Sudan Peace and Democracy Watch

By Omer Ismail
Updated on July 21, 2008

Peace will not come to Darfur in isolation. If Southern Sudan goes back to war, then there will be no chance for peace in Darfur. If Chad remains on fire, Darfur will continue to burn. If the Lord's Resistance Army continues to undermine regional security, peace in all of Sudan remains more elusive. And peace will not be lasting in Sudan until there is a more inclusive, democratic governing system in the country.

1. Latest Updates
2. What is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?
3. What is the Darfur peace process?
4. How are the CPA and the Darfur peace process related?
5. Why does ENOUGH support a democratic transformation in Sudan?
6. What is the status of CPA implementation?
6.1 What is the impasse over Abyei?
6.2 What is the status of the elections?
6.3 What is the future of the self-determination referendum?
7. What is the status of the Darfur peace talks?
7.1 What are the rebels saying?
7.2 What are Darfurians saying?
7.3 What are Darfurians in the Diaspora saying?
7.4 What about the Sudan/Chad proxy war?

The Sudan Peace and Democracy Watch is a Q&A that addresses efforts to implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA, achieve a lasting peace for Darfur, and promote the democratic transformation of Sudan.

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1. Latest Updates


The ICC and the Bashir Indictment:

On July 14, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, or ICC, requested that the Court issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Mr. Ocampo presented compelling evidence that the regime of President Bashir was involved in the design, financing, logistics, and execution of crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur, which the United States has labeled genocide. An indictment—if granted by the three judges on the pre-trial panel—will serve as a deterrent for future genocidaires, sending a strong message that criminal leaders cannot escape accountability for their offenses by appealing to state sovereignty.

Ocampo’s move elicited strong criticism from several circles, on the grounds that the move will undermine the peace process (though one scarcely exists) in Darfur. Some also predict that the regime will accelerate its campaign of terror against the people of Darfur, and may target humanitarian workers and the U.N./AU hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur—worsening an already catastrophic situation. These risks are real. Yet there is an equally real possibility that Bashir’s indictment will create an environment more conducive to a productive peace process. ENOUGH believes that until we create consequences for the commission of genocide, the crimes in Darfur—and elsewhere—will continue. Only by ending impunity and establishing accountability can we stop such atrocities. The past indictments of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor, for example, contributed dramatically to peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia and Liberia, respectively.

For more background, read ENOUGH’s latest report The Merits of Justice.

A New Darfur Mediator:

The U.N. has confirmed Djibril Bassolé, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, as head mediator for Darfur. He replaces the joint mediation team of Jan Eliasson of Sweden and Salim Salim of Tanzania. According to the news source Afriquenligne:

The UN said Bassole would work to mediate between the Sudanese government and Darfur rebels. It said the new envoy would work on a full-time basis from El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state and headquarters of the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force in the region (UNAMID).

Afriquenligne also reported that Mr. Salim and Mr. Eliasson will remain available for consultation or engagement as required. Mr Bassolé’s credentials include his role in the signing of the Ouagadougou peace agreement, which ended the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. He helped broker a power sharing agreement that brought the rebel leader Guillaume Soro to the position of Prime Minister in the government of President Laurent Gbagbo.

In a joint letter to Mr. Bassolé, ENOUGH and the Save Darfur Coalition urged the new mediator to revive the stalled peace process, speed up deployment of the AU/U.N. hybrid force for Darfur, or UNAMID, and support accountability for human rights abuses. The letter further argues that countries with leverage over Sudan need to exercise pressure on Khartoum and the rebel groups to negotiate in good faith to end the violence. Finally, the letter encouraged Mr. Bassolé to conduct wide consultations among non-combatants in Darfur by listening to the voices of civil society and community leaders. By including all stake-holders inside Darfur and in the Diaspora, Mr. Bassolé can usefully widen the base of participation in the coming talks. The letter included a short list of major demands articulated by Darfurians from all walks of life.

