Publications

Field Dispatch: Walikale

Patrick Furey — Wed, 03 Feb 2010 12:36:41 -0500

By Olivia Caeymaex

This is the second of two Field Dispatches looking at the crisis in eastern Congo on the ground.

In December I travelled to Walikale territory, the vast and remote westernmost region of North Kivu, scene of much of the fighting during the past year, and home to some of the region’s most lucrative mines. I visited several towns in the region alongside a U.N. Joint Protection Team. These teams are composed of both military peacekeepers and civilian experts from the U.N. Mission in Congo, or MONUC, and are tasked with assessing how best to protect civilians. In interviews with local government officials, civil society, security forces, and health workers, we got a sense of the concerns of the population.

The presence of MONUC peacekeepers appears to deliver a basic level of security, but as one travels away from their positions, insecurity rises precipitously. The Rwandan Hutu rebel group the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, maintains a strong presence in the territory, pillaging and looting with a focus on the strategic mining sites of Bisie and Omate. Military operations have disrupted the FDLR, who have responded by breaking into groups as small as five to ten men each rather than the groups of 30-40 fighters used in the past. Sadly, even under duress the FDLR poses a grave threat to civilians. In addition, local Mai Mai groups, including some that are closely aligned with the FDLR, also prey upon the population.

Travelling along the road from Kibua to Mpofi to Walikale, we found many villages emptied of their inhabitants. It appears that these people have fled to the larger towns of Kibua and Walikale, where they live with local populations as there are no official camps for displaced persons in the area.

Defection at Kibati

In a sign of the fragility of the ‘integration’ of former CNDP rebels into the Congolese army, some 120 ex-CNDP combatants under the command of Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, the former bodyguard to Laurent Nkunda, deserted the army in Kibati on December 6, 2009. Most of the deserters rejoined the army after realizing that the group lacked external support. The remnants – Colonel Emmanuel and an average of 20 men - aligned with another armed group. Throughout Walikale, local representatives repeatedly pointed to this defection not only as a sign of the failure of the integration, but as testimony to the lack of a strategy to protect civilians.

Local leaders recognized the thorny dilemma at the heart of the problem: villagers in Walikale territory are dependent upon Congolese military forces to provide security, but they also recognize the inability of these forces to actually finish off the FDLR. Instead of progress toward disarming and dismantling the rebels, the main result of the fighting is more reprisal attacks against civilians, more human rights abuses by the army itself, and additional destruction of Walikale’s already devastated infrastructure.

Sorely lacking infrastructure and trust

Already one of the more remote regions of eastern Congo, the war has dealt a major blow to basic infrastructure in Walikale, especially in terms of roads. The lack of access to the region means that the levels of humanitarian aid actually getting to the field are much lower than the needs. Moreover, the local population tends to distrust MONUC because of their support for the Congolese army, and even go so far as to suspect that MONUC is also collaborating with the FDLR. Given this atmosphere of suspicion and the legacy of conflict between local ethnic groups and rwandaphones, Walikale remains on a knife’s edge. Efforts to provide a modicum of stability and security in the region will need to go hand-in-hand with efforts to support local conflict resolution, rebuilding both physical infrastructure and some measure of trust within and between local communities.

Field Dispatch: The Protection Gap in Haut Uele

Patrick Furey — Tue, 26 Jan 2010 09:48:28 -0500

By Ledio Cakaj

A resurgent LRA is terrorizing the population in the Haut Uele region of northeast Congo. Congolese soldiers deployed to the region have been unable to provide adequate protection and the number of UN peacekeepers in the area remains woefully inadequate. But better coordinated and resourced efforts by both Congolese and international security forces have the potential to protect civilians from LRA attacks. This is the second of two dispatches based on my visit to Haut Uele.

The Congolese Army in Haut Uele

The Congolese army has deployed close to 6,000 soldiers in Province Orientale, but they have utterly failed to protect civilians from LRA attacks. Most of the LRA attacks have taken place around three places—Ngilima, Bangadi and Niangara – where there is a significant army presence. In Bangadi, for example, there are at least 100 Congolese soldiers. Yet, Bangadi has been frequently attacked by the LRA in the last few months. In personal accounts, people in Bangadi report that Congolese soldiers simply do not respond when alerted to LRA attacks. Similarly, people in Ngilima said that the soldiers are too scared to confront the LRA; they say they have never seen a LRA rebel killed or captured by the Congolese soldiers. “The only time the [Congolese army] fights the LRA is when they happen to come across them by accident,” said a local official.

In many interviews Congolese civilians accused Congolese soldiers of preying on the local population. Notoriously unpaid and unfed, soldiers steal from civilians, often by force at checkpoints along the main roads. “It is a daily occurrence,” said a local NGO worker. “Civilians are either forced to pay or forced to work for the soldiers at checkpoints such as collecting wood or cleaning their boots and washing their uniforms.” Lacking vehicles, Congolese soldiers needing to walk to their duty stations force locals to transport them on their bicycles or steal their bicycles at gunpoint. The stealing of bicycles is so common that the residents of Ngilima, in anticipation of a Congolese army troop rotation, declared December 27 as the “day without bicycles” and hid their bicycles from Congolese soldiers.

There are many cases of rape and sexual violence committed by the Congolese army. In Ngilima, we heard from the local population that there are consistently about six to eight rapes reported per month that are attributed to Congolese soldiers. Many more rapes go unreported. Killings also occur, mostly when civilians refuse to hand over their possessions to Congolese soldiers. An internal U.N. report cited eight killings of civilians by the Congolese army in Haut Uele during the month of November, with another four people injured. In Bangadi, we saw a Congolese soldier cut a civilian with a bayonet, because the civilian, who was driving a motorcycle, refused to give the soldier a ride to his barracks.

In interviews, a variety of Congolese army officials denied all abuses. According to the commander of the FARDC battalion in Bangadi, Congolese soldiers have never committed any crimes against the civilian population. The commander of the troops based in Ngilima said the population was lying. The FARDC troop commander in Dungu recognized that abuses had taken place but added that these were isolated incidents. “These are the problems of the man,” he said. “Not of the organization.”

Representatives from Congolese civil society organizations said that abuses had occurred where there was a clear lack of good leadership. They believe that the Congolese army and government should ensure command responsibility. Civil society members have also asked the United Nations mission in Congo, or MONUC, to condition aid to the army on good behavior. At the moment, MONUC supports Congolese soldiers in Province Orientale by providing daily rations for 6,000 soldiers and gasoline for seven army vehicles. MONUC officials said it was difficult for them to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congolese national army.

The role of the United Nations

The mandate for the United Nations mission in DRC, or MONUC, clearly prioritizes civilian protection, but their presence is thinly stretched in Haut Uele. A battalion of Moroccan peacekeepers is trying to offer protection to civilians but they have been unable to establish a presence in the worst affected areas. Promised reinforcements, in the shape of a Tunisian battalion, were supposed to arrive in June of 2009, but this was pushed back to February 2010. There are also fears that the Tunisians could then be deployed to neighboring Equateur Province, site of recent fighting between the Congolese army and a new rebel group.

The lack of peacekeepers to protect humanitarian convoys has forced aid groups to cease assistance to people in areas targeted by the LRA. After a series of LRA attacks on Congolese civilians who had just received food aid, and fearing attacks against their staff, U.N. and humanitarian organizations decided to stop the distribution of food in adherence to the “Do No Harm” principle. “Ideally we would need U.N. peacekeepers or Congolese soldiers to stay in the communities at least two weeks after the distribution of food,” said an international aid worker. “But there are not enough U.N. troops and the FARDC cannot be trusted.” As a result, many are starving. “We are being exterminated by the LRA and from hunger,” a resident of Bangadi told Enough.

Where present, U.N. peacekeepers have generally acted as a deterrent to LRA attacks. It is telling, for instance, that LRA attacks occur largely in Bangadi, Ngilima and Niangara where there are no U.N. troops. Furthermore, a U.N. presence also almost always guarantees that Congolese soldiers are better behaved. This is the case, for instance, in Dungu, but also in Faradje where the U.N. presence is small. A Faradje local reports that Congolese soldiers behave much better when conducting joint patrols with U.N. peacekeepers. This is not the case when Congolese soldiers are alone.

MONUC troops have both the will and the means to protect civilians. In a response to indications that the LRA were planning to attack civilians during Christmas this December, MONUC troops deployed to Ngilima. Internal U.N. reports mention a thwarted LRA attack on December 25 as a result of joint MONUC-Congolese army patrols. MONUC deployment to Ngilima is, however, temporary and the troops are expected to leave soon.

Many agree that a MONUC troop increase would go a long way towards protecting civilians in northeastern DRC. A U.N. source said in an interview that U.N. workers had been requesting a troop increase for a long time. “Gaye [General Gaye, MONUC force commander] promised us long ago that he would send more troops here,” the source said. “So far he has not kept that promise.”

Field Dispatch: Ferocious LRA Attacks in Northeast Congo

Patrick Furey — Mon, 25 Jan 2010 10:50:32 -0500

By Ledio Cakaj

In a trip to Province Orientale of northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in early December 2009, Enough researchers found abundant evidence of brutal ongoing violence committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA. Despite claims from Congolese and Ugandan state officials that the LRA is on its last legs, attacks against Congolese civilians perpetrated by the rebel group remain frequent. The LRA is far from finished. While there are disputes about whether the Ugandan rebels have been weakened by recent offensives against them or not, it is clear that they remain incredibly dangerous and ruthless. There are also lingering concerns and suspicions that the LRA may once again be receiving direct support from the ruling party in Sudan. This is the first of two dispatches based upon my visit to Haut Uele.

Brutalities in Haut Uele reminiscent of LRA of old

There is a long history of LRA violence in Congo. Attacks, however, reached a peak after Operation Lightning Thunder of December 2008, when the Ugandan army, in collaboration with the Congolese army and with U.S. support, attacked LRA bases in the Congolese Garamba National Park. The operation had the effect of scattering the LRA forces which in turn unleashed a series of coordinated attacks against the Congolese population. In a period of three weeks, close to 1,000 people were brutally murdered. About 200 were abducted, many of whom have not yet returned. Attacks continued throughout 2009, bringing the total number of LRA-caused deaths to 1,500. An estimated 3,000 people were abducted in the year; about 700 of those abducted were children.

According to internal UN reports, the LRA was responsible for an average of 30 killings per month In the Haut Uele region of Province Orientale during 2009, with those numbers increasing sharply around November and December. On November 26, an attack near the village of Ngilima left ten dead. Eight people from the same family were burned alive while two others were killed by machete blows. In Bangadi, four people were killed on December 2, two of them badly mutilated. In Tapili, 15 people were believed to be killed on December 14, although the real number might be twice as high as bodies are still being found in the bush. In a couple of attacks on December 19 and 21, two people were killed in Ngilima and two women were severely mutilated. A great number of abductions also occurred with each attack. A priest from the area estimates that the numbers of the abductees in the Tapili attack was more than 300 people. Notably, there were at least four cases in December in which victims’ lips and ears were cut—a practice rarely seen since the heyday of the LRA’s strength.

These recent attacks are especially shocking in their brutality. No longer focused on just stealing food to survive, LRA forces in DRC appear to be attacking in order to terrorize the population and perhaps to send a message to the Congolese authorities who claim the LRA is finished. These ulterior goals may explain why the LRA has returned to using vile practices such as severe mutilations.

Testimony from survivors of LRA violence

Testimony from survivors of LRA violence in northeast Congo describes this resurgence of brutality. One survivor of the November 26 massacre described above recounted the LRA attack on his family:

We were eating dinner outside of our hut when seven LRA rebels appeared and told us in broken Lingala [one of the local languages] to get inside of our hut. They looted our food, locked us inside our hut and burned it. There were 10 of us, my whole family inside the hut. When I realized they were burning us alive I started to push against the door, forcing it open. One rebel standing outside of the door tried to hit me with a heavy club but I dodged it and ran in the bush. They shot after me but missed. Apparently they shot or hit everyone else in my family who tried to come out. Except for one other person, everyone else was burned alive.

A man whose lips and ears were cut by LRA rebels on the night of December 2 in Bangadi spoke with difficulty and was still in shock. He said that his arms were tied tightly around his body and one LRA rebels kept him pinned on the ground while another proceeded to cut his lips and ears. He said that they did this in total silence, kicking while mutilating him.

Field Dispatch: Tensions in North Kivu

Patrick Furey — Fri, 22 Jan 2010 11:20:10 -0500

By Olivia Caeymaex

The end of 2009 saw optimistic statements about the situation in Congo from both the United Nations and the Congolese government. However, my experience on the ground in North Kivu seemed to point to a different picture. This is the first of two field dispatches based on my travel to particularly contentious territories in the region.

