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Preparing for Two Sudans

Patrick Furey — Fri, 12 Mar 2010 11:28:21 -0500

Enough experts break down the possible outcomes of the upcoming referendum vote in Sudan.

Sudanese campaign posters for President's Salva Kiir (Southern Sudan) and Omar Bashir (Sudan). Photos by Maggie Fick / Enough

All signs indicate that Sudan, Africa’s largest state, will very soon split in two—either peacefully or violently. In a self-determination referendum scheduled for January 2011, the people of southern Sudan are widely expected to vote for separation from their northern neighbors. Yet with the security situation in southern Sudan deteriorating, next month’s national election set to be deeply flawed, and several crucial elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, still unimplemented, the referendum and its outcome are by no means guaranteed. As a guarantor of the CPA, the United States must work multilaterally on several fronts to support the peaceful expression of the will of the people of southern Sudan and prevent a return to conflict.

The two parties to the CPA—the National Congress Party, or NCP, and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement, or SPLA/M—have a laundry list of difficult tasks to accomplish before the 2011 referendum. Next month’s elections will occur against a backdrop of intense political jockeying for position and rising tensions between the two parties. And while the Sudanese government has agreed to allow some external monitoring of the election, few Sudanese expect a credible process under the repressive security environment that persists throughout the country, particularly in the North.

The NCP and the SPLM must reach agreement on both outstanding CPA provisions and on post-referendum arrangements to avoid a return to war. Moreover, the international community must work to halt the downward spiral of intercommunal violence in southern Sudan—a situation that threatens the referendum altogether.

Unfortunately, the sustained multilateral pressure and unity of international purpose that yielded the CPA has not accompanied its implementation. In the absence of coordinated efforts by the international community, the United States remains the de facto external lead player on Sudan. However, U.S. efforts to date have assumed a level of good faith in the parties—particularly the ruling NCP—that simply does not exist. The NCP and SPLM reached agreement on areas of mutual interest with very little external facilitation. But with only nine months left before the referendum, there are major issues of disagreement that require international mediation if a return to conflict is to be averted. It is in these areas that the United States is expected to lead international efforts to facilitate compromises and to coordinate the development of multilateral pressures and incentives necessary to leverage such compromises.

The Obama administration must work urgently to support the parties in defining a clear framework for two distinct sets of negotiations: the resolution of outstanding CPA provisions and the initial discussion of post-referendum arrangements. For talks to succeed, the United States must work multilaterally to put meaningful pressure on the NCP and SPLM to find common ground on the CPA and the contentious issues that will accompany an independent southern Sudan. This approach is consistent with the Sudan policy unveiled by the Obama administration in October 2009, but the policy has not yet been implemented.

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A ticking time bomb

Last year, Enough warned that the international community was at risk of sleepwalking through national elections and the run-up to the referendum.[1] Today, more international actors are clearly concerned about the potential return to conflict between North and South. Despite this increased attention, however, the trend lines in Sudan remain decidedly negative. Violence is rife in the South and in Darfur, state-sponsored political repression remains the norm in the North, implementation of key CPA provisions is effectively stalled, and a number of potentially explosive post-referendum issues remain unresolved. The recent agreement between the government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, in Darfur, which appears to be unraveling quickly, is a good example of the substantial risks carried by poorly executed negotiations at this juncture.

1. Southern Sudan: Spiraling insecurity threatens the referendum

More than 2,500 people were killed and 350,000 displaced last year in southern Sudan.[2] Much of this violence is undoubtedly linked to historic tensions between southern groups over cattle and other resources, coupled with growing discontent over the lack of “peace dividends” received by the majority rural population across the South.[3] However, there is likely another historic trend at play. Throughout its two decades in power, the National Congress Party regime in Khartoum has frequently armed local proxies to wage war on its behalf and sow instability in Sudan’s marginalized peripheral areas.

Today, some reports indicate that Khartoum has provided arms to militias to attack civilians.[4] With this demonstrated track record of proxy warfare and now mounting anecdotal evidence, the perception among Southern leadership and some local populations is that Khartoum is the hidden hand behind recent violence. This perception is one that the Obama administration, and the international community more broadly, must take very seriously while still holding the GoSS accountable for its own shortcomings in the security sector.

Accusations by GoSS officials have stoked tensions between Juba and Khartoum and exacerbated barely below the surface rifts between communities in southern Sudan. The NCP’s hand has been strengthened by widespread perceptions that the GoSS has been incapable of extending authority throughout a vast, largely remote, and often inaccessible territory. Khartoum’s response to the intertribal violence has also helped to fuel mistrust between the parties and fostered the notion in some certain diplomatic circles that Sudan and its neighbors would be “better off” if Sudan remained united, implying that the South is incapable of “governing itself.”[5]

If 2009 was bad, 2010 may well be worse. Last August, a senior U.N. official characterized the situation in southern Sudan as a “humanitarian perfect storm.”[6] Deadly clashes have already occurred this year in four of the South’s 10 states and the threat of Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, rebels persists, particularly near the South’s borders with Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.

April’s elections could aggravate this already tense situation. A core element of the GoSS’s pre-elections security strategy is a military campaign to disarm civilians in areas with the greatest potential for election-related violence.[7] Despite efforts to improve upon past disarmament disasters, current campaigns in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, and Lakes state have directly led to violence and casualties among civilians and the army.[8] [9] The SPLA is charged by state-level security committees with carrying out disarmament, which the GoSS publicly described as “voluntary” and only coercive if civilians refuse to hand over their weapons to the SPLA.[10] However, according to a senior official with the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, rank-and-file soldiers are not trained in conducting voluntary campaigns, often leading soldiers to revert to coercive tactics.[11]

Communities have armed themselves—or are still holding onto the weapons they held during the war—in large part because they fear attacks by neighboring communities. Disarmament alone will not assuage these fears. Unless the SPLA and the GoSS devise a strategy for guaranteeing the security of disarmed communities and put greater efforts into community-level reconciliation, many communities will continue to arm themselves.

Indeed, the problems that come with a heavily-armed civilian population cannot be addressed through disarmament alone and must instead be part of broader security sector reform efforts with significant buy-in and support from donors and the international community. As one UNMIS official told Enough, “It takes a generation to get security sector reform right.”[12] With this realization in mind, it would be wise for the international community—particularly the United States and other actors already in the lead on funding security sector reform programs—to do the hard thinking now on how best to support these efforts beginning immediately after the referendum and beyond.

Given the likelihood of insecurity surrounding both the elections and the referendum, the international community also needs to work with the GoSS to anticipate and respond appropriately to outbreaks of violence in the coming months. However, security sector reform is challenging even in an environment of peace and stability and with genuine political will. It may prove almost impossible over the next year as all sides position themselves for a potential return to war.

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2. Northern Sudan: State-sponsored violence and intimidation

The repressive political climate in North Sudan is not conducive to even marginally credible elections. The majority of northern Sudanese do not live with basic freedoms such as the ability to participate freely in opposition politics, freedom of assembly, or access to a free media. In the recent protracted negotiations with the SPLM over a package of CPA-related laws, the NCP resolutely refused to reform the National Security Law that enables the government nearly unchecked powers to detain and intimidate its people. With little outcry from international diplomats, some of the truly transformative cornerstones of the CPA were simply abandoned.

The voter registration period in late 2009 was marked by Khartoum government’s use of its security forces to harass, abuse, and detain those attempting to challenge the ruling NCP.[13] In early December, Khartoum’s security forces used tear gas against peaceful opposition protestors organized by the SPLM’s northern sector in Khartoum; several senior SPLM leaders, including the SPLM’s presidential candidate Yassir Arman, were beaten and detained.

Despite a recent—and increasingly—fragile framework peace agreement between the government and the largest rebel group in Darfur, the crisis there is far from over. Nearly 3 million civilians have been driven from their homes and warehoused in sprawling camps for refugees and displaced persons. A government offensive has killed hundreds and displaced tens of thousands in recent weeks. And while the Sudanese government controls major towns, other armed groups—government-aligned militia, government-backed Chadian rebels, and Darfur’s fractured rebellion—have loose control over large tracts of territory and harass and terrorize civilians and aid workers with impunity. There is also widespread evidence that elements of the LRA, have found safe harbor in areas of Darfur controlled by government forces.

3. CPA implementation: The great unraveling

The CPA offered the promise of democratic transformation, but a true change in the political dispensation that lies at the root of so much conflict in Sudan requires the NCP and the SPLM to embrace democratic principles. Sadly, the parties have generally not chosen to pursue this path. The recent deal reached between the parties on the number of national parliamentary seats allocated to the SPLM ended a long deadlock related to a dispute over the 2008 census results, but it is arguably an example of how the CPA has been treated—and in some cases, manipulated—by each side. While the NCP has often attempted to avoid implementing the spirit and letter of the CPA, the SPLM has sought short-term advantage and political gain or mere survival, sometimes pursuing strategies that come at a cost to its image and its already shaky democratic credentials.

Despite this trend, it is important to note that the details of the late-breaking deal on parliamentary representation (which will impact the elections) are still being worked out. The SPLM is showing promising signs of supporting a more equitable process to accurately represent the degree of support opposition parties’ hold in each of the 10 southern states. Should the SPLM follow through on its recent statements regarding parliamentary representation of opposition forces in the South, this would be a step in the right direction, although it does not change the North-South deal-making dynamic that often continues to block the more transformative elements of CPA implementation.

Among a long list of CPA provisions that remain unimplemented, several pose the threat of sparking a return to conflict and should be prioritized:

Demarcation of the North-South border: “To me, the border demarcation is more important than the elections,” a leading GoSS official remarked to Enough. [14] The North-South Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee has been unable to reach agreement in its final report to the Government of National Unity, or GoNU, presidency on the 2,100-kilometer North-South border due to "procedural and substantive disagreements" between the NCP and SPLM over five particular sections of the border.[15] However, following NCP-SPLM discussions in mid-February, the two parties agreed to immediately begin demarcating the agreed-upon sections of the border and requested that the committee submit a report to the presidency within two months detailing the five disputed sections of the border. UNMIS has been denied access to several contested areas along the border—notably the Heglig oil fields that (following the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2009 Abyei ruling) lie outside of the Abyei region (the Sudanese Armed Forces interprets this new status to mean that the Heglig –Kharasana area is outside the ceasefire zone specified in the CPA).[16] If key border areas remain undemarcated, they will be obvious wellsprings for renewed violence.

Residency requirements for the Abyei referendum: The contested region of Abyei remains a major flashpoint where the parties will resort to conflict in order to demonstrate their commitment to their local constituencies—for the SPLM, the Ngok Dinka native to Abyei, and for the NCP, the Misseriya nomads, who seasonally migrate through the region.[17] In Abyei today, 20,000 residents remain displaced from the May 2008 fighting between SAF and SPLA forces. Demarcation of the Abyei boundaries has been plagued by security issues and SPLM claims of the NCP intimidating the joint border demarcation committee.

Constitution of the Southern Referendum Commission and other preparations: Although the government signed the Southern Referendum Law into law in early February, the Referendum Commission has not yet been formed. For that to happen, the National Assembly will need to be called back from its pre-elections recess in order to approve the members of the Referendum Commission nominated by the presidency. Given the precedent of extreme delays in the two other major CPA processes to date—the census and the elections—it is likely that the referendum preparations could be plagued by similar roadblocks. The referendum is a “redline” for the SPLM and the people of southern Sudan; any delay in the holding of the referendum could easily spark a return to North-South conflict.

Post-referendum issues

A recent Chatham House report described 12 distinct post-referendum issues that the parties will likely face after the January 2011 referendum.[18] Given the contentious nature of questions surrounding future relations between the North and South in the likely event of separation, some of these issues in particular should qualify as “must-discuss” topics prior to the referendum. These issues include the wealth-sharing aspects of post-referendum arrangements, which include division of and access to Sudan’s oil and water resources. Division of assets and liabilities (including Sudan’s sizeable foreign debt, much of it incurred during the North-South war) is another negotiation process that would benefit from initial discussion between the parties prior to the referendum, as is the issue of migratory rights for pastoralist populations along the North-South borders. While no single issue facing North and South is unresolvable, the sheer volume of issues on the table, the high stakes involved, and the rapid timetable for negotiations make for an explosive combination.

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Calculations of the parties

Neither the NCP nor SPLM have an interest in returning to all-out war. Unfortunately, the main factor working against an outright return to North-South conflict is also the central reason why the CPA’s project of “democratic transformation” has failed: Both parties represent the ruling elites of North and South, and neither side wishes to give up their respectively precarious positions. An accommodation between elites in Khartoum and Juba could be in the offing, but both sides are understandably reluctant to accept potentially painful compromises on their overarching objectives: access to southern oil wealth for the NCP, and sustainable southern independence for the SPLM.

1. National Congress Party

At the fifth anniversary celebration of the CPA in January, President Bashir announced that his government would be the “first to recognize an independent southern Sudan.”[19] One interpretation of this statement is that the NCP would be willing to “let the South go” as long as its fundamental interests in the territory were upheld. The NCP’s interests are several fold: first, to maintain the party’s hold on power; second, to maintain significant control over oil resources in the South; and third, to emerge from international isolation without actually making meaningful concessions on either power sharing or accountability. If Khartoum and Juba can work out a mutually beneficial wealth-sharing arrangement—one that enables Khartoum to continue to reap the benefits of the South’s resources even after its independence—then war could be avoidable. In this scenario, the NCP would need to maneuver into an arrangement in which the SPLM has no choice but to concede some of its wealth to the North; should this move succeed, the NCP may view overt tampering with the referendum as unnecessary.

The NCP is well aware that construction of a pipeline to take southern oil reserves to a port other than Port Sudan is years—and billions of dollars—away. Therefore, the SPLM will have no choice but to engage in horse trading with the NCP over usage rights. This scenario illustrates the NCP’s cost-benefit calculations in its dealings with the SPLM on numerous post-referendum issues. If it can extract exactly what it wishes from its weaker southern partner, the NCP will most likely avoid war. However, the regime has been purchasing more and more sophisticated weaponry in preparation for the opposite scenario.

President Bashir has weathered the initial storm that followed the International Criminal Court arrest warrant in 2009—although the charges still represent an existential threat to his rule—and now appears guaranteed to win a flawed national election next month. In theory, the April elections will not re-legitimize Bashir despite the fact that he will almost certainly be elected in a multiparty contest for the first time since he took power by coup two decades ago. In practice, however, the elections will certainly give African and Arab nations who are already not wholly (or even mildly) opposed to Bashir’s leadership further reason to support Bashir as the legitimate, elected leader of Sudan.

The elections will also influence the way some Western nations view Bashir and his regime. The international community has invested significantly in the elections and their credibility—including $95 million in electoral assistance from the United States. Many donors view Sudanese elections less as a democratic exercise and more as a “trial run” for the referendum. Donors have been abundantly willing to overlook fraud and vote rigging simply to move on to what they consider the main event. Moreover, the NCP is well aware of the pressures and motivations of donors, as well as their long track record of recognizing the results of patently terrible elections. The once-lofty aspiration of a democratic Sudan as encapsulated in the CPA has been sullenly reduced to an expensive box-checking exercise.