The U.N. Security Council’s visit: Activists speak out

In early June, the U.N. Security Council visited Khartoum with a long agenda aiming to promote peace in Sudan. First and foremost, the Council sought to press the Sudanese government to allow UNAMID’s full deployment. Of 26,000 authorized troops, only 9,000 are currently on the ground—and the vast majority of those are simply ill equipped AU soldiers wearing different hats. One of the reasons for the delay is Khartoum’s objections to non-African troops; another is the government’s deliberate moves to obstruct the delivery of necessary equipment to the force. Unsurprisingly, the Security Council members got an earful of promises from Khartoum, but the regime put strict limits on where the delegation could travel in Darfur. In the end, the Security Council was only able to visit one internally displaced persons camp (Zamzam Camp), near El Fashir.
On June 17, the United States delegation at the U.N. convened an informal meeting of the Security Council. At the meeting, activists and experts urged Council members to end impunity in Sudan by pushing Khartoum to cooperate with the ICC and surrender the indictees Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb. (The Council’s visit and this meeting occurred before the Chief Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant against President Bashir). Others focused on the issue of the political protection that the GoS enjoys from permanent UNSC members Russia and China. John Prendergast, co-founder of ENOUGH, maintained that if China does not contribute substantively to resolving the conflict in Darfur, “we are going to see Sudan burn—and one of the first things that is going to burn is China's own economic interests”. Actress/activist Mia Farrow was critical of China’s role as Sudan’s protector on the Security Council. "I don't think the government of Sudan could have continued in this way for more than five years without the knowledge that it has the support of a giant—and that giant is China," Ms. Farrow said.

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2. What is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?

Signed on January 9, 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the 22-year civil war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, a rebel movement based in the South of the country. The United States worked tirelessly with a regional mediation team from the regional organization IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and a core group of allies—the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy—to push the parties toward a final deal and has a significant stake in keeping the CPA on track.

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3. What is the Darfur peace process?

Since early 2004, the international community has engaged in sporadic efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement for Darfur. These efforts yielded the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006, but only one major rebel leader signed that flawed agreement. This led to further fragmentation of the rebel groups and complicated current peacemaking efforts, which are stalled The recent appointment of a new joint U.N./AU mediator—Burkina Faso Foreign Minister Djibril Yipènè Bassolé — could help jump-start this process.

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4. How are the CPA and the Darfur peace process related?

Negotiating peace in Darfur requires a commitment to implementing the CPA, and vice versa (see ENOUGH report An All Sudan Solution). Interlocking peace agreements which address power imbalances in Sudanese society and lay the groundwork for democratic change are the best chance for an end to cycles of genocide, crimes against humanity, dictatorship, and deadly conflict in Sudan. The challenge for the joint U.N./AU negotiating team for Darfur is to broker an agreement that fits within the framework for democratic transformation established by the CPA.

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5. Why does ENOUGH support a democratic transformation in Sudan?

By setting forth a timetable for elections, the CPA seeks to give Sudanese citizens significantly more control over how their country is governed. The fundamental cause of war throughout Sudan is the concentration of wealth and absolute power in the hands of unrepresentative elites—principally the ruling National Congress Party, or NCP. The establishment of strong democratic institutions and processes in Sudan will be a key prerequisite for peace because in a free and fair election the NCP would almost certainly lose its firm grip on power. (see ENOUGH report Democracy: A Key to Peace in Sudan). Legitimate elections have the potential to reshape the distribution of political power at all levels of governance in Sudan. Elections are mandated to take place next year at six levels of government: the Presidency of the Government of National Unity, the Presidency of the Government of Southern Sudan, the National Assembly in Khartoum, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in Juba, 25 State Legislatures, and 25 State Governors.

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6. What is the status of CPA implementation?

For two years, the SPLM has expressed frustration at the snail’s pace implementation of the CPA, and blames the NCP for its lack of commitment to peace and the democratic transformation of the country. In October 2007, that frustration led the SPLM to suspend its participation in and recall its ministers from the Government of National Unity. Agreement was reached in late December to return to the Unity government, but critical issues remain unaddressed.