Masisi and the Parallel Administration

The territory of Masisi, located to the west of Goma in North Kivu province, is among the most contested regions of eastern Congo. A longtime power center for the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, the area is a flashpoint for potential conflict stemming from tensions over land rights and conflict between local ethnic groups and Congolese of Rwandan descent, exacerbated by the recent population movements described in a prior field dispatch.

Despite the CNDP’s peace agreement with the Congolese government, the movement continues to operate their own government structures throughout much of Masisi, including lucrative tax collection and control over security services. This operation is based out of the town of Mushake. Following a meeting between the CNDP and the Congolese government on December 21, the CNDP agreed to close down the parallel administration. But the CNDP continues to argue it first needs to be politically integrated at the national level before stopping their tax system and parallel administration. This is another worrying sign of strains in the relationship between the Congolese government and the CNDP, despite the move by the government to take charge of CNDP’s war-wounded around Christmas time last year.

The Mushake administration feeds several worrying dynamics:

The CNDP split. Since Laurent Nkunda was deposed by the Rwandans, there has been a dangerous split within the movement between those who remain loyal to him and those loyal to Bosco Ntaganda. Allegedly, the taxes collected by the parallel administration are not going to the main CNDP administration, widening this rift.
Multiplying Militias. Authorities have described a new movement called the Force for the Liberation of Eastern Congo, based in the town of Biza, with a battalion of 500-1,000 fighters. This group is linked to wanted war criminal Bosco Ntaganda, and has conducted forced recruitment in the region. Ntaganda, reacting to the call by U.S. envoy Howard Wolpe for his arrest, is evidently arming multiple militias to defend himself.
Anti-government alliances. During a meeting held in December, the parallel administration in Mushake replaced the national police in the area with a police force consisting of CNDP forces and members of the Hutu militia called PARECO.

Most of the people I spoke with think the CNDP is using these multiple armed groups and the maintenance of the parallel administration to increase its leverage in negotiations with the government. The end goals are the return of refugees from Rwanda, the recognition of senior appointments in the military, the full integration of the CNDP into the government, and the recognition of Mushake as a territory, thereby splitting political power in North Kivu. Thus far, the result has been increased confusion, rising tensions, and greater potential for these political, military, and economic manoeuvres to trigger widespread violence.

Truth and Consequences for Sudan Now: An Open Letter to President Obama's Deputies

Patrick Furey — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 10:44:05 -0500

To: Tom Donilon, NSC

Jim Steinberg, Department of State

Stuart Levey, Department of Treasury

Michèle Flournoy, Department of Defense

Erica Barks-Ruggles, USUN

From: John Prendergast, Co-Founder, The Enough Project

Omer Ismail, Senior Advisor, The Enough Project

At the first quarterly review of Sudan policy by the Deputies Committee you will likely sense two very different assessments of what is happening in Sudan today. This divergence of opinion has major implications for your policy recommendations and decisions. One version of Sudan’s current reality will highlight recent agreements on the referendum law, high rates of voter registration, and the lack of village burnings and cross border adventurism in Darfur as demonstrations of tangible progress in Sudan.

The reality on the ground in Sudan speaks in starkly different terms. The dangerous status quo in Darfur remains unchanged in some key aspects: millions of people are left in squalid camps, unable to return home because government-supported militias occupy their land and make travel very dangerous. Women face high levels of sexual violence in Darfur, aid is erratic, and progress in the Darfur peace process remains painfully limited.

More broadly, the April national election in Sudan – an election for which the Unites States has provided tens of millions of dollars in technical assistance – is in the process of being stolen by an indicted war criminal who will use the ballot to “legitimize” his rule. The conditions to make the national election free and fair simply do not exist, and will not exist, by April, and there may well be sharp questions as to why the United States heavily bankrolled an election so obviously flawed.

Most urgently and ominously, there are abundant indicators that Sudan is on a dangerous road back to full-scale North-South war as violence increases and key elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have been left completely unimplemented. The international community’s position toward Sudan at this vital time reflects neither consensus nor coherence. Officials from both North and South speak of not wanting war, but are intensively preparing for it. Local clashes in South Sudan are escalating, against an historical backdrop of extensive support to southern Sudanese militias by the ruling party in Khartoum designed to undermine southern unity. The heavy lift of diplomacy needed to assure that Sudan’s referendum is peaceful and well managed simply remains largely undone, with no full-time, on-the-ground diplomatic teams from the U.S. engaging the regional actors on either the North-South issues or the Darfur process.

To prevent a full scale war from erupting in Sudan in the coming year, the Deputies should recommend to their superiors and President Obama a course of action marked by much deeper diplomatic engagement, backed by more assiduous efforts to build a multilateral coalition of counties willing to impose consequences on those undermining the path to peace in Sudan. On the occasion of this first quarterly policy review, we urge you to consider three main actions:

1) The Deputies should recommend that diplomatic efforts begin immediately in New York and in capitals to pull together a coalition of countries willing to pressure the parties multilaterally to take the steps necessary for peace. Those officials and parties undermining peace should face specific and clear consequences. At this juncture, that would also involve withdrawing further U.S. financial support for the April election, expanding and more effectively implementing the current arms embargo, identifying specific officials who are undermining peace and targeting them with aggressive asset freezes and travel bans, and denying the Khartoum regime any form of multilateral debt relief until peace agreements have been far more effectively implemented.

2) The Deputies should recommend that the U.S. immediately deploy a small team of diplomats to be based in Sudan and the surrounding region to work full-time on the peace processes for Darfur and the CPA. Trips by the envoy, no matter how frequent, are no substitute for on-the-ground, around-the-clock diplomacy. The team should include senior diplomats with real experience in peace processes and existing familiarity with Sudan.

3) The Deputies should recommend a ministerial level meeting among North American and European diplomats on Sudan at the earliest possible juncture. The lack of a common position on the multiplicity of profound issues facing Sudan over the coming year – including serious post-referendum issues – must be addressed.

We want to personally thank you for all of the work that you continue to do to advance U.S. national interests and the cause of peace in Sudan, and thank you for your consideration.

John Prendergast
Omer Ismail

The Enough Project

Clear Benchmarks for Sudan

Patrick Furey — Wed, 13 Jan 2010 12:51:09 -0500

In its Sudan policy review completed in mid-October 2009, the Obama administration indicated it would regularly assess the progress of peace in Sudan—or lack thereof. Administration officials have stated that the parties to Sudan’s multiple conflicts will be under the microscope, and held to clear and pre-determined benchmarks of progress. The relative progress on these benchmarks would then determine the pressures and incentives—so-called “carrots” and “sticks”—that would be brought to bear in 2010, a year the Obama administration itself said, “can either lead to steady improvements in the lives of the Sudanese people or degenerate into even more violent conflict and state failure.”

To date, the Obama administration has not publicly disclosed the precise benchmarks it is applying to assess progress in Sudan, even as the official review process takes place this month and as tensions increase with the April national elections and January 2011 referendum on independence for southern Sudan rapidly approaching. To help bring transparency to the process by which the United States ensures strict adherence to unambiguous benchmarks, and ensure that the appropriate pressures and incentives are applied accordingly, this paper aims to provide guidance for how officials, concerned citizens, and others in the international community can assess genuine progress toward a lasting peace in Sudan.

Continue reading the full benchmarks paper.

In a live, follow-up interview to his State of the Union address, President Obama answered questions submitted and voted on by YouTube users. Recognizing the opportunity to reach President Obama directly on the issue of Sudan, the Enough Project submitted its own video question. Here is the President’s response:

TAKE ACTION

Raise your voice to the online vote asking the State Department to release clear guidelines for progress in Sudan, ahead of this year's critical national election in April.

Vote "thumbs up" to add your support. Thank you!

Raise your voice to the online vote asking the State Department to release clear guidelines for progress in Sudan, ahead of this year's critical national election in April.
Vote "thumbs up" to add your support. Thank you!

Since President Obama took office, an estimated 2,500 people have been killed in violent clashes in southern Sudan. Here's our petition to President Obama that we hope you'll sign as well:

"Thank you for responding to our question about the crisis in Sudan. We agree with you, Mr. President, that there is an acute threat of violence during the upcoming elections and referendum period. We respectfully disagree, however, that our government has made the progress necessary to broker agreements in Sudan that will stabilize the country. We therefore urge you, Mr. President, to lead other counties willing to escalate pressures on the parties in support of peace. Only with increased pressures and a full-time field-based diplomatic presence in Sudan, working on both Darfur and the North-South issues, will peace efforts have a chance of success."

Explore our interactive timeline of the elections in Sudan.

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Policy paper by Enough Co-founder John Prendergast

Introduction

Background: The Obama Administration’s clear statement of intent

The administration was clear in October 2009 that these benchmarks had to reflect substantive achievements in Sudan, not just rhetoric:

“Assessments of progress and decisions regarding incentives and disincentives must not be based on process-related accomplishments (i.e. the signing of a MOU or the issuance of a set of visas), but rather based on verifiable changes in conditions on the ground.”

The administration also spelled out an explicit process for measuring progress, built around quarterly reviews by deputies from a variety of agencies. Each quarter, and beginning this month, senior-level staff from various agencies are tasked with measuring progress in Sudan against a variety of indicators. A failure to improve conditions, the administration has said, “will trigger increased pressure on recalcitrant actors.”

As noted, the administration has chosen to keep the benchmarks it is utilizing in assessing progress in Sudan opaque. Neither the benchmarks themselves, nor the pressures and incentives that are to be deployed in response, are public. There are understandable reasons why the administration would choose to keep these protocols classified. However there appears to be some confusion within the U.S. government about the nature of these classified protocols and their use. Such confusion is concerning, because the administration must stick to its public commitment to review progress in Sudan and respond accordingly.

Success relies heavily on a consistent strategy of holding the parties in Sudan accountable for their actions. As President Obama said in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, “When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, repression in Burma—there must be consequences. Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy—but there must be consequences when those things fail.”

The U.S. policy will only be effective if the administration is vigilant in responding to progress or a lack thereof. Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir is being sought by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. The U.S. government continues to declare that genocide is ongoing in Darfur. Holding to the benchmarks as laid out by the administration is crucial. Anything less would send a dangerous message to those perpetrating violence in Sudan that they can continue to act with the same impunity they have enjoyed in the past. Protecting Sudan’s civilians in this volatile and historic period is absolutely essential.

How can relative progress in Sudan be accurately assessed? There are a number of factors that should be considered in any principled set of benchmarks and watched closely over the next year. There is broad agreement among Sudanese and those concerned with the fate of Sudan that these benchmarks constitute the fundamental elements of a durable peace and serve as key indicators of progress toward that peace. In order to achieve a sustainable peace and avoid a return to war, all parties in Sudan must address these core issues.

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The Benchmarks

National Reforms

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, contained key elements that were intended to transform Sudanese society, allow greater respect for civil liberties, and make unity more attractive to southern Sudan. This agenda offered the greatest promise for changing how Sudan is governed in fundamental ways and resolving the root causes of the country’s cycle of conflict between the center and the peripheries. The CPA should have ushered in greater press freedoms, expanded political space for civil society and opposition, reformed the national civil service, provided greater fiscal and governance autonomy to the states, and eliminated laws permitting detention without trial. Unfortunately, these critical provisions of the CPA have often been swept under the rug by the parties themselves and by international diplomats as they have pursued specific tactical goals in subsequent negotiations.

Progress on these national reforms is crucial for long-term peace in Sudan. Without addressing the repressive dynamic of concentrating power and wealth in the center at the expense of peoples in the peripheries, peace in Sudan will remain illusory whatever the outcome of the southern referendum in 2011. The likely southern vote for secession will not solve the problems of Sudan; the South will simply be opting out of them. Even if there were a peace agreement in Darfur tomorrow, the imbalance of power in Sudan and the systematic denial of fundamental human rights would likely lead to new conflicts in the North, South, East, the Nuba mountains, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and elsewhere in the country.

The CPA offers entry points for essential national reforms in advance of the national elections in April 2010 and southern Sudan’s self-determination referendum in 2011. While international assistance has focused a great deal on the mechanics of balloting, very few donors have been willing to state publicly that a conducive environment for free and fair elections does not currently exist, and without that conducive environment technical assistance will only result in a rubber stamped process that could easily trigger new violence.

The passage of a national security law that grants extensive powers to the security services to arrest and detain citizens without charge, and the use of violence by government security forces against peaceful political demonstrations in December 2009 are clear indicators that the benchmarks for national reform have not been met. In December the parties agreed to pass some key laws, however we would urge the United States to pressure the Sudanese government to revise the flawed national security act, trade unions act, and make amendments to the criminal law among others.