Khartoum is better positioned to face the challenges present in the CPA’s waning interim period than the SPLM. From this position of strength, the NCP can confidently drive the agenda of the negotiations and resolutely refuse to compromise on anything—from reform of the National Security law to residency requirements for the Abyei and southern referenda—that will reduce its position.

2. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

In his own speech at the recent CPA celebration, South Sudan President Salva Kiir made an important and telling point about the nature of the agreement that ended 23 years of war between Sudan’s North and South:

…[T]he CPA represents a landmark in Sudan’s political history since it put an end to war, created conditions and established ground rules for restructuring the Sudanese state politically, economically, administratively and culturally…[The]CPA is, essentially, a deal to find a middle ground between parties and it provides a spring board to realize our vision of New Sudan through democratic means. I equally believed that if CPA is realized fully in letter and spirit, it provides the last chance for Sudan’s unity. [Emphasis from original text.] [20]

That southern leaders have largely abandoned any hope for unity is left unsaid. Salva’s decision not to run for the national presidency is as clear an indication as any that the SPLM is focused on secession. The SPLM is now left to maintain its tenuous partnership with the NCP while challenging for national elections, addressing ongoing insecurity in the South, preparing for an independence vote, engaging in wide-ranging and complex negotiations, and continuing to struggle with the basics of administration and governance. This would be a tall order for even the strongest political unit. The SPLM, however, is undergoing a period of inner turmoil in the run-up to the elections. Not only is the SPLM aware of the popular discontent (particularly among minority southern tribes), with its leadership, but it is being forced to address challengers within the party.

The electoral process is putting a great deal of stress on the SPLM, evidenced by the political drama surrounding the party’s candidate nomination process and the subsequent proliferation of “independent candidates”—former SPLM members who opted to abandon the party after being rejected as SPLM candidates. If the SPLM chooses to use this contentious period as a learning experience—and makes efforts to re-engage with members of its wounded political leadership—the process could strengthen the party and better prepare it for the challenges ahead, particularly following the referendum.

Although there is no doubt that the SPLM’s top priority is ensuring a credible referendum takes place in January 2011, the party will be tied up in the electoral process through April. Many of the senior GoSS leaders—notably the Ministers of Regional Cooperation and SPLA Affairs—are running for parliamentary positions in their home constituencies. Other government officials are assisting the SPLM candidate for the national presidency, Yassir Arman, with his campaign. It is worrisome that the most competent SPLM politicians are currently not able to prepare the party for the crucial negotiations with the NCP that must occur between the elections and the referendum.

Because the SPLM has been so heavily focused on the independence option, it has become increasingly disinterested in pushing the NCP to make important reforms whether in terms of security laws or other basic freedoms in Sudan. This has been a considerable strategic mistake for the SPLM. By focusing only on southern parochial interests, the SPLM has largely lost its ability to find common cause with northern opposition groups. It was this more unified approach between northern opposition groups and the SPLM that was able to exert more decisive negotiating pressure on the NCP, and was able to garner important international support. Equally important, by looking increasingly unconcerned about such basic freedom in Sudan, the SPLM calls into question its own democratic credentials. Even while independence remains the final goal for the SPLM, this goal can be much more effectively advanced in concert with northern opposition groups rather than in isolation.

Once the elections are behind them, the calculations of the SPLM are clear: independence or war. While the preferred outcome for the SPLM would be a credible, peaceful referendum followed by an internationally recognized secession, a unilateral declaration of independence is not out of the question should the SPLM determine that the referendum has been partially or fully subverted by the NCP. The “red line” of the referendum for the SPLM means that any delays or major difficulties associated with the conduct of the referendum could provoke the Juba leadership to take steps toward another North-South war.

The SPLM is not yet able negotiate on equal terrain and with comparable acumen to the NCP. The party faces an uphill battle which will not end after the referendum or at the conclusion of the interim period. As the South’s ruling party continues to look northward and to prioritize the threats posed by its CPA partner, it risks ignoring mounting challenges within its territory that seem poised to heighten both in the run-up to and following the referendum.

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The way forward: Forging a framework and building the leverage for talks

There is no common strategy among the CPA guarantors and little coordination between actors—such as the Obama administration and the African Union Peace and Security Council, among others—that should be uniformly supporting the parties in defining a clear framework for two distinct sets of negotiations: the resolution of outstanding CPA provisions and the initial discussion of post-referendum arrangements. Neither of these two processes can be initiated prior to the elections, but the international community should use the run-up to the April polls to help the parties set up the frameworks, build the leverage, and establish the security environment necessary for these processes to succeed.[21] Instead, there seems to be little in the way of a common position among key actors in the international community, and this lack of a well-coordinated and clear policy line toward Sudan will only make conflict prevention more difficult.

1. The framework

The United States must assist the Sudanese parties in defining a framework for both sets of negotiations and then supporting this framework through a coordinated, consistent, and well-resourced international effort.[22] The Obama administration should immediately begin harnessing qualified personnel resources for the special envoy’s team and prepare to deploy them to Khartoum and Juba in order to assist in the preparations for these critical negotiations. The barebones U.S. diplomatic presence in Sudan at present is a more telling indicator of the Obama administration’s attention to Sudan than its soaring rhetoric.

The United States must continue to be the de facto leader of international efforts on Sudan in 2010 and likely beyond. This does not mean, however, that the United States should go it alone. While focusing U.S. attention on several high-priority issues will enable progress, it must be complemented by coordination with other international actors who have a comparative advantage in advising the Sudanese parties on certain aspects of the preliminary post-referendum arrangements.

The United States should therefore coordinate its support with the other CPA guarantors, with the United Nations and African Union, and with other countries with significant interests in the future stability of Sudan, namely China, Egypt, and other Arab nations such as Qatar. The need to avoid a disjointed process is paramount, given the limited resources and capacities of the parties and the timeline for these negotiations. A logical place to begin building greater policy coherence on Sudan would be at a U.S.-European Union foreign ministerial-level summit on Sudan.

No matter what framework is adopted, the parties must lay the groundwork for 2011 to ease fears that the referendum vote will result in “zero-sum” outcomes. This year’s negotiations can establish ground rules and preliminary understanding between the two parties on the clear hot-button issues that could inflame tensions immediately following the referendum. By providing support now to the parties in discussing the likely post-referendum realities, the international community could take an important first step toward post-referendum support to southern Sudan and preserving peace after the important vote.

2. The leverage

As a top UNMIS official noted, the ability of the parties to reach and carry out the referendum peacefully will depend heavily on international pressure on Khartoum.[23] Moreover, and per the CPA, southern Sudan has an internationally recognized right to secede should its citizens vote for separation in the referendum. This right must be upheld by the CPA’s guarantors. It is imperative that the CPA’s guarantors and other international actors engaged in Sudan communicate to the NCP in no uncertain terms that there is no alternative to the referendum being held on time and in an environment in which the poll can be credible. Relative international diffidence in the face of repeated NCP provocations may also embolden the party to engage in dangerous adventurism as the referendum approaches, including the seizure of disputed territories.

Implementation of the administration’s benchmarks-based policy is the best way for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to preventing a return to war and promoting sustainable peace in Sudan. Consistent application of conditional pressures and incentives on the NCP and the SPLM based on the two parties’ behavior in the remainder of the CPA interim period will support these objectives. Given that the NCP has engaged in a renewed offensive in Darfur, given safe harbor to the LRA, and utterly failed to hold anyone accountable for war crimes or crimes against humanity, many observers are now rightly questioning whether the administration’s benchmarks approach will be rigorously applied.[24]

The United States should also call for the expansion of the mandate of the U.N. Panel of Experts in Sudan to investigate the ongoing violence in southern Sudan and reports of an influx of small arms and heavy munitions into the South. The Obama administration must continue to pressure the NCP to reform the abusive National Security Law, as credible referenda and elections cannot take place unless Khartoum’s National Security Service’s broad powers throughout the country are curbed.

3. Security

When the UNMIS mandate comes up for renewal at the U.N. Security Council in April, the United States must call forcefully for a strengthened civilian protection mandate, drawing upon the recommendations recently made by operational humanitarian agencies working in southern Sudan.[25] The new mandate should emphasize preventive action, such as predicting flashpoints, and utilize active strategies such as temporary operating bases and long-range patrols. UNMIS can and should take far more forward leaning steps to operationalize its existing civilian protection mandate, but this will require the allocation of more resources and explicit directives and guidelines from New York. The U.S Permanent Representative on the Security Council, Ambassador Susan Rice, is well poised to work with other member states to adjust the mandate, and she should receive the full backing of the Obama administration in her efforts.

Conclusion

Although preparation now for both sets of negotiations is essential, it is up to the Sudanese parties to push these processes forward after the elections. Based on the history of NCP-SPLM negotiations before and after the signing of the CPA in 2005, it is likely that agreement on outstanding CPA provisions and initial discussions on post-referendum arrangements will occur at the eleventh hour. The role of the international community is to reduce the likelihood that these discussions end up occurring in such a politically charged environment that consensus between the parties becomes impossible. Sudanese presidential adviser Ghazi Salah Al-Deen Al-Attabani recently said that failure by the Sudanese parties to address post-referendum issues such as North-South border demarcation before the referendum occurs will be a “recipe for war.”[26] It is clear that the parties are cognizant of the need to begin these discussions prior to the referendum. The international community should support these efforts or begin preparing for the next of Sudan’s catastrophic civil wars.

[1] See Gerard Prunier and Maggie Fick, “Sudan the Countdown” (Washington: Enough Project, 2009), available at www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/sudan_countdown.pdf.

[2] U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Southern Sudan,” February 17, 2010, available at http://ochaonline.un.org/Default.aspx?alias=ochaonline.un.org/sudan.

[3] See International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan” (2009), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6452.

[4] Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Supply and demand: Arms flows and holdings in Sudan,” Sudan Issue Brief. 15, December 2009, available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-15-arms-flows-and-holdings-in-Sudan.pdf.

[5] See Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Javier Solana’s Foot in Mouth Problem,” Enough Said, September 3, 2009, available at http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/javier-solana%E2%80%99s-foot-mouth-problem.

[6] Lise Grande, UNMIS Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Southern Sudan, Opening remarks at African Press Organization press conference, August 12, 2009, available at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2009/08/12/press-conference-by-lise-grande-un-deputy-resident-and-humanitarian-coordinator-for-southern-sudan/

[7] Disarmament campaigns conducted throughout the South between 2006 to 2008 have been extensively analyzed and documented by the Small Arms Survey, most recently in a January 2009 paper by Adam O’Brien, “Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign” Working Paper no. 16 (Small Arms Survey, 2009), available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP-16-South-Sudan-Civilian-Disarmament-Campaign.pdf; The GoSS Ministry of the Interior has directed the Southern Sudan Police Service, or SSPS, to take the lead on elections security; UNMIS police units are training SSPS and donor governments, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, are aiding in coordination and planning for police deployments throughout the South during the elections. According to the SPLA spokesperson, “The SPLA will release the forces needed to support the Police. The Police will then train them on the best ways to support and command them throughout the election period… the police senior officer[s] will be the ones to command the SPLA supporting forces during the elections.” Enough email correspondence with SPLA Spokesperson Major General Kuol Deim Kuol, January 28, 2010.

[8] Disarmament is currently underway in the States of Lakes, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, Warrap, Upper Nile, Unity, and Northern Bahr El Ghazal. According to a senior SPLA official, although the SPLA has been ordered to disarm the civilian population in all 10 states of southern Sudan no later than the end of June 2010, disarmament has not started in the States of Western Bahr El Ghazal, Western Equatoria ,and East Equatoria “because of the LRA atrocities in those States and [because] the tribes in neighboring countries of Kenya and Uganda are armed and raid the Sudanese communities.” The GoSS view is that “[disarmament in these three states] requires joint political decision by the GOSS and leaderships of those countries.”Enough email correspondence, senior SPLA official, January 28, 2010.

[9] U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Situation Analysis of Akot Insecurity: Rumbek East County, Lakes State, 5-6 January 2010,” On file with Enough.

[10] Ideally, the South Sudan Police Service, or SSPS, would take the lead on civilian disarmament. However, in southern Sudan, the low capacity and resources of the police necessitate the use of SPLA forces in civilian disarmament. This is yet another reason why “voluntary” disarmament has quickly turned coercive and violent in the various campaigns in the South since 2006. Given that there are an estimated 14,000 police officers, with some sources indicating that no more than 9000 are effective, it is not surprising that the SSPS is overwhelmed in its attempt to address both pre-elections security and civilian disarmament, in addition to routine policing functions. Enough email correspondence with Juba-based security consultant, January 2010.

[11] Interview with senior UNMIS official, Juba, December 2009.

[12] Interview with UNMIS official, Juba, December 2009.

[13] See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Abuses Undermining Impending Elections” (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/24/sudan-abuses-undermine-impending-elections

[14] Interview with GoSS official, Juba, January 2010

[15]Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sudan (January 2010), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/31

[16] Interview with UNMIS official, Juba, January 2010.

[17] See Colin Thomas-Jensen and Maggie Fick, “Abyei: Sudan’s Next Test” (Washington: Enough Project, 2009), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/abyei-sudans-next-test; See also Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “Abyei: Sudan’s ‘Kashmir’” (Washington: Enough Project, 2008), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/abyei-sudan%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9ckashmir%e2%80%9d.

[18] See Edward Thomas, “Decisions and Deadlines: A Critical Year for Sudan” (London: Chatham House, 2010).

[19] Reuters, “Sudan’s Bashir says would help an independent south,” January 19, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I2P320100119?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563 (last accessed March 2, 2010).

[20] Speech of H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, First Vice President of the Republic and President of GoSS, January 9, 2010. On file with Enough.

[21] As a recent USIP report noted, “There is little time to waste in defining the negotiation process and roles. With nationwide elections scheduled for April, there is a brief window for defining the process and roles before negotiations are likely to begin in earnest.” Jon Temin, “Negotiation Sudan’s Post-Referendum Arrangements,” USIP Peace Brief 6, January 22, 2010.

[22] The Government of Southern Sudan is in the process of standing up a taskforce to serve as the coordinating mechanism within GoSS charged with preparing for the referendum and its aftermath. The GoSS deserves credit for mobilizing resources and centralizing its approach to preparations for 2011 and beyond. The international community, particularly the Obama administration, should signal its support of this effort by immediately channeling technical assistance to the taskforce’s working groups, each of which will focus on different aspects of pre- and postreferendum planning.

[23] Interview with UNMIS official, Juba, January 2010.

[24] See “Lord’s Resistance Army Finds Safe Haven in Darfur,” Enough press release, March 10, 2010.

[25] Joint NGO Briefing Paper authored by Oxfam International, “Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan” (2010), available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rescuing-peace-southern-sudan.pdf.

[26] Sudan Tribune, “Sudanese NCP official criticizes referendum law as ‘recipe for war,’” January 5, 2010, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33679 (Last accessed March 2, 2010).

