Northern Uganda Policy Standard

• The U.S. provided financial support for consultations on nationwide reconciliation and accountability, a prerequisite for the resumption of peace talks in late January 2008. ^[1]

• The U.S. appointed a senior advisor for conflict resolution, Tim Shortley, in September 2007, to support peace efforts. Shortley plays a critical role in providing leverage and support to the talks, building credibility and trust, and demonstrating U.S. interest in peace in northern Uganda.

• The U.S. helped to create and continues to support the Tripartite Plus Commission, a regular convening of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda. Mandated to deal with all “negative forces” in the Great Lakes, the Tripartite Plus has helped to facilitate dialogue on regional approaches to dealing with the LRA and their bases in eastern Congo.

The administration must:
• Work with relevant parties to create a direct negotiating channel with the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, rebel head Joseph Kony to broker a security and livelihood arrangement for Kony. Direct U.S. involvement will provide a credible negotiating partner for President Museveni and will help to allay Kony’s fears about U.S. intentions, since his name remains on a U.S. terrorism list.

• Support a post-peace agreement process to address long-term reconciliation, resettlement, and redevelopment: An inclusive, community-led forum on compensation and truth and reconciliation processes within northern Uganda is critical to building sustainable peace in the country.

• Press the parties to oversee full implementation of any peace agreement reached in Juba.

Congress must:
• Support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or DDR, programs for rank and file LRA ex-combatants.

The administration and Congress must:
• Provide additional funding for training the Ugandan government army to protect civilians, particularly in the North; increasing access to courts, police, and community-based justice and conflict resolution mechanisms; and building the capacity of the government of South Sudan to protect communities at risk of attack by the LRA.

• Work through the U.N. to support the deployment of a significant contingent of human rights monitors to the internally displaced camps in northern Uganda.

• The U.S. government has stated that it will support any accountability agreement reached during the Juba peace process.

• The U.S. has been engaging with President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Government of Uganda to discuss a contingency military plan to flush the LRA out of eastern Congo.

The administration must:
• Work through the U.N. Security Council to cut off international sources of support for the LRA by strengthening the Sanctions Committee;

• Build leverage by supporting a back-up military strategy for apprehending LRA leaders indicted by the International Criminal Court should the LRA undermine the peace process or leave the talks altogether. Increased information-sharing and technical support should be provided to the Congolese government and the U.N. force in Congo now to make this option more feasible; and

• Press the Ugandan government to support and implement a nationwide reconciliation process that will address crimes on all sides of the conflict, including those committed by the Ugandan army.

Congress must:
• Provide funding and technical assistance for judicial reform in Uganda to ensure that those who commit crimes against humanity, including those within the Ugandan army, are held accountable.