Key benchmarks include:

Discontinuation of the use of the national security law to arrest or otherwise intimidate civil society, human rights activists, and political actors.
Peaceful demonstrations and other gatherings allowed without interference.
Freedom for candidates for public office to campaign without intimidation.
Concrete measures taken in Khartoum and Juba to ensure freedom of the press and freedom of association.

Security

The broad security environment in southern Sudan, in Darfur and even the capital, Khartoum, should all be considered as key measures of how the parties in Sudan are behaving. There have been a number of deeply concerning developments on this front. Recent opposition protests in Khartoum have been violently halted by the authorities, illuminating the stark lack of individual security as well as the stalled or absent nature of the aforementioned national reforms.

The U.S. Special Envoy has achieved some important successes in tamping down cross-border incursions between Chad and Sudan, but a recent report by the UN group of experts made clear that the UN arms embargo continues to be widely flouted, including by the NCP and Darfur rebel groups. Respect for the arms embargo should be considered a key benchmark, and stronger enforcement by the UN Security Council is an important step towards improving the security environment.
A functioning ceasefire in Darfur will also be a key benchmark of progress – as long as this ceasefire is also tied to a viable and advancing peace process.
Over the long term, there is probably no better barometer for the relative success or failure of the international community than the circumstances of the almost 3 million people who remain displaced or refugees after having been forced to flee from their homes by the government and its allied janjaweed militias. Darfuris are desperate to return home from camps for refugees and the internally displaced, but will only do so if they feel secure. In recent months, the NCP has announced its intention to close down internally displaced persons camps, despite the lack of security.
The NCP should be creating an environment in which returns may occur voluntarily and safely, in keeping with the rights of refugees and displaced persons, and its performance in this regard should be one key measure of progress. The government should also provide restitution for damages and resolution of disputes regarding land rights, since many villages were destroyed and are now reoccupied.
Violence in southern Sudan escalated sharply in the past year, with reports of inter-communal clashes whose intensity and casualties are far more serious than the South’s traditional cattle raids and which triggered significant displacement of civilians. The use of sophisticated weaponry during attacks that deliberately target civilians should raise alarm bells, given the long history of politicization of inter-ethnic conflict in southern Sudan. It also highlights the need for increased attention on security sector reform in the South and attention to the often-violent civilian disarmament campaigns in the South. A recent increase of activity in southern Sudan by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, is another warning sign. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, has accused the NCP of supporting proxy militias and stoking inter-communal tensions, and based on the NCP’s history the United States and others must evaluate these claims very seriously.

Some other key indicators on the security front also include:

Negotiation and implementation of a functioning ceasefire in Darfur.
An end to all provision of weapons, training, or supplies of financing to paramilitary militia groups in the North, South, or Darfur.
Full cooperation from all parties to facilitate UN peacekeepers’ freedom of movement and other essential conditions to do their work effectively.
Full compliance by all relevant parties with the UN arms embargo for Darfur.
An end to unlawful aerial bombardment in Darfur.
Increased peace-building efforts by the Government of Southern Sudan to prevent escalation of chronic inter-ethnic fighting.
Standard, clear policies by the SPLA on engagement in tribal conflict, including the respective roles and responsibilities of the army and police services.
Disarmament campaign carried out responsibly by SPLA in consultation with local communities.

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Humanitarian access

While a few of the aid agencies that were expelled from Darfur were allowed to return by the Sudanese government, it is clear that no party can be seen as acting in good faith with regard to existing agreements if humanitarian aid is systematically denied to a population. Right now, the protection sector has been effectively neutered by the NCP. For example, women do not have access to services to deal with sexual and gender-based violence.

To ensure that aid is actually reaching those who need it most, not only do aid organizations need to be let into Darfur, they need to be able to move freely and reach their target populations. Any effort to systematically deny assistance to victims of gender-based violence should also be seen as a powerful and negative benchmark. Another important benchmark is whether the national and state governments are taking concrete steps to curb the spike in attacks and kidnappings of humanitarian workers.

As the administration considers the state of affairs in Sudan, it should assess the current state of humanitarian access, or lack thereof, by engaging with UNAMID and relief agencies operating in Darfur and determining whether or not the NCP or others are obstructing the rights of civilians to access all forms of humanitarian assistance. Any obstruction should trigger immediate consequences from the United States and its allies.

Key benchmarks to consider include:

Agreements to facilitate humanitarian access are being respected and implemented.
Improvement in security for humanitarian organizations, and steps taken to investigate and prosecute attacks on these organizations.
Delivery of sufficient aid, and access for new humanitarian NGOs, as needed, to reach vulnerable populations.
Freedom for humanitarian organizations to report honestly on conditions on the ground.
Aid agencies allowed to fully implement programs assisting women who have been victims of sexual violence or other forms of abuse.

Darfur Peace Process

Given the interrelated nature of Sudan’s multiple crises, the state of the Darfur peace process should be considered as a barometer of the overall process in Sudan. Although the NCP has stated that it is willing to negotiate, it has failed to adhere to multiple commitments in Darfur and the current process lacks the credibility needed to attract all parties to the table. The United States and other external actors, therefore, should construct a viable process and press the Sudanese government, rebel groups, and key civil society actors to come to the table and negotiate in good faith.

Experts have already outlined a way forward for the Darfur peace process thatc calls for the United States and others to work with the joint United Nations/African Union mediation team to put forward a common framework for a peace agreement. In the interim, efforts should continue to unify various rebel movements and to allow independent civil society groups to reach broad consensus on a position for negotiations.

Key steps for a just and sustainable peace that policymakers should be looking for include:

Establishment of an inclusive peace process.
Pre-existing commitments made in earlier talks and agreements fulfilled by the parties.
Practical steps on the ground taken by parties to promote peace and improve security.
Credible and independent civil society groups allowed to freely participate in the peace process without obstruction of their travel or right to assemble.
Concrete steps toward accountability for crimes committed in Darfur, including prosecution of soldiers, militia, and rebels who perpetrated attacks on civilians.

Abyei

Despite the NCP and SPLM’s stated acceptance of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or PCA, on the boundary of Abyei, this oil-rich region remains a major flashpoint. The signs are not good. The committee established to oversee implementation of the ruling, has been unable to fully demarcate the border because of political obstruction. The government has not transferred funds needed for development, and many people displaced in the May 2008 clashes have not yet returned. Both parties need to do more to prevent conflict in Abyei and to ensure that its residents are allowed to vote in a self-determination referendum in 2011. These include the following:

Rapid and mutually agreed upon formation of the Abyei referendum commission.
Full implementation of the Abyei Protocol and PCA’s ruling.
Unreserved support for demarcation of the border.
Support for a process to develop guarantees for nomadic tribes to access traditional grazing lands.
Development of the popular consultation process (see below) to promote popular political transition in Southern Kordofan.
Improved monitoring of Abyei’s oil revenues, payment of past arrears from Khartoum to Juba, and transparent functioning of the Unity Fund.

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Elections

The April 2010 election will be a key test for all of the parties to Sudan’s multiple conflicts. Although the elections are less than 90 days away, the environment for them to be free and fair does not exist. In the northern states, security forces have continued to crack down on opposition parties and activists. In Darfur, a large military presence and ongoing insecurity is likely to prevent people from voting freely – if at all.

While the SPLM and the NCP appear willing to bargain with regard to the 2010 elections, it is vital that the administration take a critical look at violence around the election, the ability of candidates from all parties to campaign effectively, freedom of the press and assembly, as well as vote buying, intimidation, and other efforts to manipulate popular will. Moreover, given the prevailing security conditions in Darfur, it is also challenging to imagine how Darfuris will see their rights of enfranchisement respected. There are widespread concerns that a vote held in April 2010 would only serve to disenfranchise huge number of Darfuris while making it more difficult for them to reclaim the rights to lands from which they were forced.

If the election is not credible, the United States and others must be prepared to not recognize the results and impose a clear cost on those who denied the Sudanese the right to elect their leaders.

Other key benchmarks in the run-up toward the elections include:

Sudan’s constitutional protections of freedoms of assembly and expression ensured by the NCP and SPLM in the context of the current electoral process in northern and southern Sudan, respectively.
Sudanese media free to cover and report on election related events, trends, and developments.
Effective response by Sudan’s National Electoral Commission, or NEC, to concerns expressed by international and domestic monitoring bodies – including political party representatives – during the voter registration process in order to prepare for the polling period in April, including investigating claims of fraud.
International and domestic monitors granted freedom of movement and freedom to report on election related activities in the coming months.
Concerted steps by the NCP and SPLM to prevent electoral violence.
Active measures by the NEC to educate Sudanese voters on the electoral process, particularly in areas with comparatively low levels of voter registration.

Popular Consultations

The popular consultations for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states will be crucial in determining whether peace holds in these strategic border regions. Renewed conflict in either region could quickly spread, and carries a high risk of escalating along broader North-South lines because of the local SPLA forces from these areas. These processes must live up to their name – to be both popular and consultative – for the citizens from these states to feel they have a genuine stake in their political future. The recent passing of the population consultation law is a positive step, but much remains to be done in a short time frame for this process to succeed.

The administration should closely monitor the preparations underway in both states, and determine whether the parties are providing the necessary political space and requisite security for communities to peacefully learn and engage in the popular consultation processes. As the popular consultations are meant to be carried out by the newly elected state legislatures, contingency planning should also be encouraged to explore alternatives to support these processes if elections do not take place as planned.

Necessary steps for peaceful and successful popular consultations, and sustainable peace in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, include the following:

Progress on the demarcation of the Abyei and North/South borders, including resolution of border disputes on southern borders of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Processes for broad engagement with constituencies throughout the two states.
Improved integration of the Joint/Integrated Units, police, and state administrations.
Political space and security for free and fair elections.

Southern Referendum

The agreements reached between the NCP and the SPLM on a package of laws related to the upcoming election and referendum are important steps, but do not outweigh the accumulated actions over previous months. It is crucial to remember that in its 20-year and counting rule of Sudan, the NCP has signed numerous agreements and has always been slow, if not entirely unwilling, to implement them. Even the recently announced agreements again deferred discussions of key elements related to the referendum to a later date, highlighting the dramatic mistrust between the lead parties. In terms of benchmarks, key steps and questions for the coming year include:

Rapid and mutually agreed upon formation of the southern Sudan referendum commission.
Progress toward the full demarcation of the North-South border.
No use of direct or proxy violence in an effort to derail the referendum.
No actions that subvert the will of the people in casting their votes freely.
Neither party negotiating in such a way that makes direct North-South violence more likely.

It is important to not simply make it to the referendum without war breaking out and keeping the existing peace agreement intact, but also to have a series of agreements in place for the days, months, and years after the referendum – on borders, revenue sharing, assets, water rights, and the many other factors that could precipitate a return to conflict. The willingness and ability of the parties to credibly engage in these post-referendum vote discussions in good faith should also be considered a key benchmark.

Accountability

As much as some would like to push accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan aside, to do so would neither be productive nor right. The policy review the Obama administration produced made the case that without accountability in Sudan, peace will likely prove elusive. The International Criminal Court, or ICC, has found sufficient evidence against Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, to accuse him of multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet the ICC will only ever deal with a handful of individuals. Combating the culture of impunity in Sudan is a basic prerequisite to sustainable peace. Any disucssion of progress in Sudan should consider:

Cooperation with the ICC or agreement to a robust accountability mechanism, such as the African Union’s recently proposed hybrid court for Darfur.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Obama administration will also consider Khartoum’s cooperation on counter-terrorism issues as another key benchmark for its performance. However, given the largely non-transparent nature of this indicator, we did not include it in our list above. It is important to note that although the administration’s own policy statements have noted that counter-terrorism cooperation is one of a number of factors being included in its internal evaluation, this priority does not preclude the importance of significant progress on other fronts.

The Obama administration has rightly demanded an approach to Sudan that is based on demonstrable change on the ground. Just as the administration has made clear that it will hold the parties in Sudan accountable for their actions, so too will activists and policymakers hold the Obama administration accountable for whether and how it consistently uses benchmarks to deploy pressures and incentives.

Field Dispatch: A Civil Servant’s Close Encounter with the LRA

Patrick Furey — Tue, 12 Jan 2010 14:23:28 -0500

By Noel Atama

Bangadi, Haut Uele District, Province Oriental, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I wasn’t planning to spend much time in Bangadi, a small town in Dungu territory in remote northeast Congo, only about 65 kilomoters from the border with southern Sudan. But when mechanical difficulties grounded the flight that was supposed to pick me up, I had no shortage of time to learn more about the residents of the town and their deadly encounters with the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA.