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: LRA Attacks and Congolese Army Abuses in Northeastern Congo

Patrick Furey — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 11:25:27 -0500

Enough field researcher Ledio Cakaj details the abuses of both the Lord's Resistance Army militia and the Congolese Army against civilians in Congo.

The Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, continues to pose a severe threat to civilians in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.[1] Since the LRA began attacking civilians on Congolese soil in September of 2008 through the end of 2009, it has killed approximately 1,800 civilians, [2] with 300 deaths during December 2009.[3] More than 100 people were killed during January 2010.[4]

Units from the Congolese national army, or FARDC, sent to protect civilians and fight the LRA have shown little interest in either task. Congolese soldiers largely refuse to engage LRA while constantly harassing the local population. Incidents of rape, looting, beatings, and even killings of innocent civilians by Congolese soldier abound. There were 116 reported cases of rapes allegedly committed by Congolese soldiers last October in just one neighborhood near the Congolese army base in Dungu.[5] Meanwhile, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo, or MONUC, is stretched too thin to adequately protect civilians in the vast region where the LRA operates, often in diffuse cells.

The movement of some LRA elements into Darfur should alarm policymakers and spark revitalized international efforts to deal with the militia.[6] But these efforts should not neglect the LRA’s continuing ability to wreak havoc in northeastern Congo. Both the Congolese army and MONUC should urgently prioritize the protection of civilians. The Congolese army should take swift action to deal with abuses committed by its soldiers, prosecuting those who commit abuses with a focus on command responsibility. Moreover, a credible investigation into the embezzlement of U.N.-provided rations and supplies for the Congolese army is urgently required. The misuse of such materials contributes to the army’s bad behavior and is an obstacle to more effective efforts to deal with the LRA.

U.N. presence, especially in the areas worst affected by LRA violence, is crucial. Unsurprisingly, LRA attacks happen most frequently in places with no peacekeepers. A promised contingent of Tunisian peacekeepers should be deployed immediately to Province Orientale. The majority of the newly arrived troops should be deployed to Niangara, Ngilima, and Bangadi, with at least some presence in Bas Uele. This force will need rapid response capability, including helicopters and other vehicles. In the meantime, MONUC should conduct frequent and routine joint patrols with FARDC soldiers. Joint patrols help enormously in terms of protection and evidence demonstrates that Congolese soldiers behave better when in the company of peacekeepers.

If the Congolese army can improve its behavior, U.N. cooperation with it should expand to include information sharing and coordinated operations aimed at protecting civilians and neutralizing the LRA. Wherever possible, such cooperation should also be established with the Ugandan army, which is still operating in Congo in pursuit of the LRA. Successful cooperation between Congo’s army, MONUC, and Ugandan forces appears to have succeeded in protecting the population of Faradje from attacks last year and compelling the LRA commander, Lt. Colonel Charles Arop, to surrender in November.

Practical steps to improve civilian protection can also contribute to a more coherent regional approach to end the threat posed by the LRA. MONUC’s civilian component also has an important role to play. Political affairs officers with the capacity to collect and analyze information on the LRA should be deployed to Dungu. Likewise, increasing cross-border cooperation between U.N. operations in Congo, Sudan, and Central African Republic, or CAR, could help to develop a more holistic strategy, under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council.

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The Lord's Resistance Army in Congo

Attacks by the LRA in northeastern Congo continued throughout 2009. While it is easy to mistake the LRA’s operations for mindless violence, the patterns of attacks reflect deliberate tactics on the part of the fighting force as it has reconstituted itself as a regional threat.[7]

Attacks, abductions, and a growing humanitarian crisis

Following the LRA’s large-scale massacre of some 900 Congolese civilians in December 2008 and January 2009, LRA attacks in northeastern Congo continued throughout last year.[8] The majority of LRA attacks have taken place in and around a “triangle of death” formed by the towns of Niangara, Bangadi, and Ngilima in Haut Uele territory, with some attacks also occurring in neighboring Bas Uele. [9]

The brutality of attacks sharply increased during the final three months of 2009. For the first time in more than a year, the LRA resumed deliberate mutilations, with at least five such cases in December. Enough spoke to a man from Bangadi who was mutilated on December 2, 2009. He said the rebels beat him and cut off his lips and ears in complete silence.

Other particularly brutal practices include burning people alive. A man from Nakwa, a village 9.3 miles south of Bangadi, described such an incident: “The LRA locked our family inside our house and set it on fire, but I was able to force open the door and escape the LRA who came after me.”[10] The brutality is intended to send a message of strength to Congolese and Ugandan officials while simultaneously terrorizing Congolese civilians so that they will not disclose LRA’s whereabouts or assist people escaping LRA captivity.

Attacks have caused massive displacement and hunger. The United Nations estimates that more than 450,000 people have been internally displaced in Haut and Bas Uele, mostly due to LRA attacks.[11] Another 16,000 Congolese have sought refuge in neighboring countries.[12] As people flee their villages and gather in town centers, concerns about hunger and malnutrition have multiplied. More than 15,000 people have moved within less than a mile of Bangadi center, abandoning their crops for fear of attacks and abductions by the LRA.[13] Although aid organizations have reported severe malnutrition rates in Bangadi and Ngilima, the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies have suspended food aid in some of the worst affected areas after noticing a pattern of immediate LRA attacks just after distributions. “It is against the ‘do no harm’ principle,” said an international aid worker, “but it creates a bizarre situation where by adhering to principled positions we are letting thousands starve.”[14]

To safeguard food aid, some military force will need to stay and protect civilians up to two weeks after food is delivered. MONUC officials claim they do not have enough troops on the ground to do this. Aid workers say that based on their past behavior, Congolese soldiers cannot be trusted to protect civilians and might also loot the food themselves.

LRA's whereabouts and wherewithal

The LRA continues to cause mayhem and suffering far disproportionate to its actual size, making efforts to apprehend the leadership all the more vital. Dominic Ongwen, an International Criminal Court indictee and a notoriously brutal commander, is in charge of LRA operations in Congo.[15] He has at least 200 fighters operating in small groups of 7 to 10. The Dungu groups total about 150 fighters with another 25 to 50 located in Bas Uele. In late 2009, another LRA group, commanded by Lt. Colonel Charles Arop and operating further east in Faradje, surrendered to the Ugandan army. Close to 200 fighters were believed to be CAR, including the units that have now crossed over into South Darfur in Sudan. Of this group, approximately 50 were operating under leader Joseph Kony. Maj General Okot Odhiambo and Colonel Okot Odek are also part of this group.[16] The total LRA fighting force as of December 2009 was around 400 people.[17]

The LRA resumed the practice of abducting and indoctrinating children to fill its ranks, a practice that had declined during the first half of 2009. International aid organizations believe that 1,400 people have been abducted by the LRA in the past 18 months. At least 800 remain in captivity. More than two-thirds are children.[18] Children from Central African Republic and Sudan are used to fight in Congo, while Congolese children fight in the neighboring states.[19] Abductions are not limited to children, either. More than 250 people, mostly adults, were reportedly abducted during an attack in Tapili.[20] These large-scale abductions suggest that LRA groups might have settled and need people to farm. In December 2008 when the LRA was based in Congo’s Garamba National Park, 300 forced laborers were used to cultivate food in more than 15 square miles of land. [21]

Eyewitnesses describe three LRA bases in Haut Uele that roughly correspond to the “triangle of death”—one north of Niangara, one close to Bangadi, and another base in Ngilima.[22] The bases near Bangadi and Niangara were attacked by Ugandan soldiers in November and December of 2009. Some of the particularly brutal December attacks in Bangadi appear to have been a response to the Ugandan army’s actions. The LRA believed that people from Bangadi had informed the Ugandans of their location.[23]

The road from Niangara to Bangadi is of strategic importance to the LRA. North of Bangadi, the road leads across the border into two large forests in neighboring Western Equatoria State of Southern Sudan, the Bire Kpatua and the Mbarizunga Game Reserves. Most of the LRA attacks that plagued this part of southern Sudan during 2009 were launched from these forests by rebels under Ongwen’s command. In addition, a parallel path from Bangadi continues northwest into the Ango region of Bas Uele, and continues northward into the Central African Republic.

Bas Uele: A new safe haven?

Bas Uele is the region to the immediate west of Haut Uele and makes up the northwest corner of Province Orientale. A group of LRA fighters led by Major Kidega Murefu moved west into Ango territory in Bas Uele last summer, attacking civilians along their way, in a deliberate effort to clear the area.[24] By mid-October 2009, more than 2,500 people had fled across the border to CAR.[25] At the end of November, Congolese army troops deployed to Ango were attacked head on by the LRA, a fairly unusual practice that underlines the importance of this territory to LRA. [26]

The events in Bas Uele are significant as they indicate the possibility that the larger LRA groups, including the high command, might relocate to Ango territory if the pressure on the LRA elsewhere increases. Ango is significantly farther west in Congo than where Ongwen’s groups are now and immediately south of the large Zemongo forest in Central African Republic. Kony and the rest of the LRA troops, close to 200 fighters, were believed to have been in Zemongo in December 2009.[27]

The move of the LRA in Ango territory is bad news for the military effort to finish off the rebels. Ango is a vast and sparsely populated area with little Congolese and Ugandan military presence and no U.N. troops. The river Uele that runs south of Ango acts as a natural barrier to movement from the south while the porous border with Central African Republic lies to the north. West of Ango is Equateur Province, a hotbed of Congolese rebel activity. Any troops in pursuit of the LRA would have to pass from the east on the Doruma—Ango axis that is easy to monitor. Continuing to hunt the LRA as far as Ango seriously stretches the Ugandan army’s supply lines, and could entangle regional security forces in an unending cross-border game of cat and mouse, with the LRA able to move among Congo, Central African Republic, and Sudan.

It is possible that Ango has already been used as a safe haven for LRA leadership. A Congolese girl who recently escaped after spending a year as a wife to one LRA commander told an international aid worker that she had seen Kony in Congo in August 2009, but was unable to say exactly where. “There was a big ceremony,” she said, “and a group prayer was held in his honor.”[28]

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The Congolese army: Making a bad situation worse

The Congolese army has almost 6,000 troops in Province Orientale, with headquarters in the district capital of Dungu. Despite this sizeable presence, Congolese troops have utterly failed to protect the local population from LRA attacks. Ngilima, Bangadi, and Niangara have repeatedly been targeted by the LRA despite considerable Congolese army presence in all three places. Many of the people Enough spoke to said that Congolese soldiers were too scared to confront the LRA or simply unwilling to do so. “The FARDC only faces the LRA when they encounter them by accident,” said a local aid worker.[29] In Bangadi, repeated LRA attacks have occurred in the town market, less than a mile from a base where about 500 Congolese soldiers are stationed. [30]

Unpaid and unfed soldiers

The Congolese army lacks both the means and the motivation to protect civilians from the LRA. FARDC soldiers in Haut Uele were not paid for the last four months of 2009 until December 2, when they received only one month’s salary.[31] This sparked a protest outside of their base in Dungu, during which one soldier managed to fatally injure himself with his own grenade.[32]

Congolese soldiers maintain that their commanders misappropriate food and money intended for the rank and file. [33] Congolese soldiers were found using counterfeit 500 Congolese francs bills (worth approximately 80 cents) in the Dungu market. It’s unclear whether the fraudulent bills were sent from Kinshasa or issued by commanders who pocketed the genuine money sent from the capital, as some soldiers claimed.[34]

Food provided to the Congolese army by MONUC is often sold directly in the market with very little going to the soldiers themselves. As part of supporting the Congolese army, MONUC provides food worth $1 per day for 6,000 FARDC soldiers. Hardly any soldiers actually receive this amount of food. Troops based in and around Dungu say they receive 30 percent to 50 percent of their rations, while soldiers based further afield in Bangadi reported receiving as little as 10 percent of the rations.[35]

Enough researchers saw hundreds of MONUC-provided sardine cans on sale in the Dungu market. Two market vendors said that they bought the sardines in bulk from the Congolese army but would not provide the names of the sellers.[36] Likewise, a U.N. source described unopened 50 kilogram sacks of flour for sale in the market. [37] It is unlikely that such large amounts were sold by individual soldiers. Many believed that high FARDC officers were involved in the market dealings.[38]

Lack of discipline and training remain two of the biggest problems with Congolese troops in Orientale. These shortcomings are most acute with the so-called integrated troops: former rebel fighters granted amnesty and integrated in the national army. One-third of the 6,000 soldiers in Orientale are former fighters of the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, the pro-Tutsi militia from the Kivus formerly led by Laurent Nkunda. These former rebels were supposed to receive military training as part of their integration in the military. Many of the integrated soldiers never had any training as rebels and never received any training or underwent rigorous vetting when joining the FARDC. There are, for instance, many underage fighters within FARDC ranks. In a one-day screening in December of three Congolese army camps, including the headquarters in Dungu, U.N. and humanitarian workers found 37 soldiers believed to be less than 18 years old, with more expected to be found in other camps.[39]

Integrated soldiers often remain loyal to commanders from their former rebel groups, creating a parallel chain of command within the ranks and sometimes sowing conflict between former adversaries. Reports of in-fighting within the army started just after the arrival of integrated troops in May 2009 when one Congolese soldier beat to death two other soldiers in Niangara on July 18, 2009.[40] Two soldiers were killed by other soldiers last October.[41]

A lack of discipline and training has led to a highly unprofessional force that frequently endangers the local population. Congolese soldiers carry their weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, bazookas, and grenades in densely populated areas, even when on leave. Eyewitnesses in Dungu reported that on October 5, 2009, a soldier slipped and accidentally launched a propelled grenade 500 meters from the central market.[42] On December 3, 2009, Enough witnessed one soldier attempting to shoot a colleague next to the central market in Dungu. The soldier was restrained by two other soldiers but a great number of people in the market, including children, had to scramble as the soldier kept erratically pointing his loaded gun in all directions in an attempt to shake off the hold of his colleagues.

Instead of sleeping in their barracks three miles from Dungu town, many soldiers instead stay in the town. “It is strange that a force supposed to protect civilians lives in the middle of populated areas and not outside to protect it from attacks,” said a resident of Dungu. “In case of attacks, the soldiers will be better protected than the civilians.”[43] Being in such close proximity to the population increases the potential for abuses against civilians that Congolese soldiers are committing in great numbers.