Several significant milestones must be achieved to implement the CPA, the most important of which are resolving the impasse over the oil-rich area of Abyei, carrying out free-and-fair national elections, and completing the referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan. The cost of failure is immense: a likely return to war that would devastate the South and doom peace efforts in Darfur.

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6.1 What is the impasse over Abyei?

Abyei remains the most dangerous flash point in South Sudan and threatens to become the trigger that will return the two parties to war in the absence of significant diplomatic action. Both the SPLM and NCP claim the area of Abyei is owned by their respective supporters, the Ngok Dinka or the Arab Missiriya. The NCP’s rejection of the July 2005 Abyei Border Commission report—defining the North-South border in the oil-rich area of Abyei—did not bode well for the implementation of the CPA. While the SPLM accepted the commission’s report, the NCP alleged favoritism to the Dinka in that report and consequently denounced it. The NCP’s rejection of the “final and binding report” may have damaging consequences to Sudan’s peace and stability as a whole. Abyei has become the litmus test that will reveal the will of the parties, in particular the NCP, to achieve lasting peace.

Because of Bashir’s rejection of the Abyei Protocol, the local government provided for in the Protocol has never been established. As a result, the two percent of revenues generated from oil extracted in the Abyei area remain unavailable to help improve public services in Abyei, further heightening tensions. Although Khartoum’s oil transactions are thoroughly opaque, if reports that the NCP is in a rush to essentially drain those oil deposits geographically subject to the Abyei Protocol are accurate, Abyei’s economic situation could be negatively affected well into the future.

In May 2008, Brigade 31 of the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, displaced the entire civilian population—some 50,000 people—and burned Abyei’s market and housing to the ground. (see ENOUGH report Abyei Aflame [37] for the latest analysis) Two rounds of discussions between the NCP and SPLM, ended on June 8 when the parties agreed to a “road map” to contain the violence. Subsequent talks in Juba, the NCP and SPLM failed to reach an agreement on implementation of the Abyei Protocol within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On June 22, the parties concluded that the best way forward is to submit the dispute the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or PCA, in The Hague to make another “final and binding” ruling.

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6.2 What is the status of the elections?

After repeated delays and snags, the census—a critical prerequisite to holding elections—officially ended on May 6, 2008. An estimated 90-95 percent of the South Sudanese population was counted although certain villages in the South were not fully accounted for due to insecurity and heavy rainfall. And in the Darfur region of western Sudan, where a war has been raging on for over five years, the census was seriously hindered by violence and the lack of access to many parts of the region. Some of the data collectors were detained by rebel groups for brief periods of time, and once released, were unable to carry out their mission. The massive displaced populations were excluded from the count, ostensibly because relief organizations have records of all the camp inhabitants that may be added to the census later. So far no preliminary results have been published to explain how the census was conducted and what percentage of the country was covered. Serious doubts remain as to whether this census will yield any credible information necessary to determining the power and wealth sharing in the country, let alone serving as a crucial tool to conduct the up coming elections, if it is to be free and fair.

On July 7, after much wrangling, the Sudan Election Law cleared Parliament. The NCP, the SPLM, and other opposition parties agreed to begin preparations for parliamentary and presidential elections to take place in late 2009. Opposition parties agreed to pass the law in Parliament in spite of reservations about certain provisions in order to avoid a delay of elections which, they argue, would give the NCP greater advantage. Nonetheless, obstacles to free and fair elections remain. Yassir Arman, a leading figure in the SPLM and a Parliamentarian from the junior partner in the Government of National Unity was quoted as saying “"The press and media law, the national security law and even the criminal laws much [must] be changed," said Yasir Arman, "We cannot have free and fair elections without having new laws".

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6.3 What is the future of the self-determination referendum?