I interviewed the senior local government administrator in Bangadi, Joseph Bikwalubi Musafiri, about the security situation in LRA-affected areas. Originally from Maniema province, Mr. Bikwalubi took up his post mid-2007, and has watched the population of the town almost double in size as the residents of surrounding villages took refuge from LRA attacks, swelling the population from 15,000 to more than 26,000, according to a recent census by a local Congolese organization. As our conversation drew to a close, I asked the administrator if he could introduce me to any local citizens who had been abducted by the LRA. I was taken aback by his reply. “I myself was kidnapped by the LRA,” he told me. “My story is especially interesting because it is about a local government authority kidnapped by the LRA.”

He went on to tell me his story.

Ambushed

The first LRA attack against Bangadi took place on October 18, 2008. Mr. Bikwalubi, as well as the rest of the town’s inhabitants, fled into the bush where he spent nearly two months on the run. He returned to Bangadi around Christmas of 2008, following the Operation Lightning Thunder operations by the Ugandan and Congolese armies. At around noon on Thursday, January 22, 2009, Mr. Bikwalubi was on his way to his fields—like other civil servants in Congo, his wages are small and irregularly paid, so he has to find other ways to make ends meet—when a group of 21 LRA fighters ambushed him. “They sprang from the bush at a bend in the road, encircled me, took away my bicycle and asked me to follow them in the bush. They all were well armed with AK-47 rifles. One of them carried a MAG machine gun, and another even carried a bazooka!”

Two kidnapped Congolese were among the fighters, serving as guides and interpreters. These two Congolese had dreadlocks just like the LRA fighters, and also wore uniforms and carried weapons. Mr. Bikwalubi remembered that “their Commander was short and had a large scar on the right cheek and all its teeth were outside. He might have been wounded by a bullet.”

Living in captivity

The LRA brought Mr. Bikwalubi into the bush, where they were already holding a group of civilians from his town. There were 16 people in total, including three women and four young girls. When I asked about the living conditions while he was captive, he lowered his head to express his sadness and told me: “We really lived under difficult conditions. We slept on the ground, without any mattress or blanket, in the cold. We were bound together like slaves, our hands tied to the same cord to prevent escape. During the night, the LRA would take the women and girls. They would force the men to carry heavy loads of food they have plundered from the villages they burned.”

He told me that the LRA would strike them on the back with sticks, or with the backsides of their machetes. One fighter had slashed his feet with a razor blade because he was not walking quickly enough. He showed me the scars on his feet. They would walk all day in the bush, going from village to village, in search of abandoned food.

I asked him about how his citizens reacted when they saw him kidnapped by the LRA. But he said the better question was about his reaction to seeing his citizens in captivity. He asked them not to let the LRA know that he was a civil servant. “That is what saved my life,” he went on as saying. “I am convinced that they would have killed me if they knew that I was the administrator of Bangadi”. His fears were justified: on December 14, 2009, the administrator of Tapili, a village approximately 60 kilometers south of Bangadi, was abducted and killed by the LRA.

Released

When I asked how he came to be free, Mr. Bikwalubi told me that they were freed at the request of another LRA Commander whom they had met in the bush after their long walk. This commander seemed to outrank their captor, and had plans to move them far from Bangadi territory, until he learned that Ugandan and Congolese armed forces were tracking them. It seemed that they received an order to quickly vacate the region. Before their release the LRA beat them severely, and gave them a message for the population and local authorities: “Go tell the population that we will be returning again. No soldier of the Ugandan army, the Congolese army or MONUC [the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo] should be there. We do not want to see self-defense forces organizing against us, or to find even one weapon. Or else we will kill all in our way.”

Afterwards I asked several local people about the administrator’s story, who all confirmed what he had told me. One person added: “When even the local political and administrative authorities are not spared by the LRA, what can beleaguered civilian populations expect? Just imagine about how ordinary women and children are treated?”

Digging In: Recent Developments on Conflict Minerals

Patrick Furey — Mon, 04 Jan 2010 11:22:52 -0500

Enough experts David Sullivan and Noel Atama assess the conflict minerals trade in Congo based on firsthand field research.[1]

AP Photo / Riccardo Gangale

Congo’s mineral wealth continues to play a central role in the country’s conflict dynamics. Despite the upsurge in displacement and atrocities during 2009, multinational companies continue to purchase minerals from the war zone, providing crucial fuel for the violence. Both the opportunities for Congo to escape from its catastrophic crisis cycle and the threats that could plunge it into renewed all-out war are directly connected to the fate of the mineral sector and the manner in which natural resources are utilized during the coming months.

The latest report of the U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo lays out in detail the prominent role of the minerals trade in the financing of Congo’s ongoing conflict.[2] Findings confirm the impressions we gleaned during recent travel to North and South Kivu, where the pursuit of mineral resources by armed elements on all sides of the conflict has only accelerated under the accord between Rwanda and Congo and the Kimia II military offensive against the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR, by the Congolese army, which has the United Nations’ support.[3]

In particular, Congolese army units composed primarily of former members of the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, have expanded their control of mineral-rich regions within the context of Kimia II, compounding volatile political and ethnic grievances in these regions. And according to the U.N. Group of Experts Coordinator Dinesh Mahtani, Rwanda continues its economic partnership with these elements.[4] Meanwhile, the constellation of armed groups operating outside of the government’s control continue to benefit from access to minerals, resources that substantially impede efforts to bring security and stability to the Kivus.

Contrary to critics who argue that the militarization of mining in eastern Congo is purely symptomatic of a dysfunctional security sector and poor governance, conflict minerals are both a cause and consequence of Congo’s dilapidated state apparatus. The easy availability of lootable natural resources, especially tin, tantalum, tungsten, or the 3Ts, and gold, with their well-developed trade routes and willing international buyers, foments the fragmentation of armed groups in eastern Congo. With only a few guns and shovels, local warlords can establish themselves as a group that must be reckoned with, financing their own growth into a militia powerful enough to demand a seat at the table in negotiations and eventually a position in the army—from where they can continue to profit from the minerals trade.

Moreover, in the battle for control of resources, competing networks of armed groups, businesses, and political elites routinely manipulate Congo’s contentious and inflammatory grievances that surround sensitive issues such as ethnicity and land tenure. The inability of the Congolese government to control its territory and protect its population creates the opportunity for illicit networks to fill the vacuum, but the objective of these networks remains profit, predominantly from the mineral trade.

There remain ample opportunities to capitalize on gains achieved in recent months by utilizing the mineral trade to deliver significant peace dividends for the people of eastern Congo. This will require new levels of leadership both from the Congolese government and the international community, and broad participation by engaged elements of Congolese government agencies, the business community, and civil society.

Thanks to increased international attention, including strong statements by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to eastern Congo, all of the actors with a role in Congo’s conflict mineral drama are feeling the pressure to change their behavior. Actors in the private sector both within Congo and in the international supply chains for electronics and other industries have signaled a willingness to provide new levels of due diligence and corporate responsibility. Yet it is equally clear that a number of actors remain highly invested in business as usual with regard to conflict minerals, and that palpable change on the ground can be the only barometer of true success.

Congo's minerals leave a trail of destruction as they travel from the mines to the phone in your pocket.

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Situation update—Kimia II’s impact on the minerals trade

The direct targeting of mining areas during the Kimia II offensive rocked the status quo in the Kivus. Previously, the conflict mineral trade experienced a period of relative calm in terms of fighting between armed groups for control of mines. In fact, battlefield enemies often colluded to profit from the mineral trade while continuing to exploit and prey upon local populations, with the degree of violence involved varying considerably.[5] The rapprochement between Rwanda and Congo fundamentally upset this equilibrium, with the Congolese army incorporating elements from the CNDP and other armed groups and moving to attack the main positions of its longtime ally and sometimes business partner, the FDLR.

The Kimia II offensive has dislodged the FDLR from control of key mining areas and trade routes, but it has also allowed the Congolese army, or FARDC—especially units composed predominantly of former CNDP troops—to seize mining sites and establish new levels of control over the trade.[6] At the same time, the expanded CNDP presence has inflamed tensions with local populations still scarred by the conduct of the CNDP and its antecedents, especially the period of occupation of eastern Congo by Rwanda and its proxies from 1998 through 2002.

Given the fluidity of the security situation in the Kivus, a complete analysis of the impact of military operations on mining sites is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, we will examine a few critical case studies that point to the broader questions surrounding current efforts to deal with Congo’s conflict minerals.

The battle for Bisie: Eastern Congo’s largest mine

At 3:30am on August 12, approximately 80 armed men attacked the massive Bisie mining site, killing some 30 people and wounding 50. The objective of the attack appeared to be pillage, as attackers made off with mineral resources and supplies. The assault was well planned, with some of the attackers reportedly having infiltrated the area earlier that day posing as vegetable sellers. Some of the attackers spoke the local language, while others spoke Kinyarwanda. FARDC forces who were present in the mine did not return fire, with explanations for this ranging from the practical (they were outnumbered and most of the troops were actually busy digging in the mines at the time) to the credulous (they decided to hold fire due to concern for civilian casualties) to the conspiratorial (they may have been in on the attack).

Bisie is the largest mine in the Kivus and the source of approximately 75 percent of North Kivu’s cassiterite, or tin ore, production. Before this year, Bisie was under the control of the nonintegrated 85th Brigade of the Congolese Army, a former Mai Mai militia that operated outside the control of the Congolese government, but whose commander has been linked to senior Congolese army officers who profit from the mine.[7] By March 2009 the 85th brigade was transferred out of Bisie to Hombo on the border between North and South Kivu, and it was replaced by a rapidly integrated Congolese army brigade led by former CNDP commanders and mainly consisting of former CNDP elements. Although a few men loyal to the 85th brigade remained in the area and continued to supervise certain mineshafts, the restructuring substantially shifted control of production to the former CNDP.

The August attack on Bisie did not occur in a vacuum. In fact, it was the most deadly incident in a series of attacks on mining sites in Walikale—the region where Bisie is located—that began in June and continued into December, when the Omate mining site was attacked on December 12.[8] Enough interviews conducted with civil society, government officials, and the private sector in Goma confirm the linkages between this recent violence and longstanding struggles for control of Bisie’s mineral wealth with potentially devastating consequences for North Kivu’s volatile politics. Conflict between competing business interests are intertwined with political violence and underlying tensions between local ethnic groups and Congolese of Rwandan descent.

According to U.N. Organization Mission in DR Congo, or MONUC, staff and North Kivu civil society representatives, the attack on Bisie was led by a former businessman from Goma, Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi, who formed his own militia and is collaborating with forces including FDLR elements and other local militias.[9] Previously, Ntaberi was involved with three different companies that were embroiled in a longstanding dispute over rights to the Bisie concession.[10] Now it appears that the CNDP’s takeover of Bisie has resulted in Ntaberi pursuing a military strategy aimed at destabilizing the area, possibly together with the FDLR and former 85th Brigade elements.

Separating fact from rumor and keeping up with the constantly shifting alliances among armed groups and business interests in eastern Congo is difficult if not impossible. Understanding the struggle for Bisie is made more difficult because, as an international diplomat told Enough, “The fight is for shares of the pie, not absolute control of the trade.”[11] But the patterns of violence around Bisie suggest that mineral resources remain an objective for competing armed groups.

Moreover, these networks use inflammatory grievances to mobilize support. Civil society representatives told Enough that the conflict over Bisie was not just about control of the minerals, but a means of channeling deep insecurity around ethnicity and land in Walikale territory. They said that Ntaberi was recruiting his armed group based on resentment of Tutsi and Rwandaphones among Walikale’s majority Hunde population, especially concerns about the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. Although the actual anticipated number of refugees returning to Walikale is quite small compared with other areas, the issue nonetheless remains dangerously volatile and a potential flashpoint for political, ethnic, and economic conflict.

Bisie’s fate is of crucial importance to wider mining sector reform in eastern Congo. With a modicum of security and the government’s willingness to quash the squabbling over rights to the mine, the lion’s share of the tin trade in North Kivu could be made traceable and developed into a crucial source of “clean” Congolese tin. Long overdue investments in basic infrastructure and social services could begin to improve the quality of livelihoods dependent upon the mine, and bring its medieval working conditions up to a minimum level of decency.

From FDLR to FARDC, the behavior remains the same

The Kimia II operations in North and South Kivu have dislodged the FDLR from areas where they had been entrenched for years, controlling mining sites, intermarrying with Congolese populations, but maintaining an exploitative hold over these same populations. The good news is that for the first time in years critical mining-dependent areas in South Kivu are no longer controlled by armed groups opposed to the state—including those located in Shabunda, Mwenga, Walungu, and Kalehe territories in South Kivu. This has enabled some long overdue movement toward reconnecting these isolated areas of South Kivu with the rest of the province, including beginning to rehabilitate the Bukavu-Shabunda road.