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Abuses against the population

A U.N. official in Orientale told Enough, “Not a day goes by that we don’t receive complaints about FARDC abuses.”[44] This has prompted Congolese and U.N. authorities to make interagency visits to areas where the complaints originate. During such a visit in September in Bangadi, a community elder and pastor from the local church said, in front of the delegation complete with army commanders, that he was likely going to be killed for speaking but that the people of Bangadi were “tired of FARDC crimes against us, they [FARDC] steal, kill, rape our wives and daughters and arrest and jail anyone for no reason. We want them out of Bangadi and we the people of Bangadi are more afraid of FARDC then the LRA because of the attitude adopted by FARDC which are similar to LRA.”[45]

In some time periods, abuses by the Congolese army have been more pervasive than those of the LRA.[46] An aid worker said that there were 116 reported cases of sexual violence, including rape, for the month of October 2009 in Bamokandi alone, 1.8 miles from the big army base in Dungu.[47] Sexual assault, including rape, is also prevalent in Bangadi, Ngilima, and Niangara. A particularly egregious case involved the gang rape of a pregnant woman by five Congolese soldiers near the market of Bangadi on October 8, 2009.[48] A humanitarian organization that collects known cases of sexual violence states that there were 49 cases of sexual assault against minors in Bangadi for the second part of 2009 alone, equally attributed to FARDC and the LRA.[49] In Ngilima, there were on average 10 registered cases of sexual violence every month with 60 percent attributed to the LRA and the rest to the FARDC.[50] An international aid worker specializing in helping victims of sexual abuse noted that for every one woman who admitted to having been sexually abused at least two more people were also abused but were too afraid or ashamed to come forward.[51]

Abuses by the Congolese army against the local population also include killings, beatings, and severe injuries. In Bangadi, FARDC soldiers killed nine people from March to December of last year. The reason, according to residents of Bangadi, was mostly due to civilians refusing to hand over cash or their properties to soldiers. An internal U.N. security report for the month of October 2009 details eight confirmed civilian deaths and four injuries attributed to Congolese soldiers in Haut Uele during that month.[52] A particularly brutal case happened on November 13, 16.7 miles southeast of Dungu, when two FARDC soldiers killed a 4-year-old child and his parents so that they could steal their possessions.[53]

Cases of lootings and forced labor are daily occurrences. FARDC soldiers man checkpoints along the main axis where they charge “tax” to travelers ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 Congolese francs. A representative of a Congolese NGO estimated that instances of FARDC extortions are in the thousands per month. “It is almost an accepted fact by the population,” he said.[54]

People who cannot pay ”tax” are forced into manual labor such as collecting fire wood and washing the soldiers’ uniforms and boots. Often, Congolese civilians are kept for days at checkpoints, forced to work for the soldiers. Having no means of transport, Congolese soldiers who have to walk many miles to their postings steal bicycles from the local population and harass the local motorcycle taxi drivers. Fed up with this occurrence, residents of Niangara came out in public protests at the end of October 2009 demanding an end to the theft. Residents of Ngilima, in anticipation of a Congolese army troop rotation, declared December 27 as the “Day without bicycles” and hid their bicycles from the soldiers.[55]

Enough researchers spoke to the FARDC commander in Dungu, General Leon Mushale, about the rampant abuses. He claimed that the problem was isolated: “It is the fault of the man, not of the organization … we are dealing with the problems on a case–by-case basis.” [56] It is unclear if any FARDC soldiers have been punished for abuses committed against the population. “We have taken up the matter of abuses many times with the FARDC high command,” said an international humanitarian worker, “but all they have done is to relocate the worst people, moving the problem, not dealing with it.”[57]

A MONUC military expert said that the problem lies with the leadership of the FARDC and that commanders can do much more to stop the abuses. Residents of Bangadi directly accused the FARDC commander in charge, Major Nelson Mugaba of Battalion Urse, a former CNDP fighter, of allowing his soldiers to commit abuses against the population with absolute impunity. Residents said that the previous commander of the same FARDC troops was better behaved and that there were fewer FARDC abuses prior to the arrival of Major Mugaba in Bangadi. “During his time in Bangadi, living with the FARDC has been like living with a viper,” said a resident of Bangadi.[58] Interviews in Faradje, Ngilima, and Dungu revealed that the behavior of FARDC soldiers depended to a great degree on the behavior of their troop commander.

Failure in the fight against the LRA

Despite military agreements with the Ugandan army, the Congolese army has spectacularly failed in waging any sort of war against the LRA. Operations against the LRA were supposed to be conducted as part of two military operations. The first, Operation Rudia, was launched in September 2008 in an effort to contain the LRA within Garamba National Park and encourage defections. [59] The second, Rudia II, a joint operation with Ugandan intelligence cooperation, began in May 2009 and continues today. The Congolese army has failed to achieve its objectives under these operations. Some FARDC commanders have also intentionally weakened local self-defense forces, the only native groups that put up meaningful resistance to LRA, thus making life easier for the rebels.[60]

It is no coincidence that the worst-behaved FARDC units tend to dismantle the local self-defense forces, the only people who have the capacity to resist both the LRA and abusive Congolese soldiers. Referred to as Arrow Boys due to their primitive guns that include bows and arrows and locally manufactured guns, self-defense forces comprise civilians who try to defend their communities from LRA attacks. In Bangadi, the self-defense forces were forcibly dispersed when Major Mugaba arrived in June 2009. At least two self-defense force members from Bangadi were killed by Congolese soldiers. One of them, killed in June 2009, was shot in the middle of the Bangadi market with no warning, while at least two other members, including the leader of the force, were beaten up and imprisoned for many days.[61] Similarly, self-defense forces in Ngilima and Niangara were also dismantled by Congolese soldiers. “The self-defense forces were the only people who actually fought the LRA,” said a resident of Ngilima, adding, “without them, we are at the mercy of the LRA.”[62]

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The role of MONUC[63]

As part of their mandate to protect civilians, MONUC peacekeepers conduct joint patrols with the FARDC. [64] Enough researchers were told by MONUC officials that patrols are conducted in Dungu daily and nightly, although residents of Dungu denied that night patrols took place. MONUC troops in Faradje conduct infrequent joint patrols with the FARDC. Interviews with aid workers familiar with the situation in Dingila revealed that the 15-strong force there does not conduct patrols or any protection activities of any kind. There was no U.N. presence in the areas most affected by LRA violence—Ngilima, Bangadi, and Niangara—as of December 15, 2009.[65]

While the peacekeeping force is offering some protection and access to areas where it has presence, the lack of troops in the worst-affected areas is troublesome. “Our soldiers are tired and too few to oversee such a huge area,” said a MONUC officer, adding, “We have troops in four places and we provide protection to humanitarian agencies to the degree that we can.”[66] The need for more troops has been evident for some time now. A designated 800-strong force from a Tunisian battalion that was supposed to arrive in June 2009 has not yet arrived. A MONUC military officer said, “It is easy to blame us for not protecting civilians but we don’t have enough soldiers. There are 40,000 troops in Kosovo, but only 17,000 in the entire DRC which is a vastly bigger country.”[67]

MONUC troops can certainly do more with the same number of peacekeepers, however. There is a huge need for better communication with the local population, which is growing increasingly hostile to the U.N. presence in the area.[68] A Congolese civil society leader said that there is frustration at the appearance of U.N. soldiers with guns, armored vehicles, and helicopters sitting in Dungu while the LRA kills many in nearby areas.[69] More has to be done to ensure that MONUC’s material support to the Congolese army actually benefits the rank and file and does not simply line the pockets of commanders.

MONUC also offers some training to FARDC soldiers in terms of joint patrolling and escorting convoys. But joint patrols are not done frequently despite evidence that overwhelmingly suggests that Congolese soldiers behave much better when on patrol with MONUC peacekeepers.[70] A Moroccan officer in MONUC said that while patrols happen, in many cases they are decided by the head of unit in charge. He said, “Our primary task is to escort humanitarian convoys and protect the humanitarian agencies and NGOs. MONUC troops are not in charge of protecting civilians. The FARDC is in charge of protection.”[71]

The civilian component of MONUC should play a bigger role in tackling the LRA issue. There is no central cell in Dungu gathering and analyzing information on the LRA. The civilian component is scattered in Kisangani and Goma, many miles away from where the attacks are happening. It is surprising that MONUC did not organize such structures earlier, especially following the brutal LRA attacks of the 2008 “Christmas Massacres.”

Finally, the LRA should be regarded as a regional concern and not just a Ugandan problem. The U.N. Security Council should act accordingly and make the LRA a joint issue for the peacekeeping missions in DRC, Sudan, and CAR. There exists little cooperation at the moment between these missions. After at least three years of LRA activity outside of Uganda, one meeting of high U.N. officials from missions in the region gathered for the first time last December to discuss, among other things, how to deal with the LRA. A previous attempt planned for September 2009 failed because no MONUC high officials turned up.

Conclusion

With the LRA on the run, and facing escalating crises in eastern Congo and southern Sudan, the U.N. Security Council was content to keep the LRA on the backburner of the international security agenda during 2009. It was assumed that the Ugandan army, quietly assisted by the United States and the Congolese army, would be able to keep the LRA off balance and increasingly unable to cause trouble in one of the most remote areas in the region. Despite tangible progress, especially the surrender of several commanders and their troops, the impact of a resurgent LRA and predatory Congolese army presence in Haut Uele attest to the human cost of this arm’s-length approach to the LRA problem. That some LRA fighters have taken refuge in areas of south Darfur, Sudan controlled by the Government of Sudan is yet another disturbing development that merits urgent international investigation and response.

With the LRA replenishing its ranks and close to being able to establish a relatively safe haven near the borders of Sudan and Central African Republic, and the egregious behavior of the Congolese army effectively aiding the rebels, it’s time to up the ante. MONUC should develop a comprehensive civilian protection strategy that should prioritize more effective use of existing resources, especially greater cooperation with the Congolese army that is more rigorously conditioned. Far greater coordination between the U.N. missions in Congo, southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic is long overdue, and should be encouraged with the authority of the Security Council, which should treat the LRA as the grave threat to regional peace and security that it has repeatedly demonstrated itself to be.

Endnotes

[1] This report is based on a research trip to Haut Uele district in Province Orientale at the beginning of December 2009. For Enough’s analysis of the LRA in southern Sudan, see Ledio Cakaj, “The Lord’s Resistance Army and the Threat Against Civilians in Southern Sudan,” Enough strategy paper (2009), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/lra-threat-southern-sudan. For more on the LRA in northeast Congo, see Julia Spiegel and Noel Atama, “Finishing the Fight Against the LRA,” Enough strategy paper (2009), available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/finishing-fight-against-lra-strategy-paper.

[2] Figures totaled from the United Nations and international NGO reports.

[3] Based on reports from the president of Niangara, Niangara civil society, and the vicar of Isiro-Niangara, available at http://www.ademis.org/pop/isiro_tapili3.htm (last accessed February 8, 2010).

[4] OCHA, “Rapport hebdomadaire du 29 Janvier 2010, ” available at http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net/?Rapport-hebdomadaire-du-29-janvier (last accessed February 8, 2009).

[5] Data from an international nongovernmental organization that monitors cases of sexual violence in northeastern DRC. The place is Bamokandi, a neighborhood of the capital of Haut Uele district.

[6] Enough Project, “Press Release: Lord’s Resistance Army finds safe-haven in Darfur,” March 9, 2010.

[7] Often, the attacks in one area are carried out to divert attention from another area or event. Attacks in February 2010 in southern CAR seem to have been carried out partly to deflect attention from a group of LRA moving north.

[8] Human Rights Watch, “The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo” (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 2009/02/16/christmas-massacres-0.

[9] Due to geographical positioning with Bangadi situated at the northern tip of the triangle, Niangara in the west, and Ngilima in the east.

[10] Interview in Dungu, December 8, 2009. He and another person were the only two survivors of a family of 10.

[11] OCHA, “Humanitarian action in DRC, Weekly report” (2009).

[12] MONUC,OHCHR Special Report, “Summary of fact finding missions on alleged human rights violations committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the districts of Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in Orientale province of the Democratic Republic of Congo” (2009).

[13] Interview with local official, Bangadi, December 7, 2009.

[14] Interview with aid worker, Dungu, December 3, 2009.

[15] Ongwen is possibly second or third in command of the entire LRA. It is very likely Ongwen is second in command, especially if Odhiambo is crippled as claimed by the Ugandan army. This is particularly true if Brigadiers Abudema and Ochan Bunia were killed.

[16] The Ugandan People Defence Force claimed that Brigadier Bok Abudema was killed in Djema, Central African Republic, at the beginning of 2010. Abudema’s troops are responsible for a spate of attacks in CAR in February 2010, in the towns of Rafai, Dembia, and Nzako.

[17] The DRC numbers are based on eyewitness accounts and are estimates. Numbers for CAR are also estimates and based on accounts from former LRA commander Charles Arop and Ugandan military intelligence officers.

[18] Interviews with MONUC officials and NGO workers, Bunia, Dungu, and Kampala, December 2009.

[19] At least 30 children abducted in 2009 in Duru and surrounding areas were used as fighters in CAR, according to an international humanitarian worker. This is reminiscent of old LRA strategies when Ugandan children were used to fight in Sudan and Sudanese children were used to fight in Uganda.

[20] A report from the vicar of Isiro-Niangara puts the numbers of abductees for Tapili alone at 270. Report available at http://www.ademis.org/pop/isiro_tapili3.htm (last accessed February 8, 2010).

[21] Interviews with former LRA fighters, Gulu, September 13 and 14, 2009.

[22] Based on interviews with formerly abducted people, residents of Bangadi and Ngilima, and international aid workers based in the field.

[23] Interviews in Bangadi, December 7, 2009.

[24] Murefu has two groups under him, a larger group believed to be in Banda and a smaller one in Epi.

[25] OCHA, “Humanitarian action in DRC, Weekly report.”

[26] Interview with eyewitness in Bangadi, December 7, 2009. It is slightly unusual that the LRA would take on an incoming force head on, even FARDC forces.

[27] It is possible a group of LRA fighters under Colonel Okot Odek has moved north into CAR and possibly into South Darfur in neighboring Sudan.

[28] Interview with psychologist from INGO, Dungu, December 7, 2009.

[29] Interview with international aid worker, Dungu, December 4, 2009.

[30] According to a deployment map Enough researchers saw, FARDC Battalion Urse is deployed to Bangadi. A FARDC battalion has between 500 and 750 soldiers according to FARDC officers.

[31] Interview with MONUC officers, Dungu, December 6, 7, and 8, 2009.

[32] Interview with doctor at Dungu hospital, Dungu, December 7, 2009.

[33] Interviews with FARDC soldiers, U.N. officials, and international aid workers, Dungu, Ngilima, and Bunia, December 2 and 9, 2009.

[34] Enough interviews with local official, market vendors in Dungu, and FARDC soldier, December 2009.

[35] Interviews with local officials, FARDC soldiers, and U.N. sources, December 2009.

[36] Interview with Dungu market vendors, December 4 and 5, 2009.

[37] Interview with MONUC worker, Dungu, December 4, 2009.

[38] In interviews with local residents, NGO workers, and U.N. sources, there was a general view that the high command had to be involved or aware of the situation as the trade happened openly.

[39] Interview with U.N. officials and NGO workers, Dungu, December 4, 5, and 8, 2009.

[40] Internal annual INGO report, January 28, 2010.

[41] Internal U.N. report. Synthesis of incidents for October 2009 and December 3, 2009.

[42] Interviews in Dungu, December 6 and 7, 2009. Also corroborated in an annual INGO report, January 28, 2010.

[43] Interview in Dungu, December 7, 2009.

[44] Interview with U.N. official, Bunia, December 2, 2009.

[45] MONUC Bangadi Field Mission Report, September 24, 2009.

[46] Based on interviews with victims of FARDC abuses and U.N. and international and national NGOs.