The premise of the CPA is that during the six years between the signing of the agreement in 2005 and the self-determination referendum in 2011, the NCP, SPLM, and the agreement’s international guarantors and supporters work to “make unity attractive,” thereby increasing the likelihood that Southerners would vote for national unity. However, given that the war was fought principally in the South and Southerners were the primary victims of a conflict that killed 2 million people, the burden to make unity attractive rests overwhelmingly with the NCP in Khartoum. The clock is ticking, and the NCP must soon demonstrate a real commitment to unity. At this juncture, the chances for a vote for unity seem more remote and Southern independence more probable.

7. What is the status of the Darfur peace talks?

Hopes were high for peace talks that convened in early November 2007 in Sirte, Libya. (see ENOUGH Report, A Strategy for Success in Sirte) However, the U.N./AU joint mediation team made a critical mistake by trying to unify the more than 25 rebel groups and assemble them all in one place without a clearly defined vision for an end state that resonates with Darfur’s civilian population. A critical majority of the rebel groups refused to attend the talks, and the mediators delayed the process to get more of the rebels on board. Salim and Eliason lacked a clear strategy on how to bring the rebels to the table, running the risk of dragging the process to a point that renders the attempted solutions unworkable to all parties.

Consultations aimed at reviving the Darfur peace process are sputtering along dual tracks, and missing a crucial third track.

• The first track is direct negotiation between the parties, which have all but ground to a halt. In an effort to resuscitate the talks in Sirte, Libya, the AU/U.N. mediation kept the lights on by maintained a scant presence of the parties that attended the opening session. The Libyans placed high hopes on their efforts to bring back the parties to the table, but the Libya track has reached a dead end. Various other proposals, such as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s offer to host talks in the United Kingdom, have failed to generate any new momentum.

• The second track must be strengthened immediately: broader consultations with civil society groups in Darfur, including the community leaders among displaced people, women’s groups, and tribal chiefs. Creating such a forum would lead to a wider consensus among Darfurians on the issues that matter the most to them, and help bring to the table the non-rebel component that has been conspicuously absent from the peace process thus far. Critical to the success of this dialogue is the legitimacy of the participants, who should include the Arab tribes who seek a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Mediators must be cognizant, however, that a large number of actors could hamstring the process, and seek to overcome this constraint by presenting concrete proposals.

• The missing track is aggressive shuttle diplomacy—visiting rebel leaders, government officials, and regional actors—using a draft agreement to reinvigorate the talks. (see ENOUGH Report, A Strategy for Success in Sirte for detailed discussion of shuttle diplomacy)

Given the inadequacy of these efforts, the JEM attack near Khartoum, and the violence erupting in Abyei, it is safe to say that the Darfur peace process is stalled. The mediation has nothing new to offer, the Libyans are in Sirte waiting for the rebel groups to show up, and the rebels in turn are waiting for a miracle to put this process back on track. A meeting in Geneva in mid-March 2008 on the future of the peace process was inconclusive, and provided no new energy or ideas on the way forward.

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7.1 What are the rebels saying?

So far, five rebel groupings have emerged:

1. JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim and Ahmed Tugud Lisan.
2. SLA Unity, comprised of Suliman Jamous, Sharif Hareer and Abdalla Yahia and other commandors from the former G-19.
3. SLA Abdelshafie, consisting of five rebel groups still in Juba, South Sudan.
4. SLA Abdelwahid.
5. URF, the group of Bahar Abu Garda, former Secretary General of JEM, together with commanders Adam Bakhit, Adam Shougar, Abdallan Banda and Khamis Abdalla Abbakar, formerly of G-19 and the National Resistance Front, or NRF, formed with Eritrean backing in 2006.

Khalil Ibrahim has called for one-on-one negotiations between JEM and the government, citing the strength of JEM on the ground and refusing to include what he called the “media rebels” in the coming peace talks. Recent attacks by JEM in Omdurman, a suburb city of Sudan’s capital of Khartoum, possibly were meant to “slap” the governing National Congress Party so that JEM could cut a power sharing deal with the ruling party—without the other Darfur factions. This will further complicate an already difficult situation facing the mediators, and it underscores the urgent need for a credible peace process to deal with the crisis in Darfur.