Although the Congolese army took control of mining sites, it has proven woefully poor at protecting civilian populations, oftentimes using the same tactics as the FDLR to intimidate and exploit miners and their families. According to Human Rights Watch, the army is now the number one perpetrator of sexual abuse against women in eastern Congo.[12] This includes forcing civilians to serve as porters, carrying heavy loads of minerals as well as other supplies. Village chiefs that failed to mobilize enough porters have been arbitrarily arrested and communities have been subjected to illegal taxation by military units, which at times have given way to violence and killings.

Some of the same commanders implicated in horrific massacres, including the slaughter of Rwandan Hutu refugees at Shalio, have been identified as directly profiting from the minerals trade.[13] Moreover, multiple sources have reported to Enough that Congolese army units stationed at lucrative mines are closely connected to senior officers in Congo’s capital Kinshasa, and cannot be reined in by provincial authorities. The increasing involvement of military units may also be impeding efforts to formalize the minerals trade, as military units are forbidden from engaging in mining under Congolese law. Mining officials in North and South Kivu indicated to Enough that military activity probably constitutes a significant portion of the underground trade in minerals.

Impacts on the ongoing minerals trade

Pressure from the United Nations and international campaigners were widely cited as potential threats to the trade in minerals from eastern Congo, and by association with the possibility of a de facto embargo on Congolese minerals. When metals trading company Traxys suspended purchasing from eastern Congo in May 2009, John Kanyoni, head of the association of minerals exporters, or “comptoirs” in North Kivu, predicted: “Buyers will look elsewhere for tin, threatening thousands of people who genuinely eke out a living from mining and dealing in the mineral."[14]

On the contrary, data provided to Enough by the Congolese government indicates that the minerals trade mostly weathered the shock from Traxys’ decision to suspend its operations in Congo, as detailed in the appendix to this report. Of potential greater consequence to the Congolese trade was the September 14, 2009 announcement by Thaisarco, a Thailand-based tin smelter subsidiary of London-based Amalgamated Metals Corporation, that it would suspend purchasing from Congo. [15] Thaisarco is one of two major smelters known to source from Congo—alongside Malaysia Smelting Corporation—and is widely considered to purchase large amounts of tin ore both directly from Congolese sources as well as from international metals traders. Its decision could substantially affect the international appetite for Congolese minerals.

That said, data obtained by Enough indicates that Thaisarco was purchasing significant quantities of tin ore directly from Congo as recently as August, and their statement’s wording that they would “continue to honour existing contractual commitments until their expiry” suggests that the company may still be purchasing Congolese minerals even now.

The notion that Traxys and Thaisarco’s decisions are creating a domino effect that will dry up all international demand for Congolese minerals appears premature for two reasons. First, the only companies that have made such decisions are those named by U.N. experts as knowingly purchasing from sources linked to the FDLR. It remains to be seen whether other companies that have avoided such censure will be so quick to relinquish their access to Congo’s mineral wealth.

Second, some of the international traders and refiners that have been purchasing minerals from eastern Congo may depend more on these sources than they admit. Despite the fact that Congo’s production of the mineral ores that produce the 3Ts and gold is relatively low compared to worldwide production, it appears that particular mineral refining operations, especially those based in Thailand and Malaysia, are facing low levels of domestic production and have responded by looking abroad to Congo.

The interdependence between these multinational companies and their suppliers in Congo presents an opportunity. The threat of losing access to suppliers because of the reputational damage, combined with the pressing need to keep supplies from Congo flowing, suggests an opportunity for these companies to exert far greater due diligence down through the supply chain. Industry-driven reform efforts, discussed in more detail below, reflect such calculations by these key actors.

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Congolese and international efforts to reform the mineral trade

Intense pressure on the Congolese minerals supply chain in the wake of the U.N. investigations and a rising tide of international interest invigorated efforts to establish a legitimate, formal supply chain under the control of Congo’s state authorities.

The Congolese Government

On August 8, Kinshasa dispatched a high-level delegation consisting of Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito and Minister of Mines Martin Kabwelulu to North Kivu to evaluate eastern Congo’s mining sector. Muzito travelled to Walikale, where he stated the government’s determination to bring the mining sector under state control and to remove the military from the mines.[16]

The prime minister’s visit was greeted with skepticism among some civil society groups in the Kivus, who perceived a degree of political pandering and populism from a party sorely in need of shoring up its sagging popularity in the east. However, interviews with mining officials in both North and South Kivu indicate that the government has developed a planning process for the minerals sector that will follow on the prime minister’s policy statement.

In South Kivu, Provincial Minister of Mines Colette Mikila travelled to the interior of the province for the first time, visiting Shabunda from September 1 - 4 to assess the situation in the field, with plans for the reform of the sector to be presented to the government by year’s end. Importantly, the government is specifically addressing the critical question of achieving a traceable supply chain for minerals, as well as related questions about combating fraud and contraband.

Kinshasa’s growing interest in reforming the mining sector in eastern Congo is long overdue. That government officials are only now visiting mining areas, more than three years after elections, indicates the degree to which the minerals trade in the Kivus has been ceded to armed groups and shadow networks. Shifting this dynamic will require more than statements and one-off visits—it will require dedicated resources and political will from President Joseph Kabila himself.

The good news is that such a move may be in Kabila’s interest. He won the 2006 election thanks to a vote bank in eastern Congo where his popularity has since plummeted. Delivering benefits to this population may be his only shot at prevailing in 2011 in a credible electoral process. However, this would require cracking down on some of his own inner circle, including powerful politicians, military commanders, and business elites, to demand that they alter their practices and bring the mineral trade in eastern Congo into the sunlight.

The stabilization plan

In debates over eastern Congo’s future everybody agrees that restoring state authority and developing security forces with basic capacity to protect the population is the key to peace. How to accomplish these tasks is more difficult to articulate, and the series of crises that have wracked the Kivus over the years since the 2006 elections have often distracted from this fundamental question. Nonetheless, the political space created by the Rwanda-Congo détente has reinvigorated attempts to try.

Toward this end, the Congolese government and MONUC have put pen to paper and developed an integrated plan entitled, “The Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Zones Emerging from Armed Conflict.” Based on a stabilization plan developed by MONUC in early 2008, the plan consists of three elements: security, humanitarian and social issues, and economic revival, with ambitious plans to cover six provinces in eastern Congo.

Importantly, the stabilization plan recognizes that dealing with illicit exploitation of natural resources is a core security challenge in eastern Congo, and it includes a component within the security objective to install a mechanism to control mineral and forest resources to prevent their illegal exploitation by criminal groups. Over a six-month period the plan envisions deploying mining authorities at the subprovincial level with offices in Beni/Lubero and Walikale in North Kivu and in Shabunda, Uvira, Walungu, Kalehe, Mwenga, and Fizi in South Kivu, as well as assorted locations in Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga. At these buying centers, authorized state authorities would be placed under one roof at transportation hubs, where they would be able to collect official taxes, compile statistics, and certify the origins of minerals.

The plan also calls for implementing Congo’s Mining Code and establishing a system of permits for artisanal exploitation of minerals, an aspect of the law that has been slow to be put into practice in eastern Congo, leaving the vast majority of miners operating in an ambiguous quasi-legal state.

To demilitarize the mines the plan calls for placing mining sites under the control of legitimate authorities and deploying officials from the mining ministry, its certification authority, and antifraud agents at mining sites themselves, as well as identifying airports and landing strips used to transport minerals and developing proper oversight systems. At airports, ports, and border crossings, the plan calls for placing state authorities under one roof, developing a one-stop shop for applying both mining and forestry laws. Such a system would build upon MONUC’s commencement of random checks of aircrafts and boats to combat contraband, which began in June 2009.

Although MONUC has reported the seizure of illicit minerals as a result of these checks, Enough understands that they are extremely limited in scale and scope. Even a modest augmentation of such efforts could help deter the wholesale smuggling of minerals and other illicit trade across Congo’s porous borders.

Much more detailed plans will be required to properly assess the viability of the natural resource control elements of the stabilization plan, but its existence and incorporation of these issues is a welcome step forward. The establishment of buying centers would not ensure traceability of minerals back to their specific mines of origin, but they would provide an important first step to reasserting the regulation of the trade by legitimate authorities rather than armed groups and military units.

Ultimately, getting the mines out of armed groups’ control will depend on the ability of the Congolese state to exercise control over its own security forces, which would provide the opportunity for other state agents, from mining inspectors to customs authorities, to be able to do their job and to be held accountable for fraud. This task is gargantuan, well beyond the six-month timetable of the plan. But the size of the challenge should not preclude first steps in the right direction. Contingent upon rigorous operational plans, international donors should support stabilization efforts and provide funding to begin the process of reforming the mining sector in the east.

Private-sector efforts

Renewed international attention to Congo’s conflict minerals has provoked an unprecedented response from actors engaged in the trade, from exporters in Goma and Bukavu to metals traders and smelters operating in Europe and Asia, all the way to the electronics companies that manufacture and market mobile phones, laptops, and music players. Although the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations have “named and shamed” companies involved with armed groups in eastern Congo in the past, these efforts have previously had little effect on trade dynamics.[17]

However, the 2008 U.N. Group of Experts report and the subsequent decision by metals trader Traxys to suspend purchasing from Congo does appear to have rattled both international and Congolese actors in the supply chain, and has sparked efforts by industry to develop higher standards of due diligence. While there is clearly more enthusiasm among some members on industry than with others, increased engagement on these issues is a good thing.

The International Tin Research Institute, or ITRI, is a membership organization that represents the world’s leading tin smelters. Among its members are the two major smelters that have been confirmed as purchasing minerals from eastern Congo—the Malaysia Smelting Corporation and Thaisarco. In response, these companies formed a working group together with Traxys to develop an action plan to implement more rigorous due diligence procedures that would enable companies to continue to purchase from the Congo while seeking to exclude armed groups and military units from the supply chain.[18] The tantalum industry has put forth a similar initiative as well.[19]

The ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative, or iTSCi, presents a phased approach to improving due diligence and traceable supply chains within the Congolese tin industry. Phase 1 involves improving practices in the already formalized links in the supply chain—ensuring that exporters complete paperwork attesting to the chain of custody for the minerals they export. Phase II involves expanding the project to actually verify mines of origin. Phase III would achieve a more comprehensive program that not only verifies the provenance of minerals, but also measures performance against a range of standards including supply chain mapping, chain of custody, legitimacy, business ethics, and avoiding conflict finance. Timelines for implementation of the initiative lack precision, and they are dependent on external funding.

A number of issues with this initiative remain. The most important is ensuring that the initiative’s effectiveness can be independently verified and made subject to audits by third parties without any conflict of interest. There are provisions for independent auditing in the plan, but they have yet to be implemented. If the initiative fails to put rigorous third-party monitoring into practice the scheme will simply be the industry policing itself and papering over the continuing flow of conflict minerals with half measures. Moreover, the industry should take more overt responsibility for taking all possible measures to exclude conflict actors from the supply chain. Although this will require partnership with the Congolese government, the United Nations, donor governments, and civil society, the industry can do much on its own to hold its suppliers to account.

On October 6, the Congolese Ministry of Mines endorsed the ITRI initiative following meetings in Kinshasa. In North and South Kivu, Enough encountered receptivity toward the plan from Congolese exporters, although they cautioned that the plan would need to be adjusted and revised to be feasible to implement on the ground in eastern Congo. Likewise, a coalition of civil society organizations in South Kivu active in supporting a process of dialogue with government and industry on mining sector reform has also called for international companies to engage with local structures to prevent a boycott of Congolese minerals that might adversely affect miners and their families.

In discussions with Enough, exporters suggested that other means of achieving traceability—including strengthened efforts to formalize the traders who move minerals from mines to the major cities—could help to improve accountability for the origin of minerals. Importantly, the exporters also expressed willingness to be more transparent, including providing detailed information on their finances and taxes. This could help ensure that the taxation of the minerals trade benefits Congo’s state coffers rather than fueling corruption.

Ultimately, the reputation of the companies dealing in eastern Congo’s minerals will depend not on intentions and plans, but on the concrete actions that result. The actions that will build the credibility of industry-led initiatives include companies willing to accept independent audits and suppliers ready to stop purchasing from companies that fall short of providing adequate due diligence or whom are shown to be continuing to source from militarized mines.

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Conclusion

The economic underpinnings of Congo’s persistent conflict have been on the international agenda for nearly a decade, with many of the same individuals and companies continually linked to the trade in conflict minerals over that period. But the unprecedented surge in international attention to this issue over the past 12 months has created new opportunities for a concerted effort to break the link between Congo’s resources and violence. Sustained attention and well-coordinated action from governments, companies, activists, and civil society organizations will make or break this effort. We can only expect more of the same half measures that only scratch the surface of the problem absent a coherent approach that couples international initiatives with on-the-ground efforts to seize eastern Congo’s mineral trade back from the mafia networks. Moreover, without a credible initiative to manage the supply chain companies are more likely to cut off all engagement with Congo.

The legislation pending in the United States and the drive by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to tackle conflict minerals has already spurred some action from the Congolese government and private-sector representatives, but unless these efforts remain closely aligned with and informed by developments in the field, they could prove counterproductive. Likewise, strong international oversight will be required in the short term to help counter the pervasive influence of the many vested interests at odds with efforts to put eastern Congo’s mineral wealth at the service of its people. Developing a coalition of private and public actors ranging from the largest of multinational electronics and jewelry companies all the way to the most knowledgeable and dedicated Congolese civil society voices from the mineral rich areas of the Kivus will be necessary to finally break the cycle of mineral-fueled violence in eastern Congo.

Endnotes

[1] This report is based on field research during travel to North and South Kivu during August and September 2009, as well as follow up research by Noel Atama and Olivia Caeymaex during October and November. Unless otherwise noted, references in this report are based on interviews with civil society activists, minerals traders, Congolese government officials, and U.N. staff in Goma and Bukavu from August 25 through September 9, 2009.

[2] U.N. Security Council, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2009/603 (November 2009).

[3] For Enough’s analysis of this operation, see Colin Thomas-Jensen, Noel Atama, and Olivia Caeymaex, “An Uneasy Alliance in Eastern Congo and its High Cost for Civilians: Operation Kimia II,” Enough Strategy Paper, September 2009.

[4] United Nations, “Press Conference on Final Report by Democratic Republic of Congo Experts Group,” available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2009/091207_Mahtani.doc.htm (accessed December 21, 2009).

[5] See U.N. Security Council, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2008/773 (December 2008) and Global Witness, “Faced With A Gun, What Can You Do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo” (July 2009).

[6] The CNDP previously controlled relatively few mining sites and profited more from general taxation of trade in regions under their control, especially at key border post. See U.N. Security Council Report, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2008/773.

[7] See Global Witness, “Faced With A Gun, What Can You Do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo.”

[8] Radio Okapi, “Walikale: attaques des FDLR, 1 mort, 11 villages vidés de leurs habitants,” December 13, 2009.

[9] U.N. Security Council, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2009/603, pp. 54-56.

[10] See Global Witness, “Faced With A Gun, What Can You Do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo.”

[11] Interview with western diplomat in Goma, August 27, 2009.

[12] Human Rights Watch, “You Will Be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo” (December 2009).

[13] Notably Lt. Col. Innocent Zimurinda, whose role in the Shalio massacre is described by Human Rights Watch, and whose role in minerals extraction is described in the 2009 Group of Experts report on p. 56-57.

[14] Quoted in Metal Bulletin Weekly, “Sellers concerned by Traxys's withdrawal from DRC tin market,” May 11, 2009.

[15] ITRI, “Top Tin Producing Companies 2008,” available at http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_TECHART/view.asp?Q=BF_TECHART_285697.

[16] Radio Okapi, “Goma: Adolphe Muzito à Walikale pour mettre de l’ordre dans l’exploitation minière,” 2009,

available at http://www.radiookapi.net/index.php?i=53&a=24240.

[17] Raf Custers, Jeroen Cuvelier, and Didier Verbruggen, “Culprits or Scapegoats? Revisiting the Role of Belgian Minerals Traders in Eastern DRC,” (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, 2009).

[18] ITRI, “Tin Supply from the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” available at http://www.itri.co.uk/POOLED/ARTICLES/BF_PARTART/VIEW.ASP?Q=BF_PARTART_310250.

[19] See Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, “EICC & GeSI Join with Tantalum Supply Chain Representatives to Improve Responsible Sourcing,” Press release, September 28, 2009, available athttp://www.eicc.info/PDF/Tantalum%20Supplier%20Meeting.pdf.

[20] U.N. Security Council, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2009/603, p. 72.

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Appendix: North and South Kivu mining export data

Data provided by North and South Kivu mining authorities provides a view of the mineral trade in Congo’s conflict zones during the first half of 2009. Given the severe challenges to obtaining comprehensive and reliable data in eastern Congo, these statistics are by no means authoritative, and a close look at these figures raises more questions than it answers. The most recent U.N. Experts report makes explicit this challenge, noting the huge discrepancies between statistics recorded by the mining authorities and actual exports by particular companies. Nonetheless, this information does provide some basis for evaluating the impact of recent events on the trade.

Tin ore exports began 2009 at low levels, especially in South Kivu, which exported only 100,000 kilograms in January. Exports then rose up to more than 500,000 kilograms by May. Although they did fall back below 300,000 kgs in July, statistics for August indicate a rebound. Likewise, in North Kivu, monthly exports have mostly remained within the range of 700,000 to 1,000,000 kgs.

^{Source: London Metals Exchange.}

^{Source: Division of Mines, North/South Kivu.}

What other factors may have influenced the minerals trade during 2009? The most likely factor is the world price of tin as determined by the London Metals Exchange.

The trendlines in the world price, with strong gains in during April and May followed by a dip in June and July, broadly match the pattern of exports reported out of the Kivus. This matches analysis by experts that link trends in the trade in Congo to world price fluctuations.

Insecurity was cited by both the private sector and civil society as also contributing to the slowdown in the trade. The president of the Association of Negociants in South Kivu told Enough that many middlemen had closed their doors as a result of the war, and that important trade routes to minerals mined outside of the conflict zone in northern Katanga and Maniema had been blocked by fighting.

Another important factor cited by comptoirs in North Kivu was tax reforms. Previously as much as 12.5 percent of the value of tin exports according to London Metals Exchange prices wound up going to Kinshasa in tax payments, but this was reduced to 3 to 3.5 percent this year, increasing the incentives for minerals to be exported through legal channels. Nonetheless, we heard from negociants, comptoirs, government officials, and civil society groups that the lack of taxes across the border in Rwanda meant that smuggling minerals into neighboring countries continued, and the U.N. Experts report that “the level of fraudulent mineral exports to neighboring states has escalated significantly since 2008 and particularly since the rapprochement between Kinshasa and Kigali since January 2009.”[20]

Where are Congolese minerals going? Data provided by the Division de Mines for North Kivu provides a snapshot view of what countries and companies received exports from the province.

This information can be misleading because most of these companies are metals traders, rather than the smelters and processors that are the actual destinations for the minerals. However, the data underlines the continued importance of Belgian metals traders and smelters and processors in Asia to the Congolese trade. Of particular note are the shipments to smelters Thailand Smelting and Refining (Thaisarco), which announced it would suspend purchasing only a few weeks later. Comptoirs Sodeem, Hill Side, and Pan African Business Group were all identified by the U.N. Experts as sourcing from Bisie mine in Walikale. The Coltan supplied by MH1 to African Ventures was also noted by the U.N. Experts Group as sourced from a militarized mine operated by former CNDP elements in Masisi, North Kivu. African Ventures supplied this coltan to Refractory Metals and Mining according to the U.N. report.

The South Kivu Division of Mines informed Enough that the number of comptoirs actively exporting minerals declined significantly during the Summer 2009, with only 4 of 16 registered comptoirs operating at full capacity. Three of the five comptoirs cited by the U.N. Group of Experts as selling minerals from FDLR-controlled mines to international companies were operational and exporting during this period.

It is important to note that because U.N. investigations named particular companies rather than individuals, it is possible that some of these companies may have suspended operations in an effort to avoid being targeted for sanctions. In fact, the U.N. Experts report that Bukavu-based comptoir MDM, which announced it had suspended operations, was in fact continuing to trade in minerals from FDLR mines under the name of WMC, another comptoir also cited by the Group of Experts.

Stealing an Election In Slow Motion: Time for Real Consequences

Patrick Furey — Fri, 18 Dec 2009 11:38:30 -0500

Enough Co-founder John Prendergast explores the many challenges facing the 2010 Sudan election season.

The deputy police commissioner of Duk Padiet, left, and a police describe an attack on their village. (Photo / Maggie Fick)

Sudan’s national elections scheduled for April 2010 will be neither free nor fair absent significant international pressure on the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP, to dramatically change the electoral landscape. The crackdown by the NCP on December 7 and 14 2009, involving the arrests of senior opposition politicians and the use of tear-gas on protestors, is yet another demonstration that the basic requirements of credible elections, including freedom of expression and assembly, have yet to be met. Despite recent progress over key components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, little has been done to change the electoral environment, and many of the national-level reforms included in the CPA have been ignored by the NCP with little outcry from the international community.

Explore our interactive timeline of the elections in Sudan.

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In the wake of this crackdown, and in the face of what the Obama administration calls “ongoing genocide,” the United States has yet to impose genuine consequences on NCP officials and others who are obstructing peace in Sudan. If nothing changes before April, U.S. taxpayers will have spent nearly $100 million to support the election of an indicted war-criminal and legitimize the iron-fisted rule of one of the world’s most oppressive regimes.

The current efforts of the United States and the broader international community to end the atrocities in Darfur and prevent all-out war in Sudan are failing. Despite clear signs that the CPA is in jeopardy and continued atrocities against civilians in Darfur and southern Sudan, the Obama administration has yet to impose consequences on those behind the violence.

No consequences for commission or orchestration of crimes against humanity.
No consequences for the brutalization of political opposition and silencing of independent voices.
No consequences for the failure to establish conditions for a free and fair national election.
No consequences for the non-implementation of existing agreements, including the CPA.

A stolen election would be the beginning of the CPA’s end, as the NCP would almost certainly exploit what it would quickly claim was newfound “democratic legitimacy” to prevent southern Sudanese from holding the self-determination referendum scheduled for 2011. If that happens, it would be fanciful to think that anything short of full-scale national war would result. In this context, it is time to alter course in bold and specific ways in order to avert what could be the deadliest conflagration in Sudan’s war-torn post-colonial history.

_________________

Credible elections in Sudan? Not even close

The April 2010 national elections are a central pillar of the CPA, the peace deal that ended the North-South war. But in order for elections to truly achieve the democratic transformation that was intended in the CPA, conditions for holding credible elections must be in place. These conditions include a new security law to reduce the government’s broad powers of arbitrary arrest and detention, an independent electoral commission, clear steps to allow independent media coverage, and unrestricted access for international observation teams. Not one of these preconditions has been met to date. These are the basic freedoms that must be in place for any election to meaningfully reflect the will of the people and for opposition politics to have a chance of challenging the status quo. If they are not there, elections can further inflame the crisis, rather than ameliorate it, and to date the international community has been overwhelmingly focused on technical support for the elections without recognizing that the underlying conditions for a free and fair election are not in place.

Until the NCP agrees to conditions that will allow for credible elections, the United States and other donors should suspend all electoral assistance. Un-free and unfair elections should not be financed and legitimized by American taxpayers. If the Sudanese parties decide to continue with elections without the establishment of these basic standards, the U.S. and the broader international community should not certify its outcome as a credible one.

However, efforts to put in place the conditions for the January 2011 referendum should continue. Not holding the referendum on time is the most certain trigger for all-out war.

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The risks of ignoring electoral prerequisites and holding non-credible elections are enormous, with consequences ranging from the humanitarian to the political. Non-credible elections will:

Fuel violence and divisions, particularly in the South and Darfur;
Undermine the CPA’s aim of democratically transforming the country;
Disenfranchise millions of Darfuris;
Provide false legitimacy to an indicted war criminal, Omer al-Bashir, and to his ruling NCP;
Badly discredit international electoral assistance programs;
Reinforce to the NCP that it can ignore key provisions of the CPA such as national political reforms; and,
Waste nearly a hundred million dollars of American taxpayers’ money.

Darfur is particularly vulnerable to flawed elections at this time. Rampant insecurity and attacks on civilians, the absence of a credible peace process, a disputed census, and the displacement of the majority of Darfur’s population are key obstacles to holding truly democratic elections. The displacement of Darfur’s population alone could conceivably lead to myriad problems. Many displaced Darfuris lack proper identification papers or cards, which not only complicates the voting and registration process but also creates ripe opportunities for electoral rigging. Elections in Darfur could formalize displacement; i.e., by registering Darfuris to vote in displaced camps, the NCP may well argue that the individuals who registered in camps have forsaken their legal claims to the lands from which they were driven. The NCP has also routinely encouraged the immigration of non-Darfuris into areas cleared out by the violence, raising questions of whether an election would truly be representative of the region’s people. Elections on these terms will only create new opportunities for the NCP to further exploit the population and hand the ruling party an easy, illegitimate victory. In short, it is almost impossible to imagine a fair election in Darfur in four months, and any national election that does not include Darfur will sorely lack legitimacy.