[47] Interview with international humanitarian worker, December 4, 2009.

[48] Interview with local aid worker, Dungu, December 7, 2009.

[49] Ibid.

[50] While the real numbers are much higher, there has recently been a debate among LRA experts about the use of rape by the LRA, which is relatively new. It is possible that FARDC soldiers or Congolese civilians commit rapes pretending to be LRA rebels, although so far Enough has found no evidence to support this claim.

[51] Interview with aid worker, Dungu, December 4, 2009.

[52] U.N. synthesis of security incidents for October 2009.

[53] Internal annual INGO report, January 28, 2010.

[54] Interview with Congolese head of NGO, Dungu, December 8, 2009.

[55] Internal annual INGO report, January 28, 2009.

[56] Interview with General Mushale, Dungu, December 4, 2009.

[57] Interview with humanitarian worker, Dungu, December 8, 2009.

[58] Interview with local official, Bangadi, December 7, 2009.

[59] An agreement between the FARDC and the UPDF was signed in September 2008, and agreements have continued for the past two years. In a meeting among the chiefs of staff of FARDC, UPDF, and FACA in June 2009 in Kisangani, DRC, it was agreed that the FARDC would continue the fight against the LRA with support from UPDF intelligence squads.

[60] The recently surrendered LRA commander Charles Arop said, ”The Congolese soldiers are lazy, afraid, and not security conscious.”

[61] Interviews in Bangadi, December 7, 2009.

[62] Address by the president of the civil society of Ngilima to the U.N. delegation, Ngilima, December 8, 2009.

[63] The U.N. mission has close to 1,000 blue helmets in Haut Uele, the majority from a Moroccan infantry battalion, the rest being Indonesian engineers and Bangladeshi air force personnel. There are about 100 peacekeepers in Faradje and another 100 in Duru with a unit of 15 soldiers in Dingila, while the rest are stationed in Dungu.

[64] United Nations Security Council, “Resolution S/RES/1856” (2008).

[65] It appears that MONUC squads were sent to Ngilima, Bangadi, and Niangara at the end of December 2009, although this was a temporary solution pending the arrival of reinforcements.

[66] Interview with Morbat officer, Dungu, December 5, 2009.

[67] Interview with MONUC officer, Dungu, December 6, 2009. In fact, only the province of Haut Uele (34,363 square miles), where most of the LRA attacks happen and where fewer than 1,000 peacekeepers are based, is nine times bigger than the entire area of Kosovo (3,861 square miles).

[68] For instance, a quick impact project intended to improve community relations had the opposite effect. The $20,000 project involved repainting the office of the territorial administrator and was undertaken without consulting the population. This was not a priority for the population, which lacks roads and other basic infrastructure and services.

[69] Interview with Congolese member of civil society, Dungu, December 8, 2009.

[70] This was the case in Faradje and Dungu, according to interviews with local residents.

[71] Interview with MONUC officer, Dungu, December 4, 2009. MONUC’s mandate specifically makes the protection of civilians in DRC a priority for the peacekeeping force.

Field Dispatch: The Arrow Boys of Southern Sudan - An Army of the Willing

Patrick Furey — Mon, 08 Mar 2010 10:32:13 -0500

YAMBIO, Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan— “Omar Bashir,” Adrian said, emphatically responding to the question we posed to our local interpreter without waiting for the Zande translation. We had asked who he thought was behind the recent attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, on his community in southern Sudan. “They have been sent. They have been bribed, told to kill the people on this land,” he said. Eight months ago, this 23-year-old—his youthful face hiding the horrors he has witnessed—fled with many others from his village to the largest town in this remote corner of southern Sudan near the Congolese border. Adrian and his fellow villagers now live on land owned by the local Episcopal Church, and have begun building basic homes and cultivating the land.

But after speaking to Adrian and other men in this makeshift village of displaced and traumatized survivors of LRA attacks, it’s clear that they don’t plan to simply wait out the storm. In the absence of an effective response by the Sudanese government to the LRA, many local men and boys have taken community security into their own hands. They are part of a loose-knit, meagerly armed, local defense force called the Arrow Boys.

The Enemy

The LRA is a brutal, predatory militia that originated in northern Uganda in 1986 and has terrorized civilian populations across central Africa ever since. In December 2008, a U.S.- backed military operation by the governments of Southern Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda, known as Operation Lightning Thunder, attempted to destroy the LRA’s command center based at the time in Garamba National Park in northeastern Congo. Since this offensive, the LRA has moved north from Garamba, fanning out across the dense forests of northeastern Congo, Sudan’s Western Equatoria state, and neighboring Central African Republic. Credible reports by the Ugandan and southern Sudanese armies suggest that members of the LRA are taking refuge (and seeking to resupply) in South Darfur.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the LRA’s messianic leader Kony and two of his commanders for crimes against humanity, but they remain at-large. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the historic link between the LRA and the ruling National Congress Party in Khartoum, thought to have tapered off in recent years, may have been revived. In the minds of Adrian and many of the rank-and-file Arrow Boys operating in southern Sudan, there’s no doubt of this connection.

Enough’s LRA researcher Ledio Cakaj recently documented the failures of the SPLA and the United Nations Mission in Sudan, to protect civilians in Western Equatoria, where a string of ongoing LRA attacks displaced more than 80,000 Sudanese people in 2009. Decentralized and on the move, the LRA has been particularly lethal in recent months, with little standing in their way – except civilian populations. “They are even more dangerous now that they are in small groups,” said Sister Giovanna, an Italian nun in the town of Nzara (20 kilometers from Yambio) who lived in northern Uganda during the height of the LRA violence there.

Mobilizing, Seeking Support, and Taking Action

The concept behind the Arrow Boys preceded the LRA’s most recent arrival in Sudan. Originally, the Ugandan government, seeing its shortcomings in combating the LRA, supported the creation of the Arrow Boys in northern Uganda to protect the local communities, particularly vulnerable camps of displaced people. The title of this local militia came from the primary weapon used by its members. (Watch for an upcoming blog post on the history of the Arrow Boys in Uganda.)

In southern Sudan, the Arrow Boys seem to have sprung up more spontaneously.

The regional leader of the Arrow Boys, who asked for his name not to be used for security reasons, explained that after watching the LRA ravage their communities, southern Sudanese men and boys decided to respond.

“Very many people have died, and many others have had to flee their homes. […] We came with the mind of how to provide security for those that are here and end that threat [of the LRA],” he said.

“When I saw that kind of killing—they could crash the heads of your sons and daughters so they can’t even be recognized—it pained my heart,” said the leader of one group of Arrow Boys. “It depends on the heart. Any boy can be an Arrow Boy,” he said.

Having logged some victories against the LRA and won the support of their local communities and churches, the Arrow Boys turned to the government of Western Equatoria State for endorsement. As a show of solidarity, church leaders and government officials, including Western Equatoria governor Jemma Kumba, participated in a march in September 2009 to raise awareness about the LRA threat in the state. Their protest generated national and international attention, and the Government of Southern Sudan, or GoSS, pledged to send additional troops to fend off the predatory militia and defend the local population. But, attacks have continued. Since then, the government has stayed engaged with the Arrow Boys, though the nature of its support remains ambiguous. Some Arrow Boys Enough spoke to claimed that they have received bullets from Sudanese soldiers from time to time, but local and state government officials insist that they are not arming the Arrow Boys; rather, the government has given them permission to operate and convinced GoSS to postpone a scheduled civilian disarmament campaign in Western Equatoria so that its civilians can continue to defend themselves.

Local government sources frame the Arrow Boys as part of an organized counterinsurgency strategy. Col. Joseph Ngere, the Deputy Governor and Minister of Information in Western Equatoria, credited the Arrow Boys with being well placed to produce intelligence for the government. “In terms of information collection, it is not possible to have the army on every border,” Col. Ngere said. “The Arrow Boys know the land well so they should help.” Yambio County Commissioner David Billy reinforced this perspective. He was complimentary of their contribution to the fight but maintained that the Arrow Boys are “not given the power to do things by themselves. They are not engaging on the front line.”

However, visiting areas recently targeted by the LRA, neither the Arrow Boys nor members of their communities gave the impression that their fathers, sons, and brothers are simply feeding information to the army and clearing the way for the Sudanese soldiers to confront the militia. While coordination between the SPLA and the Arrow Boys would almost certainly bolster civilian protection in Western Equatoria, it seems that this collaboration has yet to be fully optimized.

Creative Community Security Measures

With their local guns that shoot only one bullet before needing to be reloaded and their handmade bows and arrows, the Arrow Boys may not seem to be militarily matched to the LRA and their sophisticated weapons. What the Arrow Boys have on their side, though, is the ability to counter one of the LRA’s primary tactics: surprise. The LRA doesn’t expect any resistance, they don’t expect people to fight back,” said an employee of an international organization working in Western Equatoria. Using a system that resembles a neighborhood phone tree, the Arrow Boys stay connected through cell phones dispersed strategically among the leaders of their ranks. They quickly mobilize to reinforce their comrades when the LRA is spotted in the area.

Another advantage that the Arrow Boys use to better protect their communities is their knowledge of the area. Given their familiarity with the terrain, the Arrow Boys can predict which routes the LRA will take and stake them out, capturing or killing LRA who fall into their ambush. In one area Enough visited, groups of 15-20 Arrow Boys take turns conducting nightly patrols, arguably the most important practice of protecting civilians from the LRA. The Arrow Boys and their sympathizers also keep in close touch with both southern Sudanese and Ugandan army contacts in the region. “I never thought a cell phone could be so useful. Thank God that Zain [cell network] is here now,” said Sister Giovanna, underscoring the tremendous impact basic technology can have on grassroots, civilian protection.

The regional leader of the Arrow Boys described how his group coordinates with village leaders to keep track of the people who come and go. They can gauge the approximate location of the LRA based on information from displaced people who arrive from sites of fresh LRA attacks. In partnership with village elders, the Arrow Boys also spread information about the tactics of the LRA so that local communities can do their best to remain alert and attempt to avoid succumbing to ploys the LRA use to gain access to the communities. One known maneuver is pretending to surrender – a tactic that recently led to the death of five civilians in a village we visited.

Local Security or a Budding Militia?

“We support them, but the idea is not to create another militia,” said the deputy governor of Western Equatoria. “The Arrow Boys are under our control,” said County Commissioner Billy.

The men and teenage boys we interviewed in displaced persons settlements and on the outskirts of insecure villages that have seen multiple LRA attacks do not resemble hardened militiamen or battle-ready soldiers. They are mainly farmers in an area that saw little fighting during the violent North-South civil war in Sudan. The Arrow Boys insist that they will disband as soon as the threat of the LRA subsides in their own communities. “We have only one plan, which is to provide security just here, because it is very hard for us to continue following [the LRA],” said the regional Arrow Boys leader. They don’t have the resources or the organizational structure to pursue the LRA farther afield, he said, acknowledging reports that the LRA may be moving north toward Darfur. “What we normally do is just to keep security here tight and provide a defense system to our own people.”

But as the scope of the Arrow Boys’ operations expand to include other policing duties, like rounding up local drunkards and troublemakers, and the public perception of a southern Sudanese government unable or unwilling to confront the LRA threat persists, the Arrow Boys seem to be making themselves increasingly indispensable. Should some sub-group or powerful local leader within the Arrow Boys decide that the group should broaden its mandate and extend its existence beyond the horizon of the LRA threat, many complicated questions will arise. Who will attempt to disband and disarm the Arrow Boys (and how)? What will the impact be of the dissolution of the Arrow Boys—largely made up of men and boys who may have found ways to profit from their membership in this group, and who may be reluctant to relinquish their status as defenders of their communities?

Apart from the LRA violence, we heard much talk of tension in Western Equatoria state between the agrarian Azande people and the cattle-keeping Dinka and Mbororo groups. “It is the other small sickness, the virus, in southern Sudan,” said Adrian, reflecting on just one of the numerous, deep internal ethnic fissures in southern Sudan. Whether the LRA moves away from Western Equatoria on its own volition, or the Arrow Boys help to push the LRA out of this territory, one can already anticipate a possible future source of instability – indeed, so-called ‘tribal clashes’ killed more than 2,500 people last year in other parts of southern Sudan. Given the history of proxy warfare in Sudan, it’s not difficult to imagine how the government in Khartoum might exploit these local rivalries following the exodus of the LRA from the region.

A Peace Process Play-by-Play

Patrick Furey — Thu, 25 Feb 2010 13:30:35 -0500

Enough experts lay out the preliminary deal between the Sudanese Government and the Darfuri rebel group JEM.

^{AP Images / Alfred De Montesquiou}

As the ink still dries on a preliminary deal between the Government of Sudan and Darfur’s largest rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement, the situation at the Darfur peace talks in Doha, Qatar is changing rapidly. Here’s an update capturing what we are hearing from various sources in Doha or close to the talks, recognizing that the situation remains highly fluid.

The Justice and Equality Movement - Government of Sudan Framework Agreement

Following up on a draft framework agreement signed in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena last weekend, the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leadership met in Doha on February 23, 2010, to sign a final version of a deal that sets out the terms of their forthcoming negotiations over peace in Darfur. (AlJazeera captured footage from the signing ceremony.)

In large part, the agreement is a pledge to have further negotiations, but it does include some important immediate steps. Key provisions include a two-month ceasefire, release of JEM prisoners in Khartoum (this notably includes JEM leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim’s half-brother), and recognition of JEM as political party. The framework agreement also identified some of the key topics to address during formal talks, including power and wealth sharing and compensation for Darfuri victims, and stipulates that negotiations should conclude by March 15. This rapid timetable is obviously somewhat unrealistic given the complexity of issues such as the demobilization of forces, a fact which even some of the mediators quietly acknowledge.

There is also talk of postponing the state and gubernatorial elections in Darfur until a later date (perhaps November) Contrary to some press reports, our source was confident that the presidential election in Darfur will proceed as planned in April. This formulation on elections has appeal to both JEM and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Bashir would get to claim ‘legitimacy’ with an April presidential victory that included Darfur, and JEM would be given more time to establish itself as a political party before parliamentary and gubernatorial elections take place in Darfur.

JEM’s Khalil Ibrahim insisted in a press conference that no one from his group would stand in the upcoming elections. This declaration would seem to be at odds with his desire to establish JEM as a viable political party. And the insistence perhaps unwittingly acknowledges an unwritten understanding that the Sudanese government would grant political posts to JEM before the rebels would even need to run for office.

We understand that there is also tacit agreement between JEM and the Government of Sudan that a vice presidential position would go to a Darfuri, but not a JEM leader. Ibrahim might receive a governorship.

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The Liberation and Justice Movement

Making the situation even more murky, the process of negotiations between JEM and the Sudanese government has been accompanied by a parallel effort to unite other Darfuri rebel groups, a number of whom are now negotiating as a block called the Liberation and Justice Movement. Tensions clearly remain between JEM and these other groups, and the ability to reconcile these tensions will likely determine if the agreements of the last several days are a genuine breakthrough or yet one more series of broken promises.