Negotiations began in late June in Chad between rebel factions—including JEM, URF, and SLA Unity—concerning the possibility of yet another new alliance. The talks, mediated by Chadian President Deby, are scheduled to conclude at the end of July and the outcome could impact the future of the peace process. However, any new alliance of rebel factions would face the same obstacles that previous alliances have faced—principally a profound lack of trust and historical animosities between various personalities within the rebel movements.

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7.2 What are Darfurians saying?

Civil society leaders (and many rebel leaders) want the mediation team to present a draft agreement to begin a new round of discussions. “The time for shuttle diplomacy is over,” says Professor Mahmoud Mousa Mahmoud, a leading Darfurian civil society activist in Khartoum. “We would like to see real engagement with Darfurians of all walks of life, not just the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups.”

When U.N. Envoy Eliasson met in December with rebel leaders and tribal chiefs, he was confronted by leaders of displaced communities who told him that he is not welcome in Darfur partly because of statements he made about arms in the displaced persons’ camps. One of the camp leaders accused Eliasson of “marketing Khartoum’s false propaganda.” The camp leader continued, “[Eliasson] tries every time he comes to Darfur to distort our cause.” Community leaders reiterated their demand for quick deployment of the U.N./AU peacekeeping force and expressed great skepticism about the viability of Libya as a venue for meaningful peace talks because of the negative influence of Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi.

Inside Darfur, the dialogue between community leaders and civil society organizations continued, creating several networks of leaders who are in regular contact with Darfurians abroad. One such network is the Darfur Working Group, which is headed by prominent community leaders inside Sudan and in the Diaspora. According to Dr. Hamid Ali, “the efforts of the Darfur Working Group are geared toward rallying Darfurians behind a goal of sustainable peace and unity among all ethnic groups.”

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7.3 What are Darfurians in the Diaspora saying?

The failure of Sirte resulted in a surge of activity in the Diaspora. In the United States, for instance, the Save Darfur Coalition, the law firm Baker and McKenzie, the Public International Law & Policy Group, and the U.S. Institute for Peace have collectively sponsored two workshops for the Darfurian civil society leaders in the United States. The Darfur Leaders Network benefited from marathon training on negotiations and other skills that yielded six draft documents covering the issues that are likely to be on the table in the coming rounds of peace talks (whenever and wherever they convene). Several committees were formed to contact civil society actors inside Darfur, rebel groups as well as Darfurian Diaspora elsewhere for a buy-in on these issues, and a wider discussion prior to the next talks.

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7.4. What about the Sudan/Chad Proxy War?

On March 13, 2008, Sudan and Chad signed an accord in Dakar, Senegal that calls for the cessation of hostilities between the two countries and a curb on the activities of each others’ rebels operating within their respective territories. The non-aggression deal —the fourth such deal since 2006—was brokered by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, who has actively taken part in several similar attempts before, without the participation of the major rebel groups from both countries. Dubbed a “miracle” by Abdoulaye Wade, and praised by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the French Government, the accord was scorned by Chadian rebels, who said it does “not concern” them and vowed to continue their challenge to Chadian President Idriss Deby.

In conversations with ENOUGH, Timane Erdimi, the head of RFC, who was speaking from Khartoum, and Mohamat Nouri of the National Alliance, who was speaking from Chad, both rejected the deal and threatened to “halt the flow of oil” by attacking the Doba Basin, from which Chad exports over 160,000 barrels of oil a day. But following the attacks by JEM near Khartoum, Sudan cut off all diplomatic ties with Chad. (see ENOUGH report, Nasty Neighbors). The Chadian government denies any involvement in the attack, despite ample evidence of its support for some Sudanese rebel factions. In mid-June, Chadian rebels supported by Khartoum attacked a government garrison in the eastern town of Goz Beida. Against this violent backdrop, Chadian and Sudanese officials continue to discuss implementation of the Dakar agreement. However, there is little to indicate that this deal will prove more successful than the previous regional peace efforts.

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