantanamo to the International Criminal Court that the administration is going to have to give a very thoughtful and very comprehensive review to. So I don't think Sudan policy necessarily needs to get caught in that trap.
READ: Operator?
Operator: Our next question comes from Matthew Lee, a reporter for Inner City Press. Please state your question.
MATTHEW LEE, REPORTER, INNER CITY PRESS: Yes, hello. I just want to – I wanted to ask – (INAUDIBLE) at the UN, a lot of issues have risen about whether the two UN peacekeeping missions, UNAMID and UNMIS provided information in any way that led to the indictment. And so, one of the issues, I just wanted to know if you guys could speak to whether you think that the indictment has any potential to make it less likely in the future that a leader or a person like Bashir would – can stand to a UN peacekeeping mission coming in? And also just in light of the – the sort of the very positive sense, do you think that the indictment of Joseph Coney, in general, led to – led to more peace or less and what if the Cambodia tribunal seems to kind of mired in trouble, I didn't hear that in the sort of the – the list of great tribunals? So, if you could address those, I would appreciate it.
CRANE: John, do you want – I take sort of the Coney part?
PRENDERGAST: You know, David, why don't you start out with the Cambodia piece?
CRANE: Well, again, the Cambodia tribunal is a politically constructed attempt to seek some justice for a horror story that took place. This is one of those steps by mankind to try to seek some justice, not perfect justice. And certainly the way it has been set up, it is a Cambodian court with international presence and it is going to be injected with a great deal of politics particularly since individuals who are accountable or a part of the tragedy move about the – about the court and move about the area for the times. At the end of the day, (INAUDIBLE) for criminal justice is politics and it is a smart prosecutor and it is a smart diplomat or politician that understands that, lives with that and works with the idea that there is issues related to peace and justice, I don't call it peace versus justice because both actually have to happen. Sometimes peace first, then justice or sometimes justice then peace. But certainly (INAUDIBLE) a long-term and possibility of a sustainable peace.
PRENDERGAST: And in terms of the UN peacekeeping mission question, you know it's a reasonable question. I don't think President Bashir accepted a very water down UNAMID because of his great love for peace or his desire to bring stability to Darfur. I think he accepted and negotiated down the terms of the peacekeeping mission as a way to, in an effort to preclude justice, in an effort to preclude more effective peace talks or negotiations or a more sensible approach to what was going on in the ground. So, you know obviously every – every leader has to make some hard decisions about whether a peacekeeping mission should be put in place and I would hope that the UN and the Security Council does a better job of only being willing to authorize peacekeeping missions that have the basic hallmarks in place to succeed in their mission. And I think there were a lot of concerns rightly expressed at the highest levels of the UN particularly in DPKO as UNAMID was being formed that it was not designed to succeed. And I think what we have seen on the ground is that those assessments were exactly right.
So, as to the evidence question, you know I think that the killings and what has happened in mass displacement in Darfur have been so clearly orchestrated from Khartoum that the Janjaweed have so clearly been a (INAUDIBLE) for the government of Sudan. And I think the prosecutor probably had an embarrassment of riches as far as evidence goes. So, I don't know if he did or not rely on evidence presented or provided by peacekeepers but certainly he had numerous sources to receive evidence.
CRANE: Just, Matthew …
PRENDERGAST: Yes, go ahead, David, go ahead, David please.
CRANE: Just real quickly, the UN does have a support agreement with the ICC and the part of that support agreement does authorize and allow the exchange of information to – to International Criminal Court, but that's not something extraordinary, that is just a logical follow-on the obligation or all state parties and nations to support war crimes prosecutions.
LEE: Just one, if you don't mind, I just – I can't understand – (INAUDIBLE) on the Coney thing, I just wanted to say there was a press conference here by the head of peacekeeping (INAUDIBLE) and he went out of his way to say all the UN in Sudan provided were regularly written reports as – to the Security Council that they – they say it's very plain (ph) that they are making no investigations for the ICC and they put out press releases from – on this to that effect. So I might – might then – just I mean to make – for example, Somalia, (INAUDIBLE) peacekeeping mission. If you can imagine (INAUDIBLE) Somalia saying, yes, we will have you in only if you commit not to provide evidence about what we have done here. Is there any in that, that's all I meant. That's all I require. I just meant in future peacekeeping missions, whether this unresolved question of whether evidence will be provided to the ICC might make it less likely for a leader to say, sure come in.
CRANE: I don't think that – I don't think it's unresolved, Matthew. I think that it is resolved. They do not – they are not as a matter of their mandate authorize to be sharing information or executing – supporting the activities of the ICC beyond just the report that – you know the regular reporting to the Security Council, I don't think this is going to be – and I think for the reasons you are raising that you are not going to see the Security Council try to add to the mandates of these peacekeeping missions and additional activity of quietly providing information and garnering and providing information for the International Criminal Court because that nobody will invite them in in that case. So certainly you have hit it – you have hit at the nail on the head. And – but I think now if they are individuals that are provided, we don't have that information, but certainly as a matter of policy – I am sorry to interrupt you, John. Go ahead.
PRENDERGAST: Yes. I think that the question is somewhat upside down. I mean I think the real lesson going forward for leaders is that if there is an ongoing UN operation on the ground, if there is international attention, you shouldn't keep committing war crimes and crimes against humanity and that you can't do so with impunity. And that will increasingly be the case whether or not there is a UN operation on the ground. And so, I think the – the real lesson and the real problem is the ongoing conduct of war crimes not the international mechanisms for responding to that.
NORRIS: Yes, that's (INAUDIBLE) underscore it and please don't get the impression what I was saying which is that – that the peacekeeping forces that are out on the field are not police arms of criminal court, but you know logical back and forth of providing information that they stumble on or if they were to provide goes through obviously the UN headquarters and the decision is made to give it to them. But yes, certainly we don't have – and agree with the – the Head of DPKO, we are not – UN is not being a police force for the ICC indeed.
LEE: Just last follow-up because it's sort of you have gotten down to – the reason I said it was unresolved is that there was this case, the Fatos Lubonja case at the ICC in which DPKO asked for confidential treatment for information they provided against Fatos Lubonja and they said that it shouldn't be shared with the defense. So it was pretty clear that that was an information that was just given through the Security Council because (INAUDIBLE) maybe it's an evolution, that's all. I just wanted – I think it is a non-resolved question, that's all.
NORRIS: I think in the case of Congo, where you have – it's very interesting, maybe you have stumbled on this stuff – or maybe you have identified the stuff that stumbled behind you, but that in the case of a referral as we have seen in Sudan by the Security Council, where the state party, where the sovereign government is opposed to the ICC's involvement that of course the – there have been strict firewalls between UNMIS and UNAMID and any kind of information sharing with the ICC because it would obviously threaten and comprise the peacekeeping force on the ground in both those missions. However in Congo where the state party has referred the case to the ICC, (INAUDIBLE) have been and in the Lubonja case there was interactions with – between the mono commission and provision of information to the ICC specific to the case of this particular indictee. So, that's an interesting division between those cases that are referred by the state party and those cases that are referred by the Security Council but I have no idea what – sorry, if David or John may – if there is codified policy of the Security Council and of the United Nations Secretariat with respect to information sharing and the difference between those two kinds of missions.
CRANE: (INAUDIBLE) from my experience with the – with the other tribunals and stuff and we have various articles that allow for the confidential moving back and forth of information requested by the – by that particular court, be it ad hoc or hybrid and it's up to the state to determine whether they can or want to release information that they may or may not want to have public but may be useful as far as other aspects of the investigation.
LEE: Thanks.
NORRIS: OK, next question?
Operator: Sir, there appear to be no further questions at this time.
NORRIS: All right.
READ: Thank you everyone.
NORRIS: Yes, thanks everyone for coming on and obviously, follow up with us if you have got any further questions or queries throughout the day and thanks for coming on.
PRENDERGAST: Thanks, David for being with us.
CRANE: Oh, my pleasure and obviously, we will be chatting about other things but just have a good day and if you need to reach out to me I will be in my office generally if there is any follow-on questions or if you want a particular (INAUDIBLE), I am available.
NORRIS: I appreciate it, thanks, bye now.
CRANE: See you.
Operator: Thank you. This does conclude today's teleconference. We thank you for your participation. You may disconnect your lines at this time and have a great day.
End