The African Union-United Nations mediators, the Qatari hosts, and U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration are pushing for the Liberation and Justice Movement to negotiate with the Government of Sudan on a parallel track to JEM, with a plan to bring the two tracks together toward the end of talks. The Liberation and Justice Movement, the Government of Sudan, and the mediators are reportedly putting finishing touches on a framework agreement, which is expected to be made public shortly. The Liberation and Justice Movement framework agreement reportedly closely resembles JEM’s (minus the prisoner release provision).

The Liberation and Justice Movement consists of 10 separate groups, five of which reportedly receive backing from Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi. The groups have more or less rallied around a leader, former governor of Darfur Tijani Seise, though there are already reports of some displeasure among the ranks because he is a civil society leader and not a rebel. There is an understanding that he could be named vice president at the end of negotiations.

One rebel faction still not bought in to this coalition is the group with ties to prominent Darfuri leader Abdel Wahid, who lives in Paris and has refused to join the talks in Doha. This group, known as the Wahid Commanders, issued a statement declaring a commitment to peace, but refusing to join the Liberation and Justice Movement or to accept Tijani Seise as the leader because of his presumed links to the Libyans. Wahid himself was dismissive of the agreement with JEM, calling it a “ceremonial peace.” International negotiators have long been frustrated by Wahid’s reluctance to join unified talks, but it is also clear that he maintains an important base of support among Darfuris.

Dual Track Negotiations

The mediation team is charging ahead with its dual track approach to negotiations, despite the protestations of JEM leader Ibrahim, who appears to feel that smaller rebel groups and civil society do not deserve a prominent place at the negotiating table. The African Union-United Nations mediators, the Qataris, and the U.S. special envoy all seem to support the parallel negotiation track, not necessarily because they see it as ideal, but because they think it is the best they can do at this moment. This may be an accurate assessment on their part, but there are obvious pitfalls to such an approach.

Perhaps most dangerous to the prospects for peace, JEM appears to be quite cool to the idea of other Darfuri players being given a seat at the table. While JEM may be the most important military force, it is far from representative of all Darfuris. In a press conference, Dr. Khalil suggested that it would be a waste of time to negotiate with the other groups because they do not represent movements. To paraphrase from Dr. Khalil’s statement at a press availability (an exact transcript was not available):

Some of these so-called leaders are taxi drivers in N’Djamena and street sweepers in the Netherlands. They will not negotiate with the Government of Sudan while we are also negotiating. It is up to this forum to choose whether to let us negotiate alone or have the others negotiate. People in Darfur and Kordofan will not accept that movements will be made in the lobby of hotels.

One interpretation of Dr. Khalil’s remarks was that JEM is trying to intimidate the mediators into giving JEM the greatest possible leadership role even while recognizing that the mediation team won’t back down from the parallel track approach and that other groups will have to have their voices heard over time. Ultimately JEM also likely recognizes that this brinkmanship has its dangers, and they could well be blamed if talks collapse – leaving them in a vulnerable position both politically and militarily. Diplomats remain optimistic that the two-track negotiations would proceed and hope that an agreement on the terms of the formal talks can be made public next week.

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Calculations for Each Side

The Government of Sudan:
The primary calculations driving the position of the Sudanese Government and its ruling National Congress Party are not difficult to discern in this case. First, an agreement with JEM would allow the western front of Darfur to remain relatively quiet over the next year while the government turns its attention to the larger strategic issue of possible independence for South Sudan and the independence referendum scheduled for January 2011. If war with the South were to reignite, which remains a distinct possibility, the ruling National Congress Party does not want to be fighting a two-front war.

The deal with JEM has also generated considerable speculation that both the National Congress Party and some like-minded Arab states are eager to unify Sudan’s Islamists at a time when the country is facing considerable secessionist pressures. Speculation on this front was further heightened when Dr. Khalil spoke in his public comments about working for the unification of Sudan. This likely struck a nerve not just among southern Sudanese, who very much have their sights set on the independence referendum, but among non-Arab Darfuri rebels and members of civil society. The fact that the Qataris have facilitated the deal with offers of incredible largesse may also fuel concerns surrounding the motives and timing of the JEM deal.

President Bashir is also deeply focused on using the April 2010 national elections as a means to legitimize himself, help fend off war crimes charges from the International Criminal Court, and minimize threats to his rule within his own party. A “successful” election in Darfur, ironically financed in no small part by the international community, would allow Bashir to again argue that he should not be held accountable for his repeated and flagrant violations of international law.

It is also clear from comments of the U.S. special envoy that President Bashir hopes to use the JEM agreement to pave the way for lifting of U.S. sanctions. One can only hope that any consideration of altering the current sanctions regime is based on demonstrable changes on the ground, as per the U.S. policy on Sudan, not simply the willingness for Khartoum to sign a piece of paper.

The Justice and Equality Movement:
Recent Chad-Sudan steps to mend relations put JEM in a difficult military position, with the rebels potentially losing a key source of material support from Chad as well as its base of operations within Chad. JEM leadership likely recognized that this unique moment of time – with the convergence of interests between the presidents of Chad and Sudan and the Qataris pushing hard for a deal – was likely the high water mark for them being able to gain concessions. By striking a deal, JEM may also calculate that they could be seen as a genuine game-changer by Darfuris, allowing them to expand their influence from being primarily based on military strength to becoming more of a political force.

The Liberation and Justice Movement:
The various factions unified under the newly formed Liberation and Justice Movement understand that they must present a united front to negotiate with the Sudanese government, and they have been feeling pressure from international actors to do so. While some of these smaller groups may be uncomfortable with how negotiations have played out so far, some are genuinely eager for peace and others are feeling squeezed by their respective patrons. In short, those groups that have joined the Liberation and Justice Movement may see this as the only game in town.

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Qatar:
Qatar has driven the negotiations, much more so than the United States, European Union, African Union-United Nations mediators, or the Egyptians. The Qataris are eager to be able to take credit for backing the negotiations. They demonstrate an Arab unity of purpose, and are willing to put in enormous resources to advance their goals. Amid initial reports that the Qataris pledged $1 billion for reconstruction in Darfur, they upped the ante and pledged $2 billion. The gravitational pull of these huge financial sums on rebel groups should not be underestimated. As the Egyptians look on with ambitions to step in as host if the Doha talks fail, Qatar remains under pressure to bring a deal to closure. Notably, while Qatar may be in a position to broker the deal, there is little to suggest that they would be an effective force in overseeing its implementation.

United States:
Special Envoy Gration’s number one priority seems to be nailing down the security arrangements for Darfur and stabilizing the country in preparation for southern Sudan’s 2011 referendum on self-determination. There seems to be an understanding between the special envoy and National Congress Party officials that rolling back sanctions is the prize on the table for negotiating with Chad and making inroads in talks with Darfuri rebels.

The African Union-United Nations mediation team:

The contract for lead mediator Djibril Bassolé will expire in just over two months, so he is under pressure to show that the peace process has progressed during his 18 months at the helm.

Potential Warning Signs

Obviously, a durable and comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur would be enormously welcome, and could help pave the way for the three million Darfuris who have been violently driven from their homes to return in an environment of genuine security. But by the same token, the numerous failed peace deals that have littered the landscape not only in Darfur, but in Sudan more broadly, remind us that good faith has often been absent from these deals. Agreements on paper have often not even been cursorily implemented. The hard experiences of Sudan’s recent history mandate that optimism be tempered with realism.

In that spirit, the rapid timetable for negotiating highly complex issues, JEM’s dismissive attitudes toward other Darfuri groups, including civil society, and the reluctance of certain key rebel groups to join the process stand out as distinct warning signs. Any set of agreements should also include international mechanisms for monitoring their implementation, something that has been a major flaw of earlier pacts. It remains somewhat troubling that these agreements do not seem to reflect a well-coordinated international position, but rather a series of ad hoc arrangements between a diffuse set of actors trying to calm the situation without necessarily resolving it. Moreover, the situation on the ground in Darfur remains highly volatile, posing a threat to the negotiations in Doha. It is our hope that all of these obstacles can be overcome, and further agreements can be supported by a robust, effective peacekeeping force on the ground – an element that has been painfully missing to date.

Field Dispatch: Walikale

Patrick Furey — Wed, 03 Feb 2010 12:36:41 -0500

By Olivia Caeymaex

This is the second of two Field Dispatches looking at the crisis in eastern Congo on the ground.

In December I travelled to Walikale territory, the vast and remote westernmost region of North Kivu, scene of much of the fighting during the past year, and home to some of the region’s most lucrative mines. I visited several towns in the region alongside a U.N. Joint Protection Team. These teams are composed of both military peacekeepers and civilian experts from the U.N. Mission in Congo, or MONUC, and are tasked with assessing how best to protect civilians. In interviews with local government officials, civil society, security forces, and health workers, we got a sense of the concerns of the population.

The presence of MONUC peacekeepers appears to deliver a basic level of security, but as one travels away from their positions, insecurity rises precipitously. The Rwandan Hutu rebel group the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, maintains a strong presence in the territory, pillaging and looting with a focus on the strategic mining sites of Bisie and Omate. Military operations have disrupted the FDLR, who have responded by breaking into groups as small as five to ten men each rather than the groups of 30-40 fighters used in the past. Sadly, even under duress the FDLR poses a grave threat to civilians. In addition, local Mai Mai groups, including some that are closely aligned with the FDLR, also prey upon the population.

Travelling along the road from Kibua to Mpofi to Walikale, we found many villages emptied of their inhabitants. It appears that these people have fled to the larger towns of Kibua and Walikale, where they live with local populations as there are no official camps for displaced persons in the area.

Defection at Kibati

In a sign of the fragility of the ‘integration’ of former CNDP rebels into the Congolese army, some 120 ex-CNDP combatants under the command of Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, the former bodyguard to Laurent Nkunda, deserted the army in Kibati on December 6, 2009. Most of the deserters rejoined the army after realizing that the group lacked external support. The remnants – Colonel Emmanuel and an average of 20 men - aligned with another armed group. Throughout Walikale, local representatives repeatedly pointed to this defection not only as a sign of the failure of the integration, but as testimony to the lack of a strategy to protect civilians.

Local leaders recognized the thorny dilemma at the heart of the problem: villagers in Walikale territory are dependent upon Congolese military forces to provide security, but they also recognize the inability of these forces to actually finish off the FDLR. Instead of progress toward disarming and dismantling the rebels, the main result of the fighting is more reprisal attacks against civilians, more human rights abuses by the army itself, and additional destruction of Walikale’s already devastated infrastructure.

Sorely lacking infrastructure and trust

Already one of the more remote regions of eastern Congo, the war has dealt a major blow to basic infrastructure in Walikale, especially in terms of roads. The lack of access to the region means that the levels of humanitarian aid actually getting to the field are much lower than the needs. Moreover, the local population tends to distrust MONUC because of their support for the Congolese army, and even go so far as to suspect that MONUC is also collaborating with the FDLR. Given this atmosphere of suspicion and the legacy of conflict between local ethnic groups and rwandaphones, Walikale remains on a knife’s edge. Efforts to provide a modicum of stability and security in the region will need to go hand-in-hand with efforts to support local conflict resolution, rebuilding both physical infrastructure and some measure of trust within and between local communities.

Field Dispatch: The Protection Gap in Haut Uele

Patrick Furey — Tue, 26 Jan 2010 09:48:28 -0500

By Ledio Cakaj

A resurgent LRA is terrorizing the population in the Haut Uele region of northeast Congo. Congolese soldiers deployed to the region have been unable to provide adequate protection and the number of UN peacekeepers in the area remains woefully inadequate. But better coordinated and resourced efforts by both Congolese and international security forces have the potential to protect civilians from LRA attacks. This is the second of two dispatches based on my visit to Haut Uele.

The Congolese Army in Haut Uele

The Congolese army has deployed close to 6,000 soldiers in Province Orientale, but they have utterly failed to protect civilians from LRA attacks. Most of the LRA attacks have taken place around three places—Ngilima, Bangadi and Niangara – where there is a significant army presence. In Bangadi, for example, there are at least 100 Congolese soldiers. Yet, Bangadi has been frequently attacked by the LRA in the last few months. In personal accounts, people in Bangadi report that Congolese soldiers simply do not respond when alerted to LRA attacks. Similarly, people in Ngilima said that the soldiers are too scared to confront the LRA; they say they have never seen a LRA rebel killed or captured by the Congolese soldiers. “The only time the [Congolese army] fights the LRA is when they happen to come across them by accident,” said a local official.

In many interviews Congolese civilians accused Congolese soldiers of preying on the local population. Notoriously unpaid and unfed, soldiers steal from civilians, often by force at checkpoints along the main roads. “It is a daily occurrence,” said a local NGO worker. “Civilians are either forced to pay or forced to work for the soldiers at checkpoints such as collecting wood or cleaning their boots and washing their uniforms.” Lacking vehicles, Congolese soldiers needing to walk to their duty stations force locals to transport them on their bicycles or steal their bicycles at gunpoint. The stealing of bicycles is so common that the residents of Ngilima, in anticipation of a Congolese army troop rotation, declared December 27 as the “day without bicycles” and hid their bicycles from Congolese soldiers.

There are many cases of rape and sexual violence committed by the Congolese army. In Ngilima, we heard from the local population that there are consistently about six to eight rapes reported per month that are attributed to Congolese soldiers. Many more rapes go unreported. Killings also occur, mostly when civilians refuse to hand over their possessions to Congolese soldiers. An internal U.N. report cited eight killings of civilians by the Congolese army in Haut Uele during the month of November, with another four people injured. In Bangadi, we saw a Congolese soldier cut a civilian with a bayonet, because the civilian, who was driving a motorcycle, refused to give the soldier a ride to his barracks.

In interviews, a variety of Congolese army officials denied all abuses. According to the commander of the FARDC battalion in Bangadi, Congolese soldiers have never committed any crimes against the civilian population. The commander of the troops based in Ngilima said the population was lying. The FARDC troop commander in Dungu recognized that abuses had taken place but added that these were isolated incidents. “These are the problems of the man,” he said. “Not of the organization.”

Representatives from Congolese civil society organizations said that abuses had occurred where there was a clear lack of good leadership. They believe that the Congolese army and government should ensure command responsibility. Civil society members have also asked the United Nations mission in Congo, or MONUC, to condition aid to the army on good behavior. At the moment, MONUC supports Congolese soldiers in Province Orientale by providing daily rations for 6,000 soldiers and gasoline for seven army vehicles. MONUC officials said it was difficult for them to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congolese national army.

The role of the United Nations

The mandate for the United Nations mission in DRC, or MONUC, clearly prioritizes civilian protection, but their presence is thinly stretched in Haut Uele. A battalion of Moroccan peacekeepers is trying to offer protection to civilians but they have been unable to establish a presence in the worst affected areas. Promised reinforcements, in the shape of a Tunisian battalion, were supposed to arrive in June of 2009, but this was pushed back to February 2010. There are also fears that the Tunisians could then be deployed to neighboring Equateur Province, site of recent fighting between the Congolese army and a new rebel group.