In the South, piecemeal and ad hoc attempts by the international community and the southern government to address significant security concerns related to the elections are a cause for concern even if the NCP does agree to pre-election reforms. If the elections occur in the current climate, where legitimate elections are impossible, they will fan the flames of simmering inter-communal and political tensions in the South. Elections in the South represent risks that will be all the more threatening if reforms by the NCP do not occur now.

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The urgent need for consequences

The U.S. and other donors to the electoral process need to stand up and conclude that the Emperor is as naked as he ever was, and blow the whistle now on this deadly charade.

To be clear, we are not calling for a postponement of the elections, per se, but rather for the creation of conditions for free and fair elections as envisioned in the CPA. The CPA was built upon a clear sequence: national reforms first, to be followed by nation-wide elections and a referendum. If the international community does not condition its continued financial and logistical assistance on substantial reform of the electoral environment, the results will be predictably unfortunate. If the international community lets the NCP gloss over the provisions that would allow for fair elections, without consequences, this will demonstrate once again the lack of international will to enforce crucial CPA components, and will signal to the NCP that it can wriggle out of additional CPA requirements, thus further imperiling the fragile peace in the South. We are calling for full implementation of the CPA. Rushing toward elections without the proper conditions in place will end badly for all involved, and further embolden the NCP to undermine the next major CPA process: the referendum.

Un-free and unfair elections in Sudan and its potentially violent aftermath will continue to undermine efforts toward democratic reforms throughout Africa as a continent. With several countries -- including Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Chad -- holding elections next year and all undermining the underpinnings of democracy in varying degrees, the conduct of credible elections in Sudan is pivotal to countering this negative regional trend. The U.S. rarely pulls the plug on its support for an electoral process, no matter how non-credible it is. Doing so in Sudan would set a positive precedent that the substance of democratic transitions matter to the United States.

There is a reason Sudan is facing this make-or-break scenario. Until now, the parties – particularly the NCP – continue to trample the agreement because there has been no cost for not implementing key parts of the CPA. It is time for President Obama to implement his administration’s own benchmark-based policy. Flouting the establishment of conditions for a credible election and referendum should trigger immediate consequences. The U.S. should work within and outside the U.N. Security Council to develop a coalition of countries willing to impose consequences on the NCP for its obstruction of basic conditions for peace. Consequences should include ratcheting up targeted multilateral sanctions, enforcement of the arms embargo, denial of debt relief, and greater support for further International Criminal Court investigations and indictments. Similar consequences should await senior SPLM officials and Darfur rebel leaders if they are found to be undermining peace as well.

These consequences that allegedly reside in the Obama administration’s confidential annex to its policy are the only instruments that can prevent an all-out national war in Sudan. Consequences, or the meaningful threat thereof, have altered the calculations and behavior of the NCP in the past. They led to the expulsion of Osama bin Laden, the end to slave raiding and aerial bombing in the South, the acceleration of intelligence cooperation after 9/11, and the CPA itself.

There is a path to peace for the parties in Sudan. The United States has a major role to play. But to contribute to peace, the U.S. needs to stand for peace with principle, and back principle with real leverage in the form of credible multilateral consequences in support of genuine democratic processes and verifiable commitment to peace. The first step surely is to suspend U.S. taxpayer support for the unacceptably flawed electoral process, signaling the beginning of a strategy in which fundamental human rights and civil rights violations have real and escalating costs.

The Lord’s Resistance Army and the Threat Against Civilians in Southern Sudan

Patrick Furey — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 11:01:28 -0500

Enough experts expose the ongoing violence and turmoil caused by the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa.

^{Source: Enough / Ledio Cakaj}

Arrow Boys are local militia that have organized to defend communities against the LRA.

The cross-border nature of the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA—currently active in northeastern Congo, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan—is a clear threat to international peace and security, but the United Nations Security Council has yet to take seriously its responsibility to protect civilians from the LRA and marshal the will and the resources to put in place an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

In Western Equatoria State in Southern Sudan, where LRA attacks in recent months have killed at least 135 people and driven 67,000 from their homes, the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, have been unable and in some cases unwilling to protect southern Sudanese civilians. Unfortunately, U.N. peacekeepers deployed to support implementation of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement have not risen to the direct challenge to peace posed by the LRA. The Government of Southern Sudan and the United Nations must do better, but improved civilian protection is only one element of a comprehensive strategy to address the LRA threat. Civilians in the affected region will not be safe so long as the LRA continues to operate as a transnational terrorist group.

The U.N. Security Council must authorize and member states must resource a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians in LRA-affected areas, identify and sever external lines of support, increase opportunities for rank-and-file fighters to defect, and end the insurgency once and for all through more effective military pressure on LRA leader Joseph Kony and his high command.

_______________________________________

John Prendergast speaks to activists about the LRA at the How It Ends lobby days event, organized by the Enough Project, Invisible Children, and Resolve Uganda.

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Introduction

A spate of brutal attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, in southern Sudan is further evidence of the urgent need for a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians and end the LRA crisis once and for all through an internationally backed counterinsurgency effort. LRA leader Joseph Kony and two of his deputies are wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity, yet his 22-year-old campaign of violence against civilians continues in northeastern Congo, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan. With mounting anecdotal evidence that Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party is again backing proxy militias—including the LRA—to destabilize southern Sudan in the run up to elections next year and a self-determination referendum in 2011, the regional threat to innocent civilians from the LRA is escalating. The international community must respond accordingly.

The cross-border nature of the LRA is a clear threat to international peace and security, but the international response thus far has been woefully inadequate. The situation in Western Equatoria State in Sudan’s southwest corner is but one example among many of the unique challenges that this insurgent group poses to the international community’s responsibility to protect. Recent attacks have caused death, displacement, and made an already difficult humanitarian situation much worse. Farmers have stopped cultivating their land for fear of being abducted and killed, while much of the food surplus they have accumulated has been looted by the LRA.

The status quo response to the LRA in Western Equatoria—and other LRA-affected areas in northeastern Congo and the Central African Republic—is failing. Although the responsibility to protect civilians in Western Equatoria rests first and foremost with the Government of Southern Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, the SPLA’s limited capacity and strained relationship with local populations has made protecting civilians daunting. The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, has also struggled to fulfil its mandate to “protect civilians under threat of imminent violence” from the LRA.

However, a significantly improved effort by the SPLA and UNMIS to protect civilians in Western Equatoria is only one element of what is needed: a comprehensive approach to the LRA threat that protects civilians in these areas and pursues LRA leadership through a properly resourced counterinsurgency effort. Marshalling the will and the resources to put such an approach in place is the responsibility of the U.N. Security Council and U.N. member states. Until the Security Council, working in coordination with the Government of Southern Sudan and other regional actors, takes seriously its responsibility to protect civilians from the LRA and to execute international arrest warrants against LRA leadership, LRA atrocities will continue.

Failing to Protect:
The case of southern Sudan

In the aftermath of Operation Lightning Thunder—a U.S.-backed joint offensive against the LRA in northeastern Congo by Ugandan, Congolese, and southern Sudanese forces in December 2008—the LRA stepped up a campaign of extreme violence, targeting civilians in northeastern Congo, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic.[1]

While these so-called “Christmas massacres” in Congo received international attention, the suffering of southern Sudanese at the hands of the LRA occurs largely under the radar.[2] A U.N. report from October noted that the LRA has already killed 205 people in Western Equatoria in 2009 and abducted another 135 people. Over 67,700 southern Sudanese have been driven from their homes.[3] However, this is potentially the tip of the iceberg. Given the thin international presence in the area, the real numbers for deaths and abductions are likely higher.

The international responsibility to respond to this cross-border threat to international peace and security rests with the U.N. Security Council, but the Security Council has failed thus far to articulate a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians and end the LRA insurgency. In the absence of strong leadership from New York, the Government of Southern Sudan, U.N. Peacekeepers, and local militias have faltered in their efforts to protect civilians in Western Equatoria.

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The Government of Southern Sudan:
A perceived lack of will

Enough conducted a series of interviews in and around the towns of Yambio and Nzara during recent field research in Western Equatoria. Most of the people interviewed felt that the SPLA in Western Equatoria cannot protect them because of inadequate troop numbers and limited capacity. A significant number also claimed that the SPLA was unwilling—sometimes refusing outright—to protect them from the LRA. Other witnesses say that SPLA officers have accused local informants of being collaborators, even accusing some villagers of being responsible for the attacks.[4]

Witnesses to LRA attacks said that the SPLA often deployed too late to provide meaningful protection and in some cases failed to act even when they were nearby. One person from the village of Birisi, which is a mile from Yambio, said that in three separate LRA attacks in July and August 2009, SPLA soldiers did not deploy to confront the LRA despite being based in close proximity. According to the same witness, SPLA soldiers told the villagers in Birisi that they did not have the authority to fight the LRA.

Interviewees instead expressed greater confidence in local defence forces called Arrow Boys and the Ugandan army, or UPDF, which has deployed forces to pursue the LRA in southern Sudan. “The UPDF fights the LRA, even the Arrow Boys fight the LRA, but not the SPLA,” said a local chief. The UPDF has made a continuing effort to reach out to the local population for information regarding the LRA. As a religious worker said, “From the level of communications and cooperation it seems as if the UPDF is the local army and the SPLA the foreign one.”[5] One Nzara resident told Enough that in cases of LRA attacks, people inform the UPDF first, then the SPLA: “Had it not been for the UPDF, we would be displaced or killed by now.”[6]

After attacks on the villages of Ukcuo in August 2009 and Bomu in September 2009, there was allegedly no response from the SPLA. At least 16 people were killed in Bomu and many were abducted in both villages. During three separate LRA attacks in August and September 2009 in the villages of Bureangure, Sakure, and Baikpara, SPLA soldiers turned up many hours after the attacks had taken place. According to testimony from displaced persons from Bureangure, SPLA soldiers arrived on the scene at least eight hours after the attack. Many people were killed and abducted but only the Arrow Boys responded, eventually pursuing the LRA into the bush. The bodies of six people killed in Sakure were collected on August 30 by the local population with the help of Ugandan soldiers.

There have been cases when the SPLA engaged the LRA, but these were mostly instances in which the SPLA was directly attacked. And when the SPLA has been given LRA positions, it often fails to seize the initiative. People driven from the village of Karika told Enough that after the LRA attacked their village in August 2009, they informed a nearby SPLA unit. The SPLA commander told the villagers to follow the LRA fighters and inform him when and where the LRA fighters went to sleep. On October 2, 2009, the village of Karika was attacked again even though the exact location of the LRA fighters was purportedly disclosed to the SPLA.

Community and religious leaders held the same views as the majority of the people interviewed, maintaining that the SPLA was incapable of protecting civilians in Western Equatoria. “It is common practice for the SPLA to turn up five hours after the attacks happen,” said a local pastor.[7] U.N. staff and local and international aid workers reflected similar concerns about poor responses from the SPLA to LRA attacks.

While the SPLA is still transforming itself from a guerrilla force to a conventional army, the SPLA’s failure to protect civilians in Western Equatoria cannot be solely attributed to a lack of capacity.[8] According to the SPLA spokesperson, Gen. Kuol Diem Kuol, there are at least 3,000 SPLA soldiers in Western Equatoria, compared to a few hundred LRA fighters.[9]

In almost all of the interviews Enough conducted in the field, there was a consistent view that intercommunal tensions between the SPLA and the local population have undermined the SPLA’s ability and willingness to serve as a protector. The SPLA force in Western Equatoria is composed mostly of soldiers from the Dinka tribe while the local population is Zande. Intercommunal conflict in 2005 and 2006 between the Zande and the Dinka created a climate of lingering suspicion between the two groups. A local journalist said, “The mistrust has never gone away and this is why the Dinka soldiers refuse to protect people they see as their enemies.”[10] A displaced person from Ezo added: “It is very simple: The Dinka does not want to protect the Zande. For the Dinka, the Zande and the Acholi are the same.”[11] The majority of the LRA fighters are Acholi.

After repeated attempts, Enough was unable to meet with the SPLA force commander or any other official SPLA representatives in Western Equatoria to discuss the crisis of civilian protection. The inability to communicate concerns directly to the SPLA is a constant frustration for local residents as well. A journalist told Enough, “The SPLA still thinks of itself as a guerrilla force. There are no official lines of communications, be it for international journalists who want to report on the situation in Sudan or for the simple peasants who want to report LRA attacks.”[12]

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U.N. Peacekeepers: Simply inadequate

The United Nations appears dangerously behind the curve in dealing with the LRA. As currently deployed in Western Equatoria, the United Nations does not play a significant role in civilian protection. Some 200 Bangladeshi peacekeepers are based in Yambio, the capital of Western Equatoria, but this is far too small a deployment to take the aggressive measures to carry out the United Nations’ civilian protection mandate.

Moreover, the local population in Western Equatoria has very little trust in the U.N. presence. “They are not even able to protect themselves,” said a local politician, referring to the Bangladeshi battalion. [13] “The LRA attacked them in 2007 and they did not even respond,” he added. Worryingly, the lack of trust has evolved into outright contempt in some cases. “Why are they here in their trucks with their guns if not to protect us” said a community leader referring to the Bangladeshi blue helmets, “to taunt us?”[14]

U.N. humanitarian workers are similarly frustrated with U.N. peacekeepers. “If the LRA attacked us, the peacekeepers will be the first to run,” a U.N. source told Enough.[15] The peacekeepers spoke very little English and have limited interaction with the local population or even humanitarians. “How can they work in a place where they can’t communicate?” asked an international relief worker.[16]

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1870 requests that the U.N. Mission in Sudan make full use of its mandate to provide security to civilian population under imminent threat of violence, and as early as 2006 the council urged the U.N. mission to make full use of its mandate against the LRA.[17] U.N. officials in Western Equatoria, on the other hand, argue that their mandate does not allow them to “go after the LRA.”[18] Yet protecting civilians from imminent attack and hunting an insurgent group are two very different things.

The reality is that protecting civilians from LRA attacks is simply not a priority for U.N. peacekeepers right now. A U.N. worker put it bluntly, “Unfortunately, in terms of numbers of deaths, the LRA in Western Equatoria ranks low when compared to casualties from conflicts in Jonglei and Unity states. The United Nations can only respond to so many conflicts and Western Equatoria is not a priority for it at the moment.”[19] This is dangerously naïve. Few armed groups in the world can match the LRA’s ability to cause maximum chaos with a minimal number of fighters. The death and destruction will only accelerate if Khartoum accelerates support for LRA operations in southern Sudan.

Signs are increasing that the LRA could be used to disrupt the elections and the self-determination referendum. A recent LRA attack in the town of Nzara in Western Equatoria killed four people at an electoral registration centre. As a Zande paramount chief put it to Enough, “How can you talk about supporting peace when people are being killed?”[20]

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Local Militias: Filling the void

The security vacuum left by the SPLA and U.N. peacekeepers has given rise to local defence forces known as Arrow Boys. Though occasionally effective in protecting communities from LRA attacks, these armed groups, like the Mayi Mayi in neighbouring Congo, could themselves become a serious threat to civilians.

Currently, there are at least 10 Arrow Boy groups in Western Equatoria, each with 70 to 80 fighters and operating under a loose umbrella command. The fighters possess rudimentary arms—bows and arrows and locally made guns—and most have little to no military experience. Nonetheless, the Arrow Boys have had some successes against the LRA. Arrow Boys conduct night patrols around their communities and occasionally set up ambushes in areas where the LRA is known to operate. Leaders of groups in Yambio and Nzara stated in interviews that they captured at least 12 LRA fighters in the past few months. A recent U.N. report states that four LRA fighters were killed and one captured by Arrow Boys in one week in October.[21]

Local residents interviewed by Enough stated that the Arrow Boys were indispensable to providing protection in Western Equatoria. “This is not a perfect solution,” said a local official, “but the Arrow Boys are providing at least the appearance of safety which is making people not panic.”[22] A religious leader added, “The Arrow Boys are our only hope. You cannot argue with what they are doing which is essentially protecting their families and communities. No one else is doing it.”[23]

The emergence of irregular armed groups in Western Equatoria is, however, cause for concern. Not only is their sustainability questionable—given their disadvantage in weaponry and military training relative to the LRA—the Arrow Boys also have the potential to turn against the very population they claim to protect. The increasing power of the Arrow Boys is evident in the groups’ expanding involvement in administering local justice. Some of these activities border dangerously on vigilante justice. One Arrow Boy leader said, “We are also helping with solving community problems such as apprehending criminals or people who cause trouble.”[24]

On October 28, a reported clash took place between Arrow Boys in Nzara and a group of Ambororo pastoralists. One Arrow Boy was badly injured and at least one Ambororo was killed.[25] There have also been cases where Arrow Boys are reported to have captured and lynched alleged LRA rebels. At least in one case, a person who was caught and badly beaten by Arrow Boys was not a LRA rebel.[26]

Leaders of the Arrow Boys maintained that they are not soldiers, are uninterested in fighting for money, and fight out of necessity. “We got fed up with being killed, raped, and looted,” said Richard Tambua, the leader of the Nzara section of the Arrow Boys.[27] Yet the Arrow Boys have begun to demand ammunition and other supplies from the SPLA to sustain themselves.[28] “We are in constant touch with our state leaders as well as the SPLA so that they know what we do,” he added. One of the local priests told Enough that religious leaders were advising the Arrow Boys against being used as private militias by powerful individuals in the region.[29] This danger will only increase in the absence of more robust efforts by the SPLA and United Nations to protect civilians.

[pagebreak]

Protecting Civilians in Western Equatoria
and Beyond

The situation in Western Equatoria is dire and poised to get much worse in the months ahead. The region is on the brink of a major humanitarian crisis, and the Government of Southern Sudan, the United Nations, and international donors must take urgent steps to protect civilians there from the LRA. A successful approach in Western Equatoria has two key prerequisites:

Improved SPLA relationship with the local population:LRA attacks have highlighted the SPLA’s inability to protect civilians and general discontent felt by Western Equatorians toward their national army. The SPLA must urgently gain the trust of the local population and build lines of communication with community leaders to determine civilian protection needs and priorities. Improving cooperation and communication between the SPLA and local communities will require a change in perception between the two ethnically divided groups. Military experts and regional analysts also underscored the importance of communications between the army and the local population. “Gathering information from the local population is of utmost importance in counterinsurgency theory,” said a military analyst. “It is something that the U.S. army has been pursuing vigorously in Iraq and Afghanistan with success.”[30]

When Enough inquired among the local population about how to improve civilian protection, most of the answers involved integrating Zande and other Equatorian soldiers into the SPLA unit at Western Equatoria. “They should bring our Zande boys here,” said a local chief. “But if that is not possible, we want other Equatorians here, soldiers from the Rotuka tribe for instance.”[31] Other suggestions included changing the leadership of the SPLA troops. “We need more active leaders in the SPLA here,” said a local journalist. “It might be good to have a Zande force commander here, someone who knows the problems of the community.”[32]

Increased troop presence:The SPLA and United Nations urgently need to deploy more forces to Western Equatoria, especially in the towns of Ezo and Nzara, which have been regular targets of LRA attacks. The SPLA and UNMIS can be more effective by increasing patrols, identifying and surveying known LRA incoming routes, and collecting and using intelligence from the local population. With an increased military presence, the United Nations should assume a coordinating role in civilian protection, cooperating and exchanging information with U.N. peacekeepers in Congo as well as the SPLA and the Ugandan army.

Further thought should also be given to helping the SPLA with logistics such as transport and intelligence sharing. Increasing troop presence on the Congolese and Central African Republic borders is also important. A regional military analyst told Enough that because of the cross-border activities of the LRA “a strategy of adequate civilian protection would involve a simple stationing of troops in strategic areas who would actively engage any incoming forces.”[33]

However, improved civilian protection is only one element of a comprehensive strategy to address the LRA threat. Civilians in the region will not be safe so long as the LRA continues to operate as a transnational terrorist group. As Enough has argued, the U.N. Security Council must authorize and member states must resource a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians in LRA-affected areas, identify and sever external lines of support, increase opportunities for rank-and-file fighters to defect, and end the insurgency once and for all through more effective military pressure on Joseph Kony and the LRA high command.

[1] See Julia Spiegel and Noel Atama, “No Excuses: The End of the Lord’s Resistance Army Is in Sight,” Enough strategy paper (January 2009), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/no-excuses-end-lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army-sight.

[2] See Human Rights Watch, “The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo”, (February 16, 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/02/16/christmas-massacres-0.

[3] U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gap analysis for LRA response, October 1, 2009. On file with Enough.

[4] Villagers of Bomu, for instance, who reported an LRA attack to the SPLA in September 2009, were accused of being LRA collaborators. SPLA soldiers did not go after the LRA, despite 16 people being killed and many abducted. When the Arrow Boys decided to pursue the LRA, SPLA soldiers reportedly stopped them and beat up one badly. On September 5, 2009, the village of Uze was attacked by the LRA. One man was killed and another was cut with machetes. The villagers informed the SPLA of the exact house where the LRA were hiding. According to one witness, the SPLA refused to go near the house arresting instead one of the villagers.

[5] Interview with religious worker, Nzara, October 9, 2009.

[6] Interview with Nzara resident, October 9, 2009.

[7] Interview with local pastor, Yambio, October 8, 2009.

[8] One local politician told Enough, ‘The SPLA fought for 22 years during the struggle [with the Sudanese Army] unpaid and unfed. Why can’t they protect their own people now that they have won?”

[9] Sudan Radio Service, “SPLA to pursue LRA in Garamba,” September 3, 2009, available at http://www.sudanradio.org/viewArticle.php?id=2673 (last accessed November 4, 2009).

[10] Interview with journalist, Yambio, October 8, 2009.

[11] Interview with IDP, Duduma VST camp, October 10, 2009.

[12] Interview with journalist, Juba, October 4, 2009.

[13] Interview with local official, Yambio, October 6, 2009.

[14] Interview with paramount chief, October 8, 2009.

[15] Interview with U.N. worker, Yambio, October 7, 2009.

[16] Interview with international NGO worker, Yambio, October 7, 2009.

[17] S/RES./1870 (2009), April 30, 2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,SDN,456d621e2,49fef6032,0.html (last accessed November 30, 2009) and S/RES./1663 (2006) March 24, 2006, paragraph 7, available at ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=34922 (last accessed November 30, 2009).

[18] AFP, “U.N. says new peacekeeping mandate needed for LRA hunt,”,August 27, 2009, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/JOPA-7VBF9Z?OpenDocument (last accessed November 30, 2009).

[19] Interview with U.N. worker, Juba, October 5, 2009.

[20] Interview with paramount chief, October 8, 2009.

[21] UNMIS.incident reports from September 26 to October 8, Yambio. On file with Enough.

[22] Interview with GOSS official, Yambio, October 8, 2009.

[23] Interview with religious leader, Yambio, October 6, 2009.

[24] Interview with Arrow Boy, Yambio, October 8, 2009.

[25] Email exchange with leader of Arrow Boys, WES. Received on November 3, 2009.

[26] U.N. Security report. On file with Enough.

[27] Interview with Richard Tambua, Nzara, October 9, 2009.

[28] Letter of demands from the leadership of Arrow Boys in Yambio. On file with Enough.

[29] Interview with priest, Yambio, October 6, 2009.

[30] Interview with U.S. military expert. Kampala, November 24, 2009.

[31] Interview with paramount chief, Yambio, October 8, 2009.

[32] Interview with local journalist, Yambio, October 9, 2009.

[33] Email correspondence with regional analyst. October 2009.

Publications

Field Dispatch: Walikale

Field Dispatch: The Protection Gap in Haut Uele

Field Dispatch: Ferocious LRA Attacks in Northeast Congo

Field Dispatch: Tensions in North Kivu

Truth and Consequences for Sudan Now: An Open Letter to President Obama's Deputies

Clear Benchmarks for Sudan

TAKE ACTION

Introduction

Background: The Obama Administration’s clear statement of intent

The Benchmarks

National Reforms

Security

Humanitarian access

Darfur Peace Process

Abyei

Elections

Popular Consultations

Southern Referendum

Accountability

Conclusion

Field Dispatch: A Civil Servant’s Close Encounter with the LRA

Ambushed

Living in captivity

Released

Digging In: Recent Developments on Conflict Minerals

Situation update—Kimia II’s impact on the minerals trade

The battle for Bisie: Eastern Congo’s largest mine

From FDLR to FARDC, the behavior remains the same

Impacts on the ongoing minerals trade

Congolese and international efforts to reform the mineral trade

The Congolese Government

The stabilization plan

Private-sector efforts

Conclusion

Endnotes

Appendix: North and South Kivu mining export data

Stealing an Election In Slow Motion: Time for Real Consequences

Enough Co-founder John Prendergast explores the many challenges facing the 2010 Sudan election season.

The Lord’s Resistance Army and the Threat Against Civilians in Southern Sudan

Enough experts expose the ongoing violence and turmoil caused by the Lord's Resistance Army in central Africa.

Introduction

Failing to Protect: The case of southern Sudan

The Government of Southern Sudan: A perceived lack of will

U.N. Peacekeepers: Simply inadequate

Local Militias: Filling the void

Protecting Civilians in Western Equatoria and Beyond

Failing to Protect:
The case of southern Sudan

The Government of Southern Sudan:
A perceived lack of will

Protecting Civilians in Western Equatoria
and Beyond