Date: 03/13/2008
After more than four years of unrelenting violence in Darfur and eastern Chad, and faced with overwhelming suffering, it can be easier to quantify rather than qualify the nature of what is occurring. At least 200,000 people are dead and 2.5 million people are displaced in this isolated pocket of Africa.[1] But consider these statistics in a more familiar context: imagine every resident of New Orleans wiped off the map. Or picture the population of Houston, the United States’ fourth largest city, living in refugee camps, sleeping in makeshift shelters made of plastic sheeting, and subsisting on international handouts—some for more than four years.
The basic synopsis of what has happened in Darfur is well known. In mid-2003, the government of Sudan responded to a rebel insurgency by arming, training, and unleashing ethnically-based militias known as the Janjaweed to kill, rape, displace, and loot civilians with impunity.[2] The government systematically targeted specific ethnic groups—the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit—and sought to create conditions on the ground that would slowly destroy a way of life that has existed for centuries.[3]
Unlike the Rwanda genocide ten years earlier, where the slaughter was committed in the short span of one hundred days, the genocide in Darfur has unfolded over many months and has been well-documented by human rights organizations, humanitarian workers, and journalists.[4] In the wake of Rwanda, the international community focused on so-called “early warning” mechanisms—tools with which to identify nascent crises before they become full-blown catastrophes.[5] For Darfur, early warning worked—non-governmental organizations in particular identified the crisis early, provided clear policy prescriptions, and advocated them directly to policymakers and through the media.[6] However, the optimistic notion that an early warning would be heeded—and effective action taken—is seriously misguided.
Like Rwanda, genocide in Darfur and the international community’s feckless response could have generated a profound sense of hopelessness and apathy among Americans, but it did not. Americans from all walks of life have recognized a shared humanity with the people of Darfur and are taking concrete steps to end the killing and press for lasting peace in all of Sudan.[7] Indeed, the correlation between citizen activism and U.S. action is striking. Most of the measures that elected officials have taken—both the Bush Administration and members of Congress—have come as a direct result of mounting pressure from American citizens.[8] The louder activists get, the greater the political cost for failing to act. Make no mistake, activism is making a difference for Darfur, and strengthening the growing Darfur constituency should be a priority for anyone who cares about how the United States responds when genocide and crimes against humanity occur anywhere in the world.
[1] See U.N. Chief Visits Sudan to Prepare Ground for Darfur Relief Mission, Independent (London), Sept. 3, 2007, at 20.
[2]See Sandeep Gopalan, From Darfur to Sinai to Kashmir: Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Legalization, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 403, 432-33 (2007).
[3]See Human Rights Watch, "Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings in Darfur", (2005).
[4] See Michael Clough, Human Rights Watch, "Darfur: Whose Responsiblity to Protect?" (2005) (discussing how United Nations (U.N.) Member States responded to rising human rights abuses in Darfur with humanitarian action, missions, calls for negotiations and other types of assistance); Ernest Harsch, "Preventing Genocide: From Rhetoric to Action: U.N. Special Adviser Urges Firm Measures Against Darfur Slaughter", 20 AFR. RENEWAL 3 (2006), available at (comparing responses by U.N. to geno¬cides in Sudan and Rwanda). The Darfur crisis has also been the focus of considerable attention and advocacy efforts by numerous human rights organizations, such as the Save Darfur Coalition and its organizational members. See generally Save Darfur, (last visited Feb. 7. 2008).
[5] See Harsch, supra note 4 (outlining U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 2004 plan of action to prevent future genocides, which involved four main areas of activity: preventing armed conflict, protecting civilians, ending impunity, and ensuring early warnings and swift action).
[6] In June 2003, for example, the International Crisis Group published a report stating that:
The nascent armed rebellion in Darfur, now at risk of escalation, has shocked much of Sudan. The concerns of communities in this region—particularly the Fur, Zaghawa, Massaleit, and other African peoples of western Sudan—mirror not only the situation in the Three Areas and the South, but also that of the Beja in eastern Sudan and the Nubians in northern Sudan. A threatened massive military response by the government in Darfur would take a tremendous toll on the civilian population while only deepening resentment.
International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 14: Sudan's Other Wars (2003),
[7]See Richard Allen Greene, Americans Take Up Darfur’s Cause, BBC NEWS (U.K.), Nov. 20, 2006.
[8] See Clough, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the role of the United States in Darfur and the belief that the Bush Administration made ending the Sudanese civil war a top foreign policy priority in 2001-2002 due to pressure from conservative religious activists).