The lack of peacekeepers to protect humanitarian convoys has forced aid groups to cease assistance to people in areas targeted by the LRA. After a series of LRA attacks on Congolese civilians who had just received food aid, and fearing attacks against their staff, U.N. and humanitarian organizations decided to stop the distribution of food in adherence to the “Do No Harm” principle. “Ideally we would need U.N. peacekeepers or Congolese soldiers to stay in the communities at least two weeks after the distribution of food,” said an international aid worker. “But there are not enough U.N. troops and the FARDC cannot be trusted.” As a result, many are starving. “We are being exterminated by the LRA and from hunger,” a resident of Bangadi told Enough.

Where present, U.N. peacekeepers have generally acted as a deterrent to LRA attacks. It is telling, for instance, that LRA attacks occur largely in Bangadi, Ngilima and Niangara where there are no U.N. troops. Furthermore, a U.N. presence also almost always guarantees that Congolese soldiers are better behaved. This is the case, for instance, in Dungu, but also in Faradje where the U.N. presence is small. A Faradje local reports that Congolese soldiers behave much better when conducting joint patrols with U.N. peacekeepers. This is not the case when Congolese soldiers are alone.

MONUC troops have both the will and the means to protect civilians. In a response to indications that the LRA were planning to attack civilians during Christmas this December, MONUC troops deployed to Ngilima. Internal U.N. reports mention a thwarted LRA attack on December 25 as a result of joint MONUC-Congolese army patrols. MONUC deployment to Ngilima is, however, temporary and the troops are expected to leave soon.

Many agree that a MONUC troop increase would go a long way towards protecting civilians in northeastern DRC. A U.N. source said in an interview that U.N. workers had been requesting a troop increase for a long time. “Gaye [General Gaye, MONUC force commander] promised us long ago that he would send more troops here,” the source said. “So far he has not kept that promise.”

Field Dispatch: Ferocious LRA Attacks in Northeast Congo

Patrick Furey — Mon, 25 Jan 2010 10:50:32 -0500

By Ledio Cakaj

In a trip to Province Orientale of northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in early December 2009, Enough researchers found abundant evidence of brutal ongoing violence committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA. Despite claims from Congolese and Ugandan state officials that the LRA is on its last legs, attacks against Congolese civilians perpetrated by the rebel group remain frequent. The LRA is far from finished. While there are disputes about whether the Ugandan rebels have been weakened by recent offensives against them or not, it is clear that they remain incredibly dangerous and ruthless. There are also lingering concerns and suspicions that the LRA may once again be receiving direct support from the ruling party in Sudan. This is the first of two dispatches based upon my visit to Haut Uele.

Brutalities in Haut Uele reminiscent of LRA of old

There is a long history of LRA violence in Congo. Attacks, however, reached a peak after Operation Lightning Thunder of December 2008, when the Ugandan army, in collaboration with the Congolese army and with U.S. support, attacked LRA bases in the Congolese Garamba National Park. The operation had the effect of scattering the LRA forces which in turn unleashed a series of coordinated attacks against the Congolese population. In a period of three weeks, close to 1,000 people were brutally murdered. About 200 were abducted, many of whom have not yet returned. Attacks continued throughout 2009, bringing the total number of LRA-caused deaths to 1,500. An estimated 3,000 people were abducted in the year; about 700 of those abducted were children.

According to internal UN reports, the LRA was responsible for an average of 30 killings per month In the Haut Uele region of Province Orientale during 2009, with those numbers increasing sharply around November and December. On November 26, an attack near the village of Ngilima left ten dead. Eight people from the same family were burned alive while two others were killed by machete blows. In Bangadi, four people were killed on December 2, two of them badly mutilated. In Tapili, 15 people were believed to be killed on December 14, although the real number might be twice as high as bodies are still being found in the bush. In a couple of attacks on December 19 and 21, two people were killed in Ngilima and two women were severely mutilated. A great number of abductions also occurred with each attack. A priest from the area estimates that the numbers of the abductees in the Tapili attack was more than 300 people. Notably, there were at least four cases in December in which victims’ lips and ears were cut—a practice rarely seen since the heyday of the LRA’s strength.

These recent attacks are especially shocking in their brutality. No longer focused on just stealing food to survive, LRA forces in DRC appear to be attacking in order to terrorize the population and perhaps to send a message to the Congolese authorities who claim the LRA is finished. These ulterior goals may explain why the LRA has returned to using vile practices such as severe mutilations.

Testimony from survivors of LRA violence

Testimony from survivors of LRA violence in northeast Congo describes this resurgence of brutality. One survivor of the November 26 massacre described above recounted the LRA attack on his family:

We were eating dinner outside of our hut when seven LRA rebels appeared and told us in broken Lingala [one of the local languages] to get inside of our hut. They looted our food, locked us inside our hut and burned it. There were 10 of us, my whole family inside the hut. When I realized they were burning us alive I started to push against the door, forcing it open. One rebel standing outside of the door tried to hit me with a heavy club but I dodged it and ran in the bush. They shot after me but missed. Apparently they shot or hit everyone else in my family who tried to come out. Except for one other person, everyone else was burned alive.

A man whose lips and ears were cut by LRA rebels on the night of December 2 in Bangadi spoke with difficulty and was still in shock. He said that his arms were tied tightly around his body and one LRA rebels kept him pinned on the ground while another proceeded to cut his lips and ears. He said that they did this in total silence, kicking while mutilating him.

Field Dispatch: Tensions in North Kivu

Patrick Furey — Fri, 22 Jan 2010 11:20:10 -0500

By Olivia Caeymaex

The end of 2009 saw optimistic statements about the situation in Congo from both the United Nations and the Congolese government. However, my experience on the ground in North Kivu seemed to point to a different picture. This is the first of two field dispatches based on my travel to particularly contentious territories in the region.

Masisi and the Parallel Administration

The territory of Masisi, located to the west of Goma in North Kivu province, is among the most contested regions of eastern Congo. A longtime power center for the National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, the area is a flashpoint for potential conflict stemming from tensions over land rights and conflict between local ethnic groups and Congolese of Rwandan descent, exacerbated by the recent population movements described in a prior field dispatch.

Despite the CNDP’s peace agreement with the Congolese government, the movement continues to operate their own government structures throughout much of Masisi, including lucrative tax collection and control over security services. This operation is based out of the town of Mushake. Following a meeting between the CNDP and the Congolese government on December 21, the CNDP agreed to close down the parallel administration. But the CNDP continues to argue it first needs to be politically integrated at the national level before stopping their tax system and parallel administration. This is another worrying sign of strains in the relationship between the Congolese government and the CNDP, despite the move by the government to take charge of CNDP’s war-wounded around Christmas time last year.

The Mushake administration feeds several worrying dynamics:

The CNDP split. Since Laurent Nkunda was deposed by the Rwandans, there has been a dangerous split within the movement between those who remain loyal to him and those loyal to Bosco Ntaganda. Allegedly, the taxes collected by the parallel administration are not going to the main CNDP administration, widening this rift.
Multiplying Militias. Authorities have described a new movement called the Force for the Liberation of Eastern Congo, based in the town of Biza, with a battalion of 500-1,000 fighters. This group is linked to wanted war criminal Bosco Ntaganda, and has conducted forced recruitment in the region. Ntaganda, reacting to the call by U.S. envoy Howard Wolpe for his arrest, is evidently arming multiple militias to defend himself.
Anti-government alliances. During a meeting held in December, the parallel administration in Mushake replaced the national police in the area with a police force consisting of CNDP forces and members of the Hutu militia called PARECO.

Most of the people I spoke with think the CNDP is using these multiple armed groups and the maintenance of the parallel administration to increase its leverage in negotiations with the government. The end goals are the return of refugees from Rwanda, the recognition of senior appointments in the military, the full integration of the CNDP into the government, and the recognition of Mushake as a territory, thereby splitting political power in North Kivu. Thus far, the result has been increased confusion, rising tensions, and greater potential for these political, military, and economic manoeuvres to trigger widespread violence.

Truth and Consequences for Sudan Now: An Open Letter to President Obama's Deputies

Patrick Furey — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 10:44:05 -0500

To: Tom Donilon, NSC

Jim Steinberg, Department of State

Stuart Levey, Department of Treasury

Michèle Flournoy, Department of Defense

Erica Barks-Ruggles, USUN

From: John Prendergast, Co-Founder, The Enough Project

Omer Ismail, Senior Advisor, The Enough Project

At the first quarterly review of Sudan policy by the Deputies Committee you will likely sense two very different assessments of what is happening in Sudan today. This divergence of opinion has major implications for your policy recommendations and decisions. One version of Sudan’s current reality will highlight recent agreements on the referendum law, high rates of voter registration, and the lack of village burnings and cross border adventurism in Darfur as demonstrations of tangible progress in Sudan.

The reality on the ground in Sudan speaks in starkly different terms. The dangerous status quo in Darfur remains unchanged in some key aspects: millions of people are left in squalid camps, unable to return home because government-supported militias occupy their land and make travel very dangerous. Women face high levels of sexual violence in Darfur, aid is erratic, and progress in the Darfur peace process remains painfully limited.

More broadly, the April national election in Sudan – an election for which the Unites States has provided tens of millions of dollars in technical assistance – is in the process of being stolen by an indicted war criminal who will use the ballot to “legitimize” his rule. The conditions to make the national election free and fair simply do not exist, and will not exist, by April, and there may well be sharp questions as to why the United States heavily bankrolled an election so obviously flawed.

Most urgently and ominously, there are abundant indicators that Sudan is on a dangerous road back to full-scale North-South war as violence increases and key elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have been left completely unimplemented. The international community’s position toward Sudan at this vital time reflects neither consensus nor coherence. Officials from both North and South speak of not wanting war, but are intensively preparing for it. Local clashes in South Sudan are escalating, against an historical backdrop of extensive support to southern Sudanese militias by the ruling party in Khartoum designed to undermine southern unity. The heavy lift of diplomacy needed to assure that Sudan’s referendum is peaceful and well managed simply remains largely undone, with no full-time, on-the-ground diplomatic teams from the U.S. engaging the regional actors on either the North-South issues or the Darfur process.

To prevent a full scale war from erupting in Sudan in the coming year, the Deputies should recommend to their superiors and President Obama a course of action marked by much deeper diplomatic engagement, backed by more assiduous efforts to build a multilateral coalition of counties willing to impose consequences on those undermining the path to peace in Sudan. On the occasion of this first quarterly policy review, we urge you to consider three main actions:

1) The Deputies should recommend that diplomatic efforts begin immediately in New York and in capitals to pull together a coalition of countries willing to pressure the parties multilaterally to take the steps necessary for peace. Those officials and parties undermining peace should face specific and clear consequences. At this juncture, that would also involve withdrawing further U.S. financial support for the April election, expanding and more effectively implementing the current arms embargo, identifying specific officials who are undermining peace and targeting them with aggressive asset freezes and travel bans, and denying the Khartoum regime any form of multilateral debt relief until peace agreements have been far more effectively implemented.

2) The Deputies should recommend that the U.S. immediately deploy a small team of diplomats to be based in Sudan and the surrounding region to work full-time on the peace processes for Darfur and the CPA. Trips by the envoy, no matter how frequent, are no substitute for on-the-ground, around-the-clock diplomacy. The team should include senior diplomats with real experience in peace processes and existing familiarity with Sudan.

3) The Deputies should recommend a ministerial level meeting among North American and European diplomats on Sudan at the earliest possible juncture. The lack of a common position on the multiplicity of profound issues facing Sudan over the coming year – including serious post-referendum issues – must be addressed.

We want to personally thank you for all of the work that you continue to do to advance U.S. national interests and the cause of peace in Sudan, and thank you for your consideration.

John Prendergast
Omer Ismail

The Enough Project

Clear Benchmarks for Sudan

Patrick Furey — Wed, 13 Jan 2010 12:51:09 -0500

In its Sudan policy review completed in mid-October 2009, the Obama administration indicated it would regularly assess the progress of peace in Sudan—or lack thereof. Administration officials have stated that the parties to Sudan’s multiple conflicts will be under the microscope, and held to clear and pre-determined benchmarks of progress. The relative progress on these benchmarks would then determine the pressures and incentives—so-called “carrots” and “sticks”—that would be brought to bear in 2010, a year the Obama administration itself said, “can either lead to steady improvements in the lives of the Sudanese people or degenerate into even more violent conflict and state failure.”

To date, the Obama administration has not publicly disclosed the precise benchmarks it is applying to assess progress in Sudan, even as the official review process takes place this month and as tensions increase with the April national elections and January 2011 referendum on independence for southern Sudan rapidly approaching. To help bring transparency to the process by which the United States ensures strict adherence to unambiguous benchmarks, and ensure that the appropriate pressures and incentives are applied accordingly, this paper aims to provide guidance for how officials, concerned citizens, and others in the international community can assess genuine progress toward a lasting peace in Sudan.

Continue reading the full benchmarks paper.

In a live, follow-up interview to his State of the Union address, President Obama answered questions submitted and voted on by YouTube users. Recognizing the opportunity to reach President Obama directly on the issue of Sudan, the Enough Project submitted its own video question. Here is the President’s response:

TAKE ACTION

To: Erica Barks-Ruggles, Tom Donilon, Jim Steinberg, Stuart Levy, and Michele Flournoy:

When the National Security Council Deputies Committee committee met in January to review progress of the Obama Administration's Sudan policy, I was hopeful that you would act decisively in leading other countries to hold those who promote violence in Sudan accountable.

I was disappointed that you did not publicly or transparently disclose the outcomes of your meeting. And the conflicts across Sudan are getting worse as we inch closer towards the elections in April. The U.S. government has not made the progress necessary to broker agreements in Sudan that will stabilize the country.

I therefore urge you to escalate real pressures on the parties, support an international surge to protect civilians during the election period, and immediately deploy full-time U.S. diplomatic teams to the region in order to accelerate peace efforts. Only with increased pressures and a full-time field-based diplomatic presence in Sudan, working on both Darfur and the North-South issues, will peace efforts have a chance of success.

Explore our interactive timeline of the elections in Sudan.

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Policy paper by Enough Co-founder John Prendergast

Introduction

Background: The Obama Administration’s clear statement of intent

The administration was clear in October 2009 that these benchmarks had to reflect substantive achievements in Sudan, not just rhetoric:

“Assessments of progress and decisions regarding incentives and disincentives must not be based on process-related accomplishments (i.e. the signing of a MOU or the issuance of a set of visas), but rather based on verifiable changes in conditions on the ground.”

The administration also spelled out an explicit process for measuring progress, built around quarterly reviews by deputies from a variety of agencies. Each quarter, and beginning this month, senior-level staff from various agencies are tasked with measuring progress in Sudan against a variety of indicators. A failure to improve conditions, the administration has said, “will trigger increased pressure on recalcitrant actors.”

As noted, the administration has chosen to keep the benchmarks it is utilizing in assessing progress in Sudan opaque. Neither the benchmarks themselves, nor the pressures and incentives that are to be deployed in response, are public. There are understandable reasons why the administration would choose to keep these protocols classified. However there appears to be some confusion within the U.S. government about the nature of these classified protocols and their use. Such confusion is concerning, because the administration must stick to its public commitment to review progress in Sudan and respond accordingly.

Success relies heavily on a consistent strategy of holding the parties in Sudan accountable for their actions. As President Obama said in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, “When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, repression in Burma—there must be consequences. Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy—but there must be consequences when those things fail.”

The U.S. policy will only be effective if the administration is vigilant in responding to progress or a lack thereof. Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir is being sought by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. The U.S. government continues to declare that genocide is ongoing in Darfur. Holding to the benchmarks as laid out by the administration is crucial. Anything less would send a dangerous message to those perpetrating violence in Sudan that they can continue to act with the same impunity they have enjoyed in the past. Protecting Sudan’s civilians in this volatile and historic period is absolutely essential.

How can relative progress in Sudan be accurately assessed? There are a number of factors that should be considered in any principled set of benchmarks and watched closely over the next year. There is broad agreement among Sudanese and those concerned with the fate of Sudan that these benchmarks constitute the fundamental elements of a durable peace and serve as key indicators of progress toward that peace. In order to achieve a sustainable peace and avoid a return to war, all parties in Sudan must address these core issues.

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The Benchmarks

National Reforms

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, contained key elements that were intended to transform Sudanese society, allow greater respect for civil liberties, and make unity more attractive to southern Sudan. This agenda offered the greatest promise for changing how Sudan is governed in fundamental ways and resolving the root causes of the country’s cycle of conflict between the center and the peripheries. The CPA should have ushered in greater press freedoms, expanded political space for civil society and opposition, reformed the national civil service, provided greater fiscal and governance autonomy to the states, and eliminated laws permitting detention without trial. Unfortunately, these critical provisions of the CPA have often been swept under the rug by the parties themselves and by international diplomats as they have pursued specific tactical goals in subsequent negotiations.

Progress on these national reforms is crucial for long-term peace in Sudan. Without addressing the repressive dynamic of concentrating power and wealth in the center at the expense of peoples in the peripheries, peace in Sudan will remain illusory whatever the outcome of the southern referendum in 2011. The likely southern vote for secession will not solve the problems of Sudan; the South will simply be opting out of them. Even if there were a peace agreement in Darfur tomorrow, the imbalance of power in Sudan and the systematic denial of fundamental human rights would likely lead to new conflicts in the North, South, East, the Nuba mountains, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and elsewhere in the country.

The CPA offers entry points for essential national reforms in advance of the national elections in April 2010 and southern Sudan’s self-determination referendum in 2011. While international assistance has focused a great deal on the mechanics of balloting, very few donors have been willing to state publicly that a conducive environment for free and fair elections does not currently exist, and without that conducive environment technical assistance will only result in a rubber stamped process that could easily trigger new violence.

The passage of a national security law that grants extensive powers to the security services to arrest and detain citizens without charge, and the use of violence by government security forces against peaceful political demonstrations in December 2009 are clear indicators that the benchmarks for national reform have not been met. In December the parties agreed to pass some key laws, however we would urge the United States to pressure the Sudanese government to revise the flawed national security act, trade unions act, and make amendments to the criminal law among others.

Key benchmarks include:

Discontinuation of the use of the national security law to arrest or otherwise intimidate civil society, human rights activists, and political actors.
Peaceful demonstrations and other gatherings allowed without interference.
Freedom for candidates for public office to campaign without intimidation.
Concrete measures taken in Khartoum and Juba to ensure freedom of the press and freedom of association.

Security

The broad security environment in southern Sudan, in Darfur and even the capital, Khartoum, should all be considered as key measures of how the parties in Sudan are behaving. There have been a number of deeply concerning developments on this front. Recent opposition protests in Khartoum have been violently halted by the authorities, illuminating the stark lack of individual security as well as the stalled or absent nature of the aforementioned national reforms.

The U.S. Special Envoy has achieved some important successes in tamping down cross-border incursions between Chad and Sudan, but a recent report by the UN group of experts made clear that the UN arms embargo continues to be widely flouted, including by the NCP and Darfur rebel groups. Respect for the arms embargo should be considered a key benchmark, and stronger enforcement by the UN Security Council is an important step towards improving the security environment.
A functioning ceasefire in Darfur will also be a key benchmark of progress – as long as this ceasefire is also tied to a viable and advancing peace process.
Over the long term, there is probably no better barometer for the relative success or failure of the international community than the circumstances of the almost 3 million people who remain displaced or refugees after having been forced to flee from their homes by the government and its allied janjaweed militias. Darfuris are desperate to return home from camps for refugees and the internally displaced, but will only do so if they feel secure. In recent months, the NCP has announced its intention to close down internally displaced persons camps, despite the lack of security.
The NCP should be creating an environment in which returns may occur voluntarily and safely, in keeping with the rights of refugees and displaced persons, and its performance in this regard should be one key measure of progress. The government should also provide restitution for damages and resolution of disputes regarding land rights, since many villages were destroyed and are now reoccupied.
Violence in southern Sudan escalated sharply in the past year, with reports of inter-communal clashes whose intensity and casualties are far more serious than the South’s traditional cattle raids and which triggered significant displacement of civilians. The use of sophisticated weaponry during attacks that deliberately target civilians should raise alarm bells, given the long history of politicization of inter-ethnic conflict in southern Sudan. It also highlights the need for increased attention on security sector reform in the South and attention to the often-violent civilian disarmament campaigns in the South. A recent increase of activity in southern Sudan by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, is another warning sign. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, has accused the NCP of supporting proxy militias and stoking inter-communal tensions, and based on the NCP’s history the United States and others must evaluate these claims very seriously.

Some other key indicators on the security front also include:

Negotiation and implementation of a functioning ceasefire in Darfur.
An end to all provision of weapons, training, or supplies of financing to paramilitary militia groups in the North, South, or Darfur.
Full cooperation from all parties to facilitate UN peacekeepers’ freedom of movement and other essential conditions to do their work effectively.
Full compliance by all relevant parties with the UN arms embargo for Darfur.
An end to unlawful aerial bombardment in Darfur.
Increased peace-building efforts by the Government of Southern Sudan to prevent escalation of chronic inter-ethnic fighting.
Standard, clear policies by the SPLA on engagement in tribal conflict, including the respective roles and responsibilities of the army and police services.
Disarmament campaign carried out responsibly by SPLA in consultation with local communities.

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Humanitarian access

While a few of the aid agencies that were expelled from Darfur were allowed to return by the Sudanese government, it is clear that no party can be seen as acting in good faith with regard to existing agreements if humanitarian aid is systematically denied to a population. Right now, the protection sector has been effectively neutered by the NCP. For example, women do not have access to services to deal with sexual and gender-based violence.

To ensure that aid is actually reaching those who need it most, not only do aid organizations need to be let into Darfur, they need to be able to move freely and reach their target populations. Any effort to systematically deny assistance to victims of gender-based violence should also be seen as a powerful and negative benchmark. Another important benchmark is whether the national and state governments are taking concrete steps to curb the spike in attacks and kidnappings of humanitarian workers.

As the administration considers the state of affairs in Sudan, it should assess the current state of humanitarian access, or lack thereof, by engaging with UNAMID and relief agencies operating in Darfur and determining whether or not the NCP or others are obstructing the rights of civilians to access all forms of humanitarian assistance. Any obstruction should trigger immediate consequences from the United States and its allies.

Key benchmarks to consider include:

Agreements to facilitate humanitarian access are being respected and implemented.
Improvement in security for humanitarian organizations, and steps taken to investigate and prosecute attacks on these organizations.
Delivery of sufficient aid, and access for new humanitarian NGOs, as needed, to reach vulnerable populations.
Freedom for humanitarian organizations to report honestly on conditions on the ground.
Aid agencies allowed to fully implement programs assisting women who have been victims of sexual violence or other forms of abuse.

Darfur Peace Process

Given the interrelated nature of Sudan’s multiple crises, the state of the Darfur peace process should be considered as a barometer of the overall process in Sudan. Although the NCP has stated that it is willing to negotiate, it has failed to adhere to multiple commitments in Darfur and the current process lacks the credibility needed to attract all parties to the table. The United States and other external actors, therefore, should construct a viable process and press the Sudanese government, rebel groups, and key civil society actors to come to the table and negotiate in good faith.

Experts have already outlined a way forward for the Darfur peace process thatc calls for the United States and others to work with the joint United Nations/African Union mediation team to put forward a common framework for a peace agreement. In the interim, efforts should continue to unify various rebel movements and to allow independent civil society groups to reach broad consensus on a position for negotiations.

Key steps for a just and sustainable peace that policymakers should be looking for include:

Establishment of an inclusive peace process.
Pre-existing commitments made in earlier talks and agreements fulfilled by the parties.
Practical steps on the ground taken by parties to promote peace and improve security.
Credible and independent civil society groups allowed to freely participate in the peace process without obstruction of their travel or right to assemble.
Concrete steps toward accountability for crimes committed in Darfur, including prosecution of soldiers, militia, and rebels who perpetrated attacks on civilians.

Abyei

Despite the NCP and SPLM’s stated acceptance of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or PCA, on the boundary of Abyei, this oil-rich region remains a major flashpoint. The signs are not good. The committee established to oversee implementation of the ruling, has been unable to fully demarcate the border because of political obstruction. The government has not transferred funds needed for development, and many people displaced in the May 2008 clashes have not yet returned. Both parties need to do more to prevent conflict in Abyei and to ensure that its residents are allowed to vote in a self-determination referendum in 2011. These include the following:

Rapid and mutually agreed upon formation of the Abyei referendum commission.
Full implementation of the Abyei Protocol and PCA’s ruling.
Unreserved support for demarcation of the border.
Support for a process to develop guarantees for nomadic tribes to access traditional grazing lands.
Development of the popular consultation process (see below) to promote popular political transition in Southern Kordofan.
Improved monitoring of Abyei’s oil revenues, payment of past arrears from Khartoum to Juba, and transparent functioning of the Unity Fund.

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Elections

The April 2010 election will be a key test for all of the parties to Sudan’s multiple conflicts. Although the elections are less than 90 days away, the environment for them to be free and fair does not exist. In the northern states, security forces have continued to crack down on opposition parties and activists. In Darfur, a large military presence and ongoing insecurity is likely to prevent people from voting freely – if at all.

While the SPLM and the NCP appear willing to bargain with regard to the 2010 elections, it is vital that the administration take a critical look at violence around the election, the ability of candidates from all parties to campaign effectively, freedom of the press and assembly, as well as vote buying, intimidation, and other efforts to manipulate popular will. Moreover, given the prevailing security conditions in Darfur, it is also challenging to imagine how Darfuris will see their rights of enfranchisement respected. There are widespread concerns that a vote held in April 2010 would only serve to disenfranchise huge number of Darfuris while making it more difficult for them to reclaim the rights to lands from which they were forced.

If the election is not credible, the United States and others must be prepared to not recognize the results and impose a clear cost on those who denied the Sudanese the right to elect their leaders.

Other key benchmarks in the run-up toward the elections include:

Sudan’s constitutional protections of freedoms of assembly and expression ensured by the NCP and SPLM in the context of the current electoral process in northern and southern Sudan, respectively.
Sudanese media free to cover and report on election related events, trends, and developments.
Effective response by Sudan’s National Electoral Commission, or NEC, to concerns expressed by international and domestic monitoring bodies – including political party representatives – during the voter registration process in order to prepare for the polling period in April, including investigating claims of fraud.
International and domestic monitors granted freedom of movement and freedom to report on election related activities in the coming months.
Concerted steps by the NCP and SPLM to prevent electoral violence.
Active measures by the NEC to educate Sudanese voters on the electoral process, particularly in areas with comparatively low levels of voter registration.

Popular Consultations

The popular consultations for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states will be crucial in determining whether peace holds in these strategic border regions. Renewed conflict in either region could quickly spread, and carries a high risk of escalating along broader North-South lines because of the local SPLA forces from these areas. These processes must live up to their name – to be both popular and consultative – for the citizens from these states to feel they have a genuine stake in their political future. The recent passing of the population consultation law is a positive step, but much remains to be done in a short time frame for this process to succeed.

The administration should closely monitor the preparations underway in both states, and determine whether the parties are providing the necessary political space and requisite security for communities to peacefully learn and engage in the popular consultation processes. As the popular consultations are meant to be carried out by the newly elected state legislatures, contingency planning should also be encouraged to explore alternatives to support these processes if elections do not take place as planned.

Necessary steps for peaceful and successful popular consultations, and sustainable peace in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, include the following:

Progress on the demarcation of the Abyei and North/South borders, including resolution of border disputes on southern borders of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Processes for broad engagement with constituencies throughout the two states.
Improved integration of the Joint/Integrated Units, police, and state administrations.
Political space and security for free and fair elections.

Southern Referendum

The agreements reached between the NCP and the SPLM on a package of laws related to the upcoming election and referendum are important steps, but do not outweigh the accumulated actions over previous months. It is crucial to remember that in its 20-year and counting rule of Sudan, the NCP has signed numerous agreements and has always been slow, if not entirely unwilling, to implement them. Even the recently announced agreements again deferred discussions of key elements related to the referendum to a later date, highlighting the dramatic mistrust between the lead parties. In terms of benchmarks, key steps and questions for the coming year include:

Rapid and mutually agreed upon formation of the southern Sudan referendum commission.
Progress toward the full demarcation of the North-South border.
No use of direct or proxy violence in an effort to derail the referendum.
No actions that subvert the will of the people in casting their votes freely.
Neither party negotiating in such a way that makes direct North-South violence more likely.

It is important to not simply make it to the referendum without war breaking out and keeping the existing peace agreement intact, but also to have a series of agreements in place for the days, months, and years after the referendum – on borders, revenue sharing, assets, water rights, and the many other factors that could precipitate a return to conflict. The willingness and ability of the parties to credibly engage in these post-referendum vote discussions in good faith should also be considered a key benchmark.

Accountability

As much as some would like to push accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan aside, to do so would neither be productive nor right. The policy review the Obama administration produced made the case that without accountability in Sudan, peace will likely prove elusive. The International Criminal Court, or ICC, has found sufficient evidence against Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, to accuse him of multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet the ICC will only ever deal with a handful of individuals. Combating the culture of impunity in Sudan is a basic prerequisite to sustainable peace. Any disucssion of progress in Sudan should consider:

Cooperation with the ICC or agreement to a robust accountability mechanism, such as the African Union’s recently proposed hybrid court for Darfur.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Obama administration will also consider Khartoum’s cooperation on counter-terrorism issues as another key benchmark for its performance. However, given the largely non-transparent nature of this indicator, we did not include it in our list above. It is important to note that although the administration’s own policy statements have noted that counter-terrorism cooperation is one of a number of factors being included in its internal evaluation, this priority does not preclude the importance of significant progress on other fronts.

The Obama administration has rightly demanded an approach to Sudan that is based on demonstrable change on the ground. Just as the administration has made clear that it will hold the parties in Sudan accountable for their actions, so too will activists and policymakers hold the Obama administration accountable for whether and how it consistently uses benchmarks to deploy pressures and incentives